
Qass£lH2__ 



SEMICENTENNIAL PUBLICATIONS 

OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 




1868-1918 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

l 

IN SOUTH AMERICA 
1730-1806 



BY 

BERNARD MOSES 



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS 
BERKELEY 

1919 






COPTBIGHT, 1919 
BY 

BERNARD MOSES 



n. #f B. 

SEP 25 jy20 




^ 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

The Beginnings of a New Society 

I. Eelation of the Spaniards to the Indians. II. 
Spaniards, Creoles, and Mestizos. III. The new society. 

1-11 

CHAPTER II 

State of the Spanish Dependencies in South America, 
1730-1750 

I. Peru in the beginning of the period. II. The after- 
math of Antequera's rebellion. III. The controversy 
concerning Colonia. IV. Montevideo and Tucuman. V. 
Two decades of Chilean affairs. VI. The University of 
Chile. VII. New Granada under the last colonial presi- 
dents. VIII. The state of Quito. IX. The reestablished 
viceroyalty of New Granada. X. Santo Thome and the 
missions of the plains. XI. The little revolution of 
Trinidad. 12-72 

CHAPTER III 

The Spanish-Portuguese Boundary Treaty of 1750 
and the War of the Seven Reductions 

I. Terms of the treaty of 1750. II. Protests of the 
Indians against removal. III. The boundary commis- 
sioners and the disposition of the Indians. IV. Active 
hostilities of the Spanish and Portuguese against the 
Indians of the seven reductions. V. "Emperor" Nich- 
olas Nanguiru, further hostilities, and preparations for 
exile. VI. Failure of the campaign and the abrogation 
of the treaty. 73-96 



iv SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

CHAPTER IV 

The Expulsion of the Jesuits 

I. Viceroy Amat and the monopoly of alcohol. II. 
Juan Diaz Herrera and the revolt in Quito. III. The 
controversy respecting the Jesuits. IV. The decree of 
expulsion. V. The removal of the Jesuits from the 
towns of Rio de la Plata. VI. The missionaries of the 
Chaco and the region about Sierra de la Cruz. VII. The 
expulsion of the Jesuits from the reductions of Para- 
guay. VIII. The Jesuits of Peru. IX. The Jesuits of 
Chile. X. Their removal. XI. The expulsion from 
Ecuador. XII. The Jesuits removed from Bogota and 
the other towns of New Granada. XIII. The Jesuits 
of the llanos. XIV. The Jesuits in exile. 97-152 

CHAPTER V 

The Creation of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata 

I. The need of a new vieeroyalty, and the functions 
of the viceroy. II. The audiencia of Charcas and the 
creation of the viceroyatly of Rio de la Plata. III. 
Viceroy Ceballos and his army. IV. The Spanish- 
Portuguese treaty of 1777. V. The commercial code of 
1778. VI. Viceroy Vertiz. VII. Fernandez general in- 
tendant of the army and the royal treasury. 153-173 

CHAPTER VI 

The Revolt of Tupac Amaru 

I. Abuse of the Indians by the Corregidors. II. 
Areche as visitador-general. III. Tupac Amaru. IV. 
The beginning of hostilities. V. The events of Oruro 
and Sangarara. VI. Hopes and aims of Tupac Amaru. 
VII. The overthrow and execution of the Inca. VIII. 
The sieges of Sorata and La Paz. IX. Results of the 
war. 174-203 



CONTENTS v 

CHAPTER VII 

The Rebellion op the Communeros in New Granada 

I. Viceroy Florez and the visitador-regente Pifieres. 
II. The outbreak in Socorro. III. Organization of the 
Comun under Berbeo, and the battle of Puente Real. 

IV. The advance on Bogota, and the flight of the regent. 

V. The negotiations and the agreement. VI. Galan and 
the new revolt. VII. The Indians of Nemocon, and the 
conclusion of the conflict. 204-226 

CHAPTER VIII 
The Conspiracy op Gramuset and Bernet 
I. The revolt under Amat, governor and captain- 
general of Chile. II. The conspiracy of Gramuset and 
Berney. III. The arrest and imprisonment of the con- 
spirators. 227-240 

CHAPTER IX 

The Reorganization of the Vicerotalty of 
Rio de la Plata 

I. The Ordinanza de Intendentes. II. Status and 
functions of the intendants. III. The ordinance applied 
in Peru and Chile. IV. The reformed ordinance of 
1801. V. The state of Buenos Aires and the adjacent 
country. 241-255 

CHAPTER X 

Awakening Interest in Science and Politics: Mutis 
and Narino 

I. Beginnings of literary cultivation. II. El Mer- 
curio Peruano; Papel Periodico. III. Mutis' arrival 
and early years in New Granada. IV. Mutis turns to 
Botany; correspondence with Linnaeus. V. Work of 
Caballero y Gongora for progress. VI. The Botanical 



vi SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Expedition. VII. The viceroy ordered to protect the 
Isthmus against invasion. VIII. The viceroy's commer- 
cial views. IX. Botanical Bureau's headquarters trans- 
ferred to Bogota. X. The Spanish Botanical Expedition 
to Peru. XI. Narino and the young reformers and their 
trial. XII. Narino in Europe; his return to New Gra- 
nada and imprisonment. 256-291 

CHAPTER XI 

Lima and Santiago at the End of the Century 

I. The position and external form of Lima. II. The 
earthquake of 1746. III. The court of the viceroy and 
the institutions of Lima. IV. Social characteristics. V. 
Santiago de Chile. VI. The classes. 292-309 

CHAPTER XII 

The State of Venezuela and Miranda's Expedition 

I. External attempts to overthrow Spanish rule. II. 
The captaincy-general of Venezuela. III. The revolt led 
by Espana and Gaul in 1797. IV. Manners and senti- 
ments of the inhabitants of Venezuela. V. The unem- 
ployed and the remedy. VI. The economic confusion in 
the province. VII. Miranda's project. VIII. Plans of 
Great Britain and the United States. IX. The expedi- 
tion from the United States. 311-336 

CHAPTER XIII 

The British Capture and Loss of Buenos Aires 

I. The trade of Buenos Aires. II. Plans of Great 
Britain respecting ■ South America. III. The British 
advance and capture of the city. IV. Liniers and the 
overthrow of Beresford. V. The cabildo and Liniers in 
power. VI. British reinforcements and the recall of 
Popham. VII. The final British attack. 337-370 



CONTENTS vii 

CHAPTER XIV 

Peru and Chile at the Beginning of the Nineteenth 
Century 

I. The viceroys. II. El Mercurio Peruano. 3. Am- 
brosio O'Higgins. IV. The Araueanian question. V. 
Agriculture and the system of encomiendas. VI. Fear 
of foreign trade and foreign ideas. VII. The last vice- 
roy of the eighteenth century. VIII. The population. 
IX. Commerce and industry. X. Titles of nobility 
and entailed estates. XI. Life in the country. XII. 
Hindrances to production. XIII. Royal drafts on the 
resources. 372-426 

INDEX 427 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER IN 
SOUTH AMERICA 

INTRODUCTION 
Spanish South America in the last decades of 
its dependence on Spain gave evidence of a de- 
cline in Spain's governmental authority and 
efficiency. The practice of the crown in confer- 
ring important offices in America only upon 
persons sent from Spain moved the Creoles and 
mestizos gradually to constitute themselves a 
society apart from the Spaniards. This society 
drifted inevitably into opposition to the estab- 
lished administration, and led revolts against the 
government. These revolts, in many instances, 
were immediately occasioned by the imposition of 
specific fiscal burdens, and they indicate that the 
colonies were slipping from the grasp of Spain 
even before the creole-mestizo element in the 
population had clearly formed a design for eman- 
cipation. The expulsion of the Jesuits deprived 
the dependencies of their ablest and most effective 
teachers, and took from the industrial and com- 
mercial life some of the most energetic and far- 
sighted entrepreneurs. By this act, moreover, 
the government removed the only body of resi- 



x SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

dents who manifested any clear conception of the 
proper relations to be maintained between the 
Spaniards and the Indians. The manner in which 
the development of interest in science and politics 
contributed to the spirit of patriotic independence 
is illustrated by the careers of Mutis and Narifio. 
The outlook towards independence is further pre- 
sented in the negotiations and expedition of 
Miranda and the heroic defense and recapture of 
Buenos Aires by the citizens after Viceroy Sobre- 
monte had ignominiously abandoned the field. 

The stage on which these scenes were enacted 
was the part of the territory of South America 
then held by Spain and now claimed by Venezuela, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argen- 
tina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. It embraces three 
of the four great river systems of the southern 
continent; those of the Orinoco, the Magdalena, 
and the Eio de la Plata. The principal geograph- 
ical features of Venezuela are the mountains and 
the hilly country, occupying the northern and 
western parts of the territory, and the llanos, or 
plains, comprising the basin of the Orinoco, and 
extending from the western mountains to the 
delta of that river, an area of two hundred thou- 
sand square miles. In some parts of the plains 
there are low mesas, the remnants of an ancient 
plateau that has been gradually worn away by 
erosion. Other parts of this region are as level 
as the undisturbed ocean. Here nature, by the 
vigorous growth that follows the abundant rains, 



INTRODUCTION xi 

resists the encroachments of man's cultivation, 
and hitherto has tolerated only the pastoral life 
of semi-nomads. In agreeable and fertile valleys, 
between the mountain ridges and the plains, lie 
a number of the principal centers of population 
that were slowly developed during the colonial 
period. Caracas, the most important of these, is 
about six miles from the port of La Guayra, at an 
elevation of three thousand feet above the level 
of the sea. Although within the tropics, this eleva- 
tion ensures it a mild climate; the temperature 
ranges annually from 66° to 75°. In the colonial 
period, a road over the mountain was practically 
the only line of connection between the city and 
its port, but traffic by this route was greatly 
diminished by the opening of a railroad between 
the two places in 1883. Valencia and Barquisi- 
meto are two other towns that lie within this 
zone of eternal spring. The former, near Lake 
Valencia, at an elevation of sixteen hundred and 
twenty-five feet, is a little warmer than Caracas, 
having a range of temperature from 66° to 87°, 
with an annual mean of 76°. Barquisimeto lies 
about two thousand feet above the sea. These 
interior towns have outrun in prosperity the 
earlier settlements of Coro and Cumana, near the 
coast. 

The part of the viceroyalty of New Granada 
that became the territory of Colombia extended 
along the Atlantic between fifteen hundred and 
sixteen hundred miles, and had a Pacific coast of 



xii SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

nearly the same extent. But in spite of the king- 
dom's more than three thousand miles of ocean 
coast, the real entrance to the country was, and 
has continued to be, the Magdalena Eiver. It was 
by this water route that Quesada advanced to the 
land of the Chibchas, and founded Bogota on the 
plateau of Cundinamarca. Santa Marta and Car- 
tagena on the coast, the former east of the river 
and the latter west of it, were founded before 
any interior settlements, and remained important, 
particularly Cartagena, throughout the colonial 
period. Cartagena, with its excellent harbor, 
became the halting place for vessels engaged in 
trade with Peru, bound from Spain to the Isthmus. 
It was regarded as the bulwark of the country, 
and vast sums were expended on its walls and 
other defences. But Bogota, established far from 
the coast and at an elevation of eight thousand 
six hundred and eighty feet above the level of 
the sea, became the political and ecclesiastical 
capital, and was reached from the northern coast 
only by a long journey on the Magdalena Eiver to 
Honda, and by a difficult mountain trail from 
Honda to the plateau on which the city stands. 
Of the valleys of the tributaries of the Magdalena, 
that of the Cauca Eiver was destined to become 
especially important by reason of its fertility and 
agreeable climate. The independent river Atrato, 
running through the low lands near the western 
coast and flowing into the gulf of Uraba, was some- 
times regarded as furnishing, with the river San 



INTRODUCTION xiii 

Juan, a possible water-way from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific, but its low and marshy valley never 
acquired great significance in the life of the vice- 
royalty. It was at the elevated and isolated cap- 
ital that the real struggle for civilization in this 
part of South America was carried on. 

During the later decades of the colonial period, 
the territory of Ecuador was subject to the vice- 
roy of New Granada, but in some part of the 
period Quito was the seat of an audiencia. This 
city derived some of its significance from the fact 
that it was the capital of a Quichua kingdom be- 
fore the Spanish invasion. Its position in the 
Andean region that extends southward from 
Bogota, at an elevation of 9350 feet above the 
level of the sea, gives it a temperate climate, 
although it lies directly on the equator. It is one 
hundred and fourteen miles from the coast and 
one hundred and sixty-five miles northeast of the 
port of Guayaquil. Through this port Quito had 
its connection with the traffic of the sea. Over 
this long and difficult route it sent out its prod- 
ucts, particularly its textile fabrics, and imported 
much that it consumed of European wares. The 
road begun by Maldonado and designed to reach 
the port near the mouth of the river Esmeraldas 
was never completed, and in consequence of the 
difficulty of communication with the other depen- 
dencies and with Spain, the city and the region 
about it remained of only secondary importance 
in the colonial empire. The positions of both 



xiv SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Bogota and Quito were determined by previous 
establishments of the Indians. The position of 
Lima, on the other hand, was fixed solely by con- 
siderations of convenience and advantage as they 
appeared to the Spaniards. Its founders, after 
due deliberation, decided in 1535 to plant it where 
it now stands, six miles from its port, five hundred 
feet above the sea, and on the banks of the river 
Kimac. In this they broke with the tradition of 
the Indians, who preferred the high lands, the 
slopes of the Andes, to the sandy coast of the 
Pacific, and who had already in Cuzco a consider- 
able city. But the Indians had no need of com- 
merce by the ocean, while this commerce was 
necessary to make useful for the Spaniards the 
wealth of the country. The ocean to the Indians 
was a limit of their lands, not a highway to a mar- 
ket. Under the Spaniards Lima became a market 
and a governmental residence. The wealth of the 
country was drawn from the mines in the moun- 
tains of Upper Peru, now Bolivia, and exchanged at 
Lima for imported European wares. This process 
gave character to two centers of civilization in 
Peru: Lima, the seat of the exchange, and cities, 
such as Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Potosi, that came 
into existence and flourished near the mines. 
They flourished while the mines continued to pour 
out their treasures, but, as the regions where they 
were established were unfavorable for agricul- 
ture, they declined when the mines ceased to yield 
in abundance. With the failure of the mines in 



INTRODUCTION xv 

any given part of the high lands of Upper Peru 
there was no other form of production to provide 
an economic basis for society in the region in 
question. In Chile a different state of things pre- 
vailed. There was much profitable mining in the 
early decades, and the fertile soil offered abun- 
dant rewards for cultivation. When, therefore, 
the mines failed, the colony was able to rely on 
agriculture. The population in the mining regions 
of Peru increased with the prosperity of the 
mines, and diminished with their decline ; in Chile 
it suffered no such fate ; it had a slower but con- 
tinuous growth; the wheat fields furnished a 
product for exportation hardly less valuable than 
that of the mines. The Pacific coast of Chile 
extends a distance of some three thousand miles 
from north to south, and the narrow land that 
lies along the foot of the Andes, between the 
mountains and the sea, forms, in the middle part 
of the country, one of the world's most favored 
fields for civilization. The desert lands of the 
rainless region of the north are in striking con- 
trast with those settled in the period of Spanish 
colonization. In the vast nitrate deposits they 
have a source of great wealth, but none of the 
natural conditions that promote the establish- 
ment and growth of progressive society. In that 
part of the long valley where the city of Santiago 
lies at an elevation of two thousand feet, the fer- 
tile soil and the mild climate make this part of 
Chile an especially attractive seat of human cul- 



xvi SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ture. The lower levels of the southern districts 
of Chile present a rare and fruitful combination 
of field, forest, lake, and river, but the stout 
resistance of the Araucanians prevented the full 
exploitation of this region in the period here 
under consideration. 

In the southeastern part of the continent, as 
well as in Chile, agricultural resources induced 
only a late social development. The barren moun- 
tains of the northern part of the viceroyalty of 
Rio de la Plata supported flourishing and popu- 
lous cities, while the rich lands drained by the 
La Plata Eiver system showed few signs of prog- 
ress. But the later state of the low-land cities, 
compared with the mining cities of the high lands, 
furnishes a further confirmation of the fact that 
the race is not always to the swift. Decade had 
followed decade throughout the greater part of 
the eighteenth century, with little change except 
what might be observed in the increasing herds 
of the plains and the growth of contraband trade 
through Colonia. The pampas, or plains, of 
Argentina, extending six or seven hundred miles 
from the foothills of the Andes to the Rio de la 
Plata and the Atlantic, with a regular incline in 
that distance of somewhat more than two thou- 
sand feet, and stretching fourteen hundred or 
fifteen hundred miles from north to south, has no 
equally extensive rivals in fertility and possible 
productiveness except the valley of the Missis- 
sippi and the plains of Russia. The rich pastures 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

of Argentina and Uruguay, in the course of 
decades became covered with vast herds, the natu- 
ral increase of the horses and cattle that had been 
abandoned by the early settlers of Buenos Aires. 
In these herds the inhabitants had for the taking 
an abundance of flesh for food and hides for the 
limited foreign commerce. Supplied with this 
form of food without great effort, and with the 
danger of extreme want removed, the bulk of 
the inhabitants became preeminently flesh-eaters. 
For many years there was lacking an effective 
incentive to the production of articles that would 
adequately furnish a more varied diet. But 
through the stimulus of a freer commerce and an 
enlarged market, agriculture was gradually devel- 
oped, and became a rival of pastoral cultivation. 
Under the larger freedom of commerce accorded 
by the code of 1778, Buenos Aires distanced all 
other ports of this southeastern part of Spain's 
possessions. Asuncion in Paraguay, that had 
flourished in the earlier decades, became a stag- 
nant capital of an earthly paradise. With its herds 
and fruits, its tobacco and mate, Paraguay pre- 
sented physical conditions that seemed to favor 
prosperity and progress. Its impediments were 
its isolation in the interior of the continent, about 
a thousand miles up the river from the more 
favored ports of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, 
its preponderance of Indian blood in the popula- 
tion, and the unreasonable internal conflict be- 
tween secular and ecclesiastical factions. 



xviii SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

But an economic awakening, after two hun- 
dred years of stagnation, appeared in this region, 
with the failure of Spain's policy of restriction 
and the adoption of the code of 1778. Prior to 
this change, the government in Spain had been 
illustrating throughout these vast dominions, how 
human cultivation and progress may be throttled 
and suppressed in the presence of material re- 
sources greater than any that had previously 
appeared in the history of the world. 

Within this territory there were developed 
different political groups whose varying social 
characteristics were due in a large measure to the 
natural environment of the several groups and to 
the different qualities of the Indians who became 
amalgamated with the Spanish invaders. The 
history of these groups, or political entities de- 
pendent on Spain is a part of Spanish history; 
at least some changes effected in the course of 
their growth were ordered by the supreme politi- 
cal authority, and may be observed from the view- 
point of Spain. But there were other changes or 
events in this development that proceeded from 
the conscious designs of the colonists, from the 
efforts of settlers in a strange country to adjust 
themselves to their new circumstances, and from 
the unconscious influences of the widely varying 
nature in the different provinces. These latter 
events and forces seldom rose above the Madrid 
horizon, and this fact makes it necessary to 
assume a position outside of that horizon in order 



INTRODUCTION xix 

to obtain a complete view of the life that went 
on in the colonies. From the viewpoint of the 
king and the Council of the Indies, an account of 
the history of the dependencies may very well 
have a larger measure of unity than when pre- 
sented from the viewpoint of colonial life that 
varied greatly in the different dependencies. But 
by emphasizing the events or movements affecting 
all the colonies, such as the growth of a creole- 
mestizo society, an awakening intellectual interest 
in nature and politics, the overthrow of a religious 
order established in all of the colonies, and the 
rebellions and conspiracies of the last decades of 
the century, as features common to many political 
divisions, the history of Spanish South America, 
even when considered from the viewpoint of 
colonial conditions, may seem to have a certain 
unity, in spite of the wide geographical separa- 
tion, and the differing qualities of the inhabitants, 
of the several dependencies. 

Spain's power in America gave evidence of 
declining before the colonies showed any signs 
of an effective organization designed to supplant 
legitimate authority. For decades the principal 
indication of change was the indisposition of 
officials in the colonies to carry out, or force the 
strict execution of, the laws. In very many 
instances there was apparently no thought of 
creating a new power, only a protest against the 
conduct of the existing government. In the period 
here examined, from 1730 to 1806, the decline 



xx SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

was hardly stayed even by the energy of Charles 
III. In fact, that king's most positive show of 
administrative strength, the expulsion of the 
Jesuits, did not hinder but rather hastened the 
decline of Spanish power in the colonies. The 
king and the Council of the Indies continued to 
issue decrees in the spirit of Spain's govern- 
mental traditions, but the officials in America dis- 
played increasing reluctance to execute them 
exactly. The colonists frequently supported this 
attitude of the officials, because it was often 
materially advantageous to them that the royal 
decrees should not be carried out. The history 
of these last decades of Spanish rule in South 
America shows the affairs of the colonies drifting 
towards the crisis reached in the war of indepen- 
dence. 



CHAPTER I 
THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY 

I. The Relation of the Spaniards to the Indians. II. 
Spaniards, Creoles, and Mestizos. III. The new 
society. 



A civilized nation of this century, attempting to 
adjust itself to a less developed people, has for its 
instruction a number of experiments by other 
modern nations, but when the Spaniards under- 
took the control of Indians in America, they were 
pioneers; they had for their guidance only the 
experience of Spain in her internal affairs. They 
had known a society where classes were widely 
separated, and such a society they fostered in the 
New World. They undertook to transfer to 
America the social distinctions that were the 
legitimate product of a long differentiating social 
growth. They exerted powerful influences to 
make life in the colonies grow into conformity 
with the European type. They put forth distinct 
efforts to counteract any democratic influence, or 
any non-European social forms, that might issue 
from the conditions of a new country. They 
created a titled nobility, and, where titles were 
not formally granted, the relation of the encom- 



2 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

endero to his dependents offered a distinctly 
recognized superior and inferior. And whatever 
influence the church exerted was clearly in favor 
of centralized authority; it was in no sense sug- 
gestive of equality or of a democratic social 
organization. In fact, in all the activity of the 
earlier phases of colonial life in South America, 
there was no anticipation of a point of view dif- 
ferent from that which had been traditional in 
Spain. 

The Indians were adopted as an element in 
the society of the colonies. The absence of any 
conception of equality was important. It left a 
place in the social order for the Indians. In New 
England, on the contrary, the notion of equality 
appeared. The Indian could not, in any time 
allotted to him, rise to equality with the Euro- 
pean; and the New Englander, by not providing 
a lower subordinate or vassal class, left no place 
for him. 

The Spaniard built magnificent churches, 
filled them with decorations, and organized bril- 
liant processions to attract the barbarians. The 
government, moreover, provided penalties for 
keeping Indians from the churches on certain 
specified occasions. The New Englander built 
churches, and insisted on the absence of artistic 
decoration. To these churches he went in solemn 
and exclusive devotion, armed and munitioned 
against any Indian who might dare to appear. In 
the Spanish colony inequality was recognized from 



THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY 3 

the beginning, and the Indian had a place in the 
lower divisions of the social structure. In the 
English colonies the spirit of equality excluded 
him. 

The retention of the Indians as an element in 
Spanish-American society provided occasion for 
the rise of a class of mestizos to bridge the social 
chasm between the Europeans and the Indians. 
In dealing with this class the Spaniards displayed 
a degree of wisdom not always shown in later 
colonizing by other nations. In Java, for instance, 
under the Dutch, a distinct line of discrimination 
was drawn between the European and the Java- 
nese. All persons having any measure of Euro- 
pean blood were counted as Europeans. They 
held themselves aloof from the natives of pure 
blood, but neither their attainments nor their 
ambitions enabled them to participate, without 
prejudice, in the activities of the Dutch. The 
Spaniards gave no such artificial position to the 
mestizos. These products of Spanish-Indian 
unions were numerous. Their origin and quali- 
ties were recognized, but they were not separated 
either from the Indians or the Spaniards by any 
hard and fast line. They were allowed to take 
their chances of rising or falling in the communi- 
ties of their residence. Neither custom nor law 
hedged them about in a restricted position. The 
population of the Spanish dependencies was thus 
shaded off through the Creoles, the mestizos, and 
the semi-civilized Indians down to the untamed 
savages. 



4 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

II 

The Spaniards did, however, draw a line of 
demarcation, but in this discrimination the differ- 
ences of races played no part. The line was 
drawn between Spaniards born in Spain and 
Spaniards of the same stock born in America ; in 
a word, between Spaniards and Creoles. It was 
conceived that a great gulf was fixed between the 
Spaniards who were born in Spain and the mem- 
bers of the same people who were born and lived 
in a Spanish colony. 

The depreciation of the Creoles was so extreme 
and general that Spanish parents who emigrated 
held in very different regard their children who 
were born in Spain and those who were born later 
in America. In public affairs the same prejudice 
was manifest. The Spanish-creole conflict ex- 
tended even to the monks in the monasteries. The 
occupants of the monasteries and of the numerous 
religious houses of all kinds were composed of 
two diverse elements, Spaniards and Creoles, 
who lived in almost perpetual hostility. The high 
civil and ecclesiastical offices were given to Span- 
iards but not to Creoles. But in the course of time 
the Creoles became a numerous class. They 
acquired wealth; and many of them, taking ad- 
vantage of the facilities for instruction in Lima, 
Cordova, Santiago, Bogota, and Caracas, as well 
as in different parts of Europe, became men of 
extensive intellectual attainments and cultivation. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY 5 

They knew the circumstances and needs of the 
colonies, and were conscious of their own fitness 
to have a part in the colonial government. When, 
therefore, they were excluded from public office, 
they very naturally felt that they were the victims 
of an unjust discrimination. By this attitude of 
the Spanish government, all persons thus un- 
justly affected, their relatives, their friends, and 
their dependents were drawn together into the 
solidarity of an increasingly powerful opposition. 

Even in her virtuous solicitude for the welfare 
of her unmarried daughters, Spain strengthened 
this opposition and helped to prepare for a social 
revolution in America. By positive law and by 
the restraints of an efficient administrative system, 
unmarried Spanish women were prevented from 
emigrating; but a large number of the men who 
went to the colonies were unmarried. The inevi- 
table consequence of this state of affairs was the 
rise of a large class of mestizos, who became 
affiliated with the increasing class of Creoles. 

Another consequence of the amalgamation of 
the Spanish and Indian peoples was the creation 
of marked differences among the populations of 
different districts. The differing Indian peoples 
in their union with Spaniards produced descend- 
ants of varying qualities. Much of the character 
of the bold, hardy, independent Araucanian re- 
appeared in the Chilean mestizo. The gentle 
Peruvian Indians, on the other hand, under the 
severe discipline of their rulers, were unfavorably 



6 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

placed for developing heroic qualities; and they 
passed on to their mestizo descendants the virtues 
of gentleness and amiability rather than the 
sterner qualities of a warlike people. Thus, in 
the course of time, within the limits of her South 
American dominions, Spain had to deal not with 
one homogeneous people, but with a number of 
nations, who, although using a common language, 
were about as unlike one another as are the 
nations of Western Europe. These differences of 
character among the inhabitants of the several 
political divisions imposed a heavy administra- 
tive task upon Spain at a time when she was 
undertaking to govern her vast colonial empire 
under a system that took no account of social 
differences or the varying demands of unlike 
climatic conditions. Under this state of things 
Spain's government of her dependencies became 
gradually more ineffective, and this lessening of 
the disciplinary power of the legitimate regime 
permitted the growth of the creole-mestizo party 
of opposition, and the development in it of com- 
munity self-consciousness and a certain sense of 
independence. While the application of Spain's 
rigid system of colonial government might find 
favor in one quarter, it tended to provoke dis- 
satisfaction and a temper of revolt in another. It 
pleased Lima, because the merchants of that city 
enjoyed important commercial privileges; but 
Buenos Aires had no privileges, had not even the 
advantages of freedom of trade, arid consequently 
manifested a rapidly declining loyalty; and, as 



THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY 7 

subsequent events proved, the chain of provincial 
administrations in the colonies was no stronger 
than the weakest link. The triumphant self- 
assertion of the new society in one province meant 
its ultimate domination in all other provinces. 
The line of cleavage between the new society and 
the old, between the creole-mestizo element and 
the Spanish element, appeared, from one view- 
point, as the line between privileges and no privi- 
leges, between the recipients of political favors 
and those who were excluded from such favors. 
In view of the fact that many of the Indians, 
notably the Chibchas, of Colombia, and the Ayma- 
ras of Peru, represented a certain phase of civili- 
zation, the mestizos shaded off imperceptibly into 
the Indians of pure blood. In connection with this 
fact, one is able to see the importance of that 
feature of Spain's policy which provided for the 
adoption of the Indians as members of the colonial 
society. This was in marked contrast with the 
English plan./ The Spaniards accepted the Indian 
but assigned him a social position like that held 
by a dependent class recognized in the European 
feudal order./ With the Indians in feudal sub- 
jection to Spaniards it was thought to be possible 
to preserve in Spanish America differentiated 
classes corresponding with those of Europe. But 
the more important result of the adoption of the 
Indians into the body of colonial society was the 
fact that, separated by their dependent position 
from the Spanish encomenderos and the official 
class, they became attached to, or embodied in, 



8 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

the creole-mestizo element, and thus constituted 
an effective part of the new society. 

In what may be called the germ of colonial 
society, there was no middle class between the 
encomendero and his dependent Indians ; but the 
lack was supplied in the course of time by the 
appearance of the mestizos, the landless Creoles, 
and the adopted Indians. ^The development con- 
tinued until the population of Spanish South 
America embraced, on the one hand, a class of 
Spanish officials and other Spaniards who con- 
served the interests and traditions of Spain, and, 
on the other hand, the combined classes of Cre- 
oles, mestizos, and Indians. When this point had 
been attained, a far-reaching social change was 
impending. Its practical crisis, or the self-asser- 
tion of the hitherto suppressed party, was delayed 
by the isolation of the colonies and the consequent 
absence of free intellectual activity.; During the 
seventeenth century this isolation was practically 
complete, except for the infrequent communica- 
tion that was maintained between the colonies and 
Spain. No enlightenment came at this time to the 
mass of the people from the English colonies, for 
these colonies were still in the period of their 
feeble beginnings ; and the subjects of other Euro- 
pean nations were effectually excluded. The im- 
portation of books of information was prohibited, 
and no ray of light reached them except that 
which passed through the distorting mind of the 
Spanish ecclesiastics. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY 9 



III 

A revival of nationalism in Spain in the second 
quarter of the eighteenth century tended to con- 
firm the loyalty of the colonial officials ; but it did 
not remove the alienation of the increasing body 
of Creoles, mestizos, and Indians. The line of 
separation became fixed. The old policy of privi- 
lege and unjust discrimination was continued. 
The viceroys, the captains general, the judges, 
the high ecclesiastics, the bulk of the priests, in 
short, all the holders of desirable offices continued 
to be sent from Spain, and men born in the colo- 
nies, whatever might be their attainments or 
fitness for the posts in question, were neglected, 
were left without political recognition. The line 
excluding the Creoles, the mestizos, and the In- 
dians from any participation in the public affairs 
that concerned them, was becoming every year 
more distinctly recognized. 

Although the Spanish government appears to 
have been entirely unaware of the fact, in the 
neglected members of the colonies were laid the 
foundations of a new society. From this point 
onward through the succeeding decades of Span- 
ish colonial politics we observe the decline of one 
section of the population and the rise of the other 
section. We observe, moreover, the attempt on 
the part of Spain to govern the colonies in accord- 
ance with her original plan, and the recurring 
evidence of her inability to adapt herself to the 



10 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

changing conditions and the changing needs of 
the colonies. Three facts in this history, how- 
ever, assured the superiority and ultimate domin- 
ation of the creole-mestizo class. One of these 
was the continuation by the Spanish government 
of its uncompromising, repelling, and exclusive 
attitude towards that class, thus keeping alive 
class antagonisms; another was the fact that the 
number of persons born in the colonies, Creoles 
and mestizos, in a given period was in excess of 
the number added to the population by immigra- 
tion; a third was the fact that the Creoles and 
mestizos were practically the only persons who 
were sufficiently openminded to receive the liberal 
ideas that gradually drifted into the colonies from 
foreign countries, particularly from Great Britain 
and the now awakened British colonies in Amer- 
ica. The failure of the Spaniards living in the 
colonies to be influenced by imported ideas was 
not due to any intellectual inferiority on their 
part as compared with the Creoles, but to the fact 
that they were placed in a non-receptive mood 
by the offices or commercial privileges which they 
enjoyed, and by their natural adherence to the 
ideas and spirit of Spain. All the higher officials, 
Civil, military, and ecclesiastical, were opposed 
to any access of liberalism, since their privileges 
were created and upheld by the government 's con- 
servative policy; and coming, as they did, from 
Spain, they very naturally stood for the ideas 
dominant in the country they had left. Thus 



THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY 11 

the enlightenment which gradually streamed in 
through the breaking walls of Spain's exclusive- 
ness influenced especially the members of the new 
society. Their attainment of more liberal ideas 
through their growing connection with Great 
Britain and the British colonies carried them 
farther and farther from the position of those 
who represented the old order of things. The 
new society became more and more clearly con- 
scious of the separation. It became conscious, 
moreover, that its interests were opposed to the 
purposes of the Spanish government; and that 
these interests would be properly safeguarded 
only by its control of the public affairs which con- 
cerned its members. 

The discussions, the agitation, the rebellions, 
and the military campaigns of the later decades 
of the eighteenth century and the early years of 
the nineteenth century gave evidence of dissatis- 
faction with the old order of affairs, and reveal 
efforts, often misdirected, to realize new ideals. 
The ideas and sentiments of the new society, or 
the opposition party, determined the most con- 
spicuous events in the history of the last quarter 
of the century. This creole-mestizo element of 
the population resented the centuries-long mani- 
festation of Spain's arrogance and exclusiveness ; 
it resented the injustice of her social discrimina- 
tion; and this resentment inspired the rebellions 
and conspiracies that seemed to presage the end 
of Spanish rule. 



CHAPTEE II 

STATE OF SPANISH SOUTH AMERICA IN THE 
MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 

I. Peru in the middle of the century. II. The aftermath 
of Antequera 's rebellion. III. The controversy con- 
cerning Colonia. IV. Montevideo and Tucuman. 
V. Two decades of Chilean affairs. VI. The Uni- 
versity of Chile. VII. New Granada under the 
last colonial presidents. VIII. The state of Quito. 

IX. The reestablished viceroyalty of New Granada. 

X. Santo Thome and the missions of the plains. 
XL The little revolution of Trinidad. 



In the later decades of Spanish rule the native 
element in the population became conscious of its 
real position, of its exclusion from places of 
authority, and gradually constituted itself a party 
of opposition and reform in the several depen- 
dencies. The activity of the French merchants 
in the beginning of the century had shown to the 
colonists the advantages of a large measure of 
freedom in commercial affairs. The officials in 
the Indies failed to execute the decrees of the 
superior authorities, designed to restrict trade 
with the colonies to Spanish merchants, and in 
this they were upheld by the colonists. After the 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 13 

first important shock, the ancient system provid- 
ing for monopolies and the exclusion of foreign 
trade never regained its lost vigor and effective- 
ness. 

Near the middle of the century the internal 
affairs of the viceroyalty of Pern were over- 
whelmed in confusion. Lima and Callao were 
destroyed by the earthquake of 1746, and four 
years later the inhabitants of the capital were 
threatened with destruction by an uprising of the 
Indians. The plans of the leaders of the in- 
surgents were revealed to the viceroy, and this 
informtaoin was confirmed by the testimony of 
a person who had succeeded in gaining access to 
a meeting of the hostile junta. Six of the prin- 
cipal conspirators were executed. Others escaped 
and moved the province of Huarochiri to revolt. 
They killed a number of the officials and other 
Spaniards, destroyed roads and bridges, and 
attempted to defend themselves in the fastnesses 
of the mountains. They were, however, driven 
out by a force of four hundred men sent against 
them. Having been defeated, some were killed 
on the spot, and others suffered the extreme 
penalty in Lima. 

During the middle decades of the century, the 
viceregal authority in Peru was exercised by 
Armendariz, the Marquis of Castel-Fuerte (1724- 
1736), Mendoza, the Marquis of Villagarcia (1736- 
1745), and Velasco, the Count of Superunda 
(1746-1761). 



14 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Juan and Ulloa's report, the Noticias seer etas, 
presents a series of contemporary views of Peru's 
internal condition at this time. It emphasizes the 
frivolity, the greed, and the irregular living of at 
least a part of the clergy. It reveals the partisan 
conflicts that disturbed the monasteries and the 
convents, particularly on the occasion of elections. 
It sets forth the merciless exactions of the cor- 
regidores as the sole traders within their respec- 
tive districts; makes clear the oppression and 
cruelty suffered by the laborers in the manufac- 
turing establishments; and indicates some of the 
burdens borne by the Indians under the system of 
the mita. In this period occurred, moreover, the 
expeditions and assaults of Anson and Vernon. 

II 

In the province of Paraguay, the career of 
Antequera had left a legacy of rebellion and 
anarchy. Nevertheless, a few weeks after Ante- 
quera 's departure, Bishop Palos wrote to the king 
concerning the insurrection, and informed him 
that the province had been pacificed " without 
bloodshed by the prudent conduct of the governor 
of Rio de la Plata, Don Bruno Maurice de Zabala, 
who in obedience to the pressing orders of Joseph 
Armendariz, the Marquis of Castel-Fuerte, your 
viceroy, came here with sufficient force for that 
purpose." 1 But the peace announced by Bishop 

i Charlevoix, Pierre Francois Xavier de, The History of Para- 
guay, London, 1769, II, 220. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 15 

Palos "was no more than a deceitful calm; which 
was soon followed by a storm a great deal more 
furious than that which had been allayed." 2 The 
supporters of the revolutionary movement wished 
to transfer the Indians of the reductions from 
ecclesiastical to secular authority, from the Jes- 
uits to encomenderos. In 1729 the viceroy of 
Peru sent Martin de Barua to Paraguay with a 
special commission to pacify the province. At 
the same time Bartolome de Aldunate was ordered 
to proceed to Paraguay, but affairs in Buenos 
Aires, where he was a captain of infantry, re- 
quired his presence in that city, and the govern- 
ment of Paraguay remained in the hands of 
Barua. But Barua failed to execute the viceroy's 
orders. This fact and the partisan support 
accorded to him by the insurgents indicated that 
he had departed widely from the purpose of his 
mission. The insurgents, or comuneros, wished to 
make the wealth of the reductions, or missions, 
available to persons not belonging to the Society 
of Jesus. With this end in view, it was proposed 
that Spanish corregidores and regidores should 
be established in all of the reductions, where, it 
was affirmed, there were one hundred and fifty 
thousand Indians who paid no tribute to the king. 
It was proposed, moreover, that there should be 
maintained in Asuncion an office where the tribute 
to be paid by the Indians might be received. 
These propositions having been considered by the 
Council of the Indies, a royal decree was sent to 

2 Charlevoix, History of Paraguay, II, 222. 



16 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

the governors of Paraguay and Rio de la Plata, 
ordering them to collect the imposts and tribute 
payable by the Indians in accordance with the 
laws in force throughout the kingdom of Peru. 
They were also ordered to inquire into the reasons 
why this had not been done before; and they 
should report to the viceroy. But when these 
decrees arrived at Buenos Aires events had 
occurred in Paraguay that made their execution 
impracticable. 3 

The comuneros had usurped the governmental 
power in Asuncion, and excluded the legitimate 
authorities. In July, 1730, Ferdinand Mompo, or 
Mompox, arrived at Asuncion. He was born in 
the kingdom of Valencia ; he had practised law in 
Lima ; had been confined for a period in the prison 
of the inquisition; had acquired by association 
somewhat of Antequera's spirit; and in virtue of 
this association he was received with special favor 
in Paraguay. He was given a seat in the cabildo, 
and was consulted on all important matters by 
the comuneros. When it had become known that 
Soroeta had been appointed governor of Para- 
guay, Mompo sent to the viceroy a memorial 
framed in the name of the commune, setting forth 
the grave inconveniences and disturbances that 
would result from Soroeta 's appearance in Asun- 
cion. Mompo urged, moreover, that as Soroeta 
was a partisan of the Jesuits and a friend of 
Diego de los Reyes, he ought not to be permitted 

3 Zinny, Antonio, Historic/, de los gobernantes del Paraguay, 
1535-1887. Buenos Aires, 1887, 165. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 17 

to enter the province, and that Bariia should con- 
tinue to be the governor. A copy of this memorial 
was sent to Santa Fe by a messenger, who placed 
it in the hands of Soroeta. The messenger was 
instructed not to wait for a reply. But in spite 
of the warning contained in this memorial, Soro- 
eta determined to continue his journey to Asun- 
cion. This act of defiance made definite the 
breach between the commune and the legitimate 
government, and created a revolutionary inter- 
regum, lasting from 1730 until the arrival of 
Governor Manuel Augustin de Ruiloba y Calderon 
in July, 1733. During these three years, the party 
known as the comuneros dominated the affairs of 
Paraguay. 

When Governor Ignacio Soroeta arrived at 
the Tebicuary, he halted to await replies to the 
communications previously sent to Bariia, to the 
bishop, and to the cabildo. The bishop advised 
him to postpone his advance in view of the em- 
barrassment and danger that would arise from 
his presence in Asuncion. Barua presented cer- 
tain documents concerning the state of affairs, 
one of these documents affirming that, during the 
absence of the Jesuits from the college, peace and 
order had prevailed, but that disturbance and 
sedition had followed their return. The cabildo 
expressed its determination to obey the orders of 
the king ; but it has been suggested that the words 
of the cabildo rather than its acts were favorable 
to peace and harmony. After further correspon- 



18 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

dence, relating in part to a safe-conduct demanded 
by Soroeta, a force of four hundred soldiers 
appeared at the Tebicuary on the 17th of January, 
1731, under the pretext of furnishing the safe- 
conduct required, but in reality to escort Soroeta 
to Asuncion as a prisoner. As Soroeta ap- 
proached the city, he found that his escort had 
been increased by fifteen hundred persons of all 
classes and conditions, not merely Spaniards, but 
also negroes, mulattos, mestizos, and Indians. 
This demonstration was evidently designed to 
terrify Soroeta, but no such result was observ- 
able: he proceeded, without apparent anxiety, to 
the cathedral, where he was received by the bishop 
and other members of the clergy. The pretense 
of loyalty displayed by Barua and the cabildo was 
a mere sham. When Soroeta went to visit Barua, 
he was attended by a squad of eight or ten sol- 
diers, who entered the reception room and caused 
the governor great embarrassment by participat- 
ing in the conversation. During the four days 
and a half which Soroeta spent in the city, he was 
virtually a prisoner in his own house. He left 
Asuncion on the 28th of January, accompanied by 
the second alcalde and a regidor as far as the 
river Tebicuary, whence he passed to Nuestra 
Senora de Fe, and then to Lima by way of Chile. 
Although apparently in full sympathy with 
the revolutionary party, Bartia appeared to be 
reluctant to exercise the gubernatorial power 
beyond the legal term of his office ; and after the 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 19 

departure of Soroeta, the civil government of 
Paraguay was directed by the cabildo of Asuncion, 
while the military affairs were controlled by the 
maestro de campo appointed by the commune. 4 

The comuneros, who had been more or less 
guided by the advice of Mompo, finally discovered 
in him the evil genius of their confusion, and saw 
the need of an efficient organization. They deter- 
mined to elect a president, and the choice fell on 
the alcalde Barreiro, who was regarded as the 
chief of the radicals. But they had later to aban- 
don their mistaken view. Barreiro 's first impor- 
tant service was to rid the province of Mompo. 
By the ruse of a journey to Yaguaron, he con- 
ducted him to the Tebicuary where he was ar- 
rested and sent to Buenos Aires. This act, appar- 
ently in the royal service, provoked a conspiracy 
against Barreiro. This had an unfavorable out- 
come for the chief conspirators, Bartolome Galan 
and Miguel de Garay, on whom Barreiro caused 
the sentence of death to be pronounced. In the 
bitter partisan conflict that ensued, Barreiro 
raised the standard of the king, but this act 
elecited only a limited response of loyalty, and 
Barreiro 's cause was lost. He fled to the mis- 
sions, and Miguel de Garay took his place. Fear- 
ing that the newly awakened hostilities in Asun- 

4 Begarding the conduct of this government, Lozano remarked : 
"Lo que en este celebre gobierno paso solo Dios lo sabe todo, 
porque era tal el desconcierto que ni aun los mismos oficiales se 
hacien capaces de todo lo que sueedia. " Historia de las revolu- 
ciones de la provincia de Paraguay, (1721-1735), Buenos Aires, 
1905, ii, 54. 



20 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

cion might be directed against them, the Indians 
of the missions were assembled for defense at the 
Tebicuary. This act in turn alarmed the comrni- 
eros, in whose eyes the four thousand mission 
Indians were magnified to a force of ten thousand 
men. In giving expression to their fear the 
comuneros spread the report that the Indians 
were about to invade Asuncion and put the inhab- 
itants to the sword. 

In the meantime Antequera, the former leader 
of the rebellion, was a prisoner in Lima. His 
execution and that of Juan de Mena, after an im- 
prisonment of five years, helped to inflame rather 
than to allay the passions of the opposing parties. 
The daughter of Mena, now the widow of Ramon 
de las Lianas, changed her mourning costume for 
gala dress on hearing of the death of her father, 
thus making public proclamation of her view that 
he had died gloriously for the country. The mem- 
ory of Antequera and Mena, in the following 
months, excited the comuneros to new zeal, and 
revived their hostility to the Jesuits. The aroused 
partisans of Antequera 's views proposed new 
crimes in the name of the public weal: in Febru- 
ary, 1732, they expelled the Jesuits from their 
college and plundered their property. 

The details of the social confusion following 
these events reveal a society in process of dis- 
solution. The Jesuits of the missions feared an 
irruption of the comuneros, and prepared for 
defense. The comuneros, on the other hand, 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 21 

fancied that the missions in their activity were, 
in fact, preparing for conquest. There was no 
authority in Paraguay commanding general re- 
spect or obedience ; and that security of property 
which encourages production and economy was 
wanting. To political confusion was added in- 
creasing poverty. 

In order to put an end to hostilities, Governor 
Zabala called a council of war in Buenos Aires. 
The result of its deliberations was an order to the 
commandant of Corrientes to take a force of two 
hundred men and join the troops stationed on the 
Tebicuary. But the missions were not in im- 
mediate danger of invasion. The king and the 
Council of the Indies were apparently convinced 
that the Paraguayans were not competent to 
work out their social salvation independently. 
Therefore, in order to make peace and restore the 
province to a normal state, they intrusted the 
government to Manual Agustin Ruiloba. The 
viceroy recognized the difficulty of the undertak- 
ing, and urged Governor Zabala and the provin- 
cial of the Jesuits to give Ruiloba all possible 
assistance. The arrival at Asuncion of Bishop 
Arregui and the withdrawal of the troops en- 
camped on the Tebicuary seemed for the moment 
to promise peace; but discord and the spirit of 
contention were too profoundly rooted in the 
community to yield to any other remedy than 
force. This fact was clearly recognized by Gov- 
ernor Ruiloba ; for,' on arriving at San Ignacio in 



22 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

1733, he ordered the large bodies of Indian troops 
to maintain their position, and he provided that 
all other men capable of bearing arms should be 
enlisted. The policy of waiting for the evils to 
cure themselves had apparently come to an end; 
and in contemplating the new policy, the comu- 
neros experienced a sudden conversion. When 
Euiloba had reached the Tebicuary, deputies from 
Asuncion appeared, conveying to him the con- 
gratulations of the cabildo and General Sebastian 
Fernandez Mantiel, who assured him of their 
determination to obey the orders of the king. 

Euiloba 's favorable beginning was followed by 
less fortunate conduct. His severe and uncom- 
promising attitude was effective in silencing the 
old opposition, but a new opposition was aroused 
by his indiscreet utterances after his arrival in 
Asuncion, and by replacing important officials 
with persons in his confidence. He, moreover, 
described as rebellious and criminal acts held by 
the actors to be patriotic. The comuneros were 
thus brought to face the alternatives of humiliat- 
ing subserviency and a new uprising. They chose 
the latter. And when the governor was informed 
of this movement, he proceeded to suppress it 
with the limited military force at his command, a 
force especially limited at this time by reason 
of the large number of soldiers who had deserted 
to the ranks of the commune. At this stage, when 
an active conflict appeared to be imminent, Bishop 
Arregui assumed the role of mediator. Governor 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 23 

Ruiloba was, however, not in a mood to make 
concessions, and when the comuneros discovered 
his position in this regard, they attacked him, 
dragged him from his horse, and made him pay 
the penalty of his stubbornness with his life 
(September 15, 1733). 

The removal of Governor Ruiloba left the 
community without a controlling authority, and 
then followed the evils and crimes incident to a 
headless society. In this state of affairs, Arregui 
was elected governor, and a council was created. 
Arregui had been appointed bishop of Buenos 
Aires, and as a bishop clothed with the executive 
power in Paraguay, he found himself approving, 
at least formally, measures entirely inconsistent 
with his character as the religious and moral 
guide of a community. In his name as governor, 
property was confiscated, and many innocent 
persons were thrown into hopeless poverty. An- 
tagonism to the Jesuits prompted the council to 
formulate two orders respecting them for the 
approval of the governor. One was that they 
should remove all their property from the prov- 
ince. The other was that the seven pueblos, or 
reductions, San Ignacio Guazu, Nuestra Sefiora 
de Fe, Santa Rosa, Santiago, Itapua, La Trinidad, 
and Jesus, should be removed beyond the Parana, 
leaving free the lands they had occupied in Para- 
guay. 

The bishop-governor signed these orders; but 
he began to appreciate the absurdity of his posi- 



24 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

tion, particularly after Bishop Palos of Paraguay 
aud the provincial of the Jesuits had labored to 
enlighten him. He saw that he had been the tool 
of a reckless community. He also became con- 
scious of the necessity of renouncing the part he 
had played in its proceedings. Believing that 
there would be opposition to his retirement, he 
made it appear that his presence in Buenos Aires 
was required, and, leaving in his place Cristoval 
Dominguez de Obelar, he departed for Buenos 
Aires in December, 1733, followed a little later by 
Bishop Palos. 

The measures projected against the property 
of the Jesuits and the missions induced Governor 
Zabala to provide for their defense. He ordered 
the Indians of military training to guard their 
frontiers and organize new forces. When the 
viceroy was informed of the tragic death of Rui- 
loba, he commanded that all communication with 
Paraguay should be cut off, and that the effects 
of the Paraguayans at Corrientes and Santa Fe 
should be confiscated. Zabala assumed command 
of the missions, and caused their military efficiency 
to be increased by the introduction of military 
instruction. He took one hundred and fifty sol- 
diers from Buenos Aires, and, with seven thou- 
sand Indians, established his camp twelve or 
fifteen miles from the Tebicuary, in January, 
1735. The comuneros, alarmed by the approach 
of so large a force, prepared to enlist for defense 
all persons capable of bearing arms. Against the 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 25 

forces of the commune, that had taken up a posi- 
tion near the frontier, Zabala sent a detachment 
of fifty veterans, two hundred and eighteen Para- 
guayans who had joined him, and two hundred 
Indians from the missions. These were under the 
command of Captain Martin Jose de Echaurri. 
"When they arrived at the encampment of the 
enemy, they found it deserted. Bernardino Mar- 
tinez led the pursuit, attacked the retreating 
troops, and took the artillery and a large number 
of prisoners; the rest fled in confusion. Zabala 
found many of the leading insurgents among the 
prisoners, five of whom were put to death, and 
fifteen were sent into exile. The result of this 
conflict was nothing less than the subjugation of 
the whole province of Paraguay to the legitimate 
government. 

The Paraguayans had long enjoyed the privi- 
lege of electing their governor in case of vacancy, 
but the exercise of this privilege disturbed the 
peace and orderly conduct of the province. 
Zabala recognized this fact, and ordered the 
abolition of the practice. He, moreover, estab- 
lished regulations designed to counteract the 
tendencies of the revolutionary spirit. He caused 
the murderers of Kuiloba to be executed, and 
restored the confiscated property to its owner. 
Bishop Palos, who had fled to Buenos Aires, 
learned with satisfaction of the extermination of 
"the wolves that had destroyed his flock," 5 and 

s Funes, Gregorio, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, 
Tucuman y Paraguay, Buenos Aires, 1856, II, 37. 



26 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

returned to Asuncion, where the Jesuits were 
reinstated in their college, and order and the 
reign of law was once more established. For the 
reconstructed province, Martin Jose de Echaurri 
was appointed governor, and, with his mission 
accomplished, Zabala departed for Buenos Aires 
in 1735. 

Although order was restored in Paraguay, 
the hostility of the parties was not abated. The 
surviving antagonism was especially manifest in 
charges against the Jesuits, designed to discredit 
them and their work in the mind of the king. The 
province, long distracted by internal conflicts and 
confusion, was now tormented by repeated incur- 
sions of the barbarous Indians. With all these 
afflictions, it lost its prestige. The controversy 
between Spain and Portugal concerning the 
boundary; the war of the seven reductions; and 
the final expulsion of the Jesuits maintained the 
notoriety of Paraguay for a period; but it then 
lapsed into obscurity for half a century. 

Ill 

During the period of internal disorder in 
Paraguay, Uruguay was the scene of an inter- 
national contest. The Portuguese held a large 
part of the coast; they were gradually pressing 
down from the north; and they appeared to be 
firmly established in possession of Colonia. Two 
circumstances had rendered them bold and aggres- 
sive: one was the weakness and demoralization 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 27 

of Spain under Charles II; the other was the 
attitude of England as the protector of Portugal's 
commercial and maritime interests. With a sense 
of security thus established, they persisted in 
advancing their boundary and in increasing their 
contraband trade. They were moved to this latter 
undertaking by the high prices in the Spanish 
colonies caused by Spain's restrictive commercial 
policy. 

Other European nations, England, France, 
and Holland, found an advantage for themselves 
in Portugal's position, since Colonia furnished 
them a place of secure deposit for their wares, 
and a base for contraband trade with Spanish 
colonial markets. In view of the fact that the 
Portuguese court supported this encroachment 
and settlement on territory claimed by Spain, the 
governor of Bio de la Plata had little hope of 
maintaining his rights by negotiation, and conse- 
quently resorted to force. He captured the 
Portuguese commander, Lobo, and all his garri- 
son, caused the fortifications of Colonia to be 
destroyed, and transported the prisoners with 
their arms and artillery to Buenos Aires. But the 
protests of Portugal, supported by England and 
France, cowed the government of Spain. In spite 
of the energy displayed in maintaining the rights 
of Spain, Governor Grorro was recalled, and 
appointed governor of Chile. But before entering 
upon the duties of his new office, Grorro was 
obliged to suffer the humiliation of being detained 
in Cordova at the request of the Portuguese gov- 



28 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ernment; and Spain, wishing to avoid further 
conflict, entered into a treaty with Portugal. This 
treaty not only annulled all the advantages that 
might have been derived from the taking of 
Colonia, but also obliged Spain to restore that 
settlement to Portugal. This was for Spain an 
unpropitious beginning of a long controversy. 

By the treaty of 1701, Colonia was formally 
ceded to Portugal, but in the war of the Spanish 
succession, Portugal took the side of England 
against France and Spain, and, for this reason, 
the viceroy of Peru, then holding jurisdiction over 
the whole of Spanish South America, assumed 
that he was not bound by the treaty, and ordered 
the governor of Eio de la Plata to mobilize his 
forces and take possession of the post. Under the 
command of Captain Garcia Eos, the Spanish 
forces laid seige to Colonia on October 17, 1704, 
and the members of the Portuguese garrison, find- 
ing they were unable to withstand the attacking 
party, took to their boats and fled. The artillery 
and the munitions of war fell into the hands of 
the victors. 

Philip V had very little knowledge of America 
and apparently no appreciation of the importance 
of Colonia. When, therefore, the British, still 
having in mind the commercial opportunities 
which the possession of the place offered, urged 
that, in spite of the Spanish victory, it should be 
given up to the Portuguese, the king of Spain 
assented, and this cession was confirmed by the 
treaty of Utrecht. The sixth article of this treaty 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 29 

provided, "That His Catholic Majesty ceded for- 
ever and in perpetuity the Plaza de la Colonia 
with the territory necessary for its defense and 
security, to His Majesty the king of Portugal and 
to his successors by whatever line and right they 
might come to occupy the throne, without this ces- 
sion in any case and for any reason being able 
to be invalidated. ' ' 

IV 

The advance of the Portuguese and their evi- 
dent determination to establish themselves at a 
point commanding the mouth of the Rio de la 
Plata induced the Spaniards to endeavor to pre- 
vent this by seeking to increase the population of 
Montevideo. This little village already contained 
a number of families who had arrived from the 
Canaries in the early years of the eighteenth cen- 
tury. Special inducements were now offered to 
persons who would settle there. Among other 
advantages they would have free transportation 
thither for themselves and their families. Lots 
in the town and land for cultivation would be 
granted to them. Each settler would receive two 
hundred head of cattle and one hundred sheep, a 
quantity of grain for seed, and certain articles 
of food for the first year. 6 It was provided by the 

6 Bauza, Francisco, Historia de la domination espanola en el 
Uruguay, Montevideo, 1895, I, 483; Mitre, Sistoria de Belgrano, 
I, 47; Zinny, Antonio, Sistoria de los gooernadores de las provin- 
tias argentinas desde 1810 hasta la feoha, Buenos Aires, 1879, I 
XXXII; De-Maria, Isidoro, Sistoria de la republica 0. del Uru- 
guay, Montevideo, 1895, I, 75-87. 



30 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

cabildo that the holders of lands destined for cul- 
tivation should pay into the treasury a specified 
sum annually. This was the beginning of the 
Contribucion imobiliaria, or the land tax, in that 
region. 

Under these incentives a few families removed 
from Buenos Aires to Montevideo, but too few to 
satisfy the wishes and plans of Governor Zabala 
(1726-1734). In a letter to Philip V, January 6, 
1727, he announced that he had distributed lands 
and implements to the settlers at Montevideo, 
and on the 15th of July, 1728, the king replied, 
expressing his approval of the governor's acts. 
The population grew slowly, and during the fol- 
lowing year the ceremonies were held in which 
Montevideo was officially declared to be a city. 
A cabildo, or council, was created for its govern- 
ment, and on the 1st of January, 1730, Zabala 
appointed the members of the cabildo, who, hav- 
ing taken the required oath, were installed in their 
office. 

From the beginning, conflicts between the civil 
and military authorities disturbed the peace of 
Montevideo. The officers of the garrison repre- 
sented the absolutism of Spanish rule, while the 
members of the cabildo, although appointed by 
the governor, stood for the settlers and repre- 
sented their aspiration for local liberty. When 
the members of the superior Spanish government 
learned that Montevideo showed signs of pros- 
perity, they were solicitous lest foreign commerce 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 31 

might derive advantage from it, and in April, 
1730, issued orders that great zeal and care should 
be exercised to prevent illicit exportation or im- 
portation, or any violation of rules respecting the 
royal treasury. 

The strict execution of these orders deprived 
the inhabitants of Montevideo of their expected 
advantage. The Portuguese were gradually ap- 
propriating the resources of the country, and by 
these restrictions the Spaniards were prevented 
from even sharing in the prosperity of their 
neighbors. Colonia, under the command of Pedro 
Antonio de Vasconcellos, had become an impor- 
tant center of an increasing contraband commerce. 
In its population there were twenty-six hundred 
adults. These included a garrison of about nine 
hundred men, which, with its eighty guns mounted 
on the walls, seemed to furnish an adequate 
defense. 

The inhabitants of Montevideo were embar- 
rassed not only by the restrictions of the Spanish 
government and by the encroachments of the 
Portuguese, but also by the hostility of the In- 
dians. This was provoked, as had often been the 
case elsewhere, by the aggression of Europeans. 
The result of the campaign against the Indians 
was for the Spaniards a disaster. The little town 
lost a large part of the men fit for military ser- 
vice. In the midst of these difficulties, Miguel de 
Salcedo succeeded Zabala as governor, in 1734, 
bringing to the government of the province only 



32 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

mediocre ability, whether in the field of civil 
administration or military affairs. But under 
specific orders from the Spanish government, he 
gathered a force for the purpose of besieging 
Colonia. This force consisted of four thousand 
Indians from the missions, one thousand men 
from Buenos Aires, and one hundred and fifty 
men from Corrientes. It was supported by the 
frigates Armiena and San Esteban, sent from 
Spain with two hundred dragoons, and other 
vessels with munitions and a company of one 
hundred infantry. After a year of fruitless war, 
carried on with indifferent energy, France, Eng- 
land, and Holland, as mediating powers, inter- 
vened near the end of 1737, and at Paris adjusted 
terms of an armistice. 

Zabala, leaving the governorship of Rio de la 
Plata to Miguel de Salcedo (1734^1742), was 
promoted to the presidency of Chile, but before 
assuming the duties of his new office, he was 
directed, as we have seen, to intervene in the 
affairs of Paraguay. Having restored order in 
Asuncion, he embarked for Buenos Aires, but 
died before he reached Santa Fe. His claim to 
distinction among the governors of Rio de la 
Plata rests on efforts to stem the encroachments 
of the Portuguese; on his work in founding the 
city of Montevideo; on pacifying Paraguay; and, 
in general, on the energy and wisdom displayed 
in his administration. 

Montevideo had been designated a city, but 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 33 

it had acquired at this time few of a city's char- 
acteristics. The fort as described by Colonel 
Domingo Santo de Uriarte, the commandant, was 
a fort only in name. Its wall was about a yard 
and a half high, built of stone without mortar or 
cement ; it had no moat, and was in a place where 
it would protect neither the city nor the harbor. 7 
The Portuguese improved the opportunity 
offered by the armistice of Paris to strengthen the 
fortifications of Colonia, and to occupy additional 
territory. But in the presence of these advances 
and preparations for future resistance Governor 
Salcedo limited his activity to laying formal siege 
to Colonia and guarding the coast to prevent con- 
traband trade. During his administration, more- 
over, the cabildo of Montevideo had to contend 
with three enemies. These were the Indians, the 
Portuguese, and the military authorities. The 
evils arising from these sources were fostered by 
the weakness, the indolence, and the stupidity of 
Salcedo, who was finally arrested and removed 
from office in 1742, when Domingo Ortiz de Bosas 
(1742-1745) became his successor. Taking advan- 
tage of this change, the cabildo petitioned that the 
limits of jurisdiction between the civil and the 
military authorities might be fixed, and that for- 
eigners might be expelled from the city. To this 
petition the governor replied that the instructions 
of Zabala should be maintained, which conferred 
the ordinary jurisdiction in the first instance on 

7 See Bauzd, Domination espanola en Uruguay, II, 32. 



34 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

the alcaldes, with an appeal to the governor, and 
that the commandant of the garrison should not 
interfere. In replying to the second point of the 
petition, the governor repeated an order for the 
expulsion of foreigners from the city. Rosas' 
brief administration was followed by that of Jose 
de Andonaegui (1745-1756). 

In the interior of the continent, the affairs of 
the Spaniards were no more satisfactory than in 
Montevideo and the adjacent lands. Wanting the 
increasing trade of the ports, whether legitimate 
or contraband, the province of Tucuman failed to 
attain even the slow progress of Buenos Aires. 
The overland communication between Buenos 
Aires and Lima and the traffic in mules with Peru 
were the only channels for receiving information 
respecting the outside world. Cordova, having 
become the educational, ecclesiastical, and politi- 
cal capital, alone furnished an exception to the 
general monotony and stagnation of the province. 
Decade had succeeded decade with nothing to 
relieve the dull uniformity of existence; even the 
incursions of the Indians and the repeated cam- 
paign against them were monotonous. 



In Chile the age of exploration, conquest, and 
settlement had been succeeded by monotonous 
years marked by cultivation of the soil and the 
beginnings of a few primitive industries. Cano 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 35 

de Aponte entered upon the fifteenth year of his 
administration as governor of Chile in 1730. He 
had been appointed to this office by Philip V, 
October 31, 1715. He was at this time fifty years 
of age, and had been for thirty-three years in the 
military service of Spain. In this service he had 
acquired somewhat of the recklessness and the 
spirit of adventure that characterized the soldiers 
of his time. At the close of the war of the Spanish 
succession, he had attained the rank of field- 
marshal. Near the end of 1717 he arrived at San- 
tiago, having made the journey from Spain by 
way of Buenos Aires and Mendoza. He was 
accompanied by his nephew, Manuel de Sala- 
manca, who, by favor of his uncle was advanced 
in a brief period from the position of a lieutenant 
in a cavalry regiment to the highest military 
office under the governor and captain-general. 
The rapid promotion of Salamanca over officers 
of longer service and superior merit provoked 
discontent; and his irregular conduct in dealing 
with the affairs of the army and of the Indians 
gave rise to scandals believed to involve the gov- 
ernor. Cano's treatment of the Indians was not 
conciliatory. He proposed to remedy the lack of 
laborers by drafting the Araucanians into service, 
in spite of the prohibition of royal decrees. His 
agents treated them with contempt, Salamanca 
forced them to sell their ponchos to him alone, 
and at prices fixed by himself, thus depriving 
them of their promised freedom in trading. These 



36 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEB 

regulations and the order that the Indians should 
go to Concepcion to be employed under Spanish 
masters completed their exasperation, and led 
them to plan for the expulsion of the Spaniards 
from Chile. The Jesuit missionaries were not as 
blind to the consequences of these acts as were the 
governor and Salamanca. The superior of the 
Chilean missions wrote to the bishop of Concep- 
cion, warning him of the tempest that was threat- 
ening, and adding that it might still be averted 
by granting the Indians immunity from forced 
labor and other abuses. The bishop visited the 
governor, and informed him personally that an 
uprising of the Indians was impending and was 
inevitable, if they were not given complete satis- 
faction. The governor was indignant, treated the 
report as a calumny, and demanded the bishop's 
source of information. The governor then wrote 
to the Jesuit superior of the missions and later to 
the provincial of the Society. In these communi- 
cations he showed his irritation, and declared as 
exceedingly impertinent the freedom of the mis- 
sionaries in intervening in affairs that did not 
concern them and that they did not understand. 
The incursions of the French traders and the 
expeditions of Clipperton and others in the early 
years of the century had shown the inability of 
Spain to maintain her ancient commercial regime. 
The abundance of wares imported had aroused a 
spirit of speculation, and even stimulated trading 
with the Indians, and in this trading their rights 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 37 

were not always scrupulously regarded. This trad- 
ing had been facilitated by an armistice, or peace, 
with the Indians that had been maintained during 
the early years of the century. By their use the 
Indians had learned to appreciate certain articles 
offered them by the Europeans, particularly 
alcoholic liquors. The active demand for these 
articles and their extensive consumption did not 
contribute to the maintenance of peaceful rela- 
tions between the two peoples. Another cause of 
disorder and hostility appeared in the practice 
of exploiting the ignorance of the Indians by 
making exchanges with them to their disadvan- 
tage; and the gravity of the situation was en- 
hanced by the fact that the majority of the 
persons engaged in trafficing with the Indians 
were officials, who often proceeded with violence 
to take from them their cattle and even to carry 
off their children for menial service or base uses. 
These and other abuses, more or less common 
in the relations of a superior to a less developed 
people, had the inevitable result in discontent and 
revolt. A general uprising of the Indians ap- 
peared in 1723, followed by elaborate military 
preparations on the part of the colonists. The 
decisive action in the conflict was the abandon- 
ment by the Spaniards of the forts that had been 
established south of the river Biobio. 

But in the course of events the Indians dis- 
covered that the state of war was attended by 
inconveniences not experienced in years of truce. 



38 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

They could not exchange their cattle for articles 
furnished by the colonists. They were subject to 
hostile raids and the loss of property without 
compensation. Both parties were desirous of 
peace, but when a treaty was finally concluded, 
in 1726, with elaborate ceremonies, neither party 
was in a mood to abide by it : the Indians, because 
they were not in a position to comprehend its com- 
plicated provisions; the Spaniards, because they 
were not disposed to abandon their project to 
extend their frontier towards the south. 

In the later years of his service as governor, 
Cano de Aponte sought to improve the conditions 
existing in Chile, where, in spite of its excellent 
soil and climate, there was little or no progress. 
A large part of the inhabitants were poor; there 
were few industries; there was a lack of roads; 
and misery was everywhere evident in the filthy 
cities. An effective hindrance to progress in 
Chile, in fact, to progress in all of the Spanish 
colonies, was their failure to use for their own 
welfare or advantage the funds raised by their 
taxes. These were largely diverted from expendi- 
ture in the colonies to the coffers of either corrupt 
officials or the government in Spain. The troops 
in Chile were demoralized by delays in payments 
due them. The money sent by the viceroy for this 
purpose was sometimes several years overdue. 
That which arrived in Chile in 1702 was for the 
year 1694; for years later than this the soldiers 
had then not been paid. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 39 

Adding to the general misfortune, came the 
earthquake of July 8, 1730. The shocks of this 
date were the destructive beginning of a series 
of shocks that continued many months. Churches 
and other buildings were thrown down in the 
cities of central and northern Chile; but the full 
force of the movement was experienced in the 
south, in the region of Concepcion, Chilian, Val- 
divia, and the forts of the frontier. At Concep- 
cion, then on the coast at the site of the modern 
town of Penco, the sea receded half a league from 
the shore, and returned with terrific fury, throw- 
ing down many structures that the movement of 
the earth had left standing. The agitation of the 
sea was observed as far north as Callao, where 
the water rose slowly over the walls of the shore, 
and as slowly retired. 

Besides the earthquake, Chile was afflicted at 
this time (1730) with an epidemic of smallpox. It 
began at the capital and spread to the country, 
extending even to the territory of the Indians, 
where it caused greater destruction than in the 
chief cities. The inhabitants of the towns fled to 
the rural districts, but only to encounter the dis- 
ease, and to die neglected; for those who had not 
been attacked fled in terror, and abandoned those 
who had fallen ill. By epidemics like this and 
the lack of sanitary conditions of living, the 
growth of the population of Chile was materially 
hindered. In 1740, the number of the inhabitants 
was estimated to be between one hundred and ten 



40 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

thousand and one hundred and twenty thousand, 
excluding the Indians. 8 

After almost sixteen years as governor and 
captain-general of Chile, Cano de Aponte died 
November 11, 1733. In accordance with a law of 
the Indies, the oldest member of the audiencia, 
Francisco Sanchez de la Barreda y Vera, was 
charged with the government. He had been a 
member of that body for more than twenty years, 
and during this service he had acquired much 
knowledge of the country, but he was "esteemed 
rather for his moderation of character and his 
religious spirit than for his information and his 
intelligence." 9 His rule was short, for when the 
viceroy, the Marquis of Castel-Fuerte, learned of 
the death of Cano de Aponte, he bestowed the 
office of governor and captain general upon Man- 
uel de Salamanca to be held until the arrival of 
Bruno Mauricio de Zabala. The scandals pro- 
voked by Salamanca's transactions with Indians 
and foreigners were evidently not considered of 
sufficient importance by the viceroy to deter him 
from making the appointment, yet during the two 
years of his administration, prolonged on account 
of the death of Zabala, his rule became note- 
worthy for his illegitimate interference in the 
trade of the colony rather than for any acts 
important for the public welfare. These trans- 
actions made an unfavorable impression in 

s Barros Arana, Diego, Historia jeneral de Chile, Santiago, 
1886, VI, 137. 

9 Barros Arana, Hist, de Chile, VI, 89. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 41 

Madrid, and when information of Zabala's death 
reached the Court in September, 1736, the king, 
instead of confirming Salamanca in the office he 
had held temporarily, appointed General Jose 
Antonio Manso de Velasco. Manso had served 
for thirty-one years in the army of Spain. He 
sailed from Cadiz February 3, 1737, and made his 
formal entry into the city of Santiago in his 
capacity as governor and captain-general on the 
15th of November. The next day he was recog- 
nized as president of the audiencia. 

The residencia, or judicial examination of 
Salamanca 's career, imposed by royal order upon 
Governor Manso, was held under such conditions 
as to convince the governor of the entire in- 
efficiency of that form of trial. This opinion 
might very well have been derived from reports 
of similar trials in the past, where the results had 
been determined by collusion, favoritism, or 
various other forms of fraud. 

In the early months of his administration, 
moreover, the governor proceeded to the fron- 
tier, and confirmed the peace that followed the 
uprising of 1723, by a ceremonious parlamento 
celebrated with the Indians in the early part of 
December, 1738. 

In this first half of the century, Chile and Peru 
had acquired three new markets : that of France, 
made available through contraband trade; that 
of Spain, liberalized by the provisions established 
with reference to ships of register; and the mar- 



42 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ket of the eastern side of the continent, opened by 
the development of the route between Buenos 
Aires and Chile by way of the Andes and the 
Argentine plain. The ships of register were ves- 
sels that might sail to America singly, but they 
were required to depart from, and return to, the 
port of Cadiz. They were permitted, however, to 
sail to any American port where the merchants 
wished to sell their wares. Through these new 
regulations for shipping, Buenos Aires became 
in a measure liberated from the narrow restric- 
tions which Spain had imposed upon its trade. 
Buenos Aires, moreover, became an important 
port for the reception and distribution of goods 
destined for transportation to Chile and Upper 
Peru. In connection with the change in shipping 
regulations relating to the Indies, there was 
created at Madrid a Ministry of the Indies and 
Commerce; and the power to grant licenses to 
ships of register was withdrawn from the Casa de 
Contratacion, and referred to the council of min- 
isters. This was a breach in the forces defending 
the ancient monopolies, and very naturally called 
forth protests in Cadiz and Lima. 

For a number of years Chile had had an advan- 
tageous trade with Peru. An important item in 
that trade was the exportation of wheat, after 
the earthquake of 1687. But in the early decades 
of the eighteenth century, the Peruvian fields be- 
came once more productive, and there arose a 
demand in Peru for protection against the impor- 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 43 

tation of Chilean wheat. The production in Peru 
was, however, insufficient to satisfy the need for 
consumption. The viceroy then proposed to fix a 
maximum price at which wheat might be sold in 
the country. To this the Chileans made an effec- 
tive protest. Another attempt to check the im- 
portation of Chilean wheat was to require that 
payment for importations should be made with 
Peruvian products, and not with money. By this 
requirement Chile would be in a large measure 
deprived of a circulating medium of exchange. 
To counteract this disadvantage, the cabildo of 
Santiago proposed that the precious metals mined 
in Chile should be coined in Chile; and in 1732, 
it was resolved to petition the king to authorize 
the establishment of a mint in Santiago. 

The new markets, the new routes, and the 
discontent caused by the action of the viceroy led 
to a discussion of commercial and industrial 
questions, suggesting the advantage of a greater 
degree of commercial freedom, and making prom- 
inent and drawing public attention to, industrial 
and commercial interests. This stimulated an 
opposition to traditional restrictions, and caused 
a complete break with the ancient commercial 
regime. At the same time the merchants of Chile 
petitioned for the establishment of a consulado 
in Santiago, to facilitate the administration of 
justice in commercial and industrial cases, by 
enabling them to avoid the delay involved in 
resorting to the consulado of Lima. The viceroy, 



44 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Villa Garcia, having been empowered by royal 
order to make the necessary rule in the matter, 
determined that the merchants might elect each 
year one of their number to be their deputy, who 
might pronounce decisions in economic disputes; 
and that these decisions might be appealed to the 
consulado of Lima. This was not a satisfactory 
solution, on account of the delays that would be 
caused by the appeals, and of the liability of new 
issues arising in connection with them. Although 
the merchants aspired to a larger measure of 
independence than was granted by this legislation, 
still in December, 1737, they elected Juan Fran- 
cisco de Lorrain to be their deputy. 

In spite of the limited population, Governor 
Manso was engaged, in 1740, in confirming the 
conquest of the country by establishing towns in 
different regions. Some of those founded under 
his direction were Santa Rosa de los Andes, San 
Felipe el Real, Los Angeles, Cauquenes, Talca, 
San Fernando, Melipilla, Rancagua, Curico, and 
Copiapo. In order to raise funds to meet the 
initial expenses of the new towns, the king author- 
ized Governor Manso to sell six titles of count or 
marquis. In view of the general poverty of the 
country and the fact that there were then only 
four families in Chile possessing titles, the gov- 
ernor did not expect to be able to increase the list, 
and, therefore, determined to offer these titles for 
sale in Lima. But it proved to be unnecessary to 
carry out this plan; for rich Chilean merchants 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 45 

and the owners of landed estates bought the titles. 
The governor by this transaction collected the 
sum of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars, 
eighty thousand of which he distributed among 
the towns, and sent forty thousand to the king. 
Manso's refusal to retain any part of this sum 
for himself helped to enhance the reputation he 
had already acquired for honest and disinterested 
conduct in public affairs. 

On the 24th of December, 1744, the king ap- 
pointed Governor Manso to be the viceroy of 
Peru, and authorized him to designate an interim 
governor of Chile. Francisco Jose de Obando, the 
Marquis of Obando, received this appointment, 
and occupied the office until the arrival of the 
king's appointee, in March, 1746. 

At the time of his appointment Obando was 
at the head of the little squadron organized by 
the viceroy of Peru for the defense of the coast 
against the aggressions of the English. In car- 
rying out the plans of Governor Manso and in 
initiating new undertakings for the advancement 
of the colony, he displayed an interest and an 
energy not ordinarily expected of one holding a 
provisional appointment. On the arrival of Ortiz 
de Rozas, he returned to Peru, and resumed his 
duties as commander of the Pacific squadron. 



46 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

VI 

Ortiz de Bozas made his formal entry into 
Santiago on the 25th of March, 1746. He had 
been a soldier; he had served in the war of the 
succession and in campaigns in Italy and Africa; 
and after 1741 he had been governor of the prov- 
ince of Buenos Aires. Among the public works 
of his administration as governor and captain- 
general of Chile, the organization of the Univer- 
sity of San Felipe was the most noteworthy. This 
institution had long been the subject of corre- 
spondence with the king. In the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, it was observed that neither 
the Jesuits nor the Dominicans gave the instruc- 
tion required in law and medicine, so that those 
who went to the schools of Lima had a distinct 
advantage over the Chileans who could not con- 
veniently meet the expenses of the journey and 
residence in that city. Moreover, during the one 
hundred years following the first suggestion of a 
royal university by the bishops of Imperial and 
Santiago, the population of Chile had increased; 
the colony had made a certain degree of progress ; 
its attention was no longer wholly taken up by 
wars with the Araucanians; and many persons 
saw the need of offering the youth of the colony 
opportunities comparable with those furnished by 
the schools of Lima. The project to found an 
University was, therefore, brought before the 
cabildo of Santiago in December, 1713. One of 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 47 

the alcaldes, Francisco Buiz de Berecedo, 10 pre- 
sented the subject in an extensive address, and 
urged the establishment of an university under 
the royal patronage. He advocated that for this 
purpose there should be annually set aside in per- 
petuity from the funds of the royal treasury the 
sum of five thousand two hundred dollars to erect 
and maintain a royal university, which should 
bear the name of Saint Philip, the apostle, and be 
an eternal memorial to Philip V. The cabildo, 
having heard this address, agreed unanimously 
that a letter should be sent to the king, urging him 
to issue a decree creating the proposed university 
and setting aside from the royal treasury the sum 
named for its support. 

During the next twenty years the authorities 
of Chile and the king were in correspondence 
with reference to the establishment of a royal uni- 
versity. Important among the representations 
to the king and the Council of the Indies was that 
made by the authorized agent of the cabildo of 
Santiago, who had been sent to Madrid. This 
was Tomas de Azua. 11 The communication of 
Tomas de Aziia was directed to the Council of 
the Indies. This body had already in its posses- 
sion a large number of documents from Chile 
dealing with the foundation of the proposed uni- 

10 For documents relating to Francisco Buiz de Bereeedo, see 
Medina, Jose Toribio, La instruction publico, en Chile desde sus 
origenes hasta la fundacion de la universidad de San Felipe, 
Santiago de Chile, CCCLXXXVI-CCCCI. 

11 See Medina, Instruction publica, CCCCXXVIII-CCCCXXXI. 



48 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

versity ; and on the basis furnished by these com- 
munications, and on the report of its attorney, 
the Council formed its final opinion, which was 
delivered to the king under date of April 12, 1736. 
A little more than two years later the decree 
establishing a royal university was issued, July 
28, 1738. One hundred and thirty-six years had 
passed since the first communication from Chile 
on this subject was sent to the king. The action 
was not rapid on the Spanish colonial stage. 

The royal decree of 1738 was the charter of 
the university. In two long paragraphs it set 
forth the need of an university in Chile and the 
conditions under which it should be established; 
and in a final paragraph the king made the formal 
grant: "I concede and give a license for the foun- 
dation, erection, and establishment of the pro- 
posed university in the before-mentioned city of 
Santiago of the kingdom of Chile, and I com- 
mand my governor and captain-general, royal 
audiencia, secular and ecclesiastical cabildos, and 
royal officials of the already mentioned city of 
Santiago, and other ministers and persons of the 
said kingdom, that knowing this my royal resolu- 
tion they render their assistance for its most exact 
execution without permitting any alteration what- 
soever in the plan and rule with which it is my 
will the foundation of the university should be 
carried out in the said city of Santiago ; and this 
despatch shall be observed by the keepers of the 
accounts of my Council of the Indies, and by the 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 49 

royal officials of the already mentioned city of 
Santiago de Chile." 12 This decree arrived at 
Santiago in 1740, but, owing to the lack of funds, 
the formal inauguration of the university was 
delayed until the 11th of March, 1747. The first 
courses of instruction were opened June 10, 1756. 13 
In spite of the long-continued efforts aiming 
at the establishment of an university, there was 
no popular interest in any project for general 
education. There was little disposition in the 
non-ecclesiastical classes to favor the education 
of either women or Indians. Many of the women 
received no literary instruction whatever; only 
a few learned to read, and ability to write was 
a very rare accomplishment. The creation of 
schools for Indians had been ordered by royal 
decrees, but these decrees had produced only 
insignificant results. The lower classes of society, 
whether in the cities or in the country, lived in 
ignorance, on account of the lack of schools. 14 

VII 

During the years here especially considered 
the northwestern part of the continent was the 
scene of important changes in the government. 

12 Medina, Instruction publico, Documentos, No. XX. The 
report of the attorney of the Council of the Indies and the opin- 
ions of that body concerning the foundation of a royal university 
in Chile are printed in this volume by Medina, nos. XVII-XIX. 

13 Vicuna Mackenna, Benjamin, Historia critica y social de la 
ciudad de Santiago, Valparaiso, 1869, II, 121. 

i4 Barros Arana, Hist, de Chile, V, 364. 



50 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

The viceroyalty of New Granada was created in 
1717, and the royal audiencias of Panama and 
Quito were abolished. The towns that had been 
subject to the audiencia of Panama were con- 
tinued under the jurisdiction of the viceroy of 
Peru, while the territory of Quito, or Ecuador, 
became a part of the new viceroyalty. After Vil- 
lalonga 's brief term as viceroy, the viceregal office 
was suspended, in 1722, and Quito resumed its 
position under the superior authority of Peru. 
Antonio Manso Maldonado was appointed Presi- 
dent of New Granada, and assumed the duties of 
his office on the 17th of May, 1724. At the same 
time Santiago Larrain resumed his administra- 
tion as president of the audiencia of Quito. His 
official activity had been suspended by the organ- 
ization of the viceroyalty. The uneventful admin- 
istration of Antonio Manso Maldonado ended in 
1731, when he returned to Spain, leaving the gov- 
ernment of New Granada in the hands of the 
audiencia. This body conducted the general 
administration until 1733, when Rafael de Eslaba 
acceded to the presidency. He died four years 
later, and his successor, Antonio Gonzalez Man- 
rique, assumed the duties of his office on the 21st 
of October, 1738. After a short reign of thirteen 
days, his death caused the office to be again 
vacant. The audiencia then opened the instruc- 
tions relating to the presidency in the event of 
an unexpected vacancy, and found that Francisco 
Gonzalez Manrique was appointed to be the sue- 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 51 

cessor of his deceased brother. As the last of the 
presidents of New Granada under the colonial 
regime, he held the office until the reestablishment 
of the viceroyalty in 1740. 

Manso, writing of the resources of New Gra- 
nada, affirmed that emeralds existed there in such 
abundance, in the province of the Mozos, that they 
had caused those of the Orient to be forgotten, and 
that amethysts were so abundant that one might 
take out as many as he wished. But he referred 
to the fact that at the same time almost all of 
the inhabitants were beggars. 15 Bogota he found 
"in the utmost desolation; the principal inhab- 
itants and nobles withdrawn from the place; the 
merchants idle; the offices of the government 
vacant; and everything ruined and in a state of 
lamentable poverty. ' n6 The cause of the poverty 
of the people of New Granada and of the king- 
dom, in spite of the abundant natural resources, 
was the principal theme of Manso 's Relation. 
The most universal cause of this poverty he found 
in the fact "that the piety of the faithful in these 
parts is excessive." They enirched monasteries 
and the various religious orders, and founded 
chapels in the churches. For the favor of the 
church they made donations that encroached on 
their means of support and added to the dead, 
instead of to the active, wealth. 17 

is Belaciones de mando (Bibl. de hist, national, Ed. Posada, 
VIII), Bogota, 1910, 5-6. 
is Belaciones de mando, 3. 
it Belaciones de mando, 13. 



52 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



VIII 

The province of Quito, like New Granada, 
suffered extreme poverty and misery. The pro- 
ductive land was unequally distributed. Here, as 
elsewhere in the Spanish dependencies, the best 
lands were held in large tracts by the Jesuits. 
The private holdings, small in comparison, were 
burdened with tithes. From this charge the pos- 
sessions of the Jesuits were exempt. The pros- 
pects of good harvests for many years were 
ruined by unfavorable conditions, by a destructive 
drought followed by an excess of rain, by an un- 
usual degree of cold, and by pests that for fifteen 
years afflicted the growing crops. 

One of the principal causes of the lack of per- 
manent progress in the Spanish dependencies was 
the withdrawal of funds for expenditure outside 
of the political division where they were collected, 
or to be invested, as already indicated, in the dead 
hands of the church. The annual contribution of 
42,375 pesos, for instance, sent by Quito for the 
support of the garrisons of Cartagena and Santa 
Marta withdrew the surplus over the necessary 
local expenditures that might have made for the 
progress of the province. But this was not always 
merely such a surplus ; for in 1734, in order to be 
able to make this payment, it was necessary to 
withhold the salaries of the president and judges 
of the audiencia and of all the other public func- 
tionaries. 18 

18 Suarez, Federico Gonzalez, Historia general de la Bepublica 
del Ecuador, Quito, 1894, V, 48, 49. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 53 

There followed a scarcity of money. Many 
purchasers had to resort to barter. This was due 
not merely to the shipment of money to the coast 
cities, but also to the decline in the exportation of 
textile fabrics, both to Peru and New Granada. 
The diminution of the demand for the manufac- 
tured products of Quito was due in part to the 
growth of manufacturing in other provinces, and 
to the increased importation of European wares 
into the dependencies. The restrictions on the 
exportation of cacao had, moreover, added to the 
poverty prevailing throughout the province when 
Dionisio de Alcedo y Herrera became president 
in 1728. 

The increase of poverty was attended by an 
increase of crime, and the criminals took advan- 
tage of the immunity offered by the churches and 
other asylums. The ecclesiastics were slow to 
assist the secular authorities to execute justice. 
The city of Quito, therefore, fell into scandalous 
disorder. Eobberies were frequent; thieves in- 
vaded private houses and even the churches. The 
civil authorities were, however, aroused to action 
by the assassination of Jose Quiroz y Castrilton, 
a canon of the church. The murderer fled to the 
convent of St. Augustine, where he was arrested. 
Three days later he was condemned and hanged. 

Alcedo retired from the presidency in 1736. 
In the presence of poverty and crime, many of the 
inhabitants were persuaded they ought to have a 
better government, but their experience encour- 
aged the thought that it was not possible except 



54 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

through a departure from the Spanish policy. 
The name of Alcedo is less distinctly remembered 
for the president's administration than for the 
writings of his son, Antonio de Alcedo, in the 
Diccionario geogrdfico e historico de las Indias 
occidentals 6 America. 

It was in the official period of Alcedo 's suc- 
cessor, Jose de Araujo de Rio, that the expedition 
of the French Academicians appeared on the 
tableland of Ecuador. Araujo arrived at Quito 
in 1736. He was born in Lima, and this fact helps 
to account for Ulloa's attitude of disrespect 
towards him. It was a case of a Spanish official 
in the presence of a Creole official. Out of the 
violent controversy that arose between the Span- 
ish lieutenant and the Creole governor there 
appeared a widening breach between the two 
classes represented by these antagonists. The 
relations that existed between these men present 
one of the many indications of the scorn of the 
Spaniard for the Creole, and the Creole's fateful 
resentment. In fact, one of the characteristics of 
Quito society in this period, besides its extreme 
poverty, was the lack of union, the discord, the 
antagonism between the Spaniards and the Cre- 
oles. This was doubtless in part the result of a 
too narrow horizon of associations. This and the 
deadening monotony of existence made the inhab- 
itants eager to seize upon any occasion for a 
popular celebration. In 1724 the accession of 
Louis I, on the abdication of Philip V, was marked 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 55 

by a fiesta of public rejoicing. Even the period of 
mourning, following his early death, was undoubt- 
edly an agreeable change in the dull uniformity 
of their common life. Many of the celebrations 
had an official character ; the death of a king, the 
birth of a prince, the marriage of a member of 
the royal family, the coronation of a new king, all 
these events were greeted as grateful interrup- 
tions in the oppressive routine of an isolated 
colonial existence. The events of the fiesta were 
always the same: bull-fights, illumination, fire- 
works, and plays on an open stage in the plaza. 
A universal preliminary was a mass celebrated 
in the cathedral. 



IX 

The principal motives for reestablishing the 
viceroyalty of New Granada were found in the 
inability of the viceroy of Peru to exercise efficient 
supervision over the vast territory subject to his 
superior authority, and in the frequent collisions 
between the president of New Granada and the 
audiencias of Panama and Quito. The first vice- 
roy of the reestablished viceroyalty was Sebastian 
de Eslaba. All the provinces of Ecuador were 
brought into the new viceroyalty, but the audi- 
encias of Quito and Panama were not abolished 
as they had been in 1717. Their allegiance was 
transferred from the viceroy of Peru to the vice- 
roy of New Granada. In April, 1740, Eslaba 



56 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

arrived at Cartagena, where he organized his 
viceregal administration, 19 and where he remained 
until the expiration of his term of service, in 1749. 
It was in this period, in 1746, that the French 
commission led by La Condamine, completed its 
work of measuring the length of a degree of the 
meridian in Ecuador. The two Spanish officers 
who were attached to the commission, devoted 
much of their visit in America to travelling and 
making investigations in astronomy, physics, and 
geography. They also made extensive inquiries 
into the political and social conditions of Chile, 
Peru, and Ecuador. Some of the results of these 
investigations were published in A Voyage to 
South America and Noticias secretas de America. 

One of the government 's tasks of this time was 
to relieve the suffering and wretchedness among 
the poor, caused by the failure of harvests not 
only in Ecuador but also in New Granada, and 
intensified in some quarters by the earthquake's 
destruction of Popayan. In his appeals to the 
people the archbishop took a strictly ecclesi- 
astical view of the earthquake and the drought, 
exhorted the people to reform their customs, and 
thus avert a similar punishment by God in the 
future. 

Viceroy Eslaba, as already indicated, resided 
at Cartagena throughout the period of his service, 
and, therefore, remained without much knowledge 

is Vergara y Velasco, Francisco Javier, Eslava el defensor de 
Cartagena, in Capitulos, 70-78. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 57 

of the needs of the other parts of the territory 
subject to his authority. On his retirement to 
Spain in 1749, he had to his credit, however, the 
heroic and successful defense of Cartagena 
against the attack of the English under Vernon. 

On July 9, 1746, Philip V died, and the throne 
of Spain passed to Ferdinand, a son by his first 
marriage, while Charles, a son by his second mar- 
riage, was king of Naples. Under Philip V, Spain 
had given evidence of a revival from its abject 
state at the end of the preceding century. There 
were indications of an increased intellectual activ- 
ity; the financial affairs of the government were 
improved; and the reorganization of New Gra- 
nada promised increased governmental efficiency 
for that kingdom. Although Philip V was indo- 
lent and without the power of effective initiative, 
he nevertheless showed a reasonable discrimina- 
tion in accepting measures presented to him by 
his ministers. 

The hostile attitude of the British suggested 
that the successor of Eslaba should be an experi- 
enced military or naval officer, and Jose Alfonso 
Pizarro, the Marquis of Villar, was appointed. 
Pizarro had served in the naval defense of the 
coast of Bio de la Plata, Chile, and Peru. He was 
at Cadiz when the notification of his appoinment 
reached him. He left that port September 23, 
1749, taking with him seven Jesuits for the pur- 
poses of extending the missionary enterprises of 
the viceroyalty. His first noteworthy act on 



58 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

reaching Bogota was to support the bishop of 
Panama, Luna Victoria, in creating a public uni- 
versity in that city, which was to be established 
in the house of the Jesuits. Here, as throughout 
Spanish South America at the period in question, 
whatever public opinion existed with respect to 
education regarded with special favor the work of 
the Jesuits. For a number of years the true posi- 
tion and jurisdiction of the governments of Pan- 
ama and Veraguas had been under discussion. 
This discussion was, however, finally terminated 
by a royal decree, August 20, 1739, embodying 
these two captaincies-general in the viceroyalty 
of Santa Fe, or New Granada; and a few years 
later, June 20, 1751, the king of Spain caused the 
audiencia of Panama to be abolished, leaving the 
government of the region in essentially the same 
position as the government of Cartagena. 

Philip V, in 1718, urged by his financial needs, 
sold the right to coin money in New Granada to 
Jose Prieto Salazar, whose title as the possessor 
of this right was Tesorero blanquecedor. But 
after the death of Philip the crown resumed this 
right, making compensation to the person or per- 
sons deprived of it. Prieto was permitted to 
enjoy his acquired monopoly until his death, when 
it passed to his widow, Maria Ana de Ricuarte, 
who was granted a pension for surrendering it. 
A similar method for providing coin had been fol- 
lowed in other provinces. In Chile the monopoly 
of the mint was held for twenty-two years by 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 59 

Francisco Garcia Huidoboro, but in 1770 Charles 
III revoked it in favor of the crown. The mint 
of Popayan was incorporated in the crown the 
same year, when the holder of the monopoly was 
granted a pension and the title of Count of Casa- 
Valencia. The pension accorded to his legitimate 
heirs was enjoyed by the family until 1859. 

The sale of alcoholic liquors was an exceed- 
ingly profitable branch of trade as carried on 
during the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Some of the parish priests did not hesitate to 
purchase the right to sell such liquors in specified 
districts, and, in the exercise of this right, they 
helped to transform the public celebrations of the 
churches into scenes of drunkenness and debauch- 
ery. The evils resulting from this traffic were 
recognized by Archbishop Aziia, and on the 25th 
of October, 1749, he issued an edict prohibiting 
the clergy from engaging in this traffic under pen- 
alty of excommunication; but the practices at 
some of the church festivities in later times in- 
dicate that Aziia's edict was not permanently 
effective. 

The viceroy Pizarro had spent much of his life 
in a different field of official activity, and conse- 
quently found the duties involved in the civil 
administration of an extended territory disagree- 
ably burdensome. He, therefore, sought to be 
relieved of his office, and his repeated requests 
were finally granted in 1753, when he returned 
to Spain. His successor was Jose de Solis Folch 



60 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

de Cardona, of a family that had gained an influ- 
ential position at the court of Spain during 
the war of the succession. Although frequently 
referred to as very young at the time of his 
appointment, he was in fact then not less than 
thirty-five years old. His childhood acquaintance 
with Ferdinand VI suggests that he must have 
been of nearly the same age as the king, who was 
forty years old in 1753. Various rumors were 
current concerning his scandalous life in Madrid 
at the time of his appointment, and during his 
early years in Bogota; but no very solid founda- 
tion for these tales has been revealed. The record 
of his public activity in the construction of roads 
and in the management of the finances indicate 
an intelligent and effective administrator. His 
plans for public works, however, exceeded the 
financial resources of the government, and under 
these circumstances he tried to induce the inhab- 
itants of certain towns to undertake work in their 
respective districts. But the protective govern- 
ment had not developed in the people the power 
to initiate public work or the will to make volun- 
tary contributions for the public good. The atti- 
tude of the inhabitants of New Granada with 
respect to public improvements is described by 
Viceroy Solis in the remark that "they wished the 
utilities without expense or labor." 20 Solis not 
only gave attention to the kingdom's material 
betterment, but also undertook to gather its sta- 

20 Belaciones de mando, 84. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 61 

tistics into systematic form. For this purpose he 
appointed a commission composed of the regent 
of the tribunal of accounts, Francisco Vergara, 
and the chief accountant, Juan Martin de Sarra- 
tea. However imperfect may have been the 
accomplishment, the undertaking has the merit 
of a first attempt to organize a department of 
statistics in New Granada. 

Throughout the period of his office, Solis main- 
tained amicable relations with the church. In 
December, 1756, he received the information that 
his brother, the archbishop of Seville, had been 
promoted to the dignity of a cardinal. This event 
offered the cabildo of the city an occasion for 
honoring the viceroy, and in this project the 
church, through the ecclesiastical cabildo, deter- 
mined to cooperate ; and, by this cooperation with 
the secular authority, to manifest the high regard 
of the cabildo and the members of the church 
generally for the viceroy. 



The province of Guayana was one of the three 
provinces subject to the governor who resided at 
Santa Inez de Cumana, and who was subordinated 
to the viceroy of Santa Fe, or New Granada. The 
other provinces were Cumana and Barcelona. 
The town of Santo Thome was founded in the last 
decade of the sixteenth century, and became the 
capital of the province of Guayana. The founder 



62 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

and first governor was Antonio de Berrio. Rein- 
forcements brought from Spain by Domingo de 
Vera and other additions raised the number of 
the inhabitants to about four hundred, including 
men, women, and children. The early expedition 
for Minoa withdrew about three hundred of the 
inhabitants, but later recruits were received from 
Trinidad. This settlement near the mouth of the 
Caroni is referred to as being in 1598, a Spanish 
"rancerie of some twentie or thirtie houses." 21 

In 1598 there appears to have been at the 
"rancerie" a force of sixty cavalrymen and a 
hundred musketeers. After the withdrawal of 
Raleigh, near the end of January, 1618, the inhab- 
itants began to reconstruct the town, building 
churches and a Dominican as well as a Franciscan 
monastery. The Dutch West India Company sent 
a force to attack Santo Thome under Admiral 
Adriaen Janszoon Pater, who sacked and burned 
the town, which had at this time one hundred and 
thirty or a hundred and forty houses. In 1653 
it had very few inhabitants ; in fact, between 1591 
and 1648 it maintained a precarious existence, and 
was not in a position to serve as a colonizing set- 
tlement for the neighboring country. It was the 
only Spanish settlement on the Orinoco before the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. But in the 
first half of that century Spanish missionaries 
crossed the divide and established themselves on 

21 Keymis, A Relation of the Second Voyage to Guiana, Lon- 
don, 1596, 15. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 63 

the northern tributaries of the Cuyuni. The 
earliest of these establishments was the mission 
of Cupapuy, founded in 1733. In 1737 they estab- 
lished the mission and cattle ranch of Divina Pas- 
tora, on the Cumuri. Other posts in this region 
were the Indian village of Cumuri, the mission of 
Tupuquen, the mission of Palmar, founded in 
1746, the mission of Miamo, of 1748, and the mis- 
sions of Curumo and Mutanambo. Through these 
missions the Spaniards came into conflict with the 
Dutch, who regarded them as encroaching on their 
possessions. The Dutch considered Santo Thome 
as a Spanish outpost designed to facilitate hostile 
attacks. The unfriendly relations between the 
two colonies were aggravated by the fact that 
slaves who had run away from Essequibo were 
harbored by the Spaniards, and that the Span- 
iards even took by force and retained slaves who 
belonged to the Dutch. 

The first site of the town of Santo Thome, or 
the first town in the province of Guayana to bear 
that name, was situated near the confluence of 
the Caroni and the Orinoco, opposite the island 
of Faxardo. The second site was about twelve 
leagues east of the mouth of the Caroni. The 
third was at the narrows of the Orinoco. The 
removal to Angostura, or the third site, was 
effected in 1764, by Governor Joaquin Moreno de 
Mendoza, under a royal order of 1762; and the 
town established at Angostura was known as 
Santo Thome de la Nueva Guayana, thus distin- 



64 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

guishing it from Vieja Guayana. At the time of 
the removal of the town to Angostura, the Capu- 
chin missions of the Orinoco below the Caroni 
were transferred to positions above that river. 
The material local basis of the town's support 
was about twenty haciendas, or estates, and small 
herds of cattle, aggregating about eighteen hun- 
dred animals. To the product of these estates, 
the missions of the province made important con- 
tributions. The three groups of missions occu- 
pied different parts of this vast interior region; 
and this partition of the territory was authorized 
by the governors and confirmed by the king. 
The territory assigned to the Capuchins extended 
from the mouths of the Orinoco to the narrows; 
that assigned to the Observantists, from the nar- 
rows to the river Caura ; and that assigned to the 
Jesuits, from the river Caura indefinitely towards 
the west. 22 The Capuchins began to establish 
their missions in 1687, but owing to the difficulties 
of obtaining the proper support and protection 
their work suffered long interruptions. In 1724, 
however, the mission of Concepcion de Suay was 
founded about two leagues from the presidio of 
Guayana. 23 The Jesuit missions were established 
on the rivers Meta and Casanare, and were sub- 

22 Cuervo, Antonio B., Coleceion de documentos sobre geo- 
grafia y historia de Colombia, Bogota, 1891, III, 23. 

23 A list of the Capuchin missions of Guayana, together with 
the dates of their foundation and abandonment, is given in Be- 
port of V. S. Commission on the true divisonal line between 
Venezuela and British Guiana, Washington, 1898, III, 215-217. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 65 

ject to the authorities of Bogota. Only four of 
them were south of the Orinoco, and belonged to 
the province of Guayana. These were less favor- 
ably situated than the others, by reason of the 
difficulties of communication and the unhealth- 
fulness of their environment. The conversion of 
the Indians of the plains was only a part of the 
undertaking of these missions. They led a 
serious campaign against the barbarism of the 
various tribes that inhabited this region. They 
sought, moreover, to gain and communicate to 
the civilized world systematic knowledge of the 
Indians, their country, and their language. 

Prior to 1726, the missionaries in the province 
of Guayana found it difficult to obtain the food 
requisite for their support; and even in 1742, on 
information received concerning the poverty of 
the missionaries of the plains, the king ordered 
that support should be extended to them from the 
royal treasury. 24 The first steps towards making 
the missions self-supporting was the introduction 
of cattle of various kinds. These multiplied rap- 
idly on the grassy plains, but a diet consisting 
exclusively of flesh was not satisfactory, and in 
the progress of years the several missions were 
able to harvest yucca, rice, plantains, and sugar- 
cane. When the herds had grown to be very 
numerous, each mission formed an organization 
for their care. There was a principal superin- 

24 gee Cuervo, IV, 209, for decree by the king addressed to 
the governor and captain-general of New Granada. 



66 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

tendent, with such subordinates as were needed. 
It became evident very early that horses would 
be needed, especially for the vaqueros, to assist 
them in watching and controlling the extensive 
and increasing herds; and in the course of time 
the mission became abundantly supplied with both 
horses and mules. 

There is no doubt that much of the hostility 
shown towards the Jesuits, in the region of the 
Orinoco as well as elsewhere, was due to their suc- 
cessful conduct of strictly worldly affairs. The 
charges that were brought against them prior to 
their expulsion were provoked by the jealousy of 
secular traders. But it became very clear to the 
civil authorities that no missionary undertaking 
on the plains of the Orinoco and the Casanare 
could be successful except as the missions them- 
selves developed a material basis, and an inde- 
pendent source of supplies, for their support. 

Moreover, after the development of the mis- 
sions, the products resulting from the labor of 
the Indians was especially important for the sup- 
port of the military establishment. The surplus 
not required for the maintenance of the mission 
was transferred to the presidio, and according to 
Governor Diguja, "it can be safely said that with- 
out this assistance it would have been impossible 
for the presidio to support the persons who live 
in it. Nor would it have been possible for the per- 
sons who were engaged in commercial affairs in 
the region of the Orinoco to carry on their 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 67 

business with as much facility as they can do at 
present, had it not been for the fact that at the 
presidio they can find abundant provision of 
casabe and other supplies sent there by the mis- 
sionaries. Should the missions fail at any time 
to furnish this assistance, the inhabitants of the 
presidio would certainly starve. Supplies from 
other sources would be very costly, and only be 
obtained at very distance places." 25 

A list of the missions or Indian villages of the 
plains of the Orinoco, giving the dates of their 
foundation and abandonment, shows a striking 
lack of stability; and this was due in part to the 
fact that there were not missionaries enough to 
provide one for each settlement, but only one for 
three or four missions widely separated from one 
another. Thus, in the absence of the missionary, 
there was wanting the restraining and disciplin- 
ary force to curb the natural propensities of the 
natives, and to keep them from obeying the call 
of the wild. 

In the province of Caracas, another region 
that was later to be embodied in the territory of 
Venezuela, the Dutch contraband trade, the oper- 
ations of the Guipuzcoa Company, and the rebel- 
lion of Francisco de Leon occupied fully the atten- 
tion of the inhabitants. 26 

25 Beport submitted by Jose Diguja, Governor of Cumana, 
chap. VIII, sec. 6. 

26 See The Spanish Dependencies in South America, II, chap. 
XVII. 



68 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



XI 

Still farther towards the east the island of 
Trinidad presented a miniature revolution. By a 
royal decree of 1731, the provinces of Guayana, 
Caracas, Cumana, Barcelona, Carabobo, Barqui- 
shneto, and Coro were united under a captain- 
general. In consequence of this act, the govern- 
ment of New Andalucia ceased to exist. Trinidad 
was subject to this new government only with 
respect to financial affairs ; for all other branches 
of its administration, it was dependent on the 
audiencia of Bogota. 27 

Four years earlier Trinidad suffered an eco- 
nomic disaster in the failure of the cacao to 
mature. This failure was evidently due to some 
change in the temperature or other conditions of 
cultivation ; but the assignment of a natural cause 
for the calamity did not meet the approval of 
Padre Gumilla, who held it to be a divine punish- 
ment laid upon the cultivators for their neglect 
to pay the tithes regularly. 28 Although the cause 
of the failure was obscure, the effect was clear: 
the loss of private incomes ; the cessation of com- 
merce with the colony; the emigration of a large 
part of the inhabitants, reducing the colony to 
fifty whites and a hundred and fifty negroes, 

27 Blanco, Jose Felix, Documentos para la historia de la vida 
publica del Libertador de Colombia, Peru y Bolivia, Caracas, 1875- 
1878, I, no. 74, sec. 5; Borde, Pierre Gustave Louis, Eistoire de 
Vile de Trmidad sous le gouvernment espagnol, Paris, 1876-82, 
II, 91. 

28 Orinoco ilustrado, I, chap. I, see. II. 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 69 

mulattos, and mestizos; and the decline of the 
public revenues to two hundred and thirty-one 
dollars. The luxuriant vegetation of the tropics 
invaded the fields that had been cultivated. The 
village of San Jose de Oruna, its houses deserted 
and fallen into ruins, presented the appearance 
of an abandoned town. The colony was unable to 
meet the expenses of its administration, and, when 
the cabildo imposed a slight tax for the purpose 
of renewing the palm-leaf roof of the municipal 
building, the inhabitants petitioned the sovereign, 
requesting that they might be exempt from vio- 
lence in case it should not be possible for them 
to pay the impost. A few years later there was 
observed to be an increase in the population of 
Trinidad, manifesting itself by a rise in the pub- 
lic revenues from two hundred and thirty-one 
dollars in 1733 to twelve hundred and seventeen 
dollars in 1735. But this returning tide of pros- 
perity was checked in 1739 by an epidemic of 
smallpox that carried off a large part of the pop- 
ulation. The disease raged especially among the 
Indians, who, terrified by its appearance, fled 
from those who were attacked by it. Even the 
monkeys did not escape its virulence. To these 
and other ills were added the terrors of an Eng- 
lish invasion in 1740, when ships of the enemy 
entered the Gulf of Paria and ascended the 
Orinoco. This new danger moved the colonists to 
petition Philip V for fifty soldiers to be added 
to the twenty who then constituted the garrison 
of the island. 



70 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEE 

The political affairs of the colony were not 
less embarrassing than its economic affairs. Gov- 
ernor Esteban Simon de Linan y Vera transferred 
the government temporarily to Major Espinosa, 
the military commandant, and went to Comuna 
without giving the cabildo notice of his proposed 
absence. The two powers had evidently been in 
conflict; for when on the 9th of July, 1743, the 
cabildo learned that the governor had departed 
several days earlier, it immediately held an ex- 
cited meeting, and declared that the appointment 
of Espinosa was illegal. It decided that the two 
alcaldes were the only persons who, in the absence 
of the governor, had the right to conduct the civil 
and military government of the island. Espinosa 
was, therefore, deprived of his official power. The 
spirit of revolt spread from the cabildo to the 
people, and when Governor Esteban Simon de 
Linan y Vera returned, in 1745, there was a gen- 
eral uprising against him. He was seized and 
imprisoned, and his property was confiscated. 
Stimulated by the popular revolt, the cabildo 
aroused itself, and declared the governor deprived 
of his office for having been absent from the colony 
without permission. This revolutionary activity 
of the people and the cabildo was followed by a 
reaction. Major Espinosa fled to the governor 
of Cumana, who caused the details of the insur- 
rection to be passed to the viceroy of New Gra- 
nada through the captain-general of Caracas. 
The viceroy, as the governmental superior in all 



STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES 71 

the lands constituting the viceroyalty, authorized 
the lieutenant governor of Cumana to proceed to 
Trinidad, to liberate the governor from the prison 
where he was detained, and to replace him in pos- 
session of the office and employments of which he 
had been violently dispossessed. 

At the head of an effective force, the lieuten- 
ant governor of Cumana reached Trinidad with- 
out opposition in December, 1745, where he lib- 
erated the governor, who had been eight months 
in prison, and put him in possession of his prop- 
erty. Then, proceeding in his judicial capacity, 
he condemned the two alcaldes to imprisonment 
in irons and their accomplices to banishment for 
ten years. The property of the alcaldes was con- 
fiscated, and used as a contribution towards the 
expenses of the expedition against the insurgents. 

Having subdued the revolt, Felix Espinosa de 
los Monteros remained as provisional governor of 
Trinidad. His administration lasted six months, 
and on June 3, 1746, he was superseded by Juan 
Jose Salcedo, a lieutenant colonel of cavalry, who 
immediately encountered opposition on the part 
of the cabildo. This body refused to act on his 
suggestion, and lapsed into hopeless inactivity. It 
held not more than one meeting a year between 
1746 and 1750. The island's political state had 
fallen to the level of its economic condition. If 
the cabildo aroused itself in 1750, it was to peti- 
tion the king to cause the exiles to be recalled. 
This action was advocated on the ground that 



72 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

without them there were too few persons of intel- 
ligence in the island to perform the functions of 
public officials. The return of the exiles was de- 
manded, moreover, to relieve their families of the 
poverty and misery into which they had fallen. 
By a proclamation of the governor, dated April 11, 
1751, the decree of banishment was revoked, and 
those persons who had been affected by it were 
permitted to return to Trinidad; and with their 
reappearance intrigues and plots were revived. 

A critical event in the affairs of Trinidad was 
the transfer of the capital from San Jose de 
Oruna to Port of Spain. The former capital was 
abandoned by all but a few of its inhabitants; 
its buildings were dilapidated; its streets were 
choked with tropical vegetation, and torrential 
rains had washed deep ditches through them ; and 
the cabildo was composed of ignorant persons 
who neglected their duties and stood in opposition 
to the governor. The new capital presented con- 
ditions more favorable for advancement. It was 
on the coast ; the inhabitants of the town and those 
of the neighboring country were industrious and 
thrifty, and through their efforts the island en- 
tered upon a period of more hopeful prospects. 

This petty insurrection is without special sig- 
nificance, except as one of many practical indica- 
tions of the ambition which moved even small 
Spanish colonies in America in the eighteenth 
century, to enlarge their governmental preroga- 
tives, and thereby limit the power exercised by 
the royal government. 



CHAPTER III 

THE SPANISH-PORTUGUESE BOUNDARY 

TREATY OF 1750 AND THE WAR OF 

THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS 

I. Terms of the treaty of 1750. II. Protests of the 
Indians against removal. III. The boundary com- 
missioners and the disposition of the Indians. IV. 
Active hostilities of the Spanish and Portuguese 
against the Indians of the seven reductions. V. 
"Emperor" Nicolas Nanguiru, further hostilities, 
and preparations for exile. VI. Failure of the 
campaign and the abrogation of the treaty. 



The armistice of 1737 did not end the rivalry 
of the Spanish and the Portuguese in South 
America. The Portuguese continued to strengthen 
the fortifications of Colonia, and to extend their 
control over the coast of Rio de la Plata. They 
drove away the Spanish settlers, and took pos- 
session of their lands. Complaints made to the 
king of Spain concerning the acts of the Portu- 
guese finally persuaded him to order the governor 
to attack and take the town of Colonia. The first 
attempt having failed, the Spanish government 
proposed to employ a force that would be success- 



74 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ful. But at this point the king of Spain was 
induced to take a new view of the situation. Eng- 
land and Holland determined to continue their 
support of Portugal. The Spanish king's efforts 
were, moreover, paralyzed by the thought that the 
influence of his enemies might cause him to lose 
his hold on the Two Sicilies. In the meantime 
the Portuguese went on adding new strength to 
the fortress of Colonia, and the English made use 
of it in carrying on the slave trade. 

Finally, in 1750, by the treaty of Madrid, an 
attempt was made to settle the controversy about 
Colonia, and to fix the boundary, or line of de- 
marcation, between the Spanish and Portuguese 
possessions. This treaty declared that for the 
future it itself should be the only basis and rule 
for determining the limits of the Portuguese and 
Spanish dominions in America and Asia; that it 
should set aside and abolish whatever rights had 
been asserted on the basis of the bull of Alex- 
ander VI and the treaties of Tordesillas, Lisbon, 
i 

and Madrid, or of any other treaties, conventions, 
or promises ; and that all future transactions with 
reference to the boundaries of these dominions 
should not make use of other treaties or agree- 

i ments, but should refer to the prescriptions of this 
i treaty as the invariable rule to be adopted with- 

1 out controversy. 

By the thirteenth article of this treaty Portu- 
gal ceded Colonia to the crown of Spain; and, in 
the following article, Spain formally ceded to 



SPANISH-PORTUGUESE TREATY OF 1750 75 

Portugal any and all lands that had been occupied 
by Spain or to which Spain held a title, and which 
by this treaty were declared to belong to Portugal. 
The territory involved in this cession embraced 
seven of the Indian villages, or reductions, estab- 
lished by the Jesuits in Paraguay on the east of 
the Uruguay River. The missionaries of these 
reductions were required to withdraw, to take 
with them their furniture and effects, and also the 
Indian inhabitants of- the reductions. These seven 
reductions with their houses and lands, their 
churches and other buildings, were transferred to 
the crown of Portugal. 

Provision having been made for the determin- 
ation of the boundary line, elaborate and strict 
regulations were established with respect to trade 
and travel across the border, providing for a 
policy of non-intercourse. The treaty also pro- 
vided for a board of commissioners to fix prac- 
tically the line of demarcation, as specified by the 
treaty. 1 

II 

Neither the Spaniards nor the Portuguese 
were especially interested in the provisions of the 
treaty relating to the boundary in the interior, 
uninhabited part of the continent ; but the cession 

1 Calvo, Carlos, Coleccion completa de los tratados de la 
America Latina, Paris, 1862, II, 241-260; the treaty to determine 
the instructions for the board of commissioners is printed in 
Calvo 's collection, II, 261-277. 



76 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

of the seven Jesuit reductions to the Portuguese 
attracted the interested attention of everybody 
concerned. The Indians objected emphatically to 
the transfer of their lands and houses to their 
enemies, and raised the question of the possibility 
of resisting, the execution of the treaty. They 
even found it difficult to believe that the king had 
ordered their removal. This is seen in their 
appeal to Governor Andonaegui, as presented by 
Dobrizhoffer. The form of the appeal may have 
been given by a Jesuit, but the later attitude of 
the Indians indicates that the document presented 
their sentiments: "Neither we nor our fathers 
have ever offended the king or ever attacked the 
Spanish settlements. How, then, innocent as we 
are, can we believe that the best of princes would 
condemn us to banishment? Our fathers, our 
forefathers, our brethren, have fought under the 
king's banner, often against the Portuguese, often 
against the savages: who can tell how many of 
them have fallen in battle, or before the walls of 
Nova Colonia, so often besieged! We ourselves 
can show in our scars the proofs of our fidelity 
and our courage. We have ever had it at heart 
to extend the limits of the Spanish empire, and 
to defend it against all enemies ; nor have we ever 
been sparing of our blood, or of our lives. Will 
then the Catholic king requite these services by 
the bitter punishment of expelling us from our 
native land, our churches, our homes and fields 
and fair inheritance? This is beyond all belief. 



SPANISH-PORTUGUESE TREATY OF 1750 77 

By the royal letters of Philip V, which, according 
to his own injunctions, were read to us from the 
pulpits, we were exhorted never to suffer the 
Portuguese to approach our borders, because they 
were his enemies and ours. Now, we are told that 
the king will have us yield up to these very Portu- 
guese, this wide and fertile territory, which the 
kings of Spain, and God and Nature have given 
us, and which for a whole century we have tilled 
with the sweat of our brows. Can any one be 
persuaded that Ferdinand the son should enjoin 
us to do that which was so frequently forbidden 
by his father Philip ? But if time and change have 
indeed brought about such friendship between old 
enemies that the Spaniards are desirous to gratify 
the Portuguese, there are ample tracts of country 
to spare, and let those be given them. What! 
Shall we resign our towns to the Portuguese — the 
Portuguese — by whose ancestors so many hundred 
thousands of ours have been slaughtered, or car- 
ried away into cruel slavery in Brazil? This is 
as intolerable to us as it is incredible that it should 
be required. When, with the Holy Gospel in our 
hand, we promised and vowed fidelity to God and 
the king of Spain, his priests and governors prom- 
ised to us on his part, friendship and perpetual 
protection; and now we are commanded to give 
up our country ! Is it to be believed that the prom- 
ises, and faith, and friendship of the Spaniards, 
can be of so little stability?" 2 

2 Dobrizhoffer, Martin, Account of the Abipones, London, 1822, 
I, 17-29; Bauza, II, 144-148. 



78 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

It is not to be doubted that the Jesuits opposed 
the treaty of 1750 from the beginning. They could 
not reasonably be expected to assume any other 
attitude toward it, since it proposed to destroy in 
a considerable territory the results of their labors 
which had been continued for more than a hun- 
dred years. But they repudiated the charge that 
they had instigated or provoked the uprising, a 
charge that later inquiries have found to be with- 
out foundation. 

In the interval of two years between the 
signing of the treaty and the arrival of the com- 
missioners appointed to mark the boundary, the 
Jesuits of Paraguay addressed a memorial to the 
audiencia of Charcas, protesting particularly 
against the transfer of the seven reductions to 
Portugal and the removal of the inhabitants. A 
similar protest was presented to the audiencia of 
Lima. A copy of this memorial was forwarded by 
the viceroy to the king of Spain, and a second 
copy was transmitted to the governor of Buenos 
Aires, with instructions that it should be delivered 
to the commissioners. Subsequent events do not 
indicate that these protests exercised any im- 
portant influence on the conduct of the allies. 
They were based, however, on the almost unani- 
mous belief of the priests in charge of the reduc- 
tions that it would be impossible to carry out 
those provisions of the treaty which required the 
Indians to abandon their homes and fields for 
uncultivated and unoccupied lands that might be 



SPANISH-PORTUGUESE TREATY OF 1750 79 

assigned to them. In spite of the prevalence of 
this belief, the Provincial instructed the Jesuits 
of the reductions in question to urge their fol- 
lowers to obedience ; at the same time, in writing 
to the king, he pointed out the obstacles to the 
removal of the people. 

Ill 

These seven reductions were inhabited by 
about thirty thousand Guaranis. They were "not 
fresh from the woods, or half reclaimed, and 
therefore willing to revert to a savage state, and 
capable of enduring its exposure, hardships, and 
privations; but born, as their fathers and grand- 
fathers had been, in easy servitude, and bred up 
in the comforts of regular domestic life. These 
persons with their wives and their children, their 
sick and their aged, their horses and their sheep 
and their oxen, were to turn out, like the children 
of Israel from Egypt into the wilderness, not to 
escape from bondage, but in obedience to one of 
the most tyrannical commands that were ever 
issued in the recklessness of unfeeling power." 3 

The chief Spanish commissioner for estab- 
lishing the line of separation between Brazil and 
the Spanish possessions was Jose de Carvajal, 
the Marquis of Valdelerios. Senor Carvajal 
appointed Jose de Yturriaga as chief for fixing 
the northern part of the line. The other mem- 
bers were Eugenio de Alvarado, Antonio de 

3 Southey, History of Brazil, London, 1810-1819, III, 448. 



80 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Urrutia, and Jose Solano. The commissioners 
appointed by Portugal were Gomes Freyre de 
Andrade and Antonio Bobin de Maura. They 
were accompanied by a number of engineers and 
geographers. Valdelirios and his assistants 
arrived at Montevideo in January, 1752, accom- 
panied by Luis Altamirano, delegate of the gen- 
eral of the Jesuits, and his companion, Padre 
Eafael de Cordova. Padre Jose Barreda was 
especially conspicuous among the persons whose 
opinions had to be considered by the commis- 
sioners. He was the Provincial of Paraguay, hav- 
ing previously held a similar position in Peru. 
He suggested that since the treaty of limits had 
been formed without knowledge of the difficulties 
to be encountered in its execution, it ought not 
to be considered a crime in the eyes of the king 
to solicit delay; and that the only way to bring 
abount the emigration of the Indians of the seven 
reductions was not to make undue haste, or to 
substitute violence for gentleness and persuasion. 
He affirmed, moreover, that as the Indians had the 
advantage of numbers and a knowledge of the 
country, it was possible they might defeat the 
united forces of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, 
thus making it more difficult to subdue them, 
especially since there was good ground for believ- 
ing that neither the force of reason nor of arms 
would lead the Indians to abandon their towns. 

Places were selected to which it was proposed 
to remove the Indians from the seven reductions, 



SPANISH-PORTUGUESE TREATY OF 1750 81 

but at this point an obstacle appeared in the 
unwillingness of the Indians to move to the sites 
selected for them. They had been aroused by 
learning of their proposed expatriation, and 
agents were sent to persuade and pacify them. 
The agents found in most of the towns complete 
unanimity on the part of the Indians in opposition 
to removal; and Pedro Fernandez, especially 
charged with duties in this connection, wrote to 
the governor of Buenos Aires that the difficulties 
which had presented themselves could be overcome 
only by the sword. 

Both Spain and Portugal were interested in 
the execution of the treaty, and representatives 
i of the two nations met on the island of Martin 
Garcia to make arrangements for uniting their 
forces for this purpose. In March, 1754, a second 
conference was held at the same place to adopt 
final resolutions for proceeding with force against 
the inhabitants of the reductions who had assumed 
Ian attitude of rebellion. These resolutions pro- 
vided that Gomes Freyre should join his troops 
and attack the pueblo of San Angel, while An- 
donaegui with another force should move against 
the pueblo of San Nicolas. Some of the Indians 
had at first been disposed to migrate peaceably, 
but the known unwillingness of others to leave 
their towns incited nearly the whole Indian popu- 
lation to resistance. In view of this state of 
things, the Jesuits sought to have the removal of 
the Indians postponed for three years, hoping 



82 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

within that period to bring the controversy to a 
peaceful conclusion. The immediate removal 
demanded by the Spaniards gave the Indians no 
opportunity to provide for their convenience and 
support at the places where they were requested 
to settle. Moreover, the sites selected for their 
new towns were in some cases swamps or other 
unhealthf ul districts, and entirely unfit for dwell- 
ings, while others were exposed to invasion by 
hostile Indians. The Guaranis naturally objected 
to leaving the places where they and their families 
had spent decades, and where their houses were 
already built and their fields cultivated; and the 
attitude which they assumed toward those who 
would compel them to withdraw, clearly indicated 
that a peaceful execution of the treaty was im- 
possible. 

IV 

On the 21st of May, 1754, Governor Andonae- 
gui began to move his troops toward the missions. 
The unfavorable season and the lack of proper 
supplies caused many of his soldiers to desert. 
On the 3rd of October, he encountered a force of 
three hundred Indians from Yapeyu and La Cruz. 
When asked why they had come out under arms, 
they replied that they had come to defend the 
lands of the missions. Then, for the third time, 
they were summoned to obey the king, and were 
informed that in case of refusal they would be 
treated as declared enemies. This information 



WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS 83 

did not terrify them, for they appeared in front 
of the enemy's camp, waved their banners and 
standards, and hurled insults at the Spaniards. 
It was clear that they were prepared for active 
hostilities and Andonaegui had to accept the chal- 
lenge. 

The clash which followed this first encounter 
brought disaster to the Indians. They are re- 
ported to have lost two hundred and thirty killed, 
while nearly all of the survivors were made pris- 
oners. The reported loss of the Spaniards was 
one captain killed, and three sergeants and 
twenty-four men wounded. During these events, 
Gomes Freyre was moving his troops from Rio 
Pardo toward the scene of disturbance. His 
force consisted of between sixteen hundred and 
seventeen hundred men, including soldiers and 
peons, with ten pieces of artillery. On the 12th 
of November, he received a message from An- 
donaegui, informing him of the withdrawal of the 
Spanish troops, and indicating the necessity of 
Freyre 's return to his encampment at Eio Pardo. 
The retirement of the Spaniards encouraged the 
Indians to make more effective preparations for 
defense; and in the meantime other tribes, par- 
ticularly the Charruas, were beginning to make 
a common cause with the Guaranis. 

After the withdrawal of the Portuguese, the 
Indians assumed the offensive, and invaded and 
laid waste the territory almost to the camp of the 
enemy. The indecisive campaign was followed by 



84 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

a truce, November 18, 1754, during the continu- 
ance of which each party was required to keep 
within its own borders. The Jesuits made use of 
the occasion to extend their infleunce. The with- 
drawal of the European forces made current an 
exaggerated idea of the strength of the reduc- 
tions ; for the misfortunes of Andonaegui and his 
troops were due rather to the rigors of the season 
and the lack of supplies than to any effective oppo- 
sition offered by the Indians. Neverthelss, the 
refusal of the Indians to hand over their villages 
and their lands to the Portuguese, and the reports 
of the hostilities, stimulated the imaginations and 
credulity of the inhabitants of Europe; and the 
enemies of the Jesuits embraced the occasion to 
construct a remarkable web of stories. They 
affirmed that the Jesuits had built up a powerful 
state, whose soldiers had overthrown in battle the 
combined forces of Spain and Portugal; they had 
plunged into this conflict with the desire to make 
themselves independent; they had crowned one 
Nicholas Nanguiru as their king; and had taken 
other steps to make manifest their sovereignty. 
These tales were widely believed; Ferdinand VI 
was influenced by them to such an extent that he 
came to regard the Jesuits not only with lack of 
confidence, but even with repulsion; he dismissed 
his confessor, who was a Jesuit, and affirmed his 
belief that the Jesuits were the authors of the 
revolt of the Indians. 4 

^Bauza, Historic de la Domination Espanola en el Uruguay, 
II, 114. 



WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS 85 

For the next campaign Governor Viana, of 
Montevideo, was made second in command, and 
he was commissioned personally to visit Gomes 
Freyre, in order to inform him of the prepara- 
tions that had been made on the part of the Span- 
iards. The Spanish troops entered npon this 
campaign on the 4th of December, 1755, with the 
design of uniting with the Portuguese troops at 
Acegua; but on the 6th of January, 1756, Viana 
received a message informing him that the Por- 
tuguese general would meet him near the Bio 
Negro, and on the 16th of January the two forces 
were brought together at the appointed place. 
Five days later the two armies began their march 
toward the missions. 

Extravagant rumors reached the Spanish and 
Portuguese leaders concerning the number of men 
the reductions were ready to put into the field. 
These rumors affirmed that there was an army of 
five thousand men equipped for the campaign, 
while, in fact, all the troops ready for action did 
not exceed three hundred. But when the threat- 
ened towns learned that the united forces were 
advancing, they were greatly alarmed, and sent 
messengers in all directions to arouse the inhab- 
itants. Thirteen hundred and fifty men were 
gathered in a few days, but they were poorly 
equipped and inefficiently armed. Of these, San 
Miguel sent four hundred; San Angel, two hun- 
dred; San Lorenzo, fifty; San Luis, one hundred 
and fifty ; San Nicholas, two hundred ; San Juan, 



86 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

one hundred and fifty; and La Concepcion, two 
hundred. These were the seven reductions that 
had determined to resist the allied powers of 
Spain and Portugal. Their ignorant and un- 
trained leaders gave little promise of success. 
Knowing of the approach of the troops, the 
Indians sent messengers to inquire with what 
authority the European soldiers were invading 
their territory. Viana replied that they needed 
no license, only the permission of the king, in 
whose name the captain-general of this province 
appeared; and this intelligence should immedi- 
ately lead them to come and acknowledge obedi- 
ence; but if they did not wish to do this, they 
would expose themselves to all the rigors of war. 
In reply, the Indians affirmed that they recognized 
only their liberty, which they had received from 
God, and also the lands dependent on the town of 
San Miguel, which only God and no other could 
take from them ; and in view of this state of things, 
they insisted that the Spaniards should not ad- 
vance farther. They were, however, informed 
that the allies would continue their march ; where- 
upon the Indians took leave with the remark that 
they would meet on the road. 

Not long afterward there was a clash between 
a body of Indians and a detachment of the 
Spanish-Portuguese forces, in which eight Indians 
were killed, while Viana lost two killed and two 
wounded. Among the Indians killed was the 
cacique Sepee. One of the papers found on 



WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS 87 

Sepee's body was a proclamation, or message, 
containing a protest against the action of the 
allies. "We do not wish the coming of Gomes 
Freyre, ' ' it affirmed, ' ' for he and his followers are 
those who, through the work of the devil, hold us 
in such abhorrence: this Gomes Freyre is the 
author of many disturbances, and it is he who 
operates so wickedly, deceiving the king ; and for 
this reason we do not wish to receive him. "We 
have failed in nothing in the service of our good 
king; whenever it has occupied us, we have com- 
plied with his commands with our whole will, and 
in proof of this we have repeatedly risked our 
lives and poured out our blood in obedience to his 
orders. Why does he not give Buenos Aires, 
Santa Fe, Corrientes, or Paraguay to the Portu- 
guese, instead of the towns of the poor Indians, 
who are commanded to leave their houses, 
churches, and finally whatever they have and God 
has given them?" This simple protest came like 
a plea of the dead chief in. behalf of his people, 
but it had no power to stay the ruthless advance 
of the allies. 



V 



On the death of Sepee, Nicholas Nanguiru was 
put in his place. This was the person referred to 
in Europe as Nicholas I, King of Paraguay and 
Emperor of the Mamelucos. He was in reality a 



88 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

person of very limited ability; his single accom- 
plishment was a little skill in playing the violin. 5 
In his Account of the Abipones, Martin Dobriz- 
hoffer, who was a Jesuit missionary in Paraguay, 
and a contemporary of Nicholas Nanguiru, refers 
to the stories about the ''King of Paraguay." 
"About the beginning of the disturbances," he 
says, ' ' one Joseph, corregidor of San Miguel, was 
elected general of their forces against the Portu- 
guese. This Joseph, an active and courageous 
man, behaved like a good soldier but an execrable 
general, for he was as ignorant of military tactics 
as I am of the black art. On his falling in a chance 
skirmish, Nicholas Nanguiru, many years corregi- 
dor of the town of Concepcion, succeeded. Under 
his conduct the war was poorly carried on; and 
the affairs of the Uruguayans gradually declin- 
ing, the seven towns were delivered up to the 
royal forces." . . . "This is that celebrated Nich- 
olas Nanguiru," Dobrizhoffer continues, "whom 
the Europeans called the king of Paraguay, whilst 
Paraguay itself had not an inkling of the matter. 
At the very time when the feigned majesty of 

s Bougainville quotes a letter from a captain of grenadiers in 
which mention is made of Nicholas: "Yesterday we likewise saw 
the famous Nicolas, the same whom people were so desirous to 
confine. He was in a deplorable situation, and almost naked. He 
is seventy years of age, and seems to be a very sensible man. His 
Excellency (Bucarelli) spoke with him a long time, and seemed 
very much pleased with his conversation." Voyage round the 
World, 116. The following is the title of one of the books about 
Nicolas, written apparently without any knowledge of the sub- 
ject, except vague rumors: Historie de Nicolas (Nenguiru) Boy 
de Paraguai et Empereur des Mamelus, A Saint Paul, 1756. 



WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS 89 

the king of Paraguay employed every mouth and 
press in Europe, I saw this Nicholas Nanguiru, 
with naked feet, and garments after the Indian 
fashion, sometimes driving cattle before the sham- 
bles, sometimes chopping wood in the market- 
place; and when I considered him and his occu- 
pation, could hardly refrain from laughter." 6 

Continuing their march, the allied forces 
encountered a considerable body of Indians on 
the morning of the 10th of February. After the 
officers had held a council, the troops were ordered 
to prepare for battle. The Spanish troops were 
placed on the right, and the Portuguese on the 
left. In the rear, arranged in four columns, were 
the two hundred carts containing the baggage and 
the equipment. The line was finally extended 
along the base of the hill, Kaibate, the enemy 
being within clear range. The forces brought into 
this action by the Spanish and Portuguese have 
been estimated at two thousand five hundred men. 
In the battle which ensued the Spaniards lost 
three killed and ten wounded. Among the latter 
was Andonaegui. The Portuguese lost one killed 
and thirty wounded. By reason of their ineffec- 
tive weapons and lack of military skill, the Indians 
were seriously handicapped, and suffered an over- 
whelming defeat. The number of killed on their 
side has been variously estimated, the estimates 
ranging from six hundred to fifteen hundred and 
eleven. Bauza adopts the highest number, with 
one hundred and fifty-four prisoners. 

« Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Abipones, I, 27, 28. 



90 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

The effect of this encounter was to break the 
resistance of the Indians. They had lost their 
principal chiefs, Sepee and Nanguiru, and after 
this crushing blow they had no competent leaders, 
even if they had had the spirit to continue the 
conquest. Their depressed state is indicated by 
the fact that the allied forces met no opposition 
in their forward movement after the battle. Yet 
their way led through a forest and an unknown 
mountainous region, where a comparatively small 
troop of Indians familiar with the country could 
have set an effective obstacle to their further 
progress. Having entered the territory of the 
reductions, they had several skirmishes with the 
Indians, and on the 17th of May, 1756, they 
entered the town of San Miguel. 

On entering the town, Viana, the Spanish com- 
mander, is said to have been surprised at its 
excellent appearance, and to have exclaimed: 
' ' And is this one of the towns which we are com- 
manded to turn over to the Portuguese? The 
authorities at Madrid must be crazy to destroy 
a town which has no rival among all those of 
Paraguay." On the arrival of the invaders, the 
inhabitants of San Miguel took flight, abandoned 
their property, and spread the panic to other 
towns through which they passed. 

That some of the inhabitants of the reductions 
considered their cause hopeless is indicated by 
the fact that the authorities of the town of San 
Juan presented themselves at the camp of the 



WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS 91 

allies, and acknoweldged to Andonaegui their com- 
plete submission. 7 Andonaegui pointed out to 
them the serious consequences that would result 
from any indication of further insubordination. 
It was expected that San Lorenzo would follow 
the example of San Juan, but as no message of 
submission was received, Andonaegui detailed 
Viana and eight hundred men to take possession 
of the town. Setting out on the 19th of May, 
Viana entered the town at dawn the following 
morning; he surprised the inhabitants, and made 
a number of them prisoners, among whom were 
the priests Limp, Unger, and Henis. Padre 
Henis, examined before Viana, made a vigorous 
reply to the charges that were brought against 
him. " These pueblos," he said, "have cost the 
king nothing; we have conquered them ourselves 
with the crucifix in the hand. His Majesty can- 
not hand them over to the Portuguese ; and if I 
had been in Madrid, I could have given him 
such information that this surrender would not 
have been undertaken." 8 The positive attitude 
assumed by Padre Henis called forth only a repri- 
mand from Viana. The priests were, however, 
set at liberty, and measures were taken to pre- 
serve public order, and to cause the Spanish 
commander's authority to be recognized. 

At this point Andonaegui wrote to the priests 
and cabildos of the towns that had not submitted, 

7 Bauza, II, 135. 

8 Relation de los servicios de Viana, MS, quoted by Bauza, 
II, 136. 



92 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

called their attention to the example of San Juan, 
and suggested that they should bind themselves 
to maintain obedience. This communication had 
the desired effect. All the cabildos and corregi- 
dores presented themselves, took the oath of 
fidelity, and were then despatched to their several 
reductions. They understood then that their 
cause was lost, and that it only remained for them 
to gather themselves together and prepare for 
emigration. The priests, Balda and Henis, were 
ordered to direct the march of the Indians. But 
not all of the Indians were disposed to accept the 
fate of exiles with resignation. Some fled to the 
forests to resume the lawless life of savages. 
Progress toward a final settlement of the affairs 
of the reductions was, moreover, interrupted by 
doubts as to the outcome of negotiations in 
Madrid. Valdelirios expected another general 
would be sent to replace Andonaegui, and that 
new instructions would be issued with reference 
to the transfer of the reductions. Events half 
accomplished awaited the conclusion of diplomatic 
maneuvers. 

VI 

In November, 1756, the expected general, Don 
Pedro Ceballos, arrived. He came with a body of 
one thousand men, who were for the greater part 
foreigners and vagabonds. The tales that had 
been circulated in Europe concerning Emperor 
Nicholas and the possibility of the defeat of the 



WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS 93 

Spanish and Portuguese forces had made a pro- 
found impression on Ceballos, but he was soon 
undeceived by his newly acquired knowledge of 
the actual state of affairs. In January, 1757, he 
arrived at the missions, and the superior of the 
Jesuits went out to receive him. "At San Borja 
a platform was erected in front of the church, 
and Ceballos, surrounded by the Marquis of 
Valdelirios and the principal Spanish leaders, 
received the declarations of the multitude that no 
one was opposed to the Jesuits. " 9 This somewhat 
theatrical ceremony had no great significance, 
except as a formal presentation of the new com- 
mander of the forces. After this event Andonae- 
gui and Viana departed for Buenos Aires, the 
former en route to Spain, and the latter proceed- 
ing to resume the duties of his office as governor 
of Montevideo. 

j Neither the government of Spain nor that of 
Portugal was now disposed to carry the boundary 
\ question to a practical settlement. Portugal had 
already spent fifteen million dollars on the under- 
taking, and the destruction of Lisbon by the earth- 
quake of 1755 had discouraged all foreign enter- 
prises; while in Spain the death of Queen Barbara 
^and the illness of the king had paralyzed all the 
agencies of the government. The commissioners 
who had been charged to effect the transfer and 
establish the new boundary were no longer zealous 
in the execution of their task; and the Jesuits, 

9Bauza, II, 141. 



94 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

after all their wretched experiences, were recalled 
to take charge of the reductions. 10 

Other evidence that the Spaniards no longer 
regarded themselves as hostile to the Indians of 
the missions may be discovered in the fact that 
in order to be prepared to resist any possible 
future attacks by the Indians of the Chaco, Cebal- 
los placed the inhabitants of the reductions on a 
war footing, requiring military service from all 
able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and 
sixty. 

"Thus ended," to quote Francisco Bauza, 
"this famous campaign of the missions, in which 
the Spaniards fought bravely to promote the 
interests of the Portuguese, encountering hard- 
ships and dangers for the purpose of carrying out 
a boundary treaty, that dismembered their terri- 
tory and undermined their military and political 
power on American soil. In few undertakings 
have the officers and ministers of the king shown a 
more vigorous tenacity; and would they had em- 
ployed it for our good rather than, as it was, for 
the limitation of our territorial extension and of 
our natural advantage. Money, soldiers, diplo- 
matic intrigues, insults and threats against every 
opponent, entreaties, cruelties, promises, were 
alternative means brought to bear to execute the 
boundary treaty, without attaining anything else, 
after seven years of aggression and turmoil, than 
their withdrawal from the negotiations, disgusted 

10 Bauza, II, 141, 142. 



WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS 95 

among themselves and returning affairs to their 
previous condition. ' m 

In the last years of the decade there was no 
prospect of reviving the interest of the contract- 
ing parties in the treaty of 1750. The treaty itself 
represented a laudable attempt on the part of 
Spain and Portugal to establish a line of demarca- 
tion between the lands of their American colonies, 
but it was formed in ignorance of the conditions 
that were to be affected by it, and the attempt to 
execute it brought satisfaction to nobody. 

In 1759 Charles III brought a large measure 
of force and intelligence to the Spanish govern- 
ment. He found that the treaty had few or no 
supporters in either nation. Portugal was con- 
vinced that Colonia was more valuable than the 
seven reductions; and the court of Spain had 
already anticipations of a time when both Colonia 
and the missions would be counted among its pos- 
sessions. Ten years had brought about a marked 
change in the attitude of the two nations toward 
one another. Neither government wished the 
treaty to stand. On October 3, 1760, the king of 
Spain declared it "nulo, de nungun valor para lo 
sucesivo ; ' ' and in 1761 an agreement was reached, 
in accordance with which the treaty and all the 
stipulations based on it were annulled. This 
agreement was the treaty of 1761. It declared 
that all the treaties, pacts, and agreements made 
between the two governments before 1750 should 

n Hist, de la Domination Espafiola en el Uruguay, II, 142, 143. 



96 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

remain in full force and vigor from the date of 
this last document forward. Both parties were 
expected to withdraw all persons who had been 
sent to America to assist in the practical execution 
of the treaty. 12 

12 The principal article of the treaty of February 12, 1761, is 
as follows: "Articulo I. El sobredicho tratado de limites de 
Asia y America entre las dos coronas, firmado en Madrid en 13 
de enero de 1750, con todos los otros tratados 6 convenciones que 
en consecueneia de el se fueron celebrado para arreglar las instruc- 
ciones de los respeetivos eomisarios que hasta ahora se han empleado 
en las demarcaeiones de los referidos limites, y todo lo acordado 
en virtud de ellas, se dan y quedan en fuerza del presente por 
cancelados, casados y anulados eomo si nunca hubiesen existido ni 
hubiesen sido ejecutados; y todas las cosas perteneeientes a los 
limites de America y Asia se restituyen a los terminos de los 
tratados, pactos y convenciones que habian sido celebrados entre 
las dos coronas contratantes antes del referido ano de 1750; de 
forma que solo estos tratado, pactos y convenciones celebrados 
antes del ano de 1750 quedan de aqui adelante en su fuerza y 
vigor." Calvo, II, 350. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 

Viceroy Amat and the monopoly of alcohol. II. Juan 
Diaz Herrera and the revolt in Quito. III. The 
controversy respecting the Jesuits. IV. The decree 
of expulsion. V. The removal of the Jesuits from 
the towns of Rio de la Plata. VI. The missionaries 
of the Chaco and the region about Sierra de la 
Cruz. VII. The expulsion of the Jesuits from the 
reductions of Paraguay. VIII. The Jesuits of 
Peru. IX. The Jesuits of Chile. X. Their re- 
moval. XI. The expulsion from Ecuador. XII. 
The Jesuits removed from Bogota and the other 
towns of New Granada. XIII. Jesuits of the 
Llanos. XIV. The Jesuits in exile. 



While the Spanish and Portuguese troops were 
entering upon their campaign against the Jesuit 
reductions, Manuel de Amat y Junient landed at 
Buenos Aires, proceeding to Chile to take up his 
duties as governor and captain-general of that 
dependency. Six years later, after the failure of 
the campaign and the abrogation of the treaty of 
1750, he entered Lima (October 12, 1761) as the 
viceroy of Peru, then the supreme authority in 



98 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

America for the whole of Spanish South America, 
except the new viceroyalty of New Granada. 

Having served in the army in some capacity 
from his boyhood, from the age of eleven, Amat 
had naturally acquired much of the traditional 
ambition of the old soldier. In order to strengthen 
the means of colonial defense, it became his dom- 
inant purpose to organize and discipline military 
forces. Under his influence a body of militia was 
formed in nearly every province of Peru. At the 
same time a number of private persons of wealth 
and standing in their communities created troops 
and maintained them at their own expense. 

In keeping with his other military prepara- 
tions, the viceroy continued energetically the work 
of construction on the incomplete fortress of Cal- 
lao. He repaired certain warships and made them 
fit for service, and sent arms and munitions to 
Chiloe, Valdivia, Valparaiso, Guayaquil, Panama, 
and Cartagena. He caused bronze cannon to be 
cast at Lima, various kinds of small arms to be 
made, and transformed the appearance of the 
capital into that of a military camp. 

In these military preparations, the viceroy 
appears to have anticipated an approaching need. 
The monopolies and their incidental oppression 
had already begun to produce disorder and rebel- 
lion. An uprising in Quito, in 1765, indicates that 
a part of the inhabitants at least had become suf- 
ficiently self-conscious to react under oppression, 
or what they thought to be oppression. The pro- 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 99 

voking cause in this case was an act of prohibition. 
It was decreed that alcohol should not be distilled 
either in Quito or in any of the provinces subject 
to the audiencia of Quito, except for the account 
of the royal treasury. To increase the funds of 
the royal treasury or to check the evils of drunk- 
enness were the two possible motives for the 
action. But the king's frequently expressed wish 
to have the revenues increased, and the vast sums 
he had drawn from America in two hundred years 
suggest that the former motive was the more 
powerful. The monopoly right to distill and to 
sell alcohol was at first granted to a private per- 
son, in consideration of a certain annual payment, 
but when the government observed what enormous 
gains the monopolist was making, the privilege 
was annulled, and the right reverted to the crown. 

II 

In 1765, after the monopoly had existed for 
ten years, Juan Diaz Herrera arrived at Quito as 
the agent of the royal treasury and administrator 
of the monopoly now in the hands of the govern- 
ment. He was sent by the viceroy of New Gra- 
nada, who then exercised jurisdiction over the 
province of Ecuador. The details of the popular 
revolt that followed his advent need hardly be 
narrated. They were such as might be expected 
to attend the uprising of an angry populace tem- 
porarily in control of a city. Placards attached to 



100 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

the walls at the street corners announced the pro- 
posed attack on the hated monopoly. The offices 
of the agent were stormed. The mob smashed in 
the windows with stones, broke down the doors, 
and rushing in destroyed everything it encoun- 
tered. The receptacles of alcohol were thrown 
into the street and broken open, and the intoxi- 
cated crowd set fire to the house to complete its 
destruction. The flames against the night sky and 
the half-lighted buildings made a weird back- 
ground for the scenes enacted in the streets. The 
cries of terrified women and children were added 
to the shouts of drunken rioters. Near midnight 
the priest of the church of Santa Barbara thought 
to allay the popular fury by displaying in the 
streets the holy sacrament, but the crowd was not 
tamed, and turned with scorn upon the sacred 
objects. In order to avoid a sacreligious attack, 
the procession retired to the church of Carmen. 
Herrera, the agent of the monopoly, fled, half- 
naked, to the judges of the audiencia, and im- 
plored their aid. Then, finding his request disre- 
garded, he ran to the monastery of San Francisco 
and hid himself. 1 

Terrified by the increasing disorder, the mem- 
bers of the audiencia appealed to the Jesuits 
to treat with the rioters. The Jesuits, seeking 
to abate the disturbance, promised that the 
monopoly and other objectionable duties would 

i Suarez, Hist, del Ecuador, V, 213-215; Cevallos, Pedro Fer- 
miu, Resumen de la Mstoria del Ecuador desde su orijin hasta 
1845, Lima, 1870, II, 94. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 101 

be abolished and a general pardon granted; but 
the crowd demanded a confirmation of this prom- 
ise by the audiencia. The first phase of the insur- 
rection closed with the granting of this request, 
but the series of events attending the uprising 
exposed the weakness of the government. Only 
a general belief in this weakness was required to 
cause a new outbreak of hostilities. This time 
the rage of the majority of the people was directed 
against the Spaniards. The line here between 
the Europeans and the Americans was sharply 
drawn, and both the Creoles and the mestizos 
demanded that the chapetones should be expelled 
from the city. 

From May until September the insurgents 
dominated the city. On the 17th of the latter 
month a communication was received from the 
viceroy of New Granada ratifying a decree of 
general amnesty issued by the audiencia of Quito. 
This proclamation was published in all the wards 
of the city; and, in celebration of this formal 
ending of the revolt, the buildings were decorated 
with brilliant hangings, and the streets were 
adorned with temporary triumphal arches. The 
insurgents assumed the airs of a victorious party, 
and were disposed to direct the action of the 
audiencia. In view of this state of things the 
viceroy of Peru and the viceroy of New Granada 
formed an agreement to place a strong garrison 
in Quito, commanded by Juan Antonio Zelaya, a 
Spanish officer of recognized ability and valor, 



102 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

then at Guayaquil, holding the office of governor 
of the coast district. Zelaya was not merely 
appointed to the command of the garrison, but 
became also the president of the audiencia and 
captain-general of the province. He took up the 
work of his new office in September, 1766, about 
a year after the formal end of the insurrection; 
and under his protection the Spaniards, who had 
been banished, returned to Quito. Zelaya estab- 
lished the authority of the government in the city, 
and, after an administration of ten months, re- 
sumed his post at Guayaquil, leaving Colonel Jose 
Diguja as his successor. 2 

The revolt in Quito produced a shock that was 
felt over only a limited area, but it shows that, in 
addition to their vast wealth, the Jesuits had here 
acquired such a degree of power that the officers 
of the civil government, in facing a popular rebel- 
lion, felt constrained to appeal to them. This 
revolt was, moreover, an indication of the attitude 
the creole-mestizo party was destined to assume 
towards the supreme government in Spain and 
the legitimate authorities in America. The new 
society undertook here, within an isolated and 
limited field, to assert its capacity to dominate 
and direct public affairs. The expulsion of the 
Jesuits in the following year did not restore, as 
it may have been expected to do, the power and 
prestige of Spanish rule in America. The con- 
fiscated property fell ultimately largely into the 

2 Suarez, Hist, del Ecuador, V, 227. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 103 

hands of Creoles and mestizos, and gave them an 
enlarged basis of wealth for their later enter- 
prises in the cause of emancipation. It loosened 
the hitherto firm hold of Europeans on both the 
material and spiritual interests of the colonies. 

Ill 

The revolution in Paraguay had made especi- 
ally prominent the contrast between the purposes 
of the Jesuits and the encomenderos in that prov- 
ince, or between the purposes of the ecclesiastical 
and the secular elements of society, with reference 
to the Indians. The labor and the tribute of the 
Indians constituted the basis of the encomendero 's 
prosperity ; but in the reductions the Indians paid 
no tribute, and their labor was expended for their 
own advantage or to increase the common stock 
of the reductions. The extension of the Jesuits' 
system seemed to those not involved in it to tend 
to curtail secular opportunities, and the secular 
proprietors did not fail to present this view to 
the crown. The Spanish employers of Indians 
saw their supply of laborers diminished to their 
disadvantage as the Indians of the reductions 
increased ; and the next logical step for them was 
to attempt to break down the reductions. 

Charles III succeeded his brother, Ferdinand 
VI, in August, 1759, and with the crown he inher- 
ited the controversy between the Portuguese and 
Spanish colonies in America. He also inherited 



104 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

the war of the seven reductions, in which the fol- 
lowers of the Jesuits offered a vigorous resistance 
to the efforts of Spain and Portugal. The revolu- 
tion in Paraguay was fresh in the memory of 
everybody, and the communications concerning 
it that reached the king, proceeding from the revo- 
lutionists, naturally presented the Jesuits in a 
most unfavorable light: they were hostile to the 
established policy of Spain ; they were a growing 
power that threatened the interests of Spaniards 
in America, and even the general welfare of the 
state. In the spirit of these communications, it 
was demanded that the activities of the Jesuits 
should be restricted or their power destroyed; 
and in these demands the king and his ministers 
found additional reasons for their radical project. 

IV 

In 1766, Charles III appointed Francisco 
Paula Bucareli y Ursua governor of Rio de la 
Plata, the provinces which ten years later were to 
be organized as a viceroyalty. The next year he 
issued a decree expelling the Jesuits from Spain 
and the Spanish possessions in America. The 
decree, the Real Decreto de Ejecucion, was in the 
following terms: "Having accepted the opinion 
of the members of my Royal Council in Extra- 
ordinary, which met on the 29th of last January 
for consultation concerning past occurrences and 
concerning matters which persons of the highest 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 105 

character have reported to me; moved by very 
grave causes relative to the obligation under 
which I find myself placed of maintaining my 
people in subordination, tranquility, and justice, 
and other urgent, just, and necessary reasons, 
which I reserve in my royal mind ; making use of 
the supreme economical authority, which the 
Almighty has placed in my hands for the protec- 
tion of my vassals, and the respect of my crown ; 
I have ordered that the Jesuits be expelled from 
all my dominions of Spain, the Indies, the Philip- 
pine Islands, and other adjacent regions, priests 
as well as coadjutors or lay-brothers, who may 
have made the first profession, and the novices, 
who may wish to follow them; and that all the 
properties of the Society in my dominions be 
taken; and for the uniform execution of this de- 
cree throughout these dominions I give you full 
and exclusive authority; and that you may form 
the necessary instructions and orders, according 
to your best judgment, and what you may think 
the most effective, expeditious, and peaceful 
method for carrying out these instructions and 
orders. And I wish that not only the magistrates 
and superior tribunals of these kingdoms may 
execute your mandates punctually, but that the 
same understanding may be entertained concern- 
ing those which you may direct to the viceroys, 
presidents, audiencias, governors, corregidores, 
alcaldes, mayores, and any other magistrates of 
those kingdoms and provinces; and that in re- 



106 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEE 

sponse to their respective requests, all troops, 
militia or civilian, shall render the necessary 
assistance, without any delay or evasion, under 
pain of the delinquent's falling under my royal 
indignation; and I charge the provincials, presi- 
dents, rectors, and other superiors of the Society 
of Jesus to accept these provisions punctually, 
and in carrying them out the Jesuits shall be 
treated with the greatest regard, attention, hon- 
esty, and assistance, so that in every respect the 
action taken may be in conformity with my sover- 
eign intentions. You will keep this in mind for 
its exact fulfillment, as I very confidently expect 
from your zeal, activity, and love of my royal ser- 
vice; and to this end you will give the necessary 
orders and instructions, accompanying them with 
copies of my royal decree, which being signed by 
you shall be given the same faith and credit as 
the original." 3 

This decree, bearing the king's rubric, and 
dated February 27, 1767, was sent to the Count of 
Aranda, then president of the Council. 

"With authority conferred by this decree 
Aranda issued instructions for the removal of the 
Jesuits from the dominions of the Indies and the 
Philippine Islands. These instructions were 
dated March 1, 1767, and conveyed to the viceroys, 
presidents, and governors the same power that 

3 Coleccion General de las providencias hasta aqui tomadas 
por el gobiemo sobre el estranamiento y ocupacion de temporali- 
dades de los regulares de la Compania, que existian en los dominios 
de S. M. de Espafia, Indios, e Islas Filipinas. Madrid, 1767, 1, 2. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 107 

had been bestowed upon Aranda by the royal 
decree. They made the officials concerned respon- 
sible for the execution of the decree, and provided 
means for conducting the affairs of the missions 
after the departure of the Jesuits. By these 
instructions, moreover, the specific directions 
contained in the instructions of the same date, 
issued for removing the Jesuits from Spain, were 
made applicable in the Indies and the Philippine 
Islands in so far as the circumstances of those 
countries permitted. 

No one has hitherto made an entirely satisfac- 
tory exposition of the influences which moved the 
king to take this action, but it was naturally sug- 
gested to him that his royal prestige might be 
lessened by the increasing wealth, power, and 
presumption of the Society. Clement XIII wished 
to know the reason for the expulsion, but to his 
inquiry the king replied: "In order to keep from 
the world a great scandal, I shall conceal in my 
breast the abominable machination which has been 
the motive of this severity. Your Holiness must 
believe me on my word: the security and repose 
of my existence require of me the most absolute 
silence on this subject." 4 

On the 20th of March, 1767, Aranda issued a 
circular letter, enclosing the royal decree of expul- 
sion and detailed instructions for carrying out 
this decree. These documents were addressed to 
the magistrates in all the places where the Jesuits 

4 See Bauza, Historia de la dominacidn espafiola en el Uruguay, 
II, 191. 



108 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

had houses. The recipients were required not to 
open them until a certain fixed day in the future, 
and in the meantime to communicate to no one 
the fact that they had been received. It was 
required that the officers charged with the execu- 
tion of the royal decree should be assisted by the 
army, and that care should be exercised to take 
possession of the houses and colleges of the Jesuits 
in the early morning and under such conditions as 
would leave no opportunity for any member of 
the order to escape. The archives, the libraries, 
and all kinds of property, except the very few 
personal effects which the members of the order 
might retain, should be seized and turned over to 
the state. To Bucareli, governor of Rio de la 
Plata, came not only his commission, but also 
orders to be transmitted to the governor of Chile, 
the president of the audiencia of Charcas, and 
the viceroy of Peru. 



The night that had been set apart for arresting 
the Jesuits of Buenos Aires was made almost 
insupportable by a storm of hail and wind and 
rain, so that Governor Bucareli, the troops, and 
all persons who were expected to assist in the 
undertaking were obliged to remain in the fort 
from midnight until half past two in the morning. 
At this hour a company of soldiers was sent to 
the college of St. Ignatius, commonly known as 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 109 

Colegio Grande. The soldiers were accompanied 
by the governor's secretary, Juan de Berlanga, 
who was the head of this expedition, and by 
three assistants. Having entered, they gathered 
together the thirty-six Jesuits found at the col- 
lege, and read to them the king's order for their 
expulsion. The prisoners were kept for eight 
hours in the apartment of the rector, and were 
then conducted through the streets, guarded by 
the troops, to the suburbs near the college of 
St. Elmo. While the Jesuits were being taken 
from the Colegio Grande, another commission, 
supported by a company of soldiers, appeared 
at the college of St. Elmo, and took the eight 
inmates who were subject to expulsion, and held 
them imprisoned with those who had been brought 
from the other institution. 

Early in the morning of July 13, Bucareli pub- 
lished an edict at Buenos Aires, in which he gave 
notice of the action that had been taken under the 
royal decree, and ordered that no one, under pain 
of death, should communicate with the Jesuits in 
any manner whatsoever, or censure the decree or 
the measures taken in carrying it out. By the 
same decree it was also ordered that all persons 
owing the padres anything, or holding anything 
that belonged to them, should present themselves 
before the governor within three days and declare 
their indebtedness and the article which they held. 

This unexpected act on the part of the gov- 
ernor and his agents startled the inhabitants of 



110 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

the city; and the closing of the Jesuit church 
disturbed especially those who had been accus- 
tomed to resort to it for worship or confession. 
The order prohibiting communication between the 
people and the prisoners was not strictly obeyed, 
and the governor wrote to the chief of the guard, 
charging him under no pretext to permit this 
order to be violated, and requesting him to exam- 
ine the padres one by one and take away from them 
any paper, ink, pens, or other means of communi- 
cating with their friends or adherents in the city. 

Montevideo was the first city to learn of the 
arrest and imprisonment of the Jesuits in Buenos 
Aires. Travelers arriving from the capital 
brought information of the execution of the royal 
decree in that city; and on the 5th of July, an 
attempt was made in Montevideo to transport the 
books of the Jesuit library to some other place, 
apparently to avoid the necessity of turning them 
over to the government. This plan was, however, 
defeated, and the next morning the four Jesuits 
in the city were arrested. Three of them were 
sent immediately to Buenos Aires, but the superior 
was held to assist in making out an inventory of 
the property that was to be confiscated. 

A week later, at four o'clock in the morning 
of July 13, the troops surrounded the Jesuit col- 
lege at Santa Fe. The officers charged with the 
execution of the decree of expulsion then rang 
the bell and called for the rector, and on his 
appearance they arrested him, together with the 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 111 

porter. The invading party at once distributed 
themselves throughout the edifice, and gradually 
gathered all the occupants together and locked 
them in the refectory. Jesuit writers are natu- 
rally disposed to emphasize the commotion made 
by the inhabitants of the towns when they learned 
of the action of the officers in carrying out the 
king's orders. In this case it is reported that "all 
the people were excited when they learned what 
had happened in the college. A large number of 
persons assembled in the plaza; some hooted, 
others wept, and gave themselves over to grief 
in a manner to excite compassion; while others, 
having retired to their houses on account of the 
horror caused by this outrage, bewailed the fate 
of the Jesuits in secret." 5 

In the afternoon the Jesuits were taken from 
the college, and, on the same day, after an exam- 
ination of their effects, they were driven in car- 
riages out of the city. They were held in an open 
field within sight of the city for a whole day while 
preparations were made for their transportation 
to Buenos Aires. On this journey the soldiers 
were charged to prevent any communication be- 
tween them and either the inhabitants of the city 
or of the country through which they passed. 
Santa Fe contributed to the contingent already at 
Buenos Aires five priests, one student, and five 
coadjutors. The rector and the procurador re- 

5 Coleccion de libros y documentos referentes a la historia de 
America, Madrid, 1904, VII, 76. 



112 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

mained for the time being to assist in closing up 
the affairs of the college. 

In contemplating the removal of the Jesuits 
from Cordova, Bucareli feared that, on account 
of their number and importance, certain difficul- 
ties might arise if the undertaking were left to the 
officials of the province or of the city. He, there- 
fore, entrusted the task to Major Fernando Fabro, 
appointed by him and sent from Buenos Aires, 
accompanied by a detachment of eighty soldiers. 
It was between three and four o'clock on the 
morning of the 12th of July when Fabro called at 
the door of the Colegio Maximo, and asked for 
the rector. Here, as a kind of pretext, the porter 
was told that the rector was wanted to attend a 
dying man. When the rector, accompanied by 
another priest, reached the door, they saw that 
the college was surrounded by soldiers. All the 
priests were then required to get up, in order that 
they might hear a communication from the king. 
They were conducted to the refectory, which they 
found already occupied by a large number of 
soldiers, and here a notary read the decree of 
expulsion and confiscation. The priests of the 
seminary of Monserrat were at the same time 
aroused and brought to the refectory of the col- 
lege, where the whole assembly was locked in. 
Mattresses were brought in for the night, and were 
placed on the floor, on the tables, under the tables, 
on chairs, wherever space could be found, yet 
there were not enough to accommodate the one 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 113 

hundred and thirty Jesuits who were crowded 
together in this single room. For the day the mat- 
tresses were piled up in order to afford standing 
room and to give the prisoners an opportunity to 
move about. 

For ten days the Jesuits of Cordova were kept 
in these narrow quarters. On the 22d of July it 
was announced to them that the time had come 
for them to depart. Fabro took leave of them and 
turned them over to Captain Antonio Bobadilla. 
At nine o 'clock in the evening they were conducted 
from the refectory to the vehicles gathered for 
their transportation. They took with them only 
their clothing and their breviaries, and at mid- 
night began their long journey to the port of 
Ensenada. When they halted for the first night 
nine miles from the city, they found themselves 
surrounded by a considerable number of the resi- 
dents of Cordova, who had come out of the city 
to take leave of them. Some of these followed the 
train four or five days. 

The thirty-four carts laden with deposed 
priests, escorted by forty soldiers, and attended 
by drivers and camp-followers, constituted a con- 
siderable caravan, that moved over the monot- 
onous plain day after day for nearly a month 
towards the capital and its adjacent port. The 
caravan did not enter Buenos Aires, but passed 
on to Ensenada, leaving the city on the left, four 
or five miles from the line of march. Two days 
after their arrival at the port, the Jesuits were 
embarked, August 20, on the ship La Venus. 



114 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

After Cordova, other cities farther away from 
Buenos Aires sent their quotas of deposed priests 
to be added to those already at the capital await- 
ing transportation to Europe. Fifteen were taken 
from Corrientes. The distance of Asuncion and 
the known inclination of the governor of Para- 
guay to favor the Jesuits left uncertain the result 
in case he had to be trusted with the execution of 
the royal decree. The king, therefore, appointed 
two persons to assist the governor, who were 
known to be hostile to the designs of the Jesuits ; 
their hostility, however, did not prevent them 
from upholding Governor Morphy in his consider- 
ate and humane treatment of the sixteen persons 
found in the college at Asuncion, who were liable 
to expulsion under the royal decree. The prison- 
ers were held for three weeks before preparations 
were complete for their voyage down the river, 
which was finally begun on the 19th of August. 

The college at Tarija was still farther away 
from the port. It was in a district dependent on 
the audiencia of Charcas, but belonged to the 
Jesuit province of Paraguay. The execution of 
the royal decree there was under the direction of 
Victorino Martinez de Tineo, the interim presi- 
dent of the audiencia. The persons marked for 
exile, twelve or fourteen in number, were started 
on their long journey of twelve hundred miles 
within twenty-four hours after their arrest, but 
they were detained a few miles from Tarija from 
the 24th of August until the 1st of September. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 115 

Padre Asua died on the way ; the rest of the com- 
pany reached Buenos Aires on the 27th of Decem- 
ber, after an overland journey that lasted nearly 
four months. Gradually, in the course of the last 
half of the year, the Jesuits were brought to 
Buenos Aires from their outlying posts, from 
Salta, Tucuman, Santiago del Ester o, Catamarca, 
and Eioja. They were brought also from the 
towns of Cuyo. 

Only a month before the publication of the 
decree of expulsion, a license was granted in 
Spain which authorized the taking of eighty Jesuit 
missionaries to America. It is not to be supposed 
that the plan of banishing the Jesuits was con- 
ceived and matured after the granting of this 
license ; it is probable, on the contrary, that wish- 
ing to keep the project of expulsion secret, the 
king was willing to let events take their normal 
or undisturbed course until the arrival of the day 
for executing the decree. Jesuit missionaries 
were allowed to embark for America when it was 
known that they would be arrested and sent back 
to Europe as soon as they landed. Those who 
embarked in the San Fernando in January were 
buffeted by the winds and waves for seven months, 
and arrived at Montevideo on the 26th of July, 
1767. Six of them had died after they left Spain, 
and the remaining thirty-six, exhausted by the 
want of food and the other hardships of the voy- 
age, came into port signaling for assistance. Their 
requests were, however, disregarded ; and the next 



116 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

day La Rosa, the governor of the province, accom- 
panied by a troop of soldiers, appeared on the 
vessel, and, having assembled all of the Jesnits 
on deck, informed them of the decree of expulsion. 
At the time of this visit, a letter from Bucareli to 
La Rosa was on its way from Buenos Aires to 
Montevideo, ordering that in case the Jesuits 
arrived from Europe they should not under any 
conditions be allowed to land; but they should 
be conducted at once to Ensenada, transferred to 
the frigate, La Venus, and returned to Spain. 
This message did not arrive until the Jesuits had 
been taken from the ship and shut up in the nar- 
row quarters formerly occupied by the priests who 
had been sent to Buenos Aires. It is somewhat 
difficult to determine whether this was a more or 
less fortunate turn in the affairs of the prisoners 
than would have been that which Bucareli 's order 
proposed. Towards the end of August, twenty 
of those who had arrived in July were sent to 
Ensenada; seven others who were ill were re- 
tained some weeks longer in Montevideo, and 
were dispatched for Buenos Aires on the 17th 
of November; but they were overtaken by a vio- 
lent storm and all were drowned. 

Before the end of September a large number 
of the deposed Jesuits had been brought together 
in Buenos Aires. Some of them had been waiting 
nearly three months for the completion of prepa- 
rations for their transportation. Counting those 
who had recently arrived on the San Fernando 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 117 

and those who had been taken from posts in 
the interior of the country, the whole number 
amounted to two hundred and twenty-four. Of 
these La Venus carried one hundred and fifty, 
while the rest were distributed among the San 
Esteban, El Pdjaro, La Catalana, and El Principe. 
This little fleet sailed from the port of Ensenada 
on the 29th of September. Its destination was the 
port of Santa Maria in the bay of Cadiz. La 
Venus arrived January 7, 1768 ; El Pdjaro, Janu- 
ary 9; La Catalana, January 17; San Esteban, 
February 17; and El Principe, March 9. At 
Santa Maria the exiles were lodged in the Hos- 
picio de Misiones, a house that had belonged to 
the Jesuits, and that had been occupied by mis- 
sionaries awaiting opportunity to sail to America. 
But Santa Maria was only a halting place, and the 
prisoners were destined to be passed on to Italian 
territory. Finding themselves here in the home- 
country after their experiences in the New World, 
some of them sought permission to remain by 
making known their desire to leave the service of 
the Society. But this was not an acceptable 
excuse, and they were informed by the minister 
in charge of the expulsion that it would be neces- 
sary for them to go to Italy to obtain seculariza- 
tion from the pope. 

On the 15th of June the exiles sailed for the 
island of Corsica, where were already assembled 
Jesuits banished from the Peninsula; but they 
were permitted to remain here only from the first 



118 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

to the thirty-first of August, when by order of 
the French they were obliged to abandon the 
island. After an unsuccessful attempt to settle in 
the republic of Genoa, they were finally conducted 
to the States of the Church, where they found a 
permanent abiding place. 

VI 

The Jesuits constituting the first contingent 
sent to Europe from the port of Buenos Aires 
were taken from the colleges in the towns and 
cities of Rio de la Plata. There remained the mis- 
sionaries of the Chaco and Chiquitos, and those 
who had established themselves among the Guar- 
ani Indians in Paraguay. In the Chaco there 
were fifteen missions, or reductions. The action 
of the officers of the government in arresting 
the Jesuits of the colleges was known in the 
reductions before any official communication had 
reached them. The first effect of this informa- 
tion on the Indians was to inspire them with a 
desire to abandon the missions and return to their 
life in the forests. At first some of the mission- 
aries hoped that the decree of expulsion would not 
be applied to them, but that they would be allowed 
to remain on account of their influence over the 
Indians. But this hope did not last long ; for Ser- 
geant Major Francisco de Andino soon brought 
the news that the missionaries were to be taken 
from the reductions and transported to Buenos 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 119 

Aires. When the Indians received this informa- 
tion, they were greatly disturbed, and renewed 
their determination to abandon their settlements. 
They were persuaded with great difficulty to re- 
turn, and were so thoroughly enraged, as Padre 
Pauke observed, that "if I with the help of God 
and the reasons which He put into my mouth had 
not succeeded in appeasing my Indians and per- 
suading them to bear their grief, in a short time 
the city of Santa Fe would have been razed to the 
ground. ' ,6 

In removing the Jesuits, the commissioner and 
his assistants turned the missions over to persons 
who did not belong to the Society. They made a 
careful inventory of the property, the bulk of 
which consisted of various classes of animals that 
had been able to support themselves by grazing 
on the lands about the reductions. In making the 
inventory, they found very little money, for in the 
isolation of the reductions most of the economic 
transactions had been effected by barter. The 
six missionaries from San Xavier, San Pedro, and 
Concepcion were conducted first to Santa Fe, but 
they were held outside of the city while arrange- 
ments were made for transporting them to Buenos 
Aires. This last stage of the journey lasted from 
the 6th of September to the 4th of October, and 
on their arrival they were confined in the quarters 
formerly occupied by the Jesuits who had been 
sent to Europe. The procedure that was observed 

6 Coleccidn de libros y documentos, VII, 39. 



120 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

in the first reductions, from which the Jesuits 
were removed, was followed in the others, until 
each was deprived of its leaders. In all cases the 
Indians saw the departure of their priests with 
regret, which often found expression in signs of 
profound grief. 

At Buenos Aires the Jesuits remained im- 
prisoned for several months, suffering not only 
serious physical hardships but also the grief less 
easily endured of humiliation and disappointed 
hopes. Towards the end of March, 1768, the 
frigate Esmeralda arrived from Spain, and on 
the 6th of May she set sail for the return voy- 
age, having on board one hundred and fifty-one 
Jesuits. This was the second expedition from this 
port, and what the exiles suffered can be only 
imperfectly imagined, even when we think of the 
crowded condition of the ship and the very inade- 
quate preparations that had been made for the 
long journey, lasting from the 6th of May to the 
22d of August, when they arrived at the port of 
Santa Maria. From this port the Germans among 
the deposed priests were sent to their native coun- 
try, while the rest were transported directly to 
Italy, without being subjected to the disagreeable 
vicissitudes experienced by the members of the 
first expedition. 

There were ten reductions in the territory of 
the Chiquitos, a region which now forms the 
southeastern part of Bolivia. The execution of 
the decree of expulsion was not entrusted to Gov- 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 121 

ernor Bucareli, but to the president of the royal 
audiencia of Charcas. The troops appointed to 
assist in this undertaking were placed under the 
command of Lieutenant Colonel Martinez, who at 
that time had his headquarters in Santa Cruz de 
la Sierra, and his special mission here was to 
resist the encroachments of the Portuguese. But 
in arresting the priests it was not found necessary 
to use the troops, for the Jesuits were willing to 
promise obedience to the order of the king. They 
proposed to make no resistance, and even sug- 
gested that the soldiers should be kept away from 
the reductions, lest their presence should make 
an unfavorable impression on the neophytes. 

A party of thirteen priests was despatched on 
the 2d of November; another party of six on the 
28th of December; and on the 2d of April, 1768, 
the rest of the missionaries of the Chiquitos fol- 
lowed their companions to Buenos Aires, or to 
Spain by some other route. Among the priests 
of these reductions there were several whose age 
and infirmities seemed to render it impossible for 
them to make the long journey without fatal con- 
sequences. The commissioner, therefore, wrote 
to the president of the audiencia for authority 
to allow them to remain in the country of the 
Chiquitos until the end of their lives, which was 
apparently not far off. This request was denied 
on the ground that the proposed action would be 
contrary to the royal instructions which pro- 
hibited any member of the Society from remain- 



122 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ing in the reductions, even on account of age or 
infirmity. One of those for whom this privilege 
was sought was Padre Chome. When the request 
made by the commissioner had been denied, 
Chome was taken from his bed, placed in a ham- 
mock, and carried by two strong Indians from 
San Xavier sixty leagues to Santa Cruz de la 
Sierra; then for a distance of a hundred leagues 
to Cochabamba; and finally over the desert and 
the rough and dangerous paths of the cordillera 
to Oruro, where his power of endurance failed 
completely, and he died on the 7th of September, 
1768. 

Another who was thought unable to endure the 
hardships of the journey to Spain was Padre 
Messner. The first stage of his journey was from 
his post to Santa Cruz de la Sierra, one hundred 
and twelve leagues. Messner reached Santa Cruz 
de la Sierra rather dead than alive, and had to 
wait here five months for the snow to disappear 
from the mountains. The continuance of the jour- 
ney from this point, over the mountains and 
across the bleak and barren plateau, was exhaust- 
ing even to a person in robust health, and was 
almost more than one could stand who was bur- 
dened with illness and old age. It was, moreover, 
rendered more fatiguing by the determination of 
the conductor of the expedition to push on as 
rapidly as possible, whatever might be the state of 
the way. On the mountains between Oruro and 
Tacna, the aged priest asked that he might be 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 123 

allowed to halt and rest. His petition was not 
granted, but a man was detailed to walk by the 
side of his horse and hold him, in order that he 
might not fall from his saddle. They had, how- 
ever, advanced only a short distance in this way 
when the aide found that the priest was dead. 
Another priest whose course was almost run was 
Padre Pallozzi. He was taken over nearly the 
same route as the others to Arica; then from 
Arica to Callao and Panama; and on arriving at 
Porto Bello he found himself exhausted, and died 
there December 21, 1768. And yet, the commis- 
sioner who ordered these things was frequently 
accused of being a partisan of the Jesuits, and 
too lenient to perform properly the duties of his 
post. 

VII 

By the middle of May, 1768, the Jesuits had 
been despatched from all the stations in the prov- 
inces of Eio de la Plata, except from the cele- 
brated Misiones of the Guaranis in Paraguay. 
The reports that had been circulated, represent- 
ing these reductions as usurpers of powers that 
belonged properly to the king, and as in rebellion 
against the authority of the sovereign, led the 
governor to proceed with great caution. He sum- 
moned the Provincial to Buenos Aires, but later 
countermanded the order, and requested him to 
return to Yapeyu from Bojada, the present city 



124 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

of Parana. He also requested that the Indian 
corregidor of each of the thirty reductions should 
be sent to the capital, accompanied by thirty of 
the principal caciques. These sixty influential 
Indians were detained about a year in Buenos 
Aires, and it was apparently desired that they 
should hold and express views that would justify 
the contemplated action with respect to the reduc- 
tions. When it was supposed that they had been 
sufficiently turned against the Jesuits, they were 
induced to write a joint letter to the king, showing 
their enthusiasm for the governor, and expressing 
their thanks for their prospective relief from 
slavery. It has been suggested that they would 
probably not have manifested such satisfaction 
with the governor if they had known that they 
were held as hostages for the peaceful conduct of 
the Indians they represented. 

The governor delayed the execution of the 
decree of expulsion for about a year, and during 
this time the corregidores were induced to write 
other letters to the Indians of their reductions, 
with a view of creating a prejudice among them 
against the priests. The position of the Jesuits 
during this period was sufficiently difficult even 
without the intrigues of the authorities at Buenos 
Aires; for it was known that they were to be 
removed, and this knowledge tended to destroy 
their prestige with the Indians. They felt com- 
pelled, however, to counsel the Indians to submit 
to the proposed action of the government, which 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 125 

everybody knew was hostile to the system of the 
missions. 

Besides the time required for carefully pre- 
paring for the change, the difficulty of obtaining 
secular priests as substitutes for the Jesuits, was 
another reason for the delay. Finally, on the 24th 
of May, Governor Bucareli left Buenos Aires, 
proceeding to Misiones to provide for the removal 
of the Jesuits. He made extensive military 
preparations for overcoming any resistance that 
might appear on the part of the Indians ; but these 
preparations were proved by the events to have 
been unnecessary. On the 15th of July he arrived 
within a league of Yapeyu, and sent a commis- 
sioner to the reduction to bring the decree of 
expulsion officially to the attention of the provin- 
cial and any other Jesuits who might be there. 
The commissioner in this instance was Dr. An- 
tonio Aldao, who had acted in the same capacity 
in expelling the Jesuits from Cordova. The 
ordinary procedure was observed here, including 
a notification in the prescribed form, the taking 
of an inventory of all the property belonging to 
the reduction, or pueblo, the church as well as the 
workshops and the warehouses. The objects con- 
tained in the church were turned over to the new 
priest, and the other items of property were put 
in charge of an administrator, one being appointed 
for each of the pueblos from which the Jesuits 
were removed. During these events Bucareli 
remained a short distance from the pueblo, wish- 



126 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ing to enter only after the departure of the 
Jesuits. "Finally, he entered the pueblo with all 
the ostentation possible, and remained there ten 
days, seeking to please the Indians and gain their 
confidence. ' ' 7 

From Yapeyu, the first of the reductions, or 
pueblos, in which the decree of expulsion was 
executed, the process was carried to each of the 
other pueblos, and by the 22d of August they had 
all been occupied and the new masters installed. 
The number of Jesuits deposed in these thirty 
pueblos and sent down to Buenos Aires was 
seventy-eight. After their arrival in the capi- 
tal, they were held imprisoned until they were 
despatched for Spain, on the 8th of December. 
The voyage lasted four months, and on the 7th of 
April, 1769, they reached Cadiz, and a little later 
were transferred to the port of Santa Maria. In 
Santa Maria they were confined in the house of 
the Augustinians and the hospital of San Juan, 
and they remained there somewhat more than a 
year. During this period the provincial, Padre 
Manuel Vergara, was added to the long list of 
those who died going into exile. In all the prov- 
ince of Paraguay only one Jesuit remained. He 
was Padre Segismundo Aperger, who was left 
there because he could not be removed, since he 
was confined to his bed, burdened with the weight 
of nearly ninety years, paralyzed and moribund. 

7 Coleccion de Wbros y documentos, VII, 212. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 127 

VIII 

The beginning of the Jesuit establishment in 
Peru was made by a mission authorized by San 
Francisco de Borja, the third general of the order, 
on the suggestion of Philip II. The chief of this 
mission was Padre Geronimo Euiz del Portillo. 
The eight other members were drawn from the 
four Jesuit provinces of Spain. They embarked 
at San Lucar on the 2d of November, 1567; one 
of them died at Panama; and the survivors 
entered Lima on the 1st of April, 1568, bearing 
the royal decree providing for the settlement of 
the order in Peru. The Jesuit province of Peru 
at that time, with Portillo as the first provincial, 
comprehended the whole of South America. The 
members of the mission were received by the 
Dominicans and lodged in their monastery. With 
assistance rendered by the government and pri- 
vate donations, they proceeded at once to the 
constuction of buildings immediately needed, and 
planned for the foundation of their permanent 
church. The corner stone of this edifice was laid 
by Archbishop Loayza. Other Jesuits arrived a 
few months after Portillo 's mission, and, a college 
having been organized, the people, in enthusiasm 
over the new institution, gave abundantly of their 
wealth for its support. The enthuisasm mani- 
fested itself not only in prompting extensive gifts 
but also in moving persons to adopt the sotana. 
The first of these was Pedro Mejia, a member of 



128 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

the audiencia. In the course of a few years, all 
of the principal cities became the seats of insti- 
tutions founded by the Jesuits. In 1576 the 
historian Jose Acosta became provincial, succeed- 
ing Portillo, whom he sent to Potosi, to found a 
college in that city, and make it the center of 
missionary efforts. 

Among the early colleges were those founded 
in Huancavelica, Guamanga, and Cuzco. Besides 
the college of Cuzco founded for the instruction 
of sons of Indian chiefs, there was another, that 
of San Bernardo, designed for the sons of the con- 
quistadores, devoted to the teaching of theology, 
philosophy, Latin, rhetoric, and morals. The uni- 
versity that was later developed from this insti- 
tution petitioned the king for the privilege of 
granting degrees to persons who had studied 
elsewhere, but this was denied, and authority 
conferred to grant degrees only to persons who 
had studied in a Jesuit college. 

In Peru as well as elsewhere the Jesuits pur- 
sued the worldly path in accumulating riches. 
They sought gifts and inheritances; associated 
themselves with persons of fortune; used means 
of persuasion that only religious guides are in 
a position to apply; acquired vast estates, and 
made their products the material of mercantile 
operations; transferred large sums to Europe to 
assist members of the order in their designs to 
dominate governments; imposed their influence 
on persons of authority in both church and state ; 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 129 

and introduced into public affairs the power of 
accumulated wealth. The other side of the shield 
bears a record of their devotion to the welfare 
of the Indian, their opposition to the merciless, 
greed-prompted cruelty of the encomenderos, and 
their varied productive industry that might have 
been a beneficent example to a people disposed 
to put wealth-seeking adventure and homely 
indolence above persistent and systematic labor. 
On the 20th of August, 1767, the viceroy of 
Peru received from the governor of Rio de la 
Plata a letter enclosing documents relating to the 
expulsion of the Jesuits. Among these was an 
autograph letter from the king, commanding the 
viceroy to obey and carry out orders that the 
Count of Aranda might communicate to him in 
the king's name. The viceroy was, moreover, 
authorized to use the military force if found to 
be necessary, as it might be employed in case of 
a rebellion. The 8th of September was fixed as 
the date for the execution of the decree. In 
taking possession of the various houses or insti- 
tutions of the Jesuits, essentially the same pro- 
cedure was observed as in the execution of the 
decree in other parts of South America. The 
members of the order were arrested in their 
institutions, and provisional administrators were 
put in possession of the confiscated property. 
Mounted police patrolled the streets to prevent 
curious or malicious groups of persons from caus- 
ing disturbance. The prisoners were conducted 



130 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

in carriages under escort from their several 
houses, and assembled in the monastery of St. 
Paul; from Pisco, lea, Huancavelica, and Gua- 
manga, they were taken to Lima ; but from Cuzco, 
Arequipa, and Puno they were embarked at a port 
farther towards the south. 

One of the items in the inventory of the con- 
fiscated property of the Jesuits in Lima was a 
body of 5200 slaves. The value of haciendas, or 
estates, was approximately a million pesos, but 
by far the largest item appears to have been the 
credits and the gold and silver. In November, 
1768, a bureau was created to take charge of this 
property, at least such of it as had not been con- 
sumed in maintaining and transporting the pris- 
oners, or had not been sent to the king. The first 
of these items has been set down at 500,000 
pesos, and the second at 800,000. Much of what 
remained passed to other organizations; the 
libraries went to the university; the numerous 
churches in Lima and other towns became hospi- 
tals, prisons, schools, or places of retirement for 
pious persons. Many of the sacred vases, orna- 
ments, relics, and jewels had a destination that 
has not been recorded. 8 

s On the Jesuits in Peru, see Mendiburu, I, 230-237, 257-267, 
293-300; VI, 278, 525-536, 614-618, giving a list of the Jesuits 
expelled. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 131 



IX 

During the one hundred and seventy-four 
years of their residence in Chile, the Jesuits had 
attained preeminence among the religious orders 
not only for their intellectual qualities, but also 
for their worldly acquisitions. They had acquired 
prestige as teachers of youth ; they were the most 
noted preachers ; and they possessed more exten- 
sive libraries than the other orders. They had 
gained great wealth by donations from the gov- 
ernment and from private persons. 

The desire to be recognized as a founder of a 
Jesuit house or college or church furnished one 
of the motives for making donations to the order. 
Domingo Madureira Monterroco, in 1651, offered 
to give the Jesuits the sum of seventeen thousand 
dollars within a period of twelve years, but he 
determined to pay a much larger sum within a 
shorter period. The property conveyed, includ- 
ing slaves, amounted to forty thousand dollars. 
This donation secured for him the distinguished 
honor of being buried under the principal altar 
of the church, and of obtaining the title of founder, 
although the church was built fifty years earlier. 9 

In 1767, besides their urban property in the 
various cities, the Jesuits owned more than fifty 
haciendas, or estates, and almost all of them were 
the richest and most productive lands in the king- 

9 Barros Arana, Ohras completas, Santiago de Chile, 1908-1911, 
X, 60. 



132 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

dom. These were abundantly equipped with im- 
plements, provided with live stock, and amply- 
supplied with laborers, including twelve hundred 
slaves. 

Although the beginnings of the great wealth 
of the Jesuits were derived from donations, yet 
their wealth was greatly increased by industries 
under an especially wise and skilful management. 
By raising cattle on their estates, and establish- 
ing slaughter-houses, and supplying retail shops 
controlled by themselves, they exercised a prac- 
tical monopoly over an important element of food. 
The vast quantities of grain grown on the estates 
of the Jesuits was in part exported to Peru, and 
in part sent to their mills and converted into flour 
for the Chilean market. Producing in many 
departments of industry on a large scale and with 
a large number of slaves as laborers, they were 
able to control the market in many instances, and 
fix the prices independently, prices, too, that 
might eliminate competition. They manufactured 
lime, and supplied it to the government for use 
in constructing fortresses. The most important 
bakeries in the capital were in their hands. They 
controlled the trade in drugs and medicines. They 
had shipyards, where they built small vessels; 
and extensive potteries where they manufactured 
large quantities of the ware used by the common 
people. These industries were usually directed 
by the lay brothers, among whom there were 
sometimes men of special technical skill, notably 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 133 

architects, who found ample employment in the 
construction of churches and other buildings 
needed for the various purposes of the order. 10 

The Jesuits, like the other orders, were 
ambitious to have a large number of houses. 
Bar r os Arana remarked that one might suppose 
that they would have been satisfied in possessing 
in Santiago alone three colegios, or houses of 
residence, besides villas, farms, and estates in the 
suburbs, where they had established different 
industries; but instead of being satisfied with 
these, they wished to have a monastery (convento) 
in each ward of the town. 11 They had also the 
worldly habit of trying to evade the customs laws. 
Under the freedom which they enjoyed as ecclesi- 
astics, they caused many articles to pass in or 
out of the colony freely, on which a legitimate 
customs charge was due. 12 

The Jesuit establishments of Chile constituted 
a single province, but prior to 1619 they formed a 
vice-province dependent on the superior house at 
Cordova del Tucuman. At the head of the prov- 
ince stood the provincial. Within the province 
there were eleven colegios and about twenty 
houses of residence. Each of these institutions 

loBarros Arana, Obras completas, X, 120-126; Hist, de Chile, 
VI, cap. XI; Barros Arana, in his essay on the Biquesas de los 
antiguos Jesuitas, has given the names of many of the larger 
estates, but these names signify nothing in the local geography 
of Chile, since these estates have been divided and their parts 
appear under new names. Obras completas, X, 118. 

11 Obras completas, X, 73. 

12 Obras completas, X, 127. 



134 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

had its independent administration, with its pecu- 
liar estates and other property; and each had a 
superior charged with providing for its needs, 
and with caring for, and developing, its material 
interests. 

The policy carried out by the Jesuits required 
payment for their services. Their missions were 
supported by the bishops or by subventions from 
the crown. Instruction in their colleges was paid 
for by private persons, and the seminary estab- 
lished at Chilian for teaching Indians received 
annually one hundred and twenty pesos for each 
of the sixteen Indian pupils. From whatever 
source derived, the funds collected went into the 
coffers of the society, and the individual members 
seldom if ever engaged in affairs on their own 
account. The accumulated wealth of the society 
enabled it to carry on imp or ant branches of indus- 
try, and thereby to augment their riches and to 
increase their prestige in worldly affairs. By thus 
producing on a large scale, they made the small 
producers feel the inconvenience of the dominat- 
ing influence of a great corporation; and by this 
they provoked an opposition that wished their 
downfall. Their standing was, moreover, affected 
by the independent spirit of the second half of 
the eighteenth century. This spirit antagonized 
the doctrine of absolute obedience that entered 
into the basis of the Jesuit discipline. 

In the early years of their work in South 
America, the Jesuits were moved by a desire to 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 135 

correct the abuses of the governor, the corregi- 
dores, the encomenderos, and all other persons 
having power over the Indians. By their protests 
and their petitions to the higher authorities, they 
necessarily brought themselves into open conflict 
with the secular authorities in the kingdom, on 
whom the Indians were immediately dependent. 
When the Jesuit preached against the abuses of 
the encomendero, the encomendero in turn with- 
held his contribution to the order. The corregi- 
dor resented any interference with his plan of 
spoiling the Indians in his district ; and thus very 
early a breach was made between the Jesuits and 
the secular proprietors. This had only to be 
developed in order to bring it to the attention of 
the government. 

X 

Before executing Aranda's order for the 
expulsion of the Jesuits from Eio de la Plata, 
Governor Bucareli sent the papers designed for 
Chile to Governor Guill y Gonzaga. These docu- 
ments reached Santiago on the 7th of August, 
1767. Guill y Gonzaga was greatly embarrassed by 
these orders and the unusual manner of their com- 
munication. "Weak in character, ill, fanatically 
devoted to the church, a decided partisan of the 
Jesuits, among whom he had sought his confessor 
and spiritual counsellor, he was nevertheless 
obliged to carry out against them a rigid and 



136 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

severe order which antagonized his beliefs and 
his most firmly grounded sentiments." 13 The 
governor was authorized, in case the Jesuits 
should offer resistance, to use such force as might 
be necessary to procure an immediate execution 
of the decree. Although knowledge of the orders 
of the king and of the instructions of Aranda was 
kept from the people, yet when it was seen that 
the troops were preparing for action a rumor 
became current that they were to be used against 
the Jesuits. Precautions were also taken to pre- 
vent the Jesuits from escaping from the country. 
Sentinels were placed in the passes of the Andes, 
and the two ships in the harbor of Valparaiso 
were ordered not to leave port without the gov- 
ernor's permission; and the governor sent sealed 
instructions to his subordinates throughout the 
colony. These instructions were not to be opened 
before a prescribed date. The 26th of August, a 
few hours before dawn, was the time fixed for 
carrying out the decree of expulsion in all parts 
of Chile. The first house of the Jesuits visited 
in Santiago by Juan de Balmaseda, acting as 
commissioner for the government, was the Colegio 
Maximo de San Miguel, which occupied the pres- 
ent site of the palace of Congress. Sentinels were 
placed at all of the doors, and the commissioner 
then presented himself at the principal entrance, 
gave three heavy strokes on the door, and ordered 
in the name of the king that the door should be 

isBarros Arana, Hist, de Chile, VI, 268. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 137 

opened without delay. The rector of the college, 
Francisco de Madariaga, received the commis- 
sioner respectfully, offered no opposition to the 
execution of the royal order, and immediately 
called all the other officers of the college to 
assemble in the chapel. There were eighty-two of 
them. The decree of expulsion having been read, 
the rector handed to Balmaseda the keys of the 
house, which gave him access to all the property, 
books and papers of the college. In the course 
of the forenoon the Jesuits from the other estab- 
lishments in the city and from neighboring estates 
arrived and were added to those who at the college 
had already been placed under arrest. Soldiers 
were stationed not only in the streets about the 
building, but they guarded also the several en- 
trances, and in the building itself kept watch at 
the doors of the apartments occupied by the rector 
and the other members of the order. 

At other points in Chile where there were 
Jesuits, the royal decree was carried out with the 
same severity and at practically the same hour. 
From the northern and the southern districts, 
during the next few weeks, the Jesuits were taken 
to Valparaiso, and held there under guard await- 
ing transportation to Europe. The fourteen mem- 
bers of the order and three coadjutors in the 
province of Cuyo, as already indicated, were sent 
to Buenos Aires to be added to those gathered 
there from the provinces of Eio de la Plata. 
Although the removal of the Jesuits from their 



138 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

places in Chile caused serious regrets and lamen- 
tations among a very large part of the inhabitants, 
yet no resistance was made to the authorities 
commissioned to execute the king's decree. 

The first step in this remarkable undertaking 
was to arrest the Jesuits of Chile and to bring 
them into the hands of the governmental authori- 
ties. It then devolved upon the governor to find 
some means of transporting them to Europe. The 
governor's first project was to make use of a 
vessel, El Rosario, then lying in the harbor of 
Valparaiso; but on account of difficulties raised 
by the owner, this plan had to be abandoned. 
Finally, by a letter from the viceroy of Peru, the 
governor was informed that a warship, El Peru- 
ano, would arrive at Valparaiso at the end of 
October, and that Jesuits might be embarked on 
this vessel and taken around Cape Horn to their 
destination. In the meantime the task of assem- 
bling the exiles at the port remained to be com- 
pleted. In Santiago there were one hundred 
marked for deportation. At two o'clock on the 
morning of the 23d of October, these, under the 
direction of the corregidor, Luis Manuel de 
Zanartu, were marched through the dark and 
silent streets of the city to the suburbs, where 
horses had been brought together for their use 
on the journey to the coast. They arrived in Val- 
paraiso after a ride of eight days. Here they 
found themselves united with other members of 
the order, who had been brought in from other 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 139 

parts of Chile, making in all a company of about 
three hundred persons. A few of the Jesuits of 
Santiago had been left in the city on account of 
age and sickness, and seven had escaped on the 
journey to Valparaiso. 

The ship, El Peruano, expected at the end of 
October, did not arrive in Valparaiso until the 
30th of November. There were on board five 
hundred persons, of whom one hundred and 
eighty-one were Jesuits expelled from Peru. 14 
The order of the viceroy provided that the ship 
should not remain at Valparaiso more than three 
days for embarking the Jesuits of Chile. But it 
was found to be necessary to remain in port for 
a much longer period. The vessel needed repairs ; 
about one hundred of the Jesuits brought from 
Peru had not suitable clothing, and a new supply 
had to be obtained in Chile ; and the food provided 
for the voyage was inadequate and unfit for use. 
It was found, moreover, that the ship could receive 
only a few persons in addition to those who had 
embarked on it at Callao. Five of those who had 
arrived from the north had to be left at Valparaiso 
on account of serious illness, and place was found 
for only twenty-four of the three hundred Jesuits 
in Chile. The rest were left in Valparaiso; and 
early in January, 1768, El Peruano set sail on 
her long voyage to Europe. One of those left 
behind wrote: "We flattered ourselves always 

!* A list of the Jesuits expelled from Peru in 1767 is given in 
Mendiburn, VI, 614-618. 



140 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

with, the hope that the king would again regard us 
with favor, and permit us to remain in our former 
state; we prayed without ceasing; we directed 
ourselves now to the Holy Virgin, now to our 
blessed founder and to other saints. But our 
prayers were not heard. As there was no other 
Spanish ship in the port, we were embarked at 
the beginning of Lent in three Chilean vessels and 
taken to Lima." 15 Those who had been left at 
different points in Chile for various reasons, were 
in the course of the following months deported, so 
that in 1772 the governor was able to report to 
Aranda that no Jesuit remained within the limits 
of the territory under his jurisdiction. Of those 
who were sent from Chile to Lima, one hundred 
and twenty were shipped to Italy by way of Cape 
Horn, and the rest went by way of Panama. 

The historians Olivares and Molina were 
among the Jesuits sent from Chile to Peru to be 
embarked for Europe. After some months spent 
in Lima, they sailed from Callao on the 7th of 
May, and arrived in Cadiz on the 7th of December, 
1768, whence they were taken to Italy. Olivares, 
who was more than ninety years of age, resided 
in Imola, while Bologna became the residence of 
Molina. 16 

The exiles from Chile, as well as those from 
Eio de la Plata, received from the Spanish crown 

is Quoted By Barros Arana, VI, 285. 

is See Coleecion de historiadores de Chile, VII, Introduction to 
Olivares' Historia, XIII; Amunategui, Miguel Luis, Los Pre- 
cursors de la independencia de Chile, Santiago, 1870-1872, I, 
cap. VI, Sec. XVII. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 141 

an annual pension of one hundred dollars, under 
conditions similar to those that had been imposed 
upon Jesuits expelled from other parts of Spanish 
territory. 

XI 

The order requiring the expulsion of the 
Jesuits from Ecuador reached the hands of Presi- 
dent Jose Diguja as a sealed document to be 
opened eight days after its reception. Suspect- 
ing the nature of the document, Diguja had pre- 
pared for its execution without exciting a tumult 
on the part of the people, and for its execution 
in all parts of the presidency at the same time. 
There were then Jesuits in Quito, Latacunga, 
Ambato, Eiobamba, Guayaquil, Cuenca, Loja, and 
Ibarra. To the province of Quito belonged the 
colegios of Buga, Pasto, Popayan, and Panama; 
and, moreover, the missions of Maynas and those 
of the territory of the Isthmus of Darien. 

At four o'clock on the morning of the 20th of 
August, the president caused the Jesuits of the 
colegio of Quito to be assembled and the royal 
order to be read to them. At the same time he 
declared them prisoners, and forbade them to 
communicate with the inhabitants of the town. It 
was determined that all of the Jesuits of the prov- 
ince should be assembled at Guayaquil. The 
president treated them with great consideration; 
caused clothing to be prepared for them; and 
organized accommodations for them along the 



142 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

route to the port. Deguja ordered seven hundred 
beasts of burden to be gathered at Quito to trans- 
port the Jesuits and their effects to the coast. 
The gathering of the mules, the leave-taking of 
the faithful, and the long procession over the 
tableland formed a striking scene. 

The Jesuits entered upon the march in three 
divisions. The third division was composed of 
the officials who had remained to transfer the 
property to the state. The three divisions em- 
barked for Panama respectively on the 17th and 
25th of September and the 3d of October. A few 
who were ill and the procuradores sailed in 
November. Aranda disapproved of the action of 
the president in leaving six Jesuits in Quito, and 
they were removed from the city on the 9th of 
Sepember, 1772. These were very old or blind or 
ill, and the president caused them to be carried on 
stretchers. With their removal the expulsion was 
complete. The whole number expelled from 
Ecuador was one hundred and eighty-two. 17 

XII 

Shortly before the expulsion of the Jesuits, 
the viceroy of New Granada, Jose Solis Folch de 
Cardona, laid aside his worldly interests, and 
devoted his attention to acts of charity. On one 
occasion he sent the materials for an elaborate 
dinner to a hospital for the insane that was in 

17 A nearly complete list of the Jesuits expelled from. Ecuador 
is given in Suarez, Historic del Ecuador, V, 233-239. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 143 

charge of friars; and later, visiting the institu- 
tion, he asked one of the inmates if he had dined 
well, and received this reply: "Senor Viceroy, 
what I can say is that the friars have dined like 
locos, and the locos like friars." He gave his 
property for the benefit of the poor, and on the 
24th of February, 1761, he applied for admission 
to the Franciscan monastery in Bogota. In 
" abandoning the world," he took the name of 
Jose de Jesus Maria. He continued here his 
acetic regime until his death, April 27, 1770. 18 

The successor of Solis as viceroy of New 
Granada was Pedro Mesia de la Zerda, who 
assumed the duties of his office in January, 1761. 
The expulsion of the Jesuits occurred during his 
administration. The viceroy received a note from 
the king, on the 7th of July, 1767, ordering the 
other documents to be opened on the eve of the 
day fixed for the expulsion. This day was the 
1st of August. On the 31st of July, the Society 
celebrated the fiesta of Ignacio de Loyola, with all 
the pomp which the wealth of the Jesuits made 
possible. The benediction of the preacher con- 
cluded the activity of the order in Bogota. In the 
following night, the viceroy caused the establish- 
ments of the Jesuits in Bogota to be surrounded 
by guards. These establishments were the Colegio 
Maximo, the Seminario de San Bartolome, and 
the Noviciado. The commissioners appeared at 
the Colegio Maximo, and were immediately ad- 

18 Vergara y Velasco, F. J., Capitulos de una historia civil y 
militar de Colombia, Bogota, 1905, 78-85. 



144 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

mitted. Then, carrying out the usual programme, 
they summoned all the members of the college to 
assemble, and in the presence of witnesses caused 
the royal decree to be read to them. Then the 
provincial took it, kissed it, and affirmed that they 
would obey it like faithful and loyal vassals of the 
king. After the provincial had surrendered the 
keys of the college, the members of the Society 
were arrested and cut off completely, as in the 
other cases, from all communication with mem- 
bers of the secular community. The commissioner 
then made a careful examination and inventory 
of all the property discovered in the college. 
"When the faithful appeared in the morning, they 
found the doors of the church closed, and the same 
fact was observed at the Seminario and the 
Noviciado, where a similar procedure had been 
followed. To set aside the possibility of a public 
commotion, the royal decree imposing absolute 
silence respecting the events concerning the expul- 
sion, was published. It was, moreover, announced 
that the college would be opened in a few days 
with new instructors. The Jesuits from the 
Seminario and the Noviciado were transferred to 
the Colegio Maximo. 

Commissioners were appointed and sent to 
other places where Jesuits resided; to Tunja, 
Honda, Pamplona, the Llanos de Casanare, Popa- 
yan, Antioquia, Cartagena, and Mompox. The 
Jesuits taken from most of the interior towns 
were sent to Honda, consigned to an officer of the 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 145 

port, Jose Palacio, to be embarked for Mompox, 
as the next stage of their journey to Europe. 
Those from Pamplona were sent out of the coun- 
try by way of Maracaibo; while those from the 
missions of Casanare, fourteen in number, pro- 
ceeded through Venezuela. In every instance 
when the commissioners appeared at a college or 
other Jesuit institution, the door was opened for 
them immediately ; and this fact has been cited as 
evidence that the event was expected. "Whether 
this was the case or not, the priests made no effort 
to provoke a popular movement in their favor. 
However unjust they may have considered their 
expulsion, they obeyed the order without delay, 
and the royal permission to use force in making 
the arrests was superfluous. 

XIII 

The same prompt obedience was rendered by 
the Jesuits of the llanos, or the plains of the 
Orinoco or of the Casanare. In 1659 the Jesuits 
were permitted to return to the llanos, from which 
they had previously been recalled. Two priests, 
Francisco Jimeno and Francisco Alvarez, were 
appointed to explore the region, and to report 
such information as the provincial might need to 
enable him to direct the proposed missionary 
undertaking. On the basis of the report presented 
by these envoys on their return, headquarters of 
missionary work were established at Pauto. 



146 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

A feature of these missions not conspicuous 
elsewhere was a military escort provided for the 
protection of the missionaries. The small squads 
of soldiers detailed for service at the several 
reductions were paid from the royal treasury. In 
the reductions of the Orinoco, a troop of six 
soldiers appears as early as 1681, and six other 
soldiers were added to the force after the destruc- 
tion of the pueblos and the missionaries by the 
savages in 1684. The king ordered another addi- 
tion, in 1693, consisting of twenty-five soldiers, a 
number that was increased a little later to thirty- 
five. Thus from time to time the number of 
soldiers sent to the missions was increased until 
each of a majority of the reductions had a small 
escort. 

More than forty missions, or reductions, were 
founded in the district of Casanare, Meta, and 
Orinoco between 1604 and 1755, but many of these 
were afterwards abandoned, some were united, 
and others continued to exist under changed 
names. Shortly before the expulsion, there were 
the following reductions in existence, each with 
the number of Indians indicated : 

Casanaee 

Name of Mission Indians 

1. Pauto 600 

2. San Salvador del Puerto de Casanare 350 

3. Na. Sa. de la Asuncion 1,800 

4. El Pilar de Patute 70 

5. San Javier de Macaguanes 1,000 

6. San Ignacio de Betoyes 1,600 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 147 

Meta 

Name of Mission Indians 

1. Surimena 400 

2. San Miguel de Macuco 800 

3. Casimena 700 

4. La Quebradita de Jiramena 300 

Orinoco 

1. Carichana 400 

2. San Borja 330 

3. Cabruta 400 

4. Uriana 600 

5. El Raudal 300 

6. La Encaramada 290 

Total 9,940 

The policy of isolation was more or less strictly 
carried out in the reductions of the plains as well 
as in those of Paraguay. The Jesuits sought to 
prevent Europeans from knowing the internal 
affairs of the missions. The neophites were not 
expected to go out, and strangers were not ex- 
pected to enter, without the permission of the 
priests. This exclusion provoked hostility, but 
the Jesuits relied on their brethren to allay it. 
The confessor of the king and the queen were 
expected to support them in times of difficulty. 
The communism of the Jesuits of the llanos, 
another conspicuous feature of their policy, 
appears to have been adapted to the disposition 
of the Indians. The reluctance of the Indians to 
work made them look with favor on membership 
in a community where there was a stock, from 



148 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

which one might draw even when old and no 
longer able to contribute to it. 

When the Jesuits of the Orinoco plains were 
informed of the royal decree of expulsion, the 
superiors of the missions presented their books of 
accounts, containing the record of the reductions 
from their foundation, to the accredited authori- 
ties. Their property, whether in money or in any 
other form, was turned over to the governor 
of the province. The priests left their pueblos 
quietly at night, in order that there might be no 
disturbance or insurrection among the Indians 
who had adopted the settled life of the missions. 
' ' The rich haciendas of Casanare and other articles 
of great value, which were the common property 
of the Indians of this and other districts, were 
confiscated in favor of the royal treasury, leaving 
the legitimate owners in extreme want. The 
churches were dispoiled of their most costly 
jewels ; the haciendas were sold at an insignificant 
price; and the regime of rigor and rapacity 
reappeared in greater severity. The Indians 
abandoned these fields, the former theater of their 
prosperity; the reductions were depopulated; the 
temples were ruined; and the land was turned 
back to its primitive state of savage and solitary 
nature. ' n9 

is Plaza, Jose Antonio de, Memorias para la historia de la 
Nueva Granada desde su descubrimiento hasta el 20 de julio de 
1810, Bogota, 1850, 314. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 149 

XIV 

The expulsion of the Jesuits stands out as a 
prominent event in the history of Spanish South 
America, yet at the time it attracted compara- 
tively little popular attention. It was an act of 
the sovereign, and was later ratified by the pope. 
In opposition to such an act there was then no 
organized public opinion. Moreover, the meas- 
ures taken to execute the decree of expulsion were 
carried out without previous announcement; and 
before the public had become aware of what was 
contemplated, the houses, the schools, and the 
churches of the Jesuits had been closed, and the 
unfortunate missionaries were well on their way 
into exile. 

One of the problems of the expulsion of the 
Jesuits was to find where they would be received 
and permitted to remain. The attempts to estab- 
lish them in Corsica and Genoa were unsuccessful, 
and it was finally decided that they should be 
taken to the papal states. In making this decision 
Charles III, it is said, pretended to rule the states 
of the supreme pontiff with the same authority as 
that which he exercised in his own dominions. 
Thus, without soliciting beforehand the consent 
of the pope, or giving notice of his intention, he 
sent to the papal states the six thousand Spanish 
subjects whom he had expelled from Spain and 
the American colonies, ordering his captains to 
disembark them at ports of these states. By the 



150 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEK 

royal ordinance of April 2, 1767, he, moreover, 
declared that if any Jesuit should leave the states 
of the church, the pension that had been assigned 
to him would be discontinued. 20 The papal states 
were thus their prison, but the authorities of the 
church were not pleased to be made their keepers. 
Their view was that if the Jesuits were inno- 
cent of any offense, there existed no ground for 
expelling them as pernicious; if they were bad, 
one might not assume that the pope should punish 
them, but that they ought to have been punished 
in the dominions of the king. 21 

On the arrival of the Jesuits, it was not 
thought advisable to incorporate them in the 
established organization, but to assign them to 
the provinces of Emilia and Eomagna, where 
they might be maintained without great incon- 
venience. Those from Paraguay were sent to the 
cities of Faenza, Ravena, and Brisighella. At 
Faenza they received special attention from the 
priests of the Jesuit college in that city ; and some 
of them accepted an invitation from Count Can- 
toni to occupy a house owned by him in the 
country. 

Before the end of 1769, almost all of the 
banished Spanish Jesuits found themselves in the 
northern part of the papal states, and here some 
of them attempted to reorganize the instruction 
that had been interrupted in America by their 

20 Coleccidn de libros y document os, VII, 242. 

21 Coleccidn de libros y documentos, VII, 243. 



EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS 151 

expulsion. The source of their support, aside 
from the donations received, was a small pension 
of about a hundred dollars a year, paid by the 
Spanish government from the property of the 
Jesuits that had been confiscated. But all their 
resources were inadequate for their proper main- 
tenance, so that, as it was said, if they clothed 
themselves, there was nothing left for food, and 
if they ate, there was nothing left for clothing. 

Those persons among the exiles who turned 
their attention to instruction found pupils without 
going outside their own ranks ; for a considerable 
number of novices had followed their superiors. 
They had refused to accept the conditions under 
which they might have remained in America. 
These conditions were embraced in the instruc- 
tions of Aranda to the commissioners charged 
with carrying out the decree of expulsion. The 
tenth section of these instructions provided that 
if any novices were found in the novitiates, or 
houses, who had not already taken their religious 
vows, they should be immediately removed in 
order that they might have no communication 
with the rest, and should be taken to a private 
house, where they might enjoy full liberty, have 
knowledge of the perpetual expatriation that had 
been imposed upon the members of the Society, 
and decide freely according to their inclinations, 
without being influenced by the commissioner, 
whether to return to secular life or accept the 
fate of the exiles. But they were made to under- 



152 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

stand that in going with those who were expelled 
they would receive no pension, and their expatria- 
tion would be perpetual. The government was 
evidently desirous of having the novices abandon 
their plan to enter the order of the Jesuits; but 
the youths, with the zeal of new converts, were 
not easily moved, and, for the larger part, went 
with their teachers to Italy, and here under the 
newly organized instruction had an opportunity 
to continue their studies. 

The expulsion of the Jesuits not only checked 
the economic development of the dependencies, 
but also clouded their literary and scholarly pros- 
pects. The most efficient schools throughout the 
colonies were closed, and the inhabitants lapsed 
into an ignorance even more profound than that 
which had marked them in the earlier decades. 



CHAPTER V 

THE CREATION OF THE VICEROYALTY OF 
RIO DE LA PLATA 

I. The need of a new viceroyalty and the functions of 
the viceroy. II. The audiencia of Charcas and the 
creation of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. III. 
Viceroy Ceballos and his army. IV. The Spanish- 
Portuguese treaty of 1777. V. The commercial 
code of 1778. VI. Viceroy Vertiz. VII. Fernan- 
dez general intendant of the army and the royal 
treasury. 



After the expulsion of the Jesuits, and before 
the conclusion of the second boundary treaty with 
Portugal, Charles III undertook another measure 
of internal reform in the South American depen- 
dencies. The revolution in Paraguay and the 
continuance of the controversy with the Portu- 
guese emphasized the need of giving a greater 
degree of independence to the government of the 
southeastern provinces. The viceroyalty of Peru 
had, for many years, shown signs of political 
disintegration. Evidence of this was presented in 
demands for an increase in the number of audi- 
encias ; in the establishment of the viceroyalty of 



154 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

New Granada, or Santa Fe ; and in the pretension 
of the captaincies-general to be independent of 
the viceroys. The growth of the population in 
the different quarters of the continent, and the 
development of local interests and local ambitions, 
made necessary a more effective administration 
than could be furnished from any single center. 
This difficulty found its normal solution in the 
division of the original South American vice- 
royalty. This division was first carried into 
effect, as already suggested, by establishing a 
separate viceregal government for the territory 
now embraced in the republics of Colombia and 
Ecuador. 

In the southern part of the continent the need 
of a new administrative organization had become 
imperative. There was wanted a more effective 
agency not only for the better management of 
internal affairs, but also for repelling foreign 
encroachments, particularly those of the Portu- 
guese from the side of Brazil. As a capital for 
the new government, Buenos Aires had the great 
advantage of its geographical position. It was 
near the southern coast, where the Spaniards were 
attempting to plant colonies, and it was the gate- 
way to the interior of the continent, reached by 
the great rivers of Paraguay, Parana, and Uru- 
guay. The Cordillera, impassable during a large 
part of the year, made it necessary that the east- 
ern and western coasts should have different 
centers of governmental authority. The province 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 155 

of Cuyo, east of the Andes, formerly attached to 
Chile, had more intimate geographical relations 
with the provinces of Bio de la Plata than with 
the territory of the Pacific coast, and, therefore, 
needed to be politically united with the provinces 
of the southeast. 

The viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, when created, 
was in all its legal features like those that had 
been previously established in Mexico, Peru, and 
the present territory of Colombia and Ecuador. 
In Mexico and Peru, at the beginning of the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century, the succession 
of viceroys already extended over more than two 
hundred years. A complex social organization 
had grown up in their capitals; elaborate forms 
and ceremonies were observed both in the gov- 
ernment and in private life; and the class dis- 
tinctions that were recognized gave the society 
an appearance of maturity. But in Buenos Aires, 
a frontier town, there was comparatively little 
wealth, less recognition of forms and ceremonies, 
and, in every respect, a simpler mode of existence. 
"While the viceroy of Buenos Aires stood under 
the same law as the viceroy of Mexico or Lima, 
his real position was widely different from that 
of the viceroy in either of the older capitals. 

The powers and duties of a viceroy were in 
general such as devolved upon him as the imme- 
diate representative of the king. He considered 
petitions of all sorts addressed to him, and in this 
he was assisted by a legal adviser, called asesor 



156 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

general. The asesor prepared the decisions, or 
replies to the petitions, and submitted them to 
the viceroy for his signature. From these de- 
cisions there was an appeal to the audiencia. The 
viceroy stood at the head of both civil and mili- 
tary affairs. He was the commander-in-chief of 
the colonial military and naval forces, but in 
emergencies he was assisted by a council of war. 
He called courts-martial, and reviewed for con- 
firmation the sentences imposed by the courts 
before they were carried out. As president of the 
audiencia he might attend its sessions, and he had 
the power of veto over all its decisions. 1 In this 
capacity he made an annual report to the king 
through the Council of the Indies, and took this 
occasion to give the king all necessary informa- 
tion concerning the public and private characters 
of the members of this court. His conduct was, 
however, subjected to restriction. He was for- 
bidden to marry within the limits of the vice- 
royalty without the express permission of the 
sovereign. He might not engage in commercial 

1 Sometimes the viceroy attended the meetings of the audiencia 
in state. The ceremony of these occasions in Lima has been de- 
scribed by a contemporary observer. When it had been announced 
that the viceroy would thus be present, a deputation of the judges 
"attended him from his palace to the hall; on his arrival at 
the door, the porter called aloud ' the president ! ' when all the 
attorneys, advocates, and others met him and conducted him to 
his chair; the judges continued standing until he was seated and 
nodded permission for them to resume their seats." At the end 
of the session all the members of the audiencia "accompanied him 
to the door of his apartment in the palace, the regent walking 
on his left, and the other members preceding him two and two." 
Stevenson, Twenty Years' Residence, I, 175. 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 157 

affairs, acquire property, become a god-father to 
an infant, or visit a private family. He was the 
royal vice-patron. All appointments to benefices 
in the church required his confirmation. In exer- 
cising his power with reference to these appoint- 
ments, he selected one of three persons proposed 
by the archbishop. The viceroy of Peru was 
governor-general of Callao, and twice every year 
he visited the fortifications, receiving for each 
visit an addition to his salary of five hundred 
dollars. 

II 

For two centuries the audiencia of Charcas 
had exercised extensive powers over the greater 
part of the territory that now fell under the rule 
of the viceroy of Rio de la Plata. Within the limits 
of its wide jurisdiction this body had taken to 
itself practically sovereign power. It dared even 
to set itself in opposition to the will of the viceroy 
of Peru, its legitimate superior. It manifested 
this opposition in supporting the rebellion of 
Antequera, while the viceroy was using his power 
to suppress it. 2 In the interior of the continent 
the audiencia of Charcas remained serene and 
unmoved by the agitations that disturbed Lima, 
Asuncion, Buenos Aires, and other more acces- 
sible cities. It was in some sense the training 

2 Rene-Moreno, G., Bolivia y Peru: Notas historical y biblio- 
grdficas, Santiago de Chile, 1905, 202. The essay on "La Audi- 
encia de Charcas, 1559-1809" occupies pages 201 to 325. 



158 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

place, the apprentice station for oidores destined 
for promotion to the audiencia of Lima. 3 

The creation of the viceroyalty of Kio de la 
Plata was the most important act of Spanish 
colonial legislation in the later decades of the 
century. A step towards this event is seen in the 
king's declaration of 1766, that the governor of 
Buenos Aires should have supervision over the 
eastern shore, including the Straits and Cape 
Horn. 4 Another step was taken by the fiscal of 
the royal audiencia of Charcas, Tomas Alvarez de 
Acevedo. He foresaw the necessity of a change, 
and urged that the government of a province as 
far away as Buenos Aires was from the center 
of power would inevitably be inefficient and expen- 
sive. In spite of the great difficulties of communi- 
cation, the supreme tribunal for the province of 
Buenos Aires had its seat nearly two thousand 
miles away, in the city of Charcas. In order to 
•remedy the evils and promote the public welfare, 
it appeared to Acevedo imperatively necessary to 
create a viceroyalty and audiencia at Buenos 
Aires. The audiencia of Charcas adopted this 
view, and on the 12th of January, 1771, made a 
report, and sent it to the king, advising the 
creation of a new viceroyalty, urging that the 
province of Cuyo should be separated from Chile, 
and united with the provinces of Tucuman, Buenos 

3 Memorias de los vireyes del Peru, II, 93 ; Eene-Moreno, Bolivia 
y Peru, 208. 

4 Quesada, Vicente Gaspar, Vireinato del Bio de la Plata, 
Buenos Aires, 1881, 38. 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 159 

Aires, and Paraguay, and the whole be made to 
constitute the territory of the new viceroyalty of 
Eio de la Plata. 5 The prompt action that was 
taken in this case was in a large measure due to 
the hostility that had broken out between the 
Spaniards and the Portuguese. The king of 
Spain determined not only to meet the hostile 
Portuguese with an effective force, but also to 
create a new center of viceregal power. Both the 
viceroy of Peru and the governor of Buenos Aires 
favored the project; and in July, 1776, Pedro 
Ceballos was informed that he would be placed 
in command of the military expedition against the 
Portuguese in the Eio de la Plata, and that he 
would be entrusted with the superior authority 
over this district and all the territories under the 
jurisdiction of the audiencia of Charcas, as well 
as those of the cities of Mendoza and San Juan 
del Pico; and that there would be conceded to 
him the status of viceroy, governor, captain- 
general, and president of the audiencia, with all 
the powers and duties pertaining to this status. 
Ceballos was then governor of Madrid, and the 
king provided that this office should be held for 
him, in order that he might return to it when the 
object of the expedition should have been attained. 
Under the date of August 1, 1776, the king 
issued to Ceballos his commission in the following 
form: 

"Whereas, being well satisfied with the repeated 
proofs which you have given me of your love and zeal 

5 Quesada, Vireinato, 40. 



160 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

for my royal service, and having appointed you to com- 
mand the expedition that is made ready at Cadiz for 
South America, instructed to obtain satisfaction for the 
insults offered by the Portuguese, in my provinces of 
Rio de la Plata, I have appointed you my viceroy, gov- 
ernor, and captain-general of the provinces of Buenos 
Aires, Paraguay, Tucuman, Potosi, Santa Cruz de la 
Sierra, Charcas, and of all the districts, towns, and 
territories, to which is extended the jurisdiction of that 
audiencia, over which you will preside when present, 
with the appropriate powers and privileges which the 
other viceroys of my dominions in India enjoy, accord- 
ing to the laws of the Indies, thus embracing under your 
command and jurisdiction the territories of the cities of 
Mendoza, and San Juan del Pico, which at present are 
dependent on the government of Chile, with absolute 
independence of my viceroy of the kingdom of Peru, 
while thus you remain in those countries, with respect 
to the military as well as to the civil government, and the 
general superintendency of the royal treasury, in all its 
branches and products; wherefore I command the said 
viceroy of Peru, the presidents of Chile and Charcas, the 
ministers of their audiencias, the governors, corregidores, 
alcaldes, ministers of my royal treasury, officers of my 
royal army and navy, and other persons whom it may 
concern, that they may have, recognize, and obey you as 
such viceroy, governor, and captain-general of the prov- 
inces mentioned, in virtue of this my order and testi- 
monial of that which you will be obliged to direct on 
your arrival, to the chiefs, tribunals, and others who 
may be concerned, so that without the least reply or 
contradiction they may comply with your orders and 
that they may comply with them punctually in their 
respective jurisdictions, which is thus my will, and that 
as soon as you are prepared to leave Cadiz you make 
yourself known as viceroy and captain-general to all 
persons on all the warships and transports, in order that 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 161 

they may act in accordance with this knowledge and may 
be under your orders when they embark, and to the effect 
that you may not be placed in embarrassment in the 
absolute service and authority, and with regard to the 
high character of my viceroy, governor, and captain- 
general, in virtue of this my royal decree, I excuse you 
from all the rest of the formalities of other expeditions, 
oath, payment of half-year annats, assuming possession, 
judgment of residencia, and of whatever other requisites 
are customary and prescribed by the laws of the Indies, 
in case of the appointment of viceroys to those dominions, 
for thus entering my royal service; and I command 
equally the officers of the royal treasury of Buenos Aires 
and the rest of the districts of your government, that 
they may pay you punctually from the funds of my 
royal treasury to the amount of forty thousand pesos 
current in America, which I assign to you in Cadiz, in 
virtue of your receipts, or letters of payment which will 
serve for them, of proper date without any other security 
whatsoever. 

"Given in San Ildefonso, August 1, 1776." 



Ill 

The king's instructions concerning the govern- 
ment to be established were issued under date 
of August 15, 1776. The new viceroyalty was 
independent of that of Peru, and the power con- 
ferred upon Ceballos was the absolute power of 
the king. At this time the governor of Eio de la 
Plata was Juan Jose de Vertiz, who, having 
handed over to the new viceroy the command of 
the troops and the superior authority over all the 
cities and territory under his control, was ordered 



162 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

to remain as governor of this province, subordi- 
nated to the viceroy as the viceroy was subject to 
the king. The sixteenth article of the instructions 
commands the viceroy to raise all the militia pos- 
sible within the limits of the new viceroyalty, to 
commission officers, and to make effective regula- 
tions for clothing, arming, and disciplining the 
troops to be maintained; and at the conclusion 
of the expedition to make arrangements under 
which the established armed force may be con- 
tinued. It was not difficult to foresee that the 
irritation caused by Spain's commercial policy 
was destined, sooner or later, to make a consider- 
able military force needed to ward off foreign 
encroachments. 

The fleet appointed to carry the nine thousand 
soldiers placed under the command of Ceballos 
left Cadiz on the 12th of October, 1776. Ceballos 
did not go to the colony as to a strange country. 
He had been governor of the province of Rio de la 
Plata for a period of ten years, from 1756 to 1766 ; 
and in his military expeditions to Misiones and 
against Colonia he had become familiar with the 
region over which he was to rule as viceroy. He 
knew, moreover, the territory in dispute between 
the Spaniards and the Portuguese, as well as the 
merits of the pretensions of the two parties. He 
landed with his forces at Montevideo on the 21st 
of April, 1777, and led them along the shore to 
Colonia. At the same time he sent warships to 
command that town and fort from the river. 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 163 

Attacked by both the land and naval forces, 
Colonia surrendered on the 4th of June, 1777. 
One hundred and forty pieces of ordnance and a 
large quantity of arms and munitions fell into the 
hands of the Spaniards. The officers were sent to 
Eio Janeiro, while the common soldiers and the 
colonists were transported to Mendoza. The 
colonists and common soldiers had been brought 
to America from the Azores, the Portuguese gov- 
ernment expecting that their experience in the 
vineyards of their native islands would be utilized 
in developing the culture of the vine in the region 
about the mouth of the great river. But the 
climatic conditions there had been found unfavor- 
able to this undertaking. In the interior of the 
country at the foot of the Andes there was a better 
prospect, and the later important development in 
the cultivation of the grape in that region was 
furthered by the prisoners of war from Colonia. 
The continuance of the war against the Portu- 
guese was prevented by despatches from Madrid, 
announcing that, by an agreement with Portugal, 
hostilities had been suspended. Portuguese 
diplomacy had put an end to the military under- 
taking. These despatches also brought to Cebal- 
los the information that he had received military 
promotion. Under these circumstances, the only 
course open to him was to return with his army 
to Montevideo. Here he placed General Vertiz 
in immediate command of the forces, and went to 
Buenos Aires. 



164 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

IV 

The cessation of hostilities was followed by 
the treaty of San Ildefonso, October 1, 1777. By 
the nullification of the treaty of 1750, there re- 
mained as the line of demarcation between the 
possessions of the two powers only the vague and 
indefinite boundary approved by previous docu- 
ments and actual possession. Portugal found 
this favorable to her policy of persistent en- 
croachment, and, therefore, had met with indiffer- 
ence all projects for a more definite agreement. 
Finally, however, it was mutually determined to 
form a new treaty which would fix more accu- 
rately the intercolonial boundary. The ministers 
appointed to conduct the negotiations and form 
the treaty were Jose Monino, Count of Florida 
Blanca, on the part of Spain, and Francisco Ino- 
cencio de Souza Coutinho, on the part of Portugal. 
The treaty provided for the mutual release of 
prisoners taken from the opposing nations; the 
cession of Colonia and its territory and the island 
of San Gabriel to Spain. The inhabitants of the 
ceded establishments and territory might with- 
draw or remain with all their effects; and the 
Spaniards in any territory or establishment ceded 
to Portugal might enjoy the same privilege. In 
this treaty, as in that of 1750, the line of separa- 
tion to be drawn was described in detail. The 
navigation of the rivers should be in common to the 
point where both banks were held by one nation. 



VICEROYALTY OF EIO DE LA PLATA 165 

Islands in rivers where one bank was held by each 
nation should go with the land of the bank that 
was nearer in the season of low water, except in 
case of large islands, when they should be divided. 
This treaty, like its predecessor, provided for a 
commission to fix practically the boundary line, 
and to interpret the rules established in the treaty 
to be followed in its execution. Contraband trade 
across the border was prohibited. "In proof of 
the union and friendship so greatly desired by the 
two august contending parties," the Spanish 
crown offered to restore and evacuate, within four 
months after the ratification of the treaty, the 
island of Santa Catalina and the part of the 
adjacent continent which had been occupied by 
Spanish forces; and Portugal agreed not to per- 
mit any foreign ships of war or of commerce to 
enter the port of Santa Catalina or the ports of 
the adjacent coast, particularly ships belonging 
to a power with which Spain might be at war, or 
that might be suspected of carrying on contraband 
trade. The troops and vessels of war should be 
mutually withdrawn to posts destined for them in 
time of peace. 6 Moreover, inasmuch as the wealth 
of the country depended largely upon the slaves 
who cultivated the lands, the governors were 
required to agree on a method of returning them 
in case they ran away from their owners, so that 
the fact of passing under foreign dominion might 
not give them their liberty. 

e Calvo, Coleccidn complete de los tratados, Paris, 1862, III, 
128-167. 



166 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



The enemy against whom the king had made 
war was, after all, a beneficent factor in the life 
of the colony of Eio de la Plata; for smuggling 
by the Portuguese had relieved the inhabitants, in 
a large measure, from the consequences of Spain's 
commercial restrictions. Not only Portuguese 
wares, but also wares from other countries were 
smuggled over the border to Buenos Aires. Eng- 
lish goods, received at Colonia under relatively 
low duties, were smuggled across the river and 
brought to the Spanish settlers. The low prices 
at which they could be obtained naturally dimin- 
ished the importations by the overland route from 
Peru. When Charles III became aware of the 
deplorable state of things that had prevailed in 
this southern colony, he was convinced that the 
fundamental error lay in the economic legislation 
to which the colonists had been subjected. Under 
this conviction he issued the commercial code of 
1778. 7 This applied alike to all the Spanish 
colonies in America. It had been preceded by a 
decree issued by Ceballos, in 1777, making free 
the trade of Eio de la Plata with Spain and the 
rest of the colonies. This act was approved by 
the king and prepared the way for the more gen- 
eral law of the following year, the commercial 
code of 1778. 

7 Beglamento para el comercio libre de Espana a Indias de 
12 de Octubre de 1778. 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 167 

Hitherto Seville and Cadiz had held the 
monopoly of Spain's commerce with America. 
The advantages of this trade were now extended 
to the principal ports of Spain and of the Canary- 
Islands. In Spanish America practically all of 
the important ports, including Buenos Aires and 
Montevideo, were admitted to the privileges pre- 
viously enjoyed exclusively by Vera Cruz and 
Porto Bello. 

It was not the design of the crown in making 
the concession of 1778 to relinquish its hold on 
the colonies or on any part of the revenues de- 
rived from them, but the result of the enlarged 
commercial freedom was inevitably to stimulate 
a desire for liberty of a larger scope. This change 
was followed by an unprecedented growth in the 
population of the province of Buenos Aires. The 
necessary adjustment of this increasing popula- 
tion to the material conditions of the colony, in 
view of the inefficiency or indifference of the 
supreme government, called for the exercise of 
local authority, and thus fostered the sense of 
self-control and suggested the idea of indepen- 
dence. 

The war between England and Spain, which 
broke out in 1779, prevented the full realization 
of the expected results of the enlarged commercial 
freedom. This commercial emancipation, more- 
over, came too late to revive the loyalty of the 
colonists of Buenos Aires. They were well aware 
that they had been neglected for decades, and that 



168 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

this neglect had been permitted in the interests of 
the residents of other ports. They were now free 
from the commercial as well as the political domi- 
nation of Lima. Seville's monopoly was broken, 
and the rich products of Upper Peru, Chile, Para- 
guay, and the provinces of the interior were 
brought to Buenos Aires and shipped thence to 
Cadiz, Barcelona, Malaga, Santander, Vigo, Gijon, 
San Lucar, Havana, Lima, Guayaquil, and Gui- 
ana; and these ports sent back to Buenos Aires 
whatever wares were demanded to further the 
advancement and well-being of that colony. 

VI 

From San Lorenzo, October 27, 1777, the king 
issued an order declaring the viceroyalty perma- 
nent. By this order General Vertiz was appointed 
to succeed Ceballos, but it was left to Ceballos to 
determine when this appointment should become 
effective. This order, moreover, introduced an 
important reform, by creating the office of 
General Superintendent of the Army and the 
Treasury, the occupant of which was to have 
general direction and management of all the de- 
partments of the treasury. The creation of this 
office fixed a limitation on the power of the viceroy 
which had not existed during the administration 
of Ceballos; for he had performed the functions 
of general superintendent of the royal treasury, 
and "to him was subordinated the intendant 
appointed for the military expedition and all his 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 169 

subordinates of the auditor's office and the treas- 
ury." 8 The intendancies were made to embrace 
all the inhabited districts of the viceroyalty and 
all those that might be inhabited in the future, and 
the power to be exercised by the intendant under 
the new viceroy and his successors was in some 
sense a counterpoise to the authority of the vice- 
roy; for in the order appointing Vertiz the king 
informed him that while he had made him vice- 
roy, governor, and captain-general, he had left the 
supervision and regulation of the royal treasury 
in all its branches and proceeds to the care, direc- 
tion, and management of the intendant of the 
army whom he had appointed. 

During the administration of Vertiz settle- 
ments were made on the southeastern coast, in the 
region formerly known as Patagonia, and these 
were recognized as part of the viceroyalty of Rio 
de la Plata, and thus under the jurisdiction of the 
viceroy. But these establishments were found to 
cost the government large sums, and, with the 
exception of that of Rio Negro, were later aban- 
doned by the authority of the king. At the same 
time the king directed that a column should be left 
there, on which should be fixed the royal arms 
and an inscription affirming the Spanish sov- 
ereignty over the region; and that this territory 
should be visited or otherwise recognized every 
year. 9 

8 Quesada, Vireinato, 134. 

9 Informe del Virey Vertiz, para que se aoandonen los estab- 
lecimientos de las Costa Patagonica, Angelis, V, 122-127. 



170 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

At the head of the political hierarchy stood the 
viceroy, governor, and captain-general; under 
him the secretary of the viceroyalty; and there 
were the following provinces with civil or military 
governors: Montevideo, Tucuman, Paraguay, 
Charcas, Potosi, Paz, Chucuito, Santa Cruz de la 
Sierra, Mojos, Chiquitos, Misiones de Indios 
Guaranis. The Malouine, or Falkland, Islands, 
and the new settlements on the coast of Patagonia 
were dependencies of the government of the vice- 
royalty. The officials of these regions were sub- 
ordinated to that government, "and they formed 
an integral part of the administration of the gov- 
ernmental district of the viceroy. ' no 



VII 

The viceroy, on retiring from office, made, for 
the benefit of his successors, a somewhat detailed 
account of his administration, and of the ques- 
tions, solved and unsolved, that had engaged his 
official attention. This practice was continued in 
the viceroyalty of Eio de la Plata. Ceballos, in his 
memorial for his successor, referred to his efforts 
to fortify the frontier against the Indians, and, in 
order that Vertiz might be in a position to main- 
tain this defense, he gave him an account of the 
arms and munitions available for this purpose. 

10 Quesada, V. G., Vireinato, 130 ; on the political geography 
of this part of the world at the end of the eighteenth century, see 
Revista del archivo general de Buenos Aires, by Trelles, IV, 
99-278. 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 171 

At the same time he gave him the necessary infor- 
mation concerning the soldiers who were in the 
service or who might be drawn into it. In this 
document Ceballos also provided for the repatria- 
tion of the Portuguese soldiers who had been sent 
to the region about Mendoza, as well as of the 
Portuguese inhabitants of Colonia, in case they 
did not wish to remain under Spanish rule. They 
should be assisted with transportation, but only 
in case they had paid their debts, or otherwise 
satisfied their creditors. He, moreover, empha- 
sized the need of supporting the missions of the 
Gran Chaco, not merely because of the desira- 
bility of bringing to the Indians a knowledge of 
Christianity, but also in order to forestall the 
encroachments of the Portuguese in that region. 11 
The ill success of the administration of the Para- 
guayan missions after the expulsion of the Jesuits 
induced Ceballos to commend the problem of their 
reform to the consideration of Vertiz. 12 

There was abundant evidence early in the 
eighteenth century that the Spanish colonial sys- 
tem had failed to reach the ends for which it 
was designed by the king and his council. The 
Indians, in spite of the benevolent intentions of 
the supreme government, suffered a barbarous 
and destructive oppression at the hands of prac- 
tically irresponsible officials. Yet before the mid- 
dle of the century the Spanish king had in his 

11 Trelles, Bevista del archivo general de Buenos Aires, Buenos 
Aires, 1870, II, 427. 

12 Trelles, Bevista del archivo general, II, 434. 



172 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

possession the Noticias secretas de America, which 
left no ground for doubting the necessity of 
reform. The establishment of the liberal com- 
mercial code of 1778 magnified the difficulties of 
administering the colonies under the old organ- 
ization; and, in the presence of the complicated 
and difficult problem, the kings before Charles III 
had been helpless, and their helplessness had made 
more evident the need of a modification of the 
existing system. 

The appointment of Ceballos introduced a 
governmental reform in these southwestern prov- 
inces. The viceroy became the single dominant 
authority for the entire viceroyalty. The gov- 
ernors in the several provinces were subordinated 
to him. The viceroy was, however, always under 
the laws of the Indies and such other orders as 
might be issued by the king and the Council of 
the Indies. These constituted the supreme law 
under which the viceregal government existed. 
The viceroy was not assisted by ministers, but 
there was a secretary of the viceroyalty. 

The several provinces, Cuyo and those of 
Upper Peru and the rest, after the organization 
of this viceroyalty sent their accounts to the 
auditor 's office and the tribunal of accounts at the 
capital. The viceroy was the single superior, in 
the beginning, in whom all the authority of the 
viceroyalty was centered; but when it was deter- 
mined to make the viceregal organization in this 
part of the continent permanent, it was thought 



VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA 173 

to be advisable to create a general superintendent 
of the treasury with important powers, and rep- 
resenting the supreme authority of Spain in mat- 
ters relating to the treasury. This arrangement 
became effective with the appointment of Vertiz 
to succeed Ceballos. At this time Manuel Ignacio 
Fernandez was made general intendant of the 
army and the royal treasury in the provinces of 
Rio de la Plata and all the other provinces subject 
to the viceregal government. There was thus 
introduced a dual government, the inconveniences 
of which showed themselves very early. Under 
this system the viceroy's government was without 
a revenue which it could control; and the intend- 
ant lacked the power necessary to give his orders 
effective force. But all doubts or confusion with 
respect to the jurisdiction of these two function- 
aries were set aside by the publication of the 
Ordenanza de Intendentes. 1 * 

Two years after the creation of the inten- 
dencies, the king amended the commercial code of 
1778. This he did by freeing entirely from duties 
all Spanish wines, spirits, agricultural products, 
and manufactured articles, and by reducing from 
four to two per cent the duties on foreign goods 
carried from Spanish ports that were permitted 
to trade with America. This decree was dated at 
San Ildefonso August 5, 1784. 

!3 The complete title of this law was, Beal ordenanza para el 
estaoletimiento e instruction de intendentes de exertito y provincia 
en el vireinato de Buenos Aires, Ano de 1782. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 

I. Abuse of the Indians by the corregidores. II. Areche 
as visitador-general. III. Tupac Amaru. IV. The 
beginning of hostilities. V. The events of Oruro 
and Sangarara. VI. Hopes and aims of Tupac 
Amaru. VII. The overthrow and execution of the 
Inca. VIII. The sieges of Sorata and La Paz. 
IX. Results of the war. 



Twenty years after Juan and Ulloa had pre- 
pared their extended comment on the excesses of 
the corregidores and the parish priests, the city 
of Cuzco treated of the same subject in an elab- 
orate report to the king, dated August 27, 1768. 
The original purpose in creating the office of cor- 
regidor, as represented in this reoprt, was to 
place in each district a person who should hold a 
paternal relation to the Indians within his juris- 
diction ; who should be their judge, their superior, 
and should treat them with pious consideration. 
At first by reason of the abundance prevailing in 
the districts, the corregidores had opportunities for 
legitimate gains, but with the diminution of this 
abundance they resorted to illegitimate means to 



J 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 175 

increase their fortunes; they forced the Indians 
to buy articles they did not need at prices fixed 
by the corregidor, who after a while carried on 
this traffic as if no legal prohibition existed. 1 

In 1749, the viceroy had already made a vigor- 
ous protest against the corregidor 's practice of 
^throwing upon the Indians by a forced sale 
articles entirely useless to them : silk stockings to 
persons who wore no shoes ; spectacles to persons 
Hvho had no defect of vision; hats of a normal 
rvalue of sixty cents, at nine dollars ; silks, brocades, 
velvets, together with numberless articles equally 
useless. In order to pay for these things the 
L Indian was often obliged to surrender his domes- 
tic animal or animals, his principal means of 
support. Obedience to superior regulations re- 
specting the distribution of wares in the several 
districts might have brought relief to the Indians 
and immunity to the corregidores from later ven- 
geance; but the avarice of these officials would 
brook no check, and more and more wares useless 
to the Indians were forced upon them. By this 
process the natives were placed, almost without 
exception, under an obligation to pay that could 
be met only by the most strenuous effort and 
ruinous sacrifices. Inability to meet these burden- 
some obligations was followed by the forced sale 
of all of the Indian's property, even to the total 
distraction of his poor and wretched habitation. 
' One instance from an almost endless list is that 
\of a corregidor near Cuzco, who assigned to an 

1 Belaciones de los vireyes y adieneias, Madrid, 1872, III, 211. 



176 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Indian wares for which the Indian was obliged to 
pay three hundred and forty pesos. As he could 

I not use them, he sold them in the city, and was 

f able to get only twenty-five pesos for them. This 
sum he paid to the corregidor, who for the balance 

jtook from the Indian his little piece of land, or 
farm, and all the rest of his property. After this 

, the Indian expressed his satisfaction, that, having 
no more property, he was free from further 

1 repartimientos. 2 

It is significant that the exposition of the 
excesses of the corregidores and the parish priest 
made by the city of Cuzco, in 1768, shows a sur- 
vival of all the abuses that provoked condemna- 
tion by Juan and Ulloa two decades earlier. 3 The 
tragedies that resulted from the corregidor 's 
exactions, depriving the Indians of means of sup- 
port, are repeated and multiplied, indicating that, 
in spite of all opposing influences, the cupidity 
and arrogance of the corregidores and the suffer- 
ings of the Indians persisted. The viceroy had 
apparently exhausted the resources of his influ- 
ence for reform, and the Indians had to face the 
alternatives of either fleeing for refuge to the 
mountains and the forests or rising in rebellion 
against their oppressors. Still, for more than a 
decade of this time of slow movements the Indians 
continued to bear their burdens and suffer the 
outrages imposed upon them by the corregidores. 

2 Belaciones de los vireyes y audiendas, III, 219. 

3 The title of Cuzco 's protest was : ' ' Bepresentacion de la 
ciudad del Cuzco, en el aiio de 1768, sobre excesos de corregidores 
y curas," in Belaciones de los vireyes y audiendas, III, 207-306. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 177 



II 

It was not only the greed of subordinates, but 
also the demands of the crown that piled the 
burden on the unfortunate Indian. In the reign of 
Viceroy Manuel de Guirior (1776-1781), Amat's 
successor, the king sent Jose Antonio de Areche 
to Peru as visitador-general, with powers superior 
in important particulars to those of the viceroy. 
Areche arrived in Lima on the 14th of June, 1777. 
Although a member of the Council of the Indies, 
he lacked intimate knowledge of the affairs of the 
inhabitants of the dependencies. Guirior, on the 
other hand, as viceroy of New Granada, had de- 
rived from experience among the people a prac- 
tical knowledge not possessed by any official who 
had viewed America only from Madrid. 

In 1777 and 1778, numerous social movements 
at various points in the viceroyalty, promoted by 
other classes than the Indians, claimed much of 
the attention of the government. Without inquir- 
ing into the causes of these disturbances, Areche 
proceeded to form plans for increasing the royal 
revenues. But Guirior had also contributed to 
the public discontent by imposing a tax of twelve 
and one-half per cent on alcoholic liquors. The 
abuses of the corregidor's administration still 
called loudly for reform, and provoked an inquiry 
into the desirability of abolishing the system 
of repartimientos. Areche proposed, among his 
changes of taxation, to increase the alcabala from 



178 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

four to six per cent. As this was a tax on all 
articles at the time of sale, its wide application 
caused general dissatisfaction, intensified by the 
knowledge that this new contribution was not to 
be expended for the welfare of the viceroyalty, 
but was to be transported to Spain. Although 
the Indians by a special law were exempted from 
paying this tax on the products of their harvest 
and their industry, 4 there was here, however, an 
opportunity for abuse; it was often improved by 
the unscrupulous corregidor, who by this viola- 
tion of the law added to the grievances and the 
hostility of the Indians. Other changes made by 
Areche, increasing existing taxes and imposing 
new taxes, called forth protests from the cabildo 
of Lima and the tribunal of the consulado. In 
fact, the outcry against taxes in the viceroyalties 
of Peru and New Granada appears like an echo 
of the opposition that had already found voice 
in the British colonies of North America. 

The disturbance caused by Areche 's rash 
interference and changes in the affairs of the 
administration justified Viceroy Montesclaros ' 
comparison of the coming of a visitador to a little 
whirlwind. Not content with raising the dust 
about the ears of the officials, Areche conceived of 
the viceroy as his hostile rival, and presented to 
the supreme government a list of charges against 
him. Guirior thus found himself not only per- 
sonally attacked but the affairs of the kingdom 

4Mendiburu, I, 321. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 179 

turned into confusion. Areche's charges had 
much weight with the government in Spain, par- 
ticularly with Jose de Galvez, who advocated, and 
succeeded in effecting, the removal of the viceroy 
from office. Guirior's successor, Agustin de 
Jauregui (1780-1784), who arrived in Lima in 
July, 1780, found the spirit of rebellion rife 
throughout the viceroyalty. But the local revolts 
in several of the cities, Cuzco, Arequipa, Huan- 
cavelica, were early overshadowed by the great 
Indian uprising against the corregidores. 

Ill 

The officers of the government, both in Spain 
and America, knew that the movement led by 
Tupac Amaru had its origin in the abuses perpe- 
trated by the administration, and in the wrongs 
inflicted on the Indians by the parish priests, the 
corregidores, and the owners of manufacturing 
establishments. The various reports that had 
reached the viceroys, the audiencias, the Council 
of the Indies, and the king left no doubt as to the 
sources of the grievances provoking rebellion. 
Circulars and royal orders had been issued for 
the purpose of setting aside abuses, but the 
officials in America had long since ceased to be 
scrupulously obedient to the commands of their 
superiors. Royal orders had very little effect 
when they ran counter to the interests or wishes 
of an influential class in the colonies. The In- 



180 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

dian's life continued to be one of uninterrupted 
privation and suffering, and he had little hope of 
a better fate for his children. The orders of 
the supreme government and the decrees of the 
viceroys brought him no relief. The merciless 
exactions of the priests, the exhausting labor in 
the mines, and the deadly oppression of the 
obrajes had become a fixed tradition. The only 
basis of hope, and that very uncertain, lay in 
revolt; and this fact furnishes an explanation of 
the frequent uprisings and conspiracies that 
appeared in the colonies during the later decades 
of Spanish domination. 5 

The revolt of Tupac Amaru and the insurrec- 
tion of the communeros of New Granada belong 
to the same narrow period. Tupac Amaru raised 
his standard in November, 1780, and the hostili- 
ties of the comuneros began in March, 1781. The 
Inca was overthrown in May, and the comuneros 
capitulated in June, 1781. The revolt of Tupac 
Amaru was not without its forerunners, but it 
gave the fullest expression to the hatred that had 
been provoked by a long period of oppression. 
Tupac Amaru had doubtless long considered his 
plan ; but in 1780, he seized the opportunity for its 
execution presented by the general dissatisfaction 
and incipient revolutions. He was born at Tinta 
in 1742, and was baptized as Jose Gabriel Condor- 
canqui. As the son of a chief, more attention was 
given to his education than to that of most Indian 

s For a list of these revolts, see Mendiburu, VIII, 121-126. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 181 

boys. His instructors were two clergymen of 
Upper Peru, Antonio Lopez, the cura of Pam- 
pamarca, and Carlos Rodriguez, the cura of 

| Yanaoca. While still very young he was admitted 
to the Jesuit college of San Borja at Cuzco, which 
,had been established to furnish instruction to the 
sons of Indian chiefs. At the age of eighteen, in 
1760, he was married to Micaela Bastides, and 
(before he was twenty he succeeded his father as 
cacique of Tungasuca, in the province of Tinta, 

. and other villages that overlook the valley of 
Vilcamayu. His pretension as heir of the Incas 
was admitted by the Indians, and about 1770 the 
royal audiencia acknowledged his claim to the 

\marquisate of Oropesa. This honor had been 
conferred upon his family by Philip II, and now, 

f at the age of twenty-eight, Tupac Ajnaru was 
officially declared to be the lineal descendant of 
the Inca Tupac Amaru who was executed by the 
viceroy Toledo, in 1571. 

^ The recongition of the young cacique as the 
representative of the ancient Inca family and as 
the bearer of a Spanish title of nobility naturally 
awakened his pride and intensified his sense of 
the wrongs his people had suffered. The enjoy- 
ment by an Indian of the wealth and the dignity 
that attached to the marquisate of Oropesa had 
been regarded as a source of danger, and it had 
been recommended that all claimants to the mar- 
quisate should be obliged to live in Spain. This 
recommendation had, however, not been carried 



182 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

out, and Tupac Amaru remained in his native dis- 
trict and continued to govern the villages of 
Tungasuca, Surimani, and Pampamarca. His 
administration within this narrow field showed 
careful attention to the interests of the Indians, 
and made him conspicuous among the caciques for 
his practical sense. He sought to make the Span- 
iards of his acquaintance appreciate the unfor- 
tunate condition of his countrymen; and at the 
same time he did much to relieve their distress. 
In some cases he paid the tribute of the poor, 
and in other cases he supported whole families 
that had been reduced to want. 6 For several 
years he tried every available means to redress 
the grievances of his people, and when he finally 
took up arms against the Spanish authorities, he 
did it because no other course appeared to offer 
a ray of hope. He had appealed to the ecclesi- 
astics and had petitioned the king ; but the oppo- 
sition of the corregidores, in their immediate 
control of affairs, was sufficient to defeat all 
favorable reforms the king had been persuaded to 
order. The burdens of the Indians increased, and 
hope of peaceful relief disappeared. The resort 
to arms was a last resort. But even when hostili- 
ties had been determined upon, the end sought 
was not independence from Spain, "but to obtain 
some guarantee for the due observance of the 
laws, and their just administration. His views 
were certainly confined to these ends when he first 

s Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tueuman 
oj^Paraguay, Buenos Aires, 1856, II, 234. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 183 

drew his sword, although afterwards, when his 
moderate demands were only answered by cruel 
taunts and brutal menaces, he saw that indepen- 
dence or death were the only alternatives." 7 

IV 

The immediate occasion of active hostilities 
was the conduct of Antonio Aliaga , corregidor of 
Tinta, in oppressing the Indians within his juris- 
diction, which included the villages controlled by 
the Inca. The unjust acts of the corregidor had 
already called forth threats of assassination, and 
he had yielded in individual cases without modify- 
ing his general policy. He had also encroached 
upon the jurisdiction of the Church, and had been 
excommunicated by the ecclesiastical authorities 
at Cuzco. Since the Church had condemned him, 
it might be supposed that the Inca would hesitate 
less than under other circumstances in proceeding 
violently against him. 

On the 4th of November, 1780, the corregidor 
and Tupac Amaru dined with Dr. Carlos Rod- 
riguez, the cura of Yanaoca, who by this dinner 
celebrated his name-day. The Inca found an 
excuse to withdraw early, and with a few attend- 
ants ambushed the corregidor when he appeared 
a little later, and took him as a prisoner to Tunga- 
suca. By compelling the corregidor to sign an 
order for the money in the provincial treasury, 

* Markham, Travels in Peru and India, London, 1862, 139. 



184 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEK 

Tupac Amaru received twenty-two thousand dol- 
lars in money, and, in addition, a certain amount 
of gold in ingots, seventy-five muskets, and a num- 
ber of baggage horses and mules. Tupac Amaru 
determined that the corregidor should suffer 
death as a punishment for the wrongs done the 
Indians. He gathered a large force of his fol- 
lowers about him, sent for his old teacher, the 
cura of Pampamarca, and ordered him to inform 
the corregidor of his fate. He also instructed him 
to administer to the corregidor the last religious 
rites. The ceremonies of the execution, on the 
10th of November, were calculated to impress the 
Indians with the idea that a new power had arisen. 
The armed retainers of the Inca were drawn up 
in three lines around the scaffold on the plaza of 
Tungasuca, and the Inca seized the occasion to 
explain his conduct and policy to those who had 
assembled to witness the remarkable scene. 

The Inca's declaration moved the assembled 
Indians to affirm their loyalty and willingness to 
obey his orders, and the work of bringing them 
together into a military force under properly 
appointed officers was carried vigorously forward. 
The first expedition was directed against the cor- 
regidor of the province of Quispicanchi, in the 
valley of Vilcamayu. It was led by Tupac Amaru, 
but before he arrived at Quiquijana, the provin- 
cial capital, the corregidor had fled to Cuzco, 
carrying to that city the news of the revolt. Dis- 
appointed in not being able to capture the cor- 



KEVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 185 

regidor, the expedition returned to Tungasuca, 
having plundered several mills, and taken a large 
amount of clothing for his followers, eighteen 
thousand yards of woolen and sixty thousand 
yards of cotton cloth, together with a quantity 
of firearms and two pieces of artillery. The 
special reason for hostility to the owners of these 
manufacturing establishments was their conduct 
in a rigid and unmerciful enforcement of the mita, 
and their cruelties to the women and children 
employed. Tupac Amaru had already under his 
command 6000 men, 300 of whom had firearms. 
After this expedition, the revolt spread rapidly 
1 over the region now comprising the southern part 
of Peru, Bolivia, and the northern part of the 
Argentine Bepublic. It embraced practically all 
of the inhabitants except a few Europeans and 
Creoles. 



The events in Oruro were indicative of the 
happenings in other places. The Spanish Euro- 
peans were the special object of Indian and mes- 
tizo hostility. Their riches excited the covetous 
zeal of the insurgents. Frightened by the sudden 
uprising and by the destruction and death in the 
track of the rebellions, they took refuge in the 
house of Endeiza; and when the house had been 
set on fire, they fled only to fall, to the number 
of between thirty and forty, into the hands of 
their murderers. The seven hundred thousand 



186 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

pesos deposited here, belonging to Endeiza and 
other rich merchants, were seized by the rebels 
as booty. The distribution of these spoils in- 
creased the desire for other captures, and facili- 
tated the formation of an insurgent force, said 
to consist of twenty thousand men. Every com- 
mercial house was looted, and the proprietors, 
with few exceptions, were killed. There was de- 
struction on every side ; churches were desecrated, 
houses were destroyed, women sought refuge in 
the convents, and bodies were strewn about the 
plazas. 8 

Reports of the progress of the insurrection 
induced the viceroy of Peru to send to Cuzco 
General Jose Antonio del Valle and Jose Antonio 
Areche, the visitador-general. At Cuzco Areche 
was able to muster a force of 17,000 men. At the 
same time the viceroy of Buenos Aires sent three 
detachments under General Flores, designed to 
subdue the revolt in the southern towns of the 
disturbed region. 

The news of the revolt brought consternation to 
Cuzco. Two regiments which garrisoned the city 
turned the Jesuit college into a citadel, and steps 
were immediately taken to increase the forces for 
defense. The Spaniards and Creoles in the city 
were enlisted, and messengers were sent to other 
towns for assistance. On the 13th of November 
Tiburcio de Landa, the governor of Paucartambo, 
led a force of about one thousand men up the 

s Funes, Ensayo de la Historic/, civil de Buenos Avres, Tucuman 
y Paraguay, Buenos Aires, 1856, II, 244. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 187 

valley of Vilcamayu to meet the enemy. Several 
hundred of these were friendly Indians. This 
little army advanced as far as Sangarara, where 
they found themselves surrounded by a superior 
force of Indians under the Inca. This fact and 
the appearance of a severe snowstorm induced 
Landa to retreat and take refuge in a church. 
Here negotiations were opened between him and 
Tupac Amaru. Landa wished to know the Inca's 
intentions, and to this inquiry Tupac replied with 
the suggestion that all Americans should pass 
over to his camp, where they would be treated as 
patriots, since he was proceeding only against 
Europeans, corregidores, and employees of the 
customs. 9 These terms having been rejected, the 
Inca wrote to the cura, asking him to take away 
the women and children, but the Spanish troops 
prevented this, and in the struggle that ensued 
the powder on hand was exploded, blowing off the 
roof and throwing down one of the walls of the 
church. Immediately after this calamity the 
Spaniards charged the enemy, but in spite of their 
heroic onslaught they were nearly all cut down; 
there remained only twenty-eight, all of whom 
were wounded. These, however, recovered from 
their wounds in the course of time, and were set 
at liberty. Among the killed were Tiburcio de 
Landa, the chief in command, his lieutenant Esca- 
jadillo, Cabrera, the corregidor of Quispicanchi, 

9 Ferrer del Bio, A., Historia del reinado de Carlos III en 
Esparia, Madrid, 1856, III, 418. 



188 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

who had fled from his province to Cuzco, and 
Sahuaraura, the caciqne of Oropesa, who had led 
the Indian contingent of the Spanish forces. 

VI 

Immediately after the overthrow of the Span- 
ish forces at Sangarara, the way to Cuzco was 
apparently open to the victor. The city was in 
great confusion and only imperfectly defended. 
Tupac Amaru still believed, however, that, on 
account of the justice of his cause, he could 
attain his object by negotiation. With a view, 
therefore, of treating with the enemy, he estab- 
lished his followers in an encampment near Tinta. 
He then issued a proclamation, setting forth the 
grievances that led to the revolt, and denounced 
the tyranny of the Spanish officials as cruel and 
impious. At the same time he saw the possibility 
of failing by peaceable means, and called upon the 
Indians to join his forces. 

In the meantime the cabildo of Cuzco prepared 
to resist the threatened attack. It collected arms, 
repaired six old field-pieces, and began to make 
powder. Keinforcements were received from 
Urubamba, Calca, and other places. Volunteers 
from the inhabitants were brought into the mili- 
tary force, and the clergy, ordered out by the 
bishop, were organized into four companies under 
the command of Dr. Manuel de Mendieta. At the 
end of November, Cuzco had three thousand men 



EEVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 189 

in arms. Still the authorities felt insecure, and 
in order to ward off the danger of a general upris- 
ing of the Indians, they abolished the reparti- 
mientos and the alcabala, and made known by 
proclamation these and other concessions. 

Instead of leading his forces directly against 
Cuzco, Tupac Amaru visited several towns or 
villages in the district, where he called the inhab- 
itants together and told them that the object of 
his campaign was to correct abuses, punish the 
corregidores, and release the people from their 
burdens. He was everywhere received by the 
Indians with enthusiasm and greeted by them as 
their Inca and Redeemer. Mr. Markham refers 
to a private letter, dated January, 1781, which 
describes the Inca's entrance into Azangaro. He 
rode a white horse, with splendidly embroidered 
trappings; two fair men, like Englishmen, of 
commanding aspect, accompanied him, one on the 
right and the other on the left. "He was armed 
with a gun, sword, and pistols, and was dressed 
in blue velvet, richly embroidered with gold, with 
a three-cornered hat, and an uncu, in the shape 
of a bishop's rochet, over all, with a gold chain 
round his neck, to which a large golden sun was 
attached." 10 

News of the military preparations of the 
Spaniards called Tupac Amaru back from the 
south, and led him to concentrate his army in the 
neighborhood of Cuzco. A detachment under 

10 Markham, Travels in Peru and India, 145. 



190 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Antonio Castelo, proceeding directly to the city, 
was defeated at Saylla, a place about two leagues 
from Cuzco, but it finally reached the main body 
of the Inca's army. While encamped on the 
heights of Picchu, overlooking the town, Tupac 
Amaru wrote to the cabildo and the bishop. These 
letters were dated January 3, 1781. In the letter 
to the cabildo, he affirmed his position as the heir 
of the Incas, and declared that he was moved to 
try by all possible means to put an end to abuses, 
and to have men appointed to govern the Indians 
who would follow the laws laid down by the Span- 
ish authorities. He declared that the punishment 
of the corregidor of Tinta was necessary as an 
example to others; and proclaimed the object of 
the rebellion to be the entire abolition of reparti- 
mientos, the appointment of an alcalde mayor, or 
judge in every province, and the establishment of 
an audiencia, or court of appeal, with a viceroy 
as president, at Cuzco, within reach of the In- 
dians ; but he did not aim to overthrow the author- 
ity of the king of Spain. In the letter to the 
bishop, he announced that he appeared, on behalf 
of the nation, to put an end to the robberies and 
outrages of the corregidores ; and at the same 
time he promised to respect the priests, all church 
property, the women, and the inoffensive and 
unarmed people. 

The Spanish forces in Cuzco were unwilling 
to make terms with the Indians. They had been 
reinforced by the cacique of Chinchero and his 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 191 

men, and by two hundred mulatto soldiers from 
Lima. After a period of ineffective skirmishing, 
a bloody battle was begun, on the 8th of January, 
in the suburbs of Cuzco and on the heights. It 
lasted two days, and was so far unfortunate for 
the Inca that he was obliged to withdraw his 
forces to Tinta. The force of six thousand men 
that had been sent to the provinces of Calca and 
Paucartambo made a desperate resistance, and 
after the arrival of reinforcements under Pablo 
Astete, Diego retired to Tinta, on the 18th of 
January, 1781. Here the Inca reorganized his 
army, and, in union with Diego, made another 
attack on Paucartambo, on the 11th of February. 
This, like the previous attempt, was unsuccessful, 
and five days later the Inca 's army was back again 
in Tinta. 

The force of 60,000 men that Tupac Amaru 
gathered at Tinta was more notable for its num- 
bers than for its discipline or its arms. Only a 
few hundreds had muskets. But the multitude 
assembled showed how strong was the feeling 
against the abuses of the Spanish administration. 
The Indian and mestizo inhabitants of the interior 
of Central and Upper Peru were practically all 
in revolt. Only sixteen caciques adhered to the 
Spaniards. The threatening prospect alarmed 
the Spanish officials in Peru and Buenos Aires. 
The viceroy of Peru sent to Cuzco Jose Antonio 
Areche, as visitador, supported by a military 
force commanded by Jose del Valle ; and the vice- 



192 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

roy of Buenos Aires commissioned General Ignacio 
Flores to put down the rebellion in the southern 
provinces ; for the inhabitants of the entire region 
as far south as Oruro were in a state of revolt. 
Before the arrival of Flores, La Paz, which was 
under the command of Sebastian de Segurola, had 
been besieged by the Indians and subjected to 
almost daily attacks for four months. 11 

At Cuzco General del Valle collected an army 
of 15,000 men, and prepared to enter upon the 
campaign. While this army was still at Cuzco, 
the Inca wrote to Areche, the visitador, setting 
forth the fact that the Spanish officials had re- 
peatedly violated the laws and had cruelly 
oppressed the Indians ; at the same time he urged 
the necessity of certain reforms in the admin- 
istration. He, moreover, affirmed his willingness 
to enter into negotiations through which these 
reforms might be attained without further hos- 
tilities. Areche 's answer to the Inca's despatch 
was a refusal to negotiate, accompanied by a 
brutal declaration of vengeance and an affirmation 
that if Tupac Amaru would surrender at once the 
mode of his execution would be less cruel than if 
further resistance was made. 12 

11 The events of this siege are set down in the diary of the 
commanding officer of the city. This diary was edited several 
years ago by Vicente de Ballivian y Eoxas and was published in 
Paris in 1872, by A. Franck (F. Vieweg), in the first volume of 
Archivo Boliviano, under the title Diario de los sucesos del cerco 
de la Cvudad de La Paz en 1781, hasta la total Pacification de la 
rehelion general del Peru. 

izMarkham, Travels in Peru and India, 148; for the fate of 
the Inca's letter, see p. 149, note. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 193 

The attitude assumed by the brutal visitador 
Areche convinced Tupac Amaru that complete 
independence or death were the only alternatives 
before him. But he had not hitherto indicated 
that he was seeking independence; only that he 
aimed at such reforms in the Spanish administra- 
tion as would release the Indians from oppression. 
There exists a paper, however, attributed to him 
in which he is styled "Don Jose I, by the grace of 
God, Inca, King of Peru, Quito, Chile, Buenos 
Aires, and the continents of the South Sea, Lord 
of the Eiver of the Amazons, with dominion over 
the Grand Paytiti." This paper, moreover, 
affirms that 

"the king of Castile had usurped the crown and domin- 
ions of Peru, imposing innumerable taxes, tributes, 
duties, excises, monopolies, tithes, fifths; appointing 
officers who sold justice, and treated the people like 
beasts of burden. For these causes, and by reason of 
the cries which have risen up to heaven, in the name of 
Almighty God, it is ordered that no man shall hence 
forth pay money to any Spanish officer, excepting the 
tithes to priests ; but that tribute shall be paid to the Inca, 
and an oath of allegiance to him be taken in every town 
and village. ' ' 

This document is without date, and it has been 
suggested that it was forged by the Spaniards to 
be used as written evidence against the Inca. 13 

is This letter is given by Mendiburu, VIII, 137. 



194 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

VII 

About the middle of March, 1781, General del 
Valle moved from Cuzco against the insurgents. 
His army was composed of 17,116 men. His line 
of advance led along the mountains west of the 
Vilcamayu, where his troops suffered from snow- 
storms, the lack of food and fuel, and the want 
of all commissariat arrangements. Finding his 
position here almost unendurable both for himself 
and for his soldiers, he moved down from the 
mountains and ascended the valley of Vilcamayu, 
captured Quiqurjana, and near the village of Che- 
cacupe encountered the Inca's army drawn up 
behind a trench and a parapet that stretched 
across the valley. Flanking the Inca's forces, he 
made an attack in front and in the rear, and drove 
them back to another entrenchment at Combapata. 
The Indians, routed from this position, fell back 
to Tinta, where they were overthrown by the 
artillery fire and a bayonet charge of the Spanish 
troops. Tupac Amaru's plans had failed because 
of the treachery of Zunuario de Castro, and his 
final undoing was due to the traitorous action 
of one of his officers, Ventura Landaeta, who, 
assisted by the cura of Lanqui, delivered him and 
his family into the hands of the Spaniards, after 
he had fled to that place from Tinta. With this 
the Spaniards began their revolting course of 
outrage and vengeance. On the day of the Inca 's 
capture General del Valle hanged sixty-seven In- 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 195 

dian prisoners at Tinta, and stuck their heads on 
poles by the roadside. The chief prisoners were 
marched into Cuzco. They were the Inca Tupac 
Amaru, his wife, his two sons, Hipolito and Fer- 
nando, his uncle Francisco, his brother-in-law 
Antonio Bastides, his maternal uncle Patricio 
Noguero, his cousin, Cecilia Tupac Amaru, with 
her husband, Pedro Mandagure, and a number of 
the officers of the Inca's army, and the negro 
slave, Antonio Oblitas, who had served as execu- 
tioner for the punishment of Aliaga. They were 
taken to separate places of confinement, and in- 
formed that their next meeting would be on the 
day of their execution. 

The visitador Areche pronounced the Inca's 
sentence on May 15, 1781. He wished to show the 
Indians that even the high rank of the heir of 
the Incas could not deter the Spaniards from 
imposing the extreme punishment when they con- 
sidered it deserved. The charge against this vic- 
tim of Spanish barbarity was that he had rebelled 
against Spain, that he had destroyed the mills, 
that he had abolished the mita, that he had caused 
his portrait to be painted dressed in the imperial 
insignia of the uncu and mascapaicha, and that 
he had caused his victory at Sangarara to be 
represented in pictures. He was condemned to 
witness the execution of his wife, a son, his uncle, 
his brother-in-law Antonio Bastides, and his cap- 
tains; to have his tongue cut out; to be torn in 
pieces by horses attached to his limbs and driven 



196 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

in different directions ; to have his body burnt on 
the heights of Picchu, and to have his head and 
arms and legs stuck on poles to be set up in the 
different towns that had been loyal to him; to 
have his houses demolished, their sites strewn 
with salt, his goods confiscated, his relatives de- 
clared infamous, and all documents relating to his 
descent burnt by the hangman. It was also 
provided that all Inca and cacique dresses should 
be prohibited, all pictures of the Incas destroyed, 
the presentation of Quichua dramas forbidden, 
the musical instruments of the Indians burned; 
all signs of mourning for the Incas, the use of all 
national costumes by the Indians, and the use 
of the Quichua language should be prohibited. 14 
This sentence in all its barbarity was carried out 
on the 18th of May, 1781. 

VIII 

"With the death of the Inca the insurrection 
may be considered ended; nevertheless many In- 
dians still remained under arms, whom the bloody 
drama of Cuzco, far from discouraging, only 
seemed to have inspired with new fury. Thence- 
forward it was a war of extermination, so much 
so that the number of victims of the vengeance 
of the Spaniards and the Indians may be reckoned 
at 80,000. ' n5 The surviving leaders moved south- 

i* Memoirs of General Miller, Spanish ed., Lima, 1861, vol. I, 
Appendix A. 

is Mendiburu, VIII, 144. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 197 

ward, and, enraged by the horrible cruelty of 
Areche, their line of march became a path of 
destruction. Diego Cristoval Tupac Amaru, the^ 
Inca 's cousin, held the chief command. After the 
siege of Puno, Andres Mandagure and Miguel 
Bastides overran the eastern shore of Lake Titi- j 
caca and joined the forces that were carrying on 
the war about Sorata and La Paz. 16 They "laid 
siege to the town of Sorata, where the Spaniards - 
of the neighboring districts had taken refuge with 
their families and wealth. The unarmed Indians 
were unequal to the storming of fortifications, 
which, although constructed only of earth, were ( 
lined with artillery. But their leader surmounted 
this difficulty by the adoption of a measure that 
would have done credit to any commander. By \ 
the construction of a lengthened mound he col-' 
lected the waters which flow from the neighboring ' 
snowy heights of Ancoma, and, turning them 
against the earthern ramparts, washed them 
away. The immediate result was the storming of } 
the town, and the massacre of its inhabitants, with 
circumstances of horror exceeding the death of 
Tupac Amaru." 17 Practically all of the inhab- 
itants, about twenty thousand in number, were 
killed. The clergy alone escaped. 

The siege of La Paz was continued for six 
months after the death of the Inca. Like Sorata, 

16 La Paz lies in the upper end of a vast canon, several hun- 
dred feet down in the great gash that has been cut in the inter- 
andean plateau, the general surface of which is over twelve 
thousand feet above the level of the sea. 

" Memoirs of General Miller, I, 18. 



198 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

it was a place of refuge for the Spaniards of the 
surrounding country. In defending the city the 
commanding officer had constructed a line of forti- 
fications, but had determined to include only the 
principal part of the town, leaving outside the 
suburbs and several Indian villages. During the 
continuance of the rebellion in the north, the 
forces supporting the insurrection had been daily 
increasing in the south, and requests for assist- 
ance from the towns near-by were sent to La Paz, 
with which Segurola complied — as far as possible. 
He had also used all available funds to gather 
stores of provisions for the city, which were 
especially needed to support the increasing num- 
ber of refugees. The story of the progress of the 
siege and of the resistance offered by the besieged 
is given in the diary of the commanding officer, 
Sebastian de Segurola. The following extracts 
from this diary show under what disadvantages 
the Indians fought; and the fact that in the face 
of these disadvantages and of their great losses 
they persisted in the conflict for many months 
indicates to what a degree they had been moved 
by their intolerable grievances. 

"March 27. — This day the Indians attacked 
with great force all parts of the city, setting fire 
to the houses that were outside of the trenches, 
assaulting these and the wall, from which they 
were repulsed with great vigor. This engagement 
lasted from 11 o 'clock in the morning till 4 in the 
evening. At this hour the rebels retired with 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 199 

much loss, which was given at more than one hun- 
dred and fifty killed, without any loss on our part. 

1 ' March 28. — It was recognized to-day that the 
number of Indians who approached us was con- 
siderably increased. At 8 o'clock in the morning 
they attacked all parts of the city, aided by some 
guns which they fired, and at the same time they 
went on burning the houses outside of the forti- 
fications, and we resisted them with great valor. 
The attack lasted till 5 o'clock in the afternoon, 
when the enemy retired with more than three 
hundred and fifty dead, according to our calcula- 
tion, and on our side we had only two. 

"March 29. — The Indians have been coming 
down from all sides since daybreak, and at 10 
o'clock assaulted the city with desperation, and 
this attack, repulsed by us, lasted till half -past 5 
in the afternoon, at which hour they retired with 
a loss of more than 150 men, and we had the mis- 
fortune, by the bursting of a cannon in one of the 
forts, to have three killed and several severely 
wounded, and among the killed was Sergeant- 
major Joseph de Eoxas." 

After 109 days of siege, in which a besieging 
force of 40,000 Indians, according to Segurola's 
statement, took part, the condition of affairs in 
the city was desperate, but no word of despair 
appears in the diary of the commander. "By the 
grace of God," he wrote, "we have defended our- 
selves in spite of hunger, pest, and the enemies, 
even from those within, who have caused not less 



200 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

care than those without. ' ' In want of other food, 
they had eaten the horses, mules, and asses, not 
merely the flesh but the skins as well, and the dogs 
and cats, the cat having a quoted price of six 
dollars. Of the 2000 mules in the city at the begin- 
ning of the siege, scarcely more than forty re- 
mained at the end of it. During these months, 
moreover, disease made rapid strides; and many 
persons in their incautious search for food fell 
into the hands of the enemy, to whose treatment 
of them "we may not refer without the greatest 
horror, grief, and compassion." 

At the end of June, General Flores arrived 
with the troops from Buenos Aires and brought 
the desired relief. 18 He scattered the besieging 
force, and caused food to be introduced into the 
city. Under the protection of the military force, 
many of the inhabitants left their houses in the 
city and established themselves temporarily near 
the camp of the soldiers. But hostilities were 
continued at different points in the surrounding 
country; and on the withdrawal of a part of the 

is < * The reinforcements sent to the royal army from Buenos 
Aires, Tucuman, and Cochabamba were for the most part regular 
troops; the Buenos Aireans were armed and equipped as European 
soldiers; the Tucumanos composed the cavalry, and were armed 
with butcherknives and lassos; the Cochabambinos used short 
clubs loaded with lead, and which, by means of a string several 
yards in length, they could fling from them, and were deadly weapons. 
The mode of attacking the Indians was first by the fire of mus- 
ketry, to throw them into confusion, when, if the ground admitted, 
the Tucuman horsemen rode among them, dragging down whole 
ranks with their lassos, followed by the Cochabambinos, who 
despatched them with their clubs." — Temple, Travels in Various 
Parts of Peru, II, 175, 176. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 201 

troops to places where they seemed to be impera- 
tively needed, the siege of La Paz was renewed. 
This time it was continued from the beginning of 
August until the 17th of October. At noon on this 
day the troops from Oruro arrived under the com- 
mand of Lieutenant Josef Eeseguin, "and we 
began to see on the brow of the hill of Puna cer- 
tain men who it was not doubted were ours, and 
in a short time the rest appeared, covering in a 
moment the top of the hill. From this position 
they saluted the city with their artillery, filling it 
with the greatest joy and satisfaction imaginable. 
The commandant, Don Josef Eeseguin, sent to me 
immediately notice of his arrival with 7000 sol- 
diers and a large quantity of provisions which 
would supply the city. 

"Thus ended the second siege of this afflicted 
and unfortunate city, if it may not be considered 
the first; since during the period of the other 
relief the enemies remained always on the heights 
of the Potopoto, Calvario, and even on the others 
of the environs, when the troops moved their 
encampment some distance away. In this it is 
seen that the rebels to the number of 12,000 fight- 
ing men, according to all accounts, not only pur- 
sued the siege with fire and blood as before, but 
also turned the waters against us; and although 
it had not the same outcome as in the town of 
Sorata, still it caused considerable destruction in 
the city. Misery made the same inroads as the 
last time, and want compelled the use of the same 



202 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

unfit food; in sustaining life there was no exemp- 
tion for the horses, the mules, the asses, the cats, 
the dogs, and the most despicable hides, not only 
of the animals killed but also those furinshed by 
the rawhide trunks and the food pouches of the 
shepherds. ' n9 

IX 

For still two years or more desultory fighting 
continued in many parts of the country in which 
the revolt had appeared. Although the Indians 
were defeated, they were neither crushed nor 
placated. From their victory the Spaniards de- 
rived little profit and less honor. The Indians 
remained hostile and in a mood to join any enemy 
of their hated masters that might arise. Outraged 
by the barbarity of the Spaniards, they espoused 
the cause of the Creoles and became a powerful 
factor in the struggle for independence. 

A recognition of the disastrous results of 
Spain's treatment of the Indians led the Span- 
iards at last to make their exactions less burden- 
some. Under the new order the Indians might be 
employed in occupations contributing directly to 
the general well-being of society : in raising grain 
and cattle ; in building roads, bridges, and edifices 
for public use. They might also be employed in 
mining; but it was not expected that they would 
be employed in occupations that contributed 

is Archivo Boliviano, Paris, 1872, I, 127, 128. 



REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU 203 

merely to the luxurious gratification of the Span- 
ish part of the population. The line of distinction 
between these occupations was, however, only 
vaguely drawn, and was only imperfectly observed 
in practice. Service in the mines was subject to 
restrictions that were expected to obviate at least 
some of the evils that had previously existed. 
Only a certain number of laborers, not to exceed 
one-seventh of the inhabitants, might be taken 
from any district, and these were retained for a 
period of six months. They were paid at the rate 
of four reals a day. The provision that no Indian 
might be taken more than thirty miles to work in 
a mine tended to set aside the practice of taking 
them from the warm climate of the low country 
to the cold regions of the mountains. But abuses 
were continued in spite of the good intentions of 
the law-makers. The execution of the laws was in 
the hands of officers far removed from the super- 
vision of their legislative superiors. The great 
distance and the difficulties of communication still 
left the Indians practically subject to the discre- 
tion of the American end of the administration. 20 

2 o The details of the rebellion of Tupac Amaru are presented 
in the three hundred and sixty pages of documents contained in 
the first volume of Odriozola's Documentos historicos del Peru; 
in the Belacidn historica de los sucesos de la rebelion de Jose 
Gabriel Tupac Amaru en las provincial del Peru, el ano de 1780 ; 
and in Documentos para la historia de la sublevacion de Jose 
Gabriel Tupac Amaru, cacique de la provincia de Tinta en el 
Peru, in Coleccion de Angelis, Tomo V; Lorente, Historia del 
Peru bajo los Borbones, Lima, 1871, 174^-215; for the events in 
Cuzco, see "Informe Kelacionado, " in Belaciones de los vireyes y 
audiencias, III, 307-368. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE REBELLION OF THE COMUNEROS IN 
NEW GRANADA 

I. Viceroy Florez and the visitador-regente Pifieres. II. 
The outbreak in Socorro. III. Organization of the 
Comun under Berbeo, and the battle of Puente 
Real. IV. The advance on Bogota, and the flight 
of the regent. V. The negotiations and the agree- 
ment. VI. Galan and the new revolt. VII. The 
Indians of Nemocon and the conclusion of the 
conflict. 



The rebellion of the conmneros in New Granada, 
like the revolt led by Tupac Amaru, was a protest 
against abuses by the government. On the 
10th of February, 1776, Manuel Antonio Florez 
assumed the duties of viceroy at Cartagena. Hi3 
financial administration failed to elicit the ap- 
proval of the king, who sent Juan Francisco 
Gutierrez de Pifieres to be the visitador-regente 
of the viceroyalty. The visitador held a commis- 
sion from the king, ordering him to regulate the 
affairs of the royal treasury in New Granada, and, 
if possible, to increase the royal revenues. And 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 205 

when the viceroy objected to the measures 
adopted, and appealed to the king, he was in- 
formed that Pineres should be permitted to pro- 
ceed according to his own ideas, particularly with 
reference to the affairs of the treasury. The 
visitador-regente, thus placed beyond the reach 
of viceregal interference, proceeded to impose 
burdensome taxes. His sole object appeared to 
be to augment the funds that were destined to be 
sent to Spain, without observing the disastrous 
effect of his measures on the welfare of the colony. 
The viceroy having been sent to Cartagena to pro- 
vide for the defense of the coast, Pineres remained 
at Bogota the acting head of the government. 

The visitador found the inhabitants burdened 
with a long list of taxes and monopolies. There 
were monopolies of salt, tobacco, spirits, playing 
cards, the post, stamped paper, and a burdensome 
array of taxes and tributes, both civil and ecclesi- 
astical; yet in the face of a revenue system that 
removed from the colonists every prospect of indi- 
vidual prosperity, he was expected to increase at 
least some of these imposts. The instructions 
under which he acted required him to effect a more 
exact and systematic management of the royal 
revenues known as alcabala and armada de barlo- 
vento. 1 It was not merely the amount of the taxes, 
but also the intolerable brutality with which they 



\J 



1 The tax called armada de oarlovento was an impost designed 
to support the little squadron, or the division of the navy assigned 
to South America. 



206 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

were collected that provoked insurrection, 2 and 
this source of disturbance was aggravated by the 
corruption and tyranny of those persons who 
received and administered the funds collected, 
and who increased their gains by stealing one- 
half of the revenues in their passage from the 
persons taxed to the treasury. But complaints 
and protests by the people against these abuses 
were of no avail; the regent who depended solely 
on the king had more inducements to increase the 
income of his master than to seek to remove the 
corruption or lessen the burdens of the people. 
And the people were aroused to resistance not by 
a fear that the government might oppress them 
sometime in the future, but by actual oppression 
which curtailed very materially their means of 
living. It was the desire to redress real griev- 
ances rather than a prospect of independence that 
moved them. 

II 

I The province of Socorro, the seat of the prin- 
cipal manufacturing mclustries of New Granada, 
felt especially the burden of the new taxation, and 
therefore, became the center of the revolutionary 
movement, which spread rapidly from day to day, 
and appeared in regions as widely separated as 

2 " El maltratamiento que los ministros y guardas de la Eenta 
de Tobacos daban a los vasallos ... ha sido causa para que esta 
Jurisdieei6n, la de San Gil, la de Velez, y la de Tunja, segun se 
dice, se hayan alzado. " Eeport by the cabildo of Socorro to the 
viceroy, March 7, 1781, in A. M. Galan, Vida de J. A. Galdn (Bibl. 
de hist, national, IV), 223; see also ibid., 229-231. 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 207 

Pamplona and the llanos. The insurgents were, 
'moreover, stimulated by reports of the uprising 
of Tupac Amaru, which was communicated to the 
(Indians of New Granada, and which helped to 
arouse them to action. In the llanos, Javier Men- 
|doza proclaimed the revolution in the name of 
the Inca, ordered the churches closed, and pro- 
hibited the Catholic worship. 

The idea of revolt was early entertained in 
Bogota. It found adherents in Jorge Lozano de 
Peralta, Juan Bautista Morales, Manuel Garcia 
Olano, Ciriaco de Archila. The last named 
person was a lay member of the Dominican 
monastery. Opposition to the decrees of Pineres 
appeared in October, 1780, in the towns of Bari- 
chara, Simacota, and Mogotes. A few weeks later 
a more strenuous resistance was manifest in 
Charala, led by Pedro Nieto. Neither the audi- 
encia nor the regent possessed either the physical 
or the moral force to suppress the revolt in its 
beginnings. The party of rebellion sought an 
effective ally in the Indians by communicating to 
the more intelligent of them the idea that through 
independence they might find a redress for their 
long-standing grievances. Manuel Garcia Olano, 
the general director of the post, and Francisco 
Vargas, the parish priest of Socorro, were espe- 
cially influential in this undertaking. 

At Socorro, March 16, 1781, a company of 
persons, led by Jose Delgadillo, appeared before 
the house of the alcalde, Jose de Angulo y Olarte, 
and shouted their refusal to pay the new imposts. 



208 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

The alcalde addressed the crowd, and urged the 
necessity of complying with the regent's orders, 
since they were the commands of the highest 
legitimate authority in the kingdom. This appeal 
only called forth cries of indignation and violent 
threats from the rioters. In the midst of this 
uproar, a woman ran to the bulletin-board near 
the alcalde 's house, and tore down the edict of the 
visitador. This act was greeted with applause 
and with the cry, "Long live the king and death 
to bad government. ' ' The frightened alcalde fled 
to a hiding place, while the crowd surged through 
the streets proclaiming its victory and vociferat- 
ing its condemnation of the regent. 3 

This demonstration produced an immediate 
result. The cabildo of Socorro assembled on the 
afternoon of the riot, and decided to suspend the 
collection of the new taxes. The insurgents of 
Socorro were temporarily pacified, but there was 
a new outbreak in San Gil. The inhabitants came 
together in the plaza, destroyed the regent 's edict, 
attacked the guards and the administrator of 
the monopolies, burned the tobacco in the store- 
houses, and declared that they would not pay the 
additional taxes demanded. A similar attack was 
made at Simacota, where the crowd poured out 

3 Bricefio, Manuel, Los Comuneros, Bogota, 1880, 13 ; Manuela 
Beltran is said to be the name of the first person, in New Granada, 
who thus dared to tear in pieces a document issued by authority 
and posted under the royal arms of Spain. Ibid, 99; Plaza, 
Antonio de, Memorias para la liistoria de la Nueva Granada, 
Bogota, 1850, 334; Galan, A. M., Vida de J. A. Galdn (Bibl. de 
hist, national, IV), 223. 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 209 

the brandy, burned the tobacco and other stores, 
distributed the money, threw out the furniture, 
and pulled down the royal arms. The insurgents 
from many quarters prepared to appear in 
Socorro on the 15th of April to continue the work 
of destruction. Their vigorous and unrestrained 
action had a practical effect in causing the regent 
to issue a decree relieving the towns of Tunja, 
Socorro, Sogamoso, and San Gil of some of the 
objectionable taxes. The success of these early 
instances of resistance suggested the possibility 
of acquiring a larger measure of relief. 

At the end of March Dionisio Plata received 
at Socorro a document sent from Bogota by Ciri- 
aco de Archila. When opened in the presence 
of a company of the more influential residents of 
the town, it proved to be an appeal to the people 
in verse. Later it was read by the crier to four 
or five thousand persons called together by the 
sound of the tocsin, and was received with shouts 
of applause. It moved the people to avenge 
themselves for the evils they had suffered under 
exorbitant taxes and the merciless conduct of 
monopolists. The members of the crowd were ( 
transformed into an angry mob. They assaulted 
the offices of the monopolies, broke open the doors, \ 
tore down the royal arms, poured out the alcoholic 
spirits, destroyed the cards and stamped paper, 
and burned the tobacco. The guards, the admin- 
istrator, and the alcaldes escaped to the houses of \ 
Francisco Rosillo and Juan Bernardo Plata, and 



210 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

then took refuge in a church. Destruction of this 
kind was repeated as the revolt extended its area, 
\yet the seizure_of property was not robbery for 
^individual gain, nor was it jittended by assassina- 
tion. ~~ 

III 

In April, 1781, six thousand insurgents from 
adjacent towns assembled in Socorro for the pur- 
pose of organizing themselves with the view of 
persuading the government to abate the griev- 
ances of the people. They elected Juan Francisco 
Berbeo to be their chief, and Jose Antonio 
Estevez, Antonio Jose Monsalve, and Salvador 
Plata to be associated with him. These four per- 
sons having taken an oath of fidelity to the people, 
formed a commission called the Comun, from 
which the members and their adherents became 
known as Comuneros. The procurador of the 
commission was Antonio de Molina, and the secre- 
tary was Manuel Jose Ortiz. Each of the towns 
in revolt chose a captain, and by popular election 
three or five persons to constitute a local comun. 
The serious and energetic activity of Berbeo in 
creating a military force, persuaded the audiencia 
to move towards the same end. That body sent 
one of its members, Jose Osorio, to subdue the 
rebels, and establish order in the insurgent towns. 
Informed of this project, Berbeo prepared to offer 
resistance. The force which he was able to put 
into the field consisted of about four thousand 
men. These so far outnumbered the forces of 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 211 

the oidor that he found it advisable to surrender 
to the insurgents. After this event Berbeo, Mon- 
salve, Rosillo, and Estevez addressed the viceroy, 
affirming that they had accepted their positions 
as captains in order to restrain the disorderly 
proceedings, and to see whether it might be pos- 
sible, by prudence, to secure the " tranquility of 
these republics," without loss of lives and prop- 
erty. At the same time they wished to make it 
clear that they were not disposed to deny the 
sovereignty and power of the king. 4 

When the cabildos of the insurgent towns and 
the leaders of the revolt asked respectfully that 
the audiencia would moderate the new imposts, 
this tribunal replied only by an order requiring 
the pueblos to be subdued by force. For this pur- 
pose Oidor Osorio marched out towards the north 
with a troop of fifty armed men, leaving twenty- 
five in Bogota. 5 Captain Barrera was in immedi- 
ate command, while Osorio was commissioned to 
treat with the enemy. At Puente Real, near the 
town of Velez, they met the vastly superior force 
that had been gathered from the towns in revolt. 
Although the rebels had few fire arms, by the 
advantage of mere numbers they overwhelmed the 
troops sent from Bogota. Osorio had attempted 
to avoid an actual conflict by offering to make 
concessions, but in this he was not successful. 
Berrera and Osorio were captured, and sent to 

*Nota de los capitanes generates del Socorro al virey, Socorro 
y Mayo 7 de 1781, printed in Brieefio, Los Comuneros, 103. 

5 Vergara y Velasco, Novisimo texto de historia de Colombia, 
Bogota, 1910, 207. 



212 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Chiquinquira. Osorio died a few months later. 
Francisco Ponce, Barrera's aide, escaped dis- 
guised as a monk, and carried the news of the 
disaster to Bogota, where the inhabitants, in view 
of the lack of troops for defense, were thrown 
into a panic. At this encounter the insurgents 
obtained the fifty muskets that had belonged to 
the soldiers, twenty-two trabucos, and the seven 
hundred muskets which the authorities at Bogota 
had provided for the expected additions to their 
force. They took also twenty thousand cartridges 
with balls, and a large amount of powder with 
separate balls, together with pistols, swords, 
money, and equippages. 6 

The bloodless victory of the comuneros at 
Puente Real was followed by important changes 
in their organization. The captains were organ- 
ized as a supreme council of war. Berbeo became 
superintendent and commanding general, and 
Joaquin Fernandez Alvarez became secretary of 
state. With their new organization, the insur- 
gents assumed the supreme authority, and adopted 
democratic principles as the basis of their state. 
They declared their independence, and wished to 
govern themselves as a sovereign republic. 7 Yet, 
in spite of their proposed democracy, they con- 
templated offering the crown to Osorio, but an 
inquiry as to his sentiments revealed the fact that 
he would reject it if offered. 

6 Cuervo, Documewtos, IV, 8. 

7 Finestrad, J. de, El vassallo mstruido (Bibl. de hist, nacional), 
Bogota, 1905, cap. VIII. 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 213 

IV 

The next step in the revolutionary move.ment 
was an advance upon Bogota. Information 
reached Pineres that the rebels sought his head, 
and that to take it would be their first object on 
entering the city. This prospect induced him to 
prepare for flight. But before he left Bogota, he 
convened the audiencia. He proposed to that body 
that it should appoint a commission to meet the 
comuneros ; and that it should solicit the interven- 
tion of the archbishop ; it should organize the mili- 
tia and publish an edict reducing the alcabala and 
the armada de barlovento. The audiencia adopted 
the measures proposed, and adjourned at midnight. 
Before dawn of the following morning, Pineres 
had left Bogota for Honda. On the same day, the 
13th of May, the commissioners went out to meet 
the advancing insurgents. From Zipaquira they 
sent a note to Berbeo and his lieutenants, which 
reached them at Raquira. In this note the com- 
missioners announced their willingness to hear 
them on subjects which they thought might be for 
the good of the king and the people. 8 

On approaching Zipaquira, the insurgents 
were not in a tractable mood. They were not dis- 

8 This letter is printed as No. VI of the documents forming the 
Appendix of Bricefio, Los Comuneros, p. 106. No. VII of these 
documents is a list of the captains who assembled at Zipaquira 
in command of the comuneros. The men under these eighty-seven 
officers numbered about 20,000, representing sixty-six pueblos 
embraced in territory now belonging to the states of Boyaca, 
Cundinamarca, and Santander. 



214 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

posed to listen either to the commissioners or to 
the archbishop. They made a riotous attack on 
the house of the administrator of monopolies, and 
destroyed everything within reach. This out- 
break caused the members of the audiencia to see 
the helplessness of their position. With no means 
of resistance at hand, they announced that the 
tax of armada de barlovento was abolished, and 
that the alcabala was reduced to two per cent. 
Catani, one of the members, having been made 
general-in-chief of the legitimate troops, gathered 
a force of six hundred and forty men, and sent to 
Honda for arms that had been deposited there for 
the viceroy. At Nemocon the insurgents learned 
of the flight of the regent, and appointed Jose 
Antonio Galan to proceed to Honda and prevent 
him from going to the coast. 

Near Facatativa Galan and his twenty-five 
soldiers encountered the troops sent out from 
Bogota against him. Having defeated them, he 
gathered reinforcements at Facatativa, and con- 
tinued his march towards Honda. He captured 
the guards who were conducting arms to the vice- 
roy, and occupied Guaduas. This event and the 
threatening attitude of the increasing rebel force 
created a state of confusion in Bogota. The com- 
missioners and the archbishop were authorized to 
prevent the insurgents from entering the capital, 
and to this end they might employ any possible 
means. 9 

9 See the credentials of the commissioners, No. VIII of the 
documents in Bricefio, 110. 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 215 

Knowing that the greater part of the insur- 
gents were without arms, Berbeo vacilated and 
was undetermined as to what course to pursue. 
It was clear that the government would make an 
effort to defend itself and put down the rebellion, 
and Berbeo recognized the inability of an un- 
trained and unarmed crowd to resist successfully 
such a force as the government would ultimately 
bring against it. After considering suggestions 
for an agreement with the audiencia, he finally 
decided to send one of his advisers, Juan Bautista 
Morales, to England, commissioned to obtain 
funds for the purchase of arms and equipment. 

The archbishop was alarmed by the growth of 
the revolutionary spirit, and by the fact that the 
bulk of the discontented were not affected by his 
appeals. He succeeded, however, in taming the 
zeal of Berbeo, the commanding general, and in 
persuading him to adopt such an attitude of mind 
as led him later to be accused of treason to the 
cause of the insurgents. While the popular move- 
ment was gaining ground, the town of Giron 
undertook to oppose the revolution. It created 
a council of defense, and formed a military com- 
pany of two hundred lances. The aggressive acts 
of this body were answered by the revolted towns 
sending against Giron a force of four thousand 
men. The inhabitants fled, but later many of 
them were induced to return and swear allegiance 
to the supreme council of war of Socorro. The 
rebels were intolerant of the inactive or indiffer- 



216 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ent course pursued by some of the towns, and 
required them either to declare positively in favor 
of the insurrection or accept the position of 
enemies. 



In the last days of May, 1781, Ambrosio Pisco, 
with a number of Indians, joined the ranks of the 
insurgents. Pisco was a descendant of the Zipas. 
Along the way from Giiepsa to Nemocon, and on his 
arrival, he was greeted with enthusiasm, and the 
principal Indians from many quarters appeared 
to pay him homage. In the presence of a large 
assembly of Indians, he was proclaimed Lord of 
Chia and Prince of Bogota. These survivals of 
ancient ceremonies and the empty honors con- 
ferred by them apparently satisfied the Zipa. He 
placed himself under the command of Berbeo ; for 
after the oppression his race had endured for 
many generations, he knew only how to obey. If 
he had possessed the power to take the initiative 
in action, and the insurgents had had more 
respect for the Indians, the ancient rule of the 
Zipas might have been revived, and have become 
at least a temporary substitute for the rule of 
the king. 

While encamped near Zipaquira, Berbeo re- 
quested the authorities of Bogota to appoint com- 
missioners to discuss with insurgent commis- 
sioners certain terms on which the two parties 
might agree. The demands of the insurgent were 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 217 

presented in an extensive document providing for 
the abolition of monopolies, and the abolition or 
reduction of a large number of specified taxes. 10 

The rebellion of the comuneros aroused the 
Indians to revolt. At Silos, in the district of 
Pamplona, the Indians came together in consid- 
erable numbers and rejected the authority of the 
king of Spain. ''They solemnly published the 
proclamation of Tupac Amaru, and swore obedi- 
ence to him as Emperor of America." 11 

In the course of the discussion on the proposed 
terms of agreement, the mass of the insurgents 
conceived the idea that their officers, by too great 
concessions, were deceiving them. They spread 
the alarm, and demanded that the war should be 
continued. They demanded, moreover, that they 
should be led to Bogota. Aroused by the attitude 
of the crowd, the archbishop urged the immediate 
approval of the capitulaciones by the commis- 
sioners; and when this was accomplished, the 
document was sent to the audiencia. This body 
confirmed the commissioners' approval, thus 
allaying the popular agitation. 

10 This document, Texto de las capitulaciones redactadas por 
los comuneros para presentarlas al comandante general, is printed 
in Bricefio, Los Comuneros, 121-137. It is dated June 4, 1781, and 
is signed by Juan Francisco Berbeo. These capitulaciones were 
approved by the audiencia June 7, at eleven o'clock in the night; 
they were confirmed by oath on the plain of Mortifio before 2000 
insurgents, the archbishop sanctifying the agreement by a religious 
service. The multitude dissolved the same day. Sixty copies of 
the agreement were made for the sixty cabildos that had supported 
the movement. On the 15th it was published at Bogota. Vergara 
y Velaseo, Texto, 210. 

ii Bricefio, Los Comuneros, 64, 139. 



218 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Groot affirms that through the influence of the 
archbishop the capitulaciones, or the terms of 
agreement, were approved without modifications, 
"but at the same meeting the members of the com- 
mission signed a secret protest declaring that, 

vhaving given their approval, it was done under 

.-the force of circumstances in order to avoid 
greater evils, and that consequently they held the 

' agreements void as obtained by force when they 
had no force with which to sustain the dignity of 
the government. ' ' 12 Yet in the face of this atti- 
tude, when the agreement had been received at 

\Zapaquira, and had been approved and solemnly 
sworn to, the archbishop celebrated mass with the 

I Te Deum. This solemn act of hypocrisy was per- 
formed when the commissioners had already 

, (secretly declared that they would not for them- 
selves regard the agreement binding. The comu- 
neros, having faith in the oath of the commis- 

\ sioners, disbanded their forces, and caused them 
[to return to their accustomed places. 

The purpose of the audiencia in making the 
concessions contained in this agreement, as set 
forth in its report to the king, was to maintain the 
sovereignty of the crown in these dominions (at 
whatever cost) which otherwise could not have 
been accomplished, except by means of a difficult 
and bloody conquest. 13 

12 Ristoria de Nueva Granada, II, 191. 

is Informe de la real audienda de Lima a su Majestad, Lima, 
December 22, 1780 ; Carta del Arsohispo al Oidor Osorio, Zipaquira, 
June 11, 1781. 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 219 

The insurgents fancied they had won an im- 
portant victory. They were, moreover, lured into 
a fatal sense of security by oaths and the elaborate 
religious ceremonies by which the agreement was 
solemnized. The revolutionary forces returned to 
their several towns, taking with them copies of the 
document which they regarded as the charter of 
their liberty. Berbeo went to Bogota to receive 
his appointment as corregidor and chief justice 
of Socorro. This appointment was later inter- 
preted to be the price of his advocacy of the 
agreement. 

VI 

The principal insurgent force had been out- 
witted and traitorously deceived, and had left the 
field. Galan, however, held his small body of 
soldiers intact. At Guaduas he learned that the 
supporters of the rebellion in Honda had been 
defeated. He, therefore, advanced to that town, 
where he discovered that the victorious forces, 
fearing an unfavorable result of the impending 
conflict, had fled to Nare. Galan 's march towards 
Honda excited the inhabitants of towns north of 
Bogota to take up the cause of the revolution. 
La Mesa, Tocaima, Ibague, Cayaima, Purificacion, 
and Neiva raised the standard of revolt in June. 
In Neiva the leaders assembled in the plaza on 
the 19th of that month, repudiated the authority 
of the governor, broke down the doors at the office 
of the monopolies, and in general, carried out the 



220 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

programme that had been followed elsewhere, 
including the destruction of the arms of Spain. 
Hearing the uproar in the plaza, the governor, 
Policarpo Fernandez, rushed into the presence of 
the rebels; and when he saw that his commands 
were not obeyed, he drew his sword in order to 
enforce obedience. At this point, Toribio Zapata, 
one of the leaders of the rebellion of Neiva, 
attacked him and killed him with a spear. The 
alcalde, who had accompanied Fernandez, entered 
the fight and killed Zapata; and in the confusion 
of the conflict the alcalde escaped. 14 

The purpose of the capitulaciones having been 
attained in the disbanding of the insurgent force 
under Berbeo, the next step was to quell the revolt 
in the north, and to obtain from the people decla- 
rations of fidelity to the king and a repudiation 
of the capitulaciones. By the participation of the 
clergy, other-worldly influences lent their per- 
suasive force to accomplish this result. The arch- 
bishop decided to make a pastoral visit to the 
northern towns; and he summoned to his assist- 
ance the Capuchin missionaries Joaquin de Fine- 
strad, Felix Goyanes, and Miguel de Villajoyosa. 
The incentive urged by the missionaries for laying 
aside hostility to legitimate authority was not the 
common good of the community but the pains of 
eternal damnation. 

The agreement between Berbeo and the audi- 
encia settled nothing. Both the government and 

14 Brieeno, Los Comuneros, 70. 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 221 

the people were dissatisfied. The government had 
acted on the policy of making concessions in days 
of trouble, and of withdrawing them in the days 
of peace. The dissatisfaction of the people mani- 
fested itself in frequent outbreaks ; and the spirit 
of the government, now that the great body of the 
insurgents had been dispersed, was shown in ener- 
getic measures of punishment. Large numbers of 
prisoners were sent to the fortress of Cartagena, 
and among these there were many persons who 
were conspicuous and known to be popular in 
their communities; and because they were popu- 
lar and conspicuous their influence was feared. 
Therefore, under this suspicion, they were seized 
and conducted to prison secretly. 

The arrival of five hundred veteran soldiers at 
Bogota from Cartagena, on the 15th of August, 
1781, gave the government confidence in its ability 
to carry out its policy; and the desire to retreat 
from the position taken in the articles of agree- 
ment became more pronounced when it was known 
that viceroy Florez was disposed to repudiate that 
document. The viceroy's ground for nullifying 
it was that the acceptance of its terms was secured 
by force. 

VII 

In August the Indians of Nemocon came into 
conflict with the government about the salinas. 
These salt works formerly belonged to the Indians, 
but they had been taken by the audiencia and held 



222 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

\ as property of the crown. The effort of the In- 
dians to regain them was supported by Ambrosio 
(Pisco. The Indians attacked the house of the 
administrator, determined to kill him. Informa- 
tion of this event having reached Zipaquira, troops 
'were sent to Nemocon, where they arrived on the 
« 1st of September. In the clash which ensued the 
Indians were victorious, but five of their number 
'were killed, and seven of them were wounded. 15 

The Indians, persuaded that they could not 
withstand the trained troops, fled to the moun- 
tains. The commander of the legitimate forces 
ordered the heads of the Indians who had been 
killed to be cut off and placed on pikes, one in 
each of the five towns of San Diego, San Victorino, 
Las Cruces, Egypto, and Boqueron. This act sug- 
gested to the comuneros what would probably be 
their fate, and persuaded them to assemble at 
Socorro, and prepare for a new insurrection. 
Jose Antonio Galan became the commanding gen- 
eral. A number of towns, Malaga, Mogotes, 
Charala, La Concepcion, Santana, and others 
joined in a new revolt; but it was not possible to 
reawaken the enthusiasm of the people. There 
was, moreover, no leader who inspired confidence ; 
yet the audiencia, fearing that Galan might pos- 
sibly prove a successful commander, ordered his 
arrest and imprisonment. 16 

is An account of this conflict is given in a letter written by 
Jose Bernet to Viceroy Florez, September 9, 1781, printed as 
No. XXI of the documents in Bricefio, Los Comuneros, 151-153. 

is For this order, see Bricefio, Los Comuneros, 162-167. 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 223 

When the insurgents at Mogotes learned thatj 
the government had decided to imprison Galan, I 
their revolutionary zeal abated. The majority of 
them abandoned him. Attended by only a few 
followers, he fled to a place called Chagonuete, 
where he was arrested. 17 Galan was born at 
Charala, and at the time of his arrest he was 
thirty-two years of age. On the basis of charges 
that appear not to have been proved he was sen- 
tenced, January 30, 1782, to be hanged ; and, after 
the execution, his body was quartered and burned. 
Juan Manuel Jose Ortiz, Lorenzo Alcantuz, and 
Isidro Molina .met a similar fate. 18 

In pronouncing sentences at this time the 
audiencia was apparently moved by a desire for 
vengeance rather than by a wish to execute jus- 
tice. Besides those who suffered the death 
penalty, a large number of other persons received 
milder forms of punishment. The government 
rather than the rebels displayed the barbarity of 
a tribunal of terrorists. Galan 's head was sent 
to Guaduas, where it was placed on a pike at the 
entrance of the town, while the heads of Ortiz, 
Alcantuz, and Molina were exposed in a similar 
manner respectively at Socorro, San Gil, and 
Bogota. The houses of these four victims were 

" For an account of Galan 's arrest, see Plata 's report in the 
documents in Bricefio, Los Comuneros, 165-167. 

is The sentence of death on Galan, Ortiz, Molina, and Alcantuz 
is No. XXVI of the documents in Bricefio, 175-181; see charges 
against Jos6 Antonio Galan in Galan 's Vida de J. A. Galan, 
240-242. The sentence is printed on pp. 314 and 315. 



224 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

destroyed, their descendants were declared in- 
famous, and their property was confiscated. By 
its summary judgments and the severity of the 
penalties imposed, the audiencia introduced a 
reign of terror throughout the kingdom. Com- 
panions of Galan were sent to the presidios of 
Africa. Ambrosio Pisco was condemned to death, 
for setting himself up as Prince of Bogota in 
place of Charles III. But his sentence was subse- 
quently modified, and, with his wife and nephew, 
he was sent for fourteen years to the fortress of 
Cartagena. 

f After the execution, imprisonment, or expul- 
sion of the leaders of the revolt, and the return 

' of Pineres, the regent, to Bogota, the audiencia 
publicly annulled, on the 18th of March, 1782, the 

' capitulaciones, or articles of agreement, made 
with the insurgents through Berbeo ; and all acts 
based on that agreement. A little later, April 1, 

i of the same year, it deprived Berbeo of his title 

1 and functions as corregidor. 

After a troubled reign of six years filled with 
misfortune, due chiefly to the unwisdom of the 
visitador Pineres, Florez petitioned the king to be 
relieved of his viceregal office. His petition was 
granted, and Juan de Torrezal Diaz Pimienta, the 
governor of Cartagena, became his successor, and 
proceeded to Bogota by way of the Magdalena 
river. Reports of his proposed policy of con- 
ciliation had preceded him, and his arrival was 
expected with satisfaction ; but all hopeful antici- 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 225 

pations were set aside by his death four days 
after he reached the capital. In accordance with 
the sealed orders opened by the audiencia, after 
the death of Pimienta, Archbishop Caballero y 
Gongora assumed the duties of the viceregal 
office, and thus to his ecclesiastical functions, there 
were added those of the political chief of the vice- 
royalty. The archbishop was born in Andalucia; 
was appointed bishop of Chiapa in 1775 ; and was 
promoted the same year to be bishop of Yucatan. 
In March, 1779, he entered upon the office of arch- 
bishop of Bogota. 

The promotion of the archbishop to the office 
of viceroy was in recognition of the service he had 
rendered in favor of peace. The general amnesty 
granted by the king and applied by the archbishop- 
viceroy included Ambrosio Pisco and his family, 
who returned to Chia. By the barbarous punish- 
ment of Galan and his immediate followers, and 
by the subsequent acts of pardon, the spirit of, 
revolt, it was assumed, had been subdued ; yet the/ 
revolutionary flame had not been quenched, but^ 
only smothered. 19 The revolution of 1810 com- \ 
pleted the work, at once destructive and creative, . 
begun by the comuneros thirty years earlier. 

Juan Bautista Morales, as already indicated, 
had been sent to England to obtain funds for 
carrying on the revolution. In May, 1784, Luis 

is Edicto promulgando el indulto, No. XXX of the documents 
in Bricefio, 189-205. 



226 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Vidalle arived in London to assist in the under- 
taking, and on the 12th of May he presented a 
statement to the British government, in which he 
set forth the state of affairs in New Granada. 
The revolt of the comuneros had been suppressed, 
and his purpose was to obtain assistance in an 
attempt to emancipate themselves from the crown 
of Spain; as stated by Vidalle, "the inhabitants 
of these provinces are looking forward with 
anxiety to their separation from Spain." 20 The 
papers presented offered numerous inducements 
designed to persuade the British to furnish the 
required assistance. It was affirmed that the 
people would declare themselves British subjects ; 
and it was announced at the same time that an 
intimate connection existed between the move- 
ment of Tupac Amaru and the uprising of the 
comuneros. In these documents it was, moreover, 
declared that the purpose of the insurrection of 
1781 was to secure the complete independence of 
the American colonies. 

The plans of the commissioners were com- 
municated to the Spanish minister in London, 
together with copies of the propositions that 
were to be presented to the British government. 
Vidalle was arrested in France and imprisoned in 
Cadiz. Morales was also imprisoned and with 

20 Inf orme del comisionado don Luis Vidalle al gobierno ingles, 
No. XXXVI of the documents in Briceno, 235 ; Eobertson, William 
Spence, Francisco de Miranda and the revolutionizing of Spanish 
America, in Annual Eeport of Am. Hist. Assn., 1907, I, 208. 



COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA 227 

these events the comuneros' prospects of Euro- 
pean assistance and of independence vanished 
for the moment, but the hope of emancipation 
remained. 21 

21 Some of the more accessible writings dealing with the rebel- 
lion of the Comuneros are the following: Bricefio, Manuel, Los 
Comuneros, Bogota, 1880; Finestrad, Joaquin de, El vasallo vn- 
struido (Bibl. de Hist, nacional, IV), 1-204; Galan, A. M., Jose 
Antonio Galan {Bibl. de hist, nacional, IV), 205-410; Bestrepo, 
Sist. de la revoluoion de la republica de Colombia, Besanzon, 1858, 
I, 13-30; Belacion verdadera de los hechos y pasages ocurridos 
en la sublevacion de los pueblos, eiudades y villas que did prmcipio 
en la del Socorro y San Gil, y extensi/va a todos los del reyno, Santa 
Fe, 1781; Orjuela, Luis, Minuta historica Zapaquirena (Bibl. de 
hist, nacional, IV), 329-362. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE CONSPIRACY OF GRAMUSET AND 
BERNEY. 

I. The revolt under Amat, governor and captain-general 
of Chile. II. The conspiracy of Gramuset and 
Berney. III. The arrest and imprisonment of the 
conspirators. 



The breach between the governors and the gov- 
erned was often widened by the arrogant bearing 
of some of the higher officials towards the colo- 
nists. This was illustrated by the conduct of 
Amat y Junient, the captain-general of Chile (De- 
cember 29, 1755-September 26, 1761). Under 
Amat and his successor, Guill y Gonzaga (1761- 
1767), the Indians on the southern frontier contin- 
ued their ancient resistance to Spanish encroach- 
ments, and the frequent parlamentos, instituted 
by the Spaniards, generally failed to set aside the 
hostilities that existed between the settlers and 
the Indians. Francisco Javier Morales and his 
interim predecessor (1768-1773) recognized that 
the ports of the Pacific were almost entirely de- 
fenseless. At the same time it was seen that 
Spain was not in a position to furnish a force 



GR AMUSE T-BEKNEY CONSPIRACY 229 

adequate for their defense; nor was the govern- 
ment in Spain able to control the measures under- 
taken by Chile and Peru in cooperation; and the 
inability of this government to manage effectively 
the affairs of the colonies became, with the pass- 
age of time, more and more evident; yet in spite 
of this fact, the king demanded reforms in the 
revenue systems designed to increase the income 
of the royal treasury, and deplete the resources 
of the colonies. The demands made in Chile for 
the benefit of the royal treasury, were not greatly 
unlike the contemporary requirements in New 
Granada, which had provoked the revolt of the 
comuneros. During the administration of Augus- 
tin de Jauregui (1773-1780), the increase of the 
alcabala and other taxes in Chile moved the 
colonists to assume an attitude of decided hos- 
tility towards the officers of the government. 

The reforms of Charles III doubtless aimed at 
an improvement of the colonial administration, 
but, in unsettling social conditions, they weakened 
the influence of preexisting traditions as an 
element of control, and thus left the inhabitants 
freer than they were before to question the 
advisability of new legislation, and to propose 
measures inconsistent with Spain's governmental 
policy. The alcabala had long been felt to be an 
oppressive tax, but it had been endured, and even 
modifications of the rate had not greatly disturbed 
the order of things. The tax on certain shops, 
particularly those for the sale of groceries and 
alcoholic beverages, had been reduced, but under 



230 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Jauregui it was proposed to reestablish the old 
rate, and to increase the alcabala. These changes, 
the imposition of new taxes, and an increase in 
the valuation of articles subject to the alcabala, 
provoked a revolt against the king's subordinates 
in Chile, by whom the obnoxious changes had been 
made. 

On the sudden death of Silvestre Garcia, 
President Jauregui appointed Gonzalez Blanco 
to be Garcia 's interim successor as administrator 
of accounts. Blanco was especially moved by the 
desire to increase the royal revenues, and he 
undertook to reform the alcabala, as well as the 
fiscal regulations respecting the pulperias, or 
shops for selling groceries and alcoholic beverages, 
so that they might contribute to that end. When 
the people learned of these changes, Blanco be- 
came the special object of popular indignation. 
Numerous pasquinades appeared in Santiago, and 
under their influence the popular agitation was 
intensified. The fact that Blanco's predecessor 
was the author of many of the obnoxious changes 
was not remembered by the people. In July, 1776, 
they assembled in riotous disorder in the plaza of 
Santiago. The governor, apparently unable to 
restore tranquility, acceded to the demand for a 
general assembly to consider means for quieting 
the revolt. This assembly was an open meeting 
of the cabildo of Santiago, and was limited to one 
hundred members chosen by the cabildo from the 
inhabitants of the city. It selected four especially 
prominent men of the colony as an executive com- 



GRAMUSET-BERNEY CONSPIRACY 231 

mittee. These were Bacilio de Rojas, Antonio 
Bascunan, Antonio Lastra, and Lorenzo Gutierrez. 
The governor revoked provisionally the changes 
in taxation that had been introduced. He also 
gave assurance that justice would be administered. 
He sent (March 31, 1777) the provisional suspen- 
sion of the changes in taxation to the king for his 
consideration and final decision. Gonzalez Blanco, 
in consideration of his zeal in seeking to procure 
funds for the king, was appointed royal treasurer 
at Potosi. 

The popular agitation was, however, continued, 
and to this unrest was added dissatisfaction of the 
regular clergy. The rules of the orders were 
relaxed. The monks lived without the monas- 
teries, and disregarded the obligations of their 
profession. The king and his appointed inspectors 
appeared to be unable to set aside the scandals. 
The revolutionary movement in Chile was a local 
manifestation of the contemporary revolt against 
the government, that appeared with more or less 
force in practically all of the colonies. In Peru 
and New Granada it resulted in Civil War, but in 
certain other instances, owing to the peculiar cir- 
cumstances of the communities, it did not advance 
beyond the status of a conspiracy or a local rebel- 
lion. But everywhere it indicated the failure of 
the government in Spain to grow sufficiently in 
wisdom and power to enable it to accomplish suc- 
cessfully the increased task imposed upon it by 
the changing needs of the colonial administration. 



232 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

II 

The full extent of the spirit of revolt was not 
made manifest by the movements that culminated 
in active and open hostilities, and became known 
to all the world. Besides these there were secret 
conspiracies. Some of these were afterwards 
brought to light, while there were doubtless others 
that were never revealed. An instance, or a type, 
of the secret conspiracy was that formed by two 
Frenchmen, Antonio Gramuset and Antonio Ber- 
ney. Gramuset had lived many years in Chile ; he 
had been married there, had tried many projects 
and had failed in most of them. In 1769, he was 
included under the royal order for the expulsion 
of foreigners. The execution of this order was 
stayed when he joined a company of foreigners 
to fight against the Araucanians. The king dis- 
approved of this concession; nevertheless, the 
foreigners remained in the country. After sev- 
eral years of unsuccessful mining and agriculture, 
Gramuset was occupying, in 1776, a small country 
house near Santiago, and was chiefly concerned 
with mechanical inventions. 

Berney was a teacher of languages and mathe- 
matics. He had come from Buenos Aires to Chile, 
and had found protection and occupation as an 
instructor in French in a Chilean family, and in 
Latin in the Colegio Carolino. He was a guileless, 
visionary, and deluded person. His mind was 
filled with all sorts of abstract doctrines, but he 



GRAMUSET-BERNEY CONSPIRACY 233 

had very little knowledge of the real, practical 
world. Gramuset planned to become rich ; Berney, 
to make law that would shape the fortunes of a 
state. 
| Berney visited Gramuset, and their conversa- 
tion turned to the popular discontent, and to the 
absurd tyranny of the colonial regime. They 
* reached the conclusion that the country should be 
independent. By 1780 the noise of the tax revolt 
had ceased, but dissatisfaction and discontent re- 
I mained. According to Gramuset, the achievement 
of independence would be the realization of a 
general earnest desire. Gramuset examined the 
project of a revolution calmly and coolly as 
another speculative undertaking. Berney, having 
Ibeen unjustly dismissed from the Colegio Caro- 
Jino, turned against the existing order with bitter 
"resentment. The success already attained by the 
.English colonies, whose grievance was unjust 
taxation, supported the thought that the same 
I degree of success might be achieved in Chile, 
where the grievance was also burdensome taxes. 
The confidence of Gramuset was not fully 
entertained by Berney, who, as a man of books, 
was in his proper element when solving mathe- 
matical problems rather than when dealing with 
practical political problems. But Berney 's doubts 
and vacillation disappeared after his conversa- 
tion with Jose Antonio Rojas, who appeared as 
an ally in the conspiracy. Rojas was a man' of 
education and standing in the colonial community. 



234 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

He was born in Santiago and was educated at the 
Jesuit College and at the University of San 
Felipe. He had served as an officer in the garrison 
of a militia post on the frontier; as adjutant of 
Viceroy Amat, after that officer had been pro- 
moted to the position of viceroy of Peru; and as 
corregidor of Lampa. He had been in Madrid six 
years, soliciting from the government the adjust- 
ment of certain private affairs ; and the knowledge 
which he gained there of the conduct of the public 
administration, its intrigues, its prejudices, and 
its ignorance, made him a determined opponent 
of the colonial relation of Chile to Spain. He 
returned to America in 1777 with his collection of 
books. He purchased a seat in the cabildo of 
Santiago, but he did not attend the meetings; 
and a little later withdrew to his estate of Pol- 
paico. In his retirement he received Berney, and 
discussed with him the proposed republican con- 
stitution for Chile. 

Rojas' opinions, his mental attitude towards 
the social organization, underwent a very great 
change during his residence in Europe. In France 
he acquired an extensive knowledge of the cur- 
rent philosophy of the time. In Amunategui's 
words, "he left America a loyal vassal and re- 
turned a rebellious subject." 1 In this state of 
mind he entered into communication with Berney, 
and announced to him that there were two other 
allies who were important because of their social 

i Los Precursores de la independencia de Chile, III, 201. 



GRAMUSET-BERNEY CONSPIRACY 235 

standing. These were Manuel Jose Orejuela, who 
had been commissioned to go with an expedition 
to discover the city of Caesares. The other was 
Francisco de Borja Araos, a captain of artillery 
at Valparaiso. 

Gramuset then undertook the formation of a 
programme of events by which the proposed 
reform should be introduced, and Berney pro- 
ceeded to frame a constitution. He thought that 
the proclamation of the reform should embody 
the constitution of the new state, and he was 
persuaded that no other means than the reading 
of the constitution would be required to induce 
the people to adopt it and approve the change. 
Clearly much depended then on this document, 
and while writing it Berney naturally wished to 
be free from the confusion and distractions of the 
city. He, therefore, withdrew to Polpaico, Eojas' 
estate, and there began and completed his task 
of framing the constitution. 

The first part of the document that was ex- 
pected to convince and move a people, very few 
of whom were able to read, was an argument in 
justification of a republic, presenting its advan- 
tage over monarchy, and illustrated by facts 
drawn with much learning from sacred and pro- 
fane history. 

| The second part set forth the organization of 

the state, affirming that it was based on the prin- 

I ciples of natural law. It was the development 

. of two fundamental maxims: "Love your neigh- 



236 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

I bor as yourself," and "Do not to another what 
you do not wish him to do to you." The state 

I should be governed by a body called "The Sov- 
ereign Senate of the very noble, very powerful, 
jand very Catholic Chilean Republic. ' ' The mem- 
bers of the senate should be elected by the people. 
The Araucanians, like the rest of the inhabitants, 
should send deputies to this assembly. The death 
penalty should not be applied to any criminal; 
slavery should be abolished ; social classes should 
not exist; and the land should be divided into 
equal portions. As soon as the revolution should 
have triumphed, an army would be raised; the 
cities and the coast would be fortified, not with 
the design that Chile should be moved by the 
ambition of conquest, but in order that she might 
make herself respected, and that her concessions 
dictated by justice should not be attributed to 
weakness. Moreover, there should be decreed 
freedom of trade with all the nations of the world, 
without exception, including the Chinese and the 
Negroes, and even with Spain that had pretended 
to isolate America from the rest of the earth. 2 

/ The manifesto ended with a note to the king 
of Spain, informing him in moderate and cour- 
teous terms that the Chileans had determined to 

I separate themselves from his rule, and to consti- 
tute themselves an independent republic. 3 It 
affirmed, moreover, that they were disposed to 

2 Amunategui, Los Precursores, III, cap. 4, See. 9. 

3 Barros Arana, Hist, de Chile, VI, 405. 



GRAMUSET-BERNEY CONSPIRACY 237 

offer to him their friendship and their commerce 
in case the mother country preferred these 
relations to an armed breach. 

There was little probability that this pro- 
gramme would be accepted. The majority of the 
inhabitants were too ignorant and too far removed 
from the intellectual currents of the age to have 
any thought about government. The educated 
minority were either ecclesiastics, who were still 
persuaded of the divine right of kings, or en- 
comenderos or other owners of property who had 
no wish to see an equal distribution of the land. 

The number of persons privy to the plot was 
gradually and cautiously increased. Among the 
later enlistments was Mariana Perez de Saravia, 
a lawyer of indifferent standing from Buenos 
Aires. After mature consideration of his posi- 
tion, and troubled at finding himself involved in 
a questionable undertaking, he determined to de- 
nounce the revolutionary project to the authori- 
ties. The chief of these authorities at this time 
(1781) was the governor and captain-general 
Ambrosio de Benavides, whose advanced age ren- 
dered him infirm and inefficient. The effective 
head of the government was Tomas Alvarez de 
Acevedo, the regent of the audiencia. To him 
Saravia addressed a letter announcing the exist- 
ence of a conspiracy to effect a political revolution. 
Finding Saravia 's assertion in accord with re- 
ports from other sources, Acevedo resolved to act 
on it. But at this point he encountered embar- 
rassment. 



238 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

He was aware that revolution tends to breed 
revolution, and that to announce publicly the fact 
that the separation of Chile from Spain had been 
advocated, would put the thought of emancipation 
into many minds. He had, therefore, to devise a 
plan under which the offenders might be arrested, 
tried, and punished without making partisans for 
the revolution. 

Ill 

Saravia continued his association with Berney, 
and entered into relations with Gramuset. He 
pursued the business of a spy with the zeal of a 
renegade. When Acevedo had derived from 
Saravia the needed information, he caused the 
conspirators to be arrested and subjected to a 
secret trial. The proposed arrest of Eojas and 
Orejuela produced a new difficulty. On account 
of their conspicuous positions in the community, 
they could not be smuggled away and imprisoned 
without causing their absence to become noted and 
inquiries to be set on foot regarding it. Such 
inquiries would inevitably expose the fact that the 
emancipation of the colony had been advocated, 
by persons of social importance. The pro- 
posed proceedings against them, therefore, were 
dropped. 

The sentence on Berney and Gramuset was 
pronounced February 5, 1781. It was decided 
to withhold the punishment legally due, and to 



GRAMUSET-BERNEY CONSPIRACY 239 

send the prisoners to the viceroy of Peru, with 
a complete record of the case. 4 

The consideration of the fate of these con- 

I spirators occupied the attention of the crown, the 
Council of the Indies, and the viceroy of Peru for 
a number of years. In the meantime Berney and 
Gramuset remained imprisoned in Lima, the 
authorities hesitating to send them to Spain, lest 
they should fall into the hands of the British, and 
thus reveal to the enemy the fact that a conspiracy 
had existed in Chile to overthrow the government 
and establish a republic. Finally, in 1784, after 
peace had been made with Great Britain, Berney 
and Gramuset were embarked in a man-of-war. 
Berney was lost in a shipwreck on reaching the 
coast of Portugal; Gramuset, however, arrived 
at Cadiz, and was imprisoned in one of the sub- 
terranean cells of the castle, where he perished 
miserably in 1786. The government of Chile, as 
suggested, wished to keep the people in ignorance 

j of the projected revolution, lest the knowledge of 
it should breed further discontent, and it was so 
successful in this undertaking that no popular 

• tradition of the proposed movement survived in 
Chile ; yet when revealed by the researches of 
Chilean historians, it is seen to be one of the 
early manifestations of discontent, which were 

t followed by others from time to time until the 

! violent outbreak, thirty years later. 5 

4 The sentence is printed in Amunategui, Los Precursores, III, 
230. 

s For the details of this conspiracy one may consult Una con- 
spiration en 1780, by Miguel Luis Amunategui and Gregorio Vic- 



240 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

To these rebellions and conspiracies one might 
add a number of others that were less far-reaching 
in their effects, but prompted by essentially the 
same causes. Among the more noteworthy of 
these were the revolt in Venezuela, led by Fran- 
cisco de Leon, and that led by Felipe Velasco in 
the province of Huarochiri. They were all pro- 
voked by burdens, abuses, and hardships imposed 
by the government, its agents, or by members of 
a dominant class or corporation. 6 

tor Amunategui; Barros Arana, Sist. de CMle, VI, 404-420; 
Amunategui, M. L., Los Precursores, III, cap. 4. 

The experience of Jose Antonio de Eojas, who went from Chile 
to Spain in 1772 and returned in 1777, indicates one of the 
methods by which liberal or revolutionary ideas entered America. 
He became interested in the characteristic thought of the last half 
of the eighteenth century, and purchased and sent to America 
many of the notable books of the time: The Encyclopedic of 
D'Alembert and Diderot, the works of Bousseau, Montesquieu, 
Helvetius, Eobertson, Holbach, and Eaynal. Writing to Jose Per- 
fecto de Salas in December, 1774, he notes the fact that "a very 
singular work has appeared, entitled, The Political and Philo- 
sophical History of European Establishments and Commerce in 
the Indies. It is anonymous, and appears to have been printed 
in Amsterdam. It is prohibited because the author speaks very 
clearly, and because he utters certain truths." In a later letter 
to the same person, Eojas says "the author of the work men- 
tioned is Abbe Eaynal. This liombre divino, this true philosopher, 
is worthy of the praise of the whole literary world, and particu- 
larly of Americans. ' ' Quoted by Amunategui, La cronica de 1810, 
II, 47-49; on Eejas, see Ibid, II, 5-107. 

6 Schumacher, H. A., SiidameriTcanische Studien, Berlin, 1884, 
172; Mendiburu, VIII, 295. Mendiburu prints the barbarous sen- 
tence pronounced upon Velasco and his followers, VIII, 295-298. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE VICEROYALTY 
OF RIO DE LA PLATA 

I. The Ordinanza de Intendentes. II. Status and func- 
tions of the intendants. III. The ordinance applied 
in Peru and Chile. IV. The reformed ordinance 
of 1802. V. The state of Buenos Aires and the 
adjacent country. 



One of the effects of the conspiracies and rebel- 
lions already referred to was to convince the 
supreme government that the state was failing in 
its great undertaking. Conspicuous evidence of 
this was the relation that existed between the cor- 
regidores and the Indians. These officials stood 
nearer the bulk of the inhabitants than any others, 
and had thus the most advantageous position for 
either inspiring loyalty or creating dissatisfaction 
and hostility. The records of their conduct show 
how little they did to attract or please the Indian, 
and how much to repel and enrage him. Neither 
the Indian's person nor his property was secure 
from the abusive and unjustifiable acts of the cor- 
regidor; and through the reforms that followed 
these intrigues and revolts the office of the cor- 
regidor disappeared. 



242 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

In spite of the power nominally conferred upon 
officials in America, the king sought to keep in his 
own hands or in the hands of the Council of the 
Indies the essential power in all matters of funda- 
mental importance; but this involved governing 
at long range, and no adequate means existed for 
overcoming the difficulties of communication. 
The old governmental machine had shown itself 
unfit for the work it had to do. The energy even 
of Charles III, Spain's ablest king, made itself 
only imperfectly felt in the remote provinces of 
the dependencies. The power of Spain was de- 
clining in America because the governmental 
organization was inadequate to carry that power 
to points where its exercise was needed. The 
Ordinanza de intendentes was issued for the vice- 
royalty of Rio de la Plata in order to introduce 
an important administrative reform. With cer- 
tain modifications it was extended to the other 
dependencies in South America and to Mexico. 
It divided the territory of Rio de la Plata into 
eight intendencies, each taking the name of its 
principal city. The territory of each, with certain 
exceptions, was made to coincide with that of the 
bishopric in which the capital city lay. These 
exceptions refer to certain districts that were 
parts of a bishopric but not subject to the corre- 
sponding intendant. Mojos and Chiquitos were 
included in the diocese of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 
but were military governments in immediate 
subordination to the viceroy. Montevideo and 



RIO DE LA PLATA REORGANIZED 243 

Misiones were other exceptions of a somewhat 
similar kind. 1 They were in the bishopric of 
Buenos Aires, but not under the intendant of 
Buenos Aires or any other intendant. On the 
other hand the bishopric of Paraguay had the 
same limits as the intendancy of Paraguay. 

The capitals named in the ordinance were 
Buenos Aires, Asuncion, Tucuman, Santa Cruz 
de la Sierra, La Paz, Mendoza, La Plata, and 
Potosi. The powers of the viceroy were not to be 
curtailed, except that the supervision and control 
of the royal treasury was to be under the general 
intendant, who, in this matter was to act with 
absolute independence of the viceroy. 2 Under this 
law the corregidores were suppressed or sup- 
planted by sub-delegates, who, in divisions of the 
intendency called partidos, were subordinated to 
the intendant. 

II 

The audiencia of Buenos Aires was created in 
1783, the year following the publication of the 
Ordinanza. It embraced within its jurisdiction 
the provinces of Buenos Aires, Tucuman, Para- 
guay, and Cuyo. The inhabitants were thus sub- 
ject to the superior authority of the viceroy, which 

1 Quesada, Vireinato, 574. 

2 Lopez, V. F., Historia argentina, Buenos Aires, 1883, I, 403 ; 
Ordenansa de indendentes, Art 2; Quesada, Vireinato, 387-519; 
for the dates of the establishment of the bishoprics and the terri- 
tory of each, see Zinny, Gobemadores, I, XCVI. 



244 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

reached every part of the kingdom ; to the general 
intendant; to the governors-intendants, limited to 
their several indendancies ; to the audiencia of 
Buenos Aires, in the provinces of Buenos Aires, 
Tucuman, Paraguay, and Cuyo; and to the audi- 
encia of Charcas, in the provinces of Upper Peru. 
To these several secular authorities must be added 
the ecclesiastical authority of the bishops. The 
officers of the voceroyalty, under this organization, 
may be considered as apportioned to two depart- 
ments under the king, the heads of which were 
made responsible to him. At the head of the first 
stood the viceroy. At the head of the second 
stood the general intendant of the army and the 
treasury. The chief official of each of the eight 
intendancies had the double title of governor- 
intendant ; for he was subordinated to the viceroy 
in affairs relating to the police, instruction, wor- 
ship, and the judiciary, while he was the agent of 
the general intendant in his intendancy, with ref- 
erence to revenues, expenditures, and all other 
fiscal matters. 

This distribution of power did not create local 
governments, as that term is used with reference 
to a constitutional state. The divisions of the 
viceroy alty were merely administrative districts ; 
and the officers who exercised power in them did 
not derive their authority from local constituents, 
but from the king. They were not parts of a 
federation, but agents of an absolute centralized 
superior, or rather of two superiors that were 



RIO DE LA PLATA REORGANIZED 245 

expected to work along different but parallel 
lines; and "what made the application of the 
ordinance of intendants, of 1782, inconvenient 
and impossible in practice was the hierarchical 
administrative subdivision which it introduced. 
A viceroy of the treasury and a viceroy of politi- 
cal government were two incompatible terms." 3 
The inconvenience of this bifurcated administra- 
tion was soon set aside, and the two functions 
which the ordinance had separated were united in 
the viceroy. This was done by suppressing the 
independence of the general intendant and making 
him subject to the viceroy. The chiefs remained 
independent of one another only during the 
administration of Vertiz (1778-1784), and while 
Manuel Fernandez was the general intendant. 
On the appointment of Francisco de Paula Sanz, 
as general intendant, he was subordinated to the 
viceroy, and became at the same time governor- 
intendant of the intendancy of Buenos Aires, and 
in this capacity he exercised the same functions 
as the governor-intendants of the other inten- 
dances ; but in his character as general intendant, 
he had general jurisdiction in the whole territory 
of the viceroyalty, and as governor-intendant of 
Buenos Aires, his jurisdiction was limited to the 
territory of the bishopric, coextensive with the 
intendancy. 4 

3 Lopez, HiMoria argentina, I, 408. 

4 Quesada, Vireinato, 449. 



246 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEE 

III 

The ordinance of intendants was applied in 
Peru by the creation of eight intendancies. These 
were the intendancies of Trujillo, Lima, Tarma, 
Huancavelica, Guamanga, Cuzco, Puno, and Are- 
quipa, which were divided into fifty-seven par- 
tidos. 5 The application to Chile was delayed, in 
order that the question of Chile 's relation to Peru 
might be considered, and this was finally resolved 
by a royal order of June 1, 1784. This order pro- 
vided that Chile should remain dependent on the 
viceroyalty of Peru with respect to the military 
administration and the affairs of the royal treas- 
ury. The territory was divided into two inten- 
dancies. The northern part of the country, from 
the southern boundary of Peru to the river Maule, 
constituted the intendancy of Santiago ; the region 
between the Maule and the Araucanian frontier 
formed the intendancy of Conception. This 
division was confirmed January 14, 1786, by the 
viceroy of Peru. Ambrosio de Benavides became 
the intendant of Santiago, while Ambrosio 'Hig- 
gins was appointed to the same office in Concep- 
tion. In these, as in all other cases under this law, 
the intendant appointed a legal adviser. Besides 
these two cities, the only other town of importance 
in Chile was La Serena; for the majority of the 
inhabitants were engaged in agriculture, and lived 
scattered throughout the country. After the two 

5 Paz Soldan, Mariano Felipe, Historia del Peru independente, 
Lima, 1868, I, 1. 



RIO DE LA PLATA REORGANIZED 247 

intendancies had been approved by the king 
(February 6, 1787), the project to make La Serena 
the capital of a third intendancy was considered 
and rejected. The province of Chiloe remained 
dependent on the viceroy of Peru. 

IV 

The organization and procedure established 
by the royal ordinance of 1782 was modified by 
the general ordinance of 1802 6 

The later ordinance superseded the earlier, 
and the first article of it declared that each prov- 
ince should be in charge of a single person with 
the title of intendant, reuniting the political and 
the military governments. It also provided that 
the intendant should be appointed by the king. 
The ordinance itself appears as a constitution for 
the colonial governments in America, and deals 
with the superior government, the subordinate 
governments, and the whole hierarchical order of 
employees, pointing out to each one his powers 
and duties, in a word, his jurisdiction. 7 It pro- 
vides for the establishment of superior councils 
in all of the capitals of the viceroyalties and the 
captaincies-general. One of these superior coun- 
cils, or courts, with the title of contensiosa, took 
account of private cases, everything that involved 

6 The title of this later ordinance was : Ordinanea general 
formada de orden de S. M. y mandada imprimir y publicar para 
el gobierno e iTistruccion de intendentes, subdelegados y demos 
empleados de Indias. 

7 Quesada, Vireinato, 486. 



248 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

a point of law that could be settled by trial; the 
other, the junta superior de gobierno, of which 
the intendant of the capital was an ex-officio 
member, rendered opinions in cases involving 
governmental matters, everything relative to the 
revenues, the method, manner, and time of collect- 
ing them, as well as to employees and their powers 
and obligations. In so far as the members of 
these two courts were in sympathy with the inhab- 
itants of the capital where they resided and 
shared their aspirations with respect to local 
affairs, they formed a counterpoise to the cen- 
tralized power exercised by the viceroy. But all 
of these functionaries of the capitals were under 
the superior jurisdiction of the audiencias, whose 
powers lay above the range of these reforms, and 
who still were authorized to assume the viceregal 
functions in case of the death of the viceroy with- 
out provision made for an immediate successor. 
Subject to the viceregal superiority and the 
jurisdiction of the audiencia, the intendants, as 
provincial governors by royal appointment, con- 
tinued to exercise those large powers which natu- 
rally devolved upon them as agents of the viceroy 
and as important members of an administrative 
hierarchy, where the head was absolute and the 
other members too isolated to be effectively under 
practical control. 8 

s For a general statement concerning the condition of affairs 
in the vieeroyalty of Eio de la Plata at the end of the eighteenth 
century, see the Memoria of the viceroy Aviles, addressed to his 
successor, Joaquin del Pino, dated at Buenos Aires, May 21, 1801, 
and printed in Zinny, Gobernadores, I, XLVII-XCVI. 



EIO DE LA PLATA REORGANIZED 249 



At the time of these reforms, early in the last 
quarter of the century, the town of Buenos Aires 
was in a neglected state, and the condition of the 
inhabitants of the neighboring country was even 
more lamentable. In addition to the lack of the 
resources of civilized life, they were harrassed by 
Indian raids. Many of the men were killed, and 
women and children were carried off into cap- 
tivity. The region presented no places especially 
favorable for defense, or passes where the ap- 
proaching bands might be attacked and destroyed. 
From any part of the vast plain, they swooped 
down upon their unfortunate victims. To patrole 
the pampas and give security to the country popu- 
lation was a task quite beyond the power of any 
militia then at the disposal of the government. 

The city of Buenos Aires at this time showed 
the results of shameful neglect. Many of the 
streets were impassable the greater part of the 
year. The heavy rains carried off the loose 
material, leaving deep, irregular gullies and stag- 
nant pools. From the west a stream entered 
the city; it separated into two branches, formed 
deep water-courses that cut off almost completely 
different districts from one another. The inhab- 
itants enjoyed few of the facilities ordinarily 
incident to living in a city as wealthy and populous 
as Buenos Aires was then. There was no hospital, 
no public lighting, no police ; and the streets were 



250 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

unpaved. The abundant wealth was largely in 
the hands of persons whose ignorance or whose 
meanness prevented the public from deriving any 
advantage from it. Even the idea of placing 
lights in front of their houses at night did not 
occur to the inhabitants as desirable. 

Viceroy Juan Jose Vertiz (1778-1784) under- 
took to remedy some of these evident defects. In 
spite of the lack of cooperation of the inhabitants, 
he began to improve the streets; he founded a 
hospital, established a home for foundlings, cre- 
ated an orphan asylum, and took steps towards 
introducing a system of street-lighting. The 
foundling asylum was supported in part by rents 
derived from estates confiscated from the Jesuits ; 
in part from the proceeds of bull-fights; in part 
from the income from the theater; and in part 
from the gains of the printing office. The munici- 
pal lighting was supported by a door tax of two 
reals on each street door. Recognizing that the 
life of the city was barren and that there were 
few social influences except those making for 
degeneracy, Vertiz determined to establish a 
theater which might furnish a certain degree of 
inspiration through the heroic characters it would 
present, and the cultivated language of the plays. 
In carrying out this project he naturally encoun- 
tered the opposition of the clergy. A Franciscan 
friar, Jose Acosta, went so far as to censure, from 
the pulpit, these public amusements patronized 
by the viceroy. He "declared in the name of 



RIO DE LA PLATA REORGANIZED 251 

the Holy Spirit that those who attended them 
would incur eternal damnation." 9 The viceroy, 
having learned of the attitude assumed by the 
friar, required him to be expelled from the mon- 
astery, and another preacher to repudiate his 
utterances. 

The superiority of Buenos Aires over the 
other cities of the viceroyalty was rather prospec- 
tive than actual. It was at this time in no sense 
a center of wealth or cultivation. It had an old 
fort, a town organization, and an old market. 
The suggestion that it would absorb the life of the 
other towns did not seem to point to a real danger. 
The cities of Cordova, Tucuman, and Salta ap- 
peared then so firmly established as not likely to 
be affected by the rivalry of the port. These cities 
were richer and more populous than Buenos 
Aires. Cordova had a university, while no such 
institution existed at Buenos Aires in the colonial 
period. Cordova was, moreover, the residence of 
a bishop, and it was an important point on the 
line of trade between the eastern provinces and 
Chile, Cuyo, and Peru. In some respects Chu- 
quisaca was even more important than Cordova. 
It was the seat of an audiencia, the residence of 
the archbishop of La Plata, and the place of resi- 
dence of many persons of wealth. In fact, the 
centers of wealth and cultivation were not at the 
shore or in the valleys of the great river of the 
eastern part of the continent, but in the mountains 

9 Lopez, Historia Argentina, I, 438. 



252 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

near the mines of Upper Peru. But Buenos Aires 
had one point of advantage that was destined to 
become appreciated when the significance of its 
agriculture and foreign commerce with respect 
to progress in civilization should become known. 
The Spaniards were under the delusion that civi- 
lization could be developed in isolation; that it 
was a matter of precept, not a result of social 
contact and imitation. In the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, the society of the river coun- 
try and that of the mountain country were too 
different to permit a great degree of sympathy 
to exist between them; and Paraguay, with the 
large Indian element in the population and its 
traditions of theocratic government, had also a 
character peculiar to itself. 

Finding Buenos Aires without facilities for 
printing and consequently without the desired 
means for distributing information among the 
people, Vertiz endeavored to supply this de- 
ficiency. He fortunately discovered that the 
Jesuits, on their expulsion, had left a fully 
equipped printing office in the college of Nuestra 
Senora de Monserrat in Cordova. This equip- 
ment he caused to be transferred to Buenos Aires. 
Here he encountered a new difficulty : he knew no 
one competent to set up the press and use it. He 
sent inquiries to all the provinces for such a per- 
son, and was finally informed by the governor of 
Montevideo that there was in that city a young 
sergeant who had worked in a printing house in 



RIO DE LA PLATA REORGANIZED 253 

Cadiz. The viceroy called him to Buenos Aires 
to assume immediate charge of the undertaking; 
he offered him for a wife any one of the inmates 
of the orphan asylum. The young man with 
marvellous modesty expressed his desire to accept 
the choice of his patron, who is reported to have 
made a satisfactory selection. Thus was founded 
a printing house and at the same time an im- 
portant family of the viceregal capital. The 
printing house continued to be known for many 
years under the designation of Imprenta de los 
Ninos Expositos. 

Around the colonial city was the colonial 
country, and the character of this background 
determined the character of the city's life. Be- 
hind Potosi lay the rough and barren summits of 
the eastern Andes, with their rich mines of silver. 
Potosi was necessarily a miner's town. La Paz 
lies in a deep gash cut in the interandean table 
land, bounded by the inhospitable plain of central 
Bolivia and a ridge of the mountains. Santiago 
nourished in the delightful valley of central Chile. 
Back of Buenos Aires were spread out the vast 
and fertile plains of Argentina, occupied by a few 
land-holders and the multitude of a homeless prole- 
tariat. In 1744, for 186 proprietors there were 
5897 dependents. The latter were without some 
of the fundamental ideas of civilization. To them 
the plains and the herds appeared like the gift 
of God to the race. If they were hungry, there 
were the animals provided for man's comfort. If 



254 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

they needed shelter, there was the land on which 
they might erect their habitations. The new order 
of things, under which the lands were claimed as 
private property and the herds had individnal 
owners, had been brought about by decrees of per- 
sons, who from the viewpoint of the dwellers of 
the plains had no right to either the land or the 
animals. Why should the favoritism of a gover- 
nor deprive them of their ancient privilege of 
wandering or settling at will? As the generations 
passed and the blood of the white man became 
mixed with that of the tribes of the plains, the 
views of the half -wild proletariat remained prac- 
tically unchanged. The savage had not become 
civilized, but the descendants of the white man 
had moved towards the savage state. In contrast 
with the state of things in Chile, the cheapness of 
slave labor on the great estates drove the free 
men to the desert, or made them the unpaid de- 
pendents of the proprietors. If endowed with 
energy and daring, some of them moved beyond 
the limits of the territory that had been granted 
to private persons, and established themselves on 
the unappropriated lands, and made there little 
centers of cultivation. But their peace was not 
long; for a new grant brought a new proprietor 
to claim the results of their labor, or they were 
swept away by the nomadic savages. 

The absence of a minute division of the land 
was in a large measure due to the persistence of 
the feudal ideal in the colonies. Such a division, 



RIO DE LA PLATA REORGANIZED 255 

if it had been carried out, might have furnished 
an independent possession to every man seeking 
a permanent home and property for himself and 
his descendants, and filled the country with a self- 
respecting population, democratic because of the 
essential equality of wealth, and fitted in good 
time to lay the foundation of a republic. Instead 
of this, the feudal notion of inferior and superior 
survived, making, when carried into practice, the 
great body of the people in the country either 
miserable dependents or free men who could find 
no place for a permanent home. This was the 
undemocratic state of society, on which it was 
later proposed to erect a democratic government. 



CHAPTER X 

AWAKENING INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND 
POLITICS: MUTIS AND NARINO 

Beginnings of a new literary cultivation. II. El 
Mercurio Peruana; Papel Periodico. III. Mutis' 
arrival and early years in New Granada. IV. 
Mutis turns to botany; correspondence with Lin- 
naeus. V. Work of Caballero y Gongora for prog- 
ress. VI. The Botanical Expedition. VII. The 
viceroy ordered to protect the Isthmus against in- 
vasion. VIII. The viceroy's commercial views. 
IX. The Botannical Bureau's headquarters trans- 
ferred to Bogota. X. The Spanish Botanical Ex- 
pedition to Peru. XI. Narifio and the young 
reformers and their trial. XII. Narifio in Europe ; 
his return to New Granada and imprisonment. 



The revolts and conspiracies in various parts of 
Spain's South American possessions indicated 
that the inhabitants had become conscious of their 
individuality and of their unsatisfactory state. 
This consciousness was intensified by the intel- 
lectual awakening that appeared in the last 
decades of the century. Unions with intellectual 
aims became inevitably patriotic unions. The 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 257 

achievements of colonial writers and investigators 
did not enhance the interest or the pride of the 
colonists in the mother country, but helped to con- 
centrate popular interest on the welfare of the 
colonies, and to magnify their aspirations for 
recognition as independent commonwealths. The 
intellectual awakening brought into clearer light 
the unreasonableness of Spain's policy, and 
strengthened the opposition to Spanish rule. 

An illustration of this tendency may be 
observed in the consequences of the intellectual 
movement under the later viceroys of New Gra- 
nada. This movement was characterized by a 
new interest in literary production, by a new zeal 
in scientific investigation, and by attention to 
questions of political reform. 

One indication of the changed attitude towards 
literature was the formation of societies, or 
" circles," for the promotion of literary cultiva- 
tion. One of these societies in New Granada was 
called Tertulia Eutropelica. All kinds of sub- 
jects were discussed at its meetings. At the head 
of it stood Manuel de Socorro Rodriguez, who was 
one of a small group of its more notable figures. 
Others of this group were Maria Valdes, Fran- 
cisco Antonio Rodriguez, and Jose Maria Gruesso. 
All of these, as well as a great majority of those 
who participated in the scientific and literary 
movement of the period, were Creoles, men of 
Spanish blood born in New Granada. 



258 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

II 

Indications of an awakening intellectual activ- 
ity may be seen also in the literary and scientific 
revival in the University of San Marcos, in the 
increasing number of persons who habitually 
gathered in the newly established cafes of Lima 
for literary discussions, and in the publication of 
the periodical called the Mercurio Peruano. In 
Quito the Jesuits had formed an academy for the 
study of astronomy and physics, but this dis- 
appeared with the expulsion of the order. A little 
later the Escuela de la Concordia appeared, de- 
signed to further the study of agriculture and 
industry. This institution undertook the publica- 
tion of a periodical known as the Primicias de la 
Cultura de Quito, the first to appear in that city. 
The means for printing had been introduced by 
the Jesuits, and the Apendice al plan de estudios 
para la real universidad de Quito, of 1791, indi- 
cates a disposition to revive the intellectual life 
of the institution. 

In spite of the dense ignorance that prevailed 
generally throughout the viceroyalty, the capital 
had always contained a limited group of cultivated 
persons, and this group became especially active 
during the reign of Viceroy Espeleta (1789-1797). 
One of the noteworthy manifestations of this 
activity was the establishment and maintenance 
of the Papel periodico de la ciudad de Santafe de 
Bogota. It consisted of eight pages, and the first 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 259 

number was published on the 9th of February, 
1791. It deprecated the attention that had been 
given to insipid, useless, and absurd questions; 
called for an examination of the marvellous 
nature of the country; and endeavored to culti- 
vate a taste for literary, scientific, and political 
studies. Although liberal ideas had been more 
or less current in the preceding decade, Viceroy 
Espeleta became "the protector of the press 
which popularized them." 3 The appeal in favor 
of more liberal thinking was made not merely to 
New Granada, but also to other countries of Span- 
ish America. The first number of the Papel 
Periodico was sent to a literary society in Lima 
with the viceroy's commendation, and thus, 
through his patronage and protection of a publi- 
cation that encouraged the spread of emancipated 
thought, he unwittingly contributed to weaken the 
foundations of Spanish rule in New Granada and 
in every other dependency to which the journal's 
influence was extended. The Mercurio Peruano 
for April 28, 1791, devoted its leading article to 
the Papel Periodico, affirming that "the spirit of 
the century is propitious for instruction, human- 
ity, and philosophy. Different parts of America 
have, for a long time, found themselves in pos- 
session of common ideas, and have unconsciously 
united in adopting the most opportune means for 
transmitting them, namely, periodicals. Perhaps 
before 1800 Buenos Aires and Chile will respec- 

3 Groot, II, 270. 



260 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEK 

tively issue a Diario, a Mer curio, or a Gazeta." 
The Papel Periodico ceased to be published after 
an existence of five years. But while it continued 
to be issued, it was used by the new generation 
of Creoles of New Granada in making public their 
ideas and aspirations. 

Ill 

A more noteworthy phase of the intellectual 
awakening in New Granada was the series of 
investigations led by Jose Celestino Mutis, who 
stimulated a large number of the rising genera- 
tion of Creoles to habits of scientific inquiry. 
Mutis arrived in New Granada in 1760, as physi- 
cian to Viceroy Mesia de la Zerda, who landed at 
Cartagena, then the bulwark of Spanish power in 
America. Here Eslaba had spent the whole period 
of his viceregal administration (1740-1749), and 
his successor, Jose Alfonso Pizarro (1749-1753), 
had remained here the greater part of his term of 
service in New Granada. But Solis (1753-1761) 
had resided at Bogota, then, as many years later, 
difficult of access ; and his successor, Mesia de la 
Zerda (1761-1773), followed his example. Zerda 
left Cartagena on the 5th of January, 1761. By 
way of the Magdalena and the Opon rivers and 
the mountain trail, he reached Bogota on the 24th 
of February. The city as a place of residence in 
the eighteenth century did not offer many attrac- 
tions to one coming from the higher ranks of 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 261 

European society. It contained only a few thou- 
sand inhabitants. Under Viceroy Guirior (1773- 
1776), there were 16,233. In 1794, sixteen or 
eighteen years later, there were only 17,405. 
Most of the institutions characteristic of a civi- 
lized community were wanting.* 

The country was without roads. Whatever 
communication was maintained made use of 
rivers, mountain trails, and Indian paths. The 
missions were protected by military garrisons. 
The finances of the kingdom were in a low state ; 
even the more important centers of population 
furnished only meager incomes to meet local ex- 
penditures or to satisfy the demands of the royal 
treasury. And at this time the commission for 
establishing the boundary between the Spanish 
and the Portuguese dependencies in the north, 
under the direction of Jose de Yturriaga, was 
soliciting funds for the maintenance of its large 
staff of engineers, draughtsmen, mathematicians, 
naturalists, and an escort of more than a hundred 
men. The extreme of embarrassment was, how- 
ever, avoided by the arrival of the information 
that the treaty of demarcation had been annulled 
by the agreement of February 12, 1761. 

In 1762 the viceroy, accompanied by Mutis, 
returned to the coast by way of Honda and the 
Magdalena river. This journey was undertaken 
to make sure that the defenses of Cartagena were 

4 The name of the eity at this time was Santa Fe de Bogota, 
but it was usually called Santa Fe. A law of December 17, 1819, 
made Bogota the official designation. 



262 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

strong enough to withstand any attack which 
Great Britain might make. After the conclusion 
of peace and his return to Bogota, Mutis devoted 
some part of his time to instruction in the Colegio 
de Nuestra Senora del Rosario. The subject 
taught by him was Mathematics, not Medicine or 
Botany or Natural History. His public presenta- 
tion of the doctrines of Newton raised against 
him a storm of opposition on the part of the secu- 
lar clergy and the monks, but the protection of 
the viceroy appears to have fixed a point beyond 
which their opposition might not go. 



IV 

Zerda recognized the low state into which min- 
ing for the precious metals had fallen, and made 
an effort to increase the production. For this 
purpose Jose Antonio de Villegas y Avendano 
was called from Lima, and commissioned to ex- 
amine and report on certain districts north of 
Bogota. Mutis accompanied him, and remained 
for a number of years in the region about Pam- 
plona. These efforts were attended with no 
especially striking results, and the attention of 
Mutis was hereafter directed more exclusively to 
a botanical survey of the country. Linnaeus had 
urged him to make botany the object of his inves- 
tigations. Mutis' correspondence with the Swed- 
ish botanist suffered serious interruptions, for 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 263 

Linnaeus' letters were in the beginning directed 
to Santa Fe in New Mexico instead of to Santa 
Fe in New Granada. In this correspondence, 
when finally established, there was much refer- 
ence to chinchona. Although the quality of the 
bark as a remedy for fever had been known for 
more than a hundred years, scientific inquiries 
concerning it had only recently been undertaken. 
Condamine, of the geographical commission, had 
published a report on this subject in the trans- 
actions of the Paris Academy of Sciences, and this 
report had been made the basis of Linnaeus' 
description. 

The intellectual progress of New Granada, 
stimulated by the activity of Mutis, had been 
checked by the expulsion of the Jesuits. It was 
the members of this society that were furnishing 
the most hopeful instruction in the missions and 
other remote parts of the kingdom. To repair the 
temporal damage caused by their removal, the 
viceroy appointed Francisco Antonio Moreno to 
be the executor of the Jesuits' heritage. Moreno 
was born in Mariquita, was educated in Spain, 
and had been fiscal of the audiencia. In his new 
office, he conceived a comprehensive system of 
instruction that, among other things, would pro- 
vide for a school wherever a Jesuit mission had 
existed. With the confiscated book collections of 
the Jesuits he founded a public library, and to 
these measures Mutis gave his enthusiastic ap- 
proval. The Colegio del Rosario, where Mutis 



264 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

had taught mathematics, was transformed into a 
university and removed from clerical domination. 
In this institution Mutis resumed his instruction, 
now as professor of mathematics. Referring to 
the failure of the Spaniards adequately to exploit 
the products of their territory and to bring them 
into general use, Moreno cited chinchona as an 
illustration, and expressed regret that they should 
be obliged to beg from the French such a product 
of their own soil. 

In 1772, Zerda returned to Spain; Mutis, who 
had accompanied him to America as his physician, 
was invited to make the return voyage in the same 
capacity. He decided, however, to decline the 
invitation. The distinguished engineer, Francisco 
Requena, under the persuasion of the viceroy, 
reached the same decision. Although Requena 
had gone to New Granada for a brief period of 
colonial service pre-requisite for promotion in 
Spain, he remained in America three decades, and 
became the head of the Spanish Boundary Com- 
mission provided for by the Spanish-Portuguese 
treaty of 1777. 

Shortly after the departure of Viceroy Zerda, 
Mutis entered the priesthood, but in his new 
character his attention was not distracted from 
his scientific work. The new viceroy, Manuel de 
Guirior, was received at Honda, April 16, 1773, 
by a number of the higher officers of the viceregal 
government at Bogota. Mutis was a member of 
this reception committee, and a little later, in a 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 265 

letter to Linnaeus, wrote as follows concerning 
Guirior : 

''Our illustrious Viceroy, just arrived in this 
town from Spain, is a most ardent promoter of 
science. He has become acquainted with our cor- 
respondence in consequence of your present of 
books, confided to his care; and he is much inter- 
ested in what passes between us. He generally 
enters into conversation with me, after dinner, 
about you; and makes me read passages out of 
your letters, highly flattering to me in which he 
takes great delight, though they put me to the 
blush. This benevolent man, a few days since, 
took me with him into the hilly country, where he 
went for the purpose of planting strawberries, 
now one of our luxuries, in order that they may 
become naturalized all over these mountains. ' ' 5 



Guirior showed his sympathy with the liberal- 
izing efforts of his predecessor and the work of 
Moreno and Mutis by defending their educational 
reforms against the attacks of the church. He 
undertook, moreover, to improve the financial con- 
dition of the kingdom by extending the system of 
monopolies, notably those of tobacco and chin- 

s Smith, James Edward, A Selection of the Correspondence of 
Linnaeus and other Naturalists. London, 1821, 11, 525. The 
editor of this correspondence wrote, in Bees' Cyclopedia, XXV, 
Art. "Mutis," that Mutis was the means of introducing straw- 
berries into the country of New Granada. 



266 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

cliona. Extravagant expectations were at this 
time entertained concerning trade in chinchona 
bark. Some persons maintained that it was des- 
tined to be as profitable as the Dutch had found 
their oriental trade in spices. 

Before the arrival of the royal confirmation 
of the proposed changes, in the system of monop- 
olies, Viceroy Guirior was transferred to Peru, 
and Manuel Antonio Florez (1776-1782) had be- 
come his successor in New Granada. Florez 
retired from Bogota early, and, residing at 
Cartagena, was eclipsed by the visitador-regente, 
Peneres, whose maladministration provoked the 
rebellion of the comuneros. The accession of 
Archbishop Caballero y Gongora to the post of 
viceroy in June, 1782, promised a more enlightened 
rule than those which had led to the popular re- 
volt. The new archbishop-viceroy became inter- 
ested in the missions that had been ruined by the 
expulsion of the Jesuits, particularly those in the 
region of the Orinoco and the Amazon, and in the 
work of the boundary commission. He supported 
the system of schools established by Moreno, and 
furthered the plans of Mutis for an organization 
that would promote scientific research; founded 
a chair for instruction in medical science in the 
Colegio del Rosario; and contemplated the forma- 
tion of a public clinic and means for caring for 
the poor. 

In spite of his quality as an ecclesiastic Cabal- 
lero did not disapprove of the plan to bring 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 267 

German and Swedish miners into the country 
although they were Protestants; for this project 
was in keeping with his plan to have the mines 
of the kingdom worked on a larger scale and in a 
more systematic manner than heretofore. A 
somewhat similar project had occupied much of 
Mutis' attention in the earlier years of his resi- 
dence in America; and through his efforts to put 
mining on a better footing, he became interested 
in Jose Euiz, who went to Upsala to study under 
Johan Gottsckalk Wallerius. Later in a letter to 
Linnaeus, written from the mines of Ibague, Feb- 
ruary 8, 1777, Mutis says, ' ' Our friend Euiz, after 
a long journey, which has occupied him for three 
years, is now safely returned to America, and I 
have passed many delightful days with him in 
hearing all he could tell me of you and your con- 
cerns, as well as of your worthy son. . . . We came 
together from Bogota, a few days since, to these 
mines of Ibague, that he may put in practice 
everything he had further acquired in this science 
during his stay in the Upper Hartz. ' ,6 

After his return to America, Jose Ruiz had 
much practical experience in mining enterprises, 
yet the proposed mining reform was entrusted to 
Jose d'Elhuyar, who had had extensive oppor- 
tunities to acquire profound knowledge of mining. 
He was born in Legrofio. At Paris he had studied 
mathematics, physics, chemistry, and natural his- 
tory. Then, supported by a grant from the king, 

6 Smith, J. E., Correspondence of Linnaeus and other Natural- 
ists. London, 1821, 11, 526. 



268 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

he turned his attention to metallurgy; studied 
three years at Freiburg, making himself familiar 
with the processes of smelting the various metals ; 
visited the mines of Bohemia, and acquired a 
knowledge of the processes employed there ; went 
later to the mines of Hungary, Sweden, and Nor- 
way, always with the object of learning their 
practical methods and processes. By his studies 
and his observations he had become eminently 
fitted for directing the proposed reform in min- 
ing. 

VI 

Another striking evidence of an awakening 
scientific interest in the natural resources of 
America was the organization of the Botanical 
Expedition of 1777. This was to have its prin- 
cipal station at Lima, and to extend its activ- 
ity into Ecuador and Chile. This enterprise 
prompted Viceroy Caballero to organize re- 
searches in botany in New Granada. Under 
the name of an expedition he created a bureau 
or institute for botanical research. According 
to his Relacion de Mando, he was moved by 
the announcement of the coming of German 
explorers and the humiliation of having the un- 
known natural treasures of the country pointed 
out to the inhabitants by strangers. "I provided 
for the formation of a Botanical Expedition, com- 
posed of a director, a vice director, and a draughts- 
man. For the post of director, I chose the pres- 
byter Don Jose Celestino Mutis, a subject who 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 269 

for more than twenty years had traversed a great 
part of the kingdom, collecting the products of 
nature, and known by his literary correspondence 
with the scientific men of Europe." 7 

This action of the viceroy was approved and 
confirmed by the king, and he ordered that the 
necessary funds should be immediately placed at 
the disposal of Mutis. The authorities were 
spurred to unusual activity in this matter by 
national pride prompting the wish that whatever 
foreigners published might not be original dis- 
coveries but only such things as should be already 
known in America. Mutis was appointed royal 
botanist and astronomer to the expedition for the 
northern part of South America, and two thou- 
sand doubloons were awarded to him to meet the 
expenses of completing his writings. Besides this 
he was given an annual salary of two thousand 
pesos. And under the king's orders, he was to be 
furnished with all the botanical and astronomical 
books and instruments that might be needed for 
the execution of the work entrusted to him. The 
second officer of the expedition was Elroy de 
Valenzuela, who was born in Giron, and had 
accompanied Mutis from that town to Bogota. 
Mutis evidently found in him a favorite protege, 
for on one occasion he wrote to him : ' ' Every let- 
ter which I receive from you is as precious to me 
as were my letters from the great Linnaeus." 8 

i Selaciones de Mando (Bibl. de Hist. National, VIII), 253. 
s Schumacher, Hermann A., Sudamerikanische Studien, Berlin, 
1884, 45. 



270 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Mutis was empowered to select the place where 
the bureau, or the headquarters of the expedition, 
should be established, and he chose Mariquita, a 
little town in the upper valley of the Magdalena 
river near Ibague. Here he commanded a large 
staff of assistants. Among them there were 
artists or draughtsmen. The majority of the 
artists came and went. Two, however, were 
especially noteworthy. One was Pablo Antonio 
Garcia, whose original talent, cultivated at Pam- 
plona, Bogota, and Ibague, entitled him to distinc- 
tion, and who was appointed draughtsman of the 
expedition. The other was a boy from Guaduas, 
who appeared at Mariquita, and who developed 
rapidly a marvellous talent for drawing plants. 
This was Francisco Javier Matiz. With the 
opportunities for instruction which he enjoyed in 
association with Mutis he became also a botanist. 



VII 

Mutis' retirement to Mariquita and the deter- 
mination of the viceroy to reside near the coast 
made subsequent communication between them 
infrequent. The king was desirous that the 
Isthmus of Darien should be protected against in- 
vasion, and by a decree of August 15, 1783, he 
made it the special duty of Caballero to see that 
this was accomplished. The viceroy's first step 
in responding to this obligation was to appoint 
Antonio de Arevalo to be the military commander 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 271 

of that region. Garrisons were established at 
various points along the coast, and a fleet of ves- 
sels was gathered at Cartagena to carry supplies 
to these posts. 

Arevalo occupied Caiman, Mandinga, and Con- 
ception; and later, Calidonia. To Calidonia he 
gave the name of Carolina del Darien. He pro- 
ceeded to bring together inhabitants for the dis- 
trict, and to construct forts for defense against 
the Indians. The British government, through 
the governor of Jamaica, ordered that no assist- 
ance should be furnished the Indians. This ap- 
pears to have persuaded them of the hopelessness 
of their attempts to resist the Spaniards, and they 
sent a representative to Cartagena, who took the 
oath of fidelity before the archbishop-viceroy in 
the name of the eight tribes for whom he acted. 
But this oath was not faithfully observed, and the 
Indians soon traitorously attacked fort Carolina. 
The intervention of Henry Hooper, an English- 
man, who had lived many years in the region and 
knew the language of the Indians contributed to 
the restoration of peace. He persuaded the In- 
dians to send a delegation to Cartagena to agree 
on terms of peace with the viceroy. Such an 
agreement was formed July 21, 1787. By the pro- 
visions of this treaty the Indians agreed not to 
trade with the British, to carry no arms but axes 
and machetes, not to take vengeance for griev- 
ances, but to refer all grievances to the proper 
authorities. In this way the hundred years ' con- 



272 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

flict with the barbarians of Darien was brought to 
an end by the energy and prudence of the viceroy, 
and with this ceased the hostilities that had been 
encouraged by the British and the Dutch. 

In dealing with this region, the viceroy had 
his attention called to the possibility of inter- 
ocean communication, and he informed the king 
that through Darien communication between the 
oceans by water might be effected without great 
difficulties. This had reference to the route by 
the Atrato and the San Juan rivers. More than 
fifty years earlier the possibility that foreigners 
might use this route appears to have been called 
to the attention of the Spanish government. A 
royal decree was issued, January 20, 1720, that 
imposed the death penalty on anyone who should 
navigate these rivers. 9 

Absorbed in the affairs of the coast, the vice- 
roy gradually ceased to be interested in the in- 
terior of the country. He no longer thought of 
returning to Bogota, and fixed his residence in 
Turbaco, not far from Cartagena. The need of 
funds to meet the expenses of his military under- 
takings led him to impose a succession of bur- 
densome taxes; and his interest in the botanical 
expedition, at first supported for expected scien- 
tific results, was now limited to the thought that 
it might be useful in exploiting the natural re- 
sources of the country for the Spanish market. 

a Schumacher, Sudamerikanische Studien, 50 ; Plaza, Nueva 
Granada, 401. 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 273 

VIII 

In the Relation handed to his successor, 
Caballero affirmed that in two years there had 
been sent to Spain, under the monopoly 21,271 
cases of quina weighing nearly four million and 
a half of pounds. This was expected to produce 
for the royal treasury more than 600,000 pesos. 
But in the enthusiastic viceroy 's view, ' ' The prin- 
cipal ornament and glory of the botanical expedi- 
tion was the discovery of the tea of Bogota, a 
most precious plant of great use in Asia and 
Europe, and of not less use in America, and 
which until now has been believed to be the exclu- 
sive product of China. The past year, 1786, the 
Director, Don Jose Mutis, gave me the first notice 
of it, and I sent to the court the samples which he 
handed to me, in order that they might be exam- 
ined anew; and in fact, from the careful and 
repeated chemical examinations that were made, 
it proved to be not only really tea, but also more 
aromatic and of superior quality to tea of Asia. ' n0 

The prospect of an advantageous foreign trade 
in the tea of Bogota, particularly with the Eng- 
lish, loomed above the viceroy's horizon, when he 
considered the difficulty in getting it from China. « 
"We have it in the valley of Bogota, near the city 
in great abundance," he continued, "and its cul- 
tivation may be increased to any extent ; and with 
the exception of a short journey by land to Honda, 

io Relaciones de Mando (Bibl. de Hist. National, VIII), 254. 



274 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

it may be carried by the Magdalena river to Car- 
tagena, and from there to Spain, an infinitely 
shorter and more secure journey than that from 
the East Indies. The government is able to give 
it all the protection that may be needed from its 
planting to its sale in the foreign country; and 
finally the tea of Bogota, may be the most im- 
portant product for exportation from the king- 
dom." 11 

With a similar practical end in view, the vice- 
roy supported the movement to put the mining 
industry on a better basis. Engineers and miners 
were brought from Europe and an organization 
for the administration of the mines was formed. 
This embraced a director of mines, a fiscal, and 
a large number of mining officials and practical 
miners. The general direction of the whole sys- 
tem devolved, as already suggested, upon Juan 
Jose d 'Elhuyar, who became intimately associated 
with Mutis; and the region about Mariquita be- 
came the seat of initial operations. 

IX 

The new viceroy, Francisco Gil y Lemus, 
appeared in New Granada commissioned to hold 
the residencia of Caballero, and then to proceed 
to Peru. But during the period of his residence, 
from January 8, to July 30, 1789, he displayed 
great activity. He visited Santana, the seat of 

ii Belaciones de Mando (Bibl. de Eisrt. National, VIII), 255. 



INTEKEST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 275 

D'Elhuyar's mining operations, where he found 
the German miners suffering from ill effects of 
the tropical climate, and where they were the 
object of popular opposition for their Protestant 
faith. At Mariquita he found that the years of 
work by Mutis and his staff of assistants had had 
almost exclusively a scientific purpose, and had 
contributed little to the practical economic results, 
which the kingdom's finances, with the indebted- 
ness of two million pesos, seemed to demand. 

After the short administration of Viceroy Gil 
y Lemus, Jose de Espeleta succeeded him at the 
end of July, 1789. Espeleta had been captain- 
general of Cuba for more than three years (De- 
cember 28, 1785, to April 18, 1789) and was thus 
not without experience in the affairs of America. 
Early in his reign, in 1791, the bureau of the 
Botanical Expedition was transferred to Bogota, 
thirty years after Mutis had entered that city. 
In these years Bogota had undergone a great 
change. It was becoming the fashion for men of 
cultivation to turn to new things. Societies, asso- 
ciations, and clubs were formed for discussions, 
from which not even political questions were 
excluded. Many persons had found the plain 
and simple manner of living unsatisfactory, and 
articles of luxury had begun to find a way into 
the country from France. The Creoles had ex- 
perienced an intellectual awakening, and had 
become conscious of their importance in the com- 
munity. Manual Socorro Rodriguez, the chief 



276 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

official of the Library of Bogota began with this 
year, the publication of a periodical devoted to 
literature and philosophy. Much attention began 
to be given to geographical studies, and studies 
in the natural sciences were introduced into the 
Colegio del Rosario. This movement derived its 
origin and principal impulse from men of a gen- 
eration younger than that of Mutis, some of whom 
were his pupils and assistants, who had come 
with him to Bogota from Mariquita, or who were 
his collaborators on the Flora Bogotana. 

The edifice prepared for the bureau on its 
transfer from Mariquita to Bogota, became known 
as the Botanical House. It furnished abundant 
room for Mutis' herbariums and the various col- 
lections that had been made in other departments 
in previous years, as well as working space for 
the enlarged staff. The number of Creoles among 
the assistants, in relation to the Europeans, was 
increasing. This was particularly true of the 
draughtsmen and the painters. In connection 
with the bureau there was established a school of 
drawing and painting, conducted by Salvador 
Rizo, who for three years had been the accountant, 
or business manager of the expedition. By the 
work of pupils of this school a new rate of prog- 
ress was had in the preparation of drawings and 
paintings for the proposed Flora Bogotana. 

The intellectual awakening in New Granada 
that marked the years of Mutis' activity was not 
due entirely to the progress of studies in the 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 277 

realm of nature. The events of the French Revo- 
lution became gradually known, and provided sub- 
jects for discussion among the members of the 
new generation. But the director of the expedi- 
tion was of another generation. Science still 
claimed Mutis' undivided attention. Although 
his later years were spent in the capital, he had 
little part in its conspicuous society. In spite of 
the publications directed against him in Spain by 
Sebastian Jose Lopez, the opinion of the Span- 
iards concerning him remained that to which 
Linnaeus had given expression. 12 



The botanical expedition to Peru was more 
properly called an expedition than that which 

12 Jos6 Celestino Mutis was born in Cadiz in 1732, and died in 
Bogota September 2, 1808. Some of the results of Ms investiga- 
tions were published in the proceedings of the Swedish Academy 
of Sciences. A part of his correspondence with Linnaeus is 
included in Smith's "Selection of the correspondence of Linnaeus 
with other Naturalists," London, 1821. A collection of papera 
entitled El arcano de la Quina with portrait, was published in 
Madrid in 1828. The material prepared for the Flora de Santa 
Fe de Bogota, was deposited in the archives of the Botanical 
Garden at Madrid. This consisted of a large number of manu- 
scripts, an extensive herbarium, and 6849 drawings of plants. 
Some of his monographs were Memoria de las palmas del Nuevo 
Beino de Granada (incomplete), Memoria sobre el Caryocar 
amygdaliferum, printed in Cavanilles' Icones, and Observaciones 
soore la vigilia y sueno de algunus plantas, in Botanical Garden 
of Madrid. An elaborate aceount of Mutis is found in Gredilla, 
A. Federico, Biografia de Jose Celestino Mutis con la relacidn de 
su viaje y estudios practicados en el Nuevo Beino de Granada, 
Madrid, 1911. 



278 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

appeared in New Granada. It was directed by 
Hipolito Buiz and Jose Pavon, who went from 
Spain and returned to Spain after they had fin- 
ished their survey and made their collections. 
This expedition left Cadiz November 4, 1777, and 
arrived at Callao April 8, 1778. It embraced, 
besides the directors, Joseph Dombey, "Galliarum 
Regis Medico, et Botanico egregio," and two 
draughtsmen, Joseph Brunete and Isidore do 
Galvez. 

In the preface to their Flora the directors give 
a general sketch of their survey, noting the regions 
explored, and giving some account of the material 
results of their researches. They first examined 
the country immediately about Lima, and sent to 
Spain, by the ship Buen Consejo, a large number 
of dried plants and two hundred and forty-two 
colored drawings. Their second field of investi- 
gation was the region about Tarma and Jauja, 
whence they passed to Huanuco, where they dis- 
covered seven species of Cascarillos. After their 
return to Lima, they went a little later to the 
province of Chancay, leaving Dombey at Lima. 

Chile, as well as Peru, was a part of the field 
assigned to Euiz and Pavon, as the directors of 
the Peruvian expedition. The descriptions of 
Chile by Feuvillee and Frazier facilitated the 
exploration of that country. The members of the 
expedition went to Chile by sea, and landed at 
Talcahuana. They surveyed the regions near 
Concepcion, Itata, Kene, and Arauco; and also 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 279 

the provinces of Puchocay, Maule, San Fernando, 
Bancagua, Santiago, and Quillota and some part 
of the region of the Andes. A shipment of fifty- 
two cases of the collections which they had made 
in two years was lost in the wreck of the San 
Pedro de Alcantara, that ran on the rocks at 
Peniche in Portugal, on the 2nd of February, 
1786. In order to repair this loss, the investiga- 
tors returned to Huanuco, and revisited various 
parts of that province; they advanced as far as 
the Huancabamba river, which was then the 
boundary between the lands of the settled inhab- 
itants and the territory of Indians still in their 
wild state. At the estate of Macora they spent 
two months, and here two persons, Juan Tafalla 
and Francisco Pulgar, became attached to the 
expedition in the capacity of student assistants, 
the former as a botanist and the latter as a 
draughtsman. 

Before the loss of the shipment on the San 
Pedro de Alacdntara the expedition encountered 
a disaster, on the 6th of August, 1786, in the burn- 
ing of the descriptions of plants, animals, and 
minerals made in Chile, and of the topographical 
accounts of the provinces of that kingdom and 
of Peru. At the same time there were burned 
large numbers of plants, birds, quadrupeds, and 
insects, together with equipment and supplies for 
three months. The expedition returned once more 
to Huanuco, and after this undertaking sent from 
Callao to Spain by the frigates El Pilar and El 
Brillante, seventy-three cases of natural products, 



280 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

eighteen pots of living plants, and five hundred 
and eighty-six drawings. 

The draughtsman Joseph Brunete died in 
Pasco in 1787, whither he had gone to receive the 
salaries of the expedition's personnel. The other 
members having returned to Lima, took leave of 
their pupils, Tafalla, who later became professor 
of Botany at Lima, and Pulgar, and embarked 
in the ship El Dragon on the first of April, 1788. 
They took with them their manuscripts, twenty- 
nine cases of natural products and one hundred 
and twenty-four living plants. After a voyage of 
somewhat more than five months, they landed at 
Cadiz, on the 12th of September. 

In the preface to their work, Florae Peruvi- 
anae, et Chilencis Prodromus, XV, Euiz and Pavon 
enumerated the toils they had endured and the 
dangers they had passed during the eleven years 
of their sojourn and wanderings in America. 
They had suffered, to quote their account, "heat, 
weariness, hunger, thirst, nakedness, wants of 
every kind, tempests, earthquakes, plagues of 
mosquitos and other insects, continual risks of 
being devoured by tigers, bears and other wild 
beasts, ambush by thieves and savage Indians, 
treachery of slaves, accidents from precipices, 
from the falling of the branches of the lofty trees 
of the forests, and from the passing of rivers and 
torrents, the burning of Macora, the shipwreck of 
the San Pedro de Alcantara, the separation from 
M. Dombey, the death of the draughtsman 
Brunete, and the loss of manuscrips." 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 281 

These two undertakings present certain points 
of contrast. The expedition to Peru was organ- 
ized in Spain; the members were appointed in 
Spain; and it proceeded to Peru to work with a 
large measure of independence for the attainment 
of its specific purpose. The expedition, as it 
appeared in New Granada, had to a large extent 
the character of a domestic institution, in the 
organization of which the viceroy was especially 
active. The director although born in Spain, had 
already at the time of his appointment, spent 
many years in scientific researches in America. 
The expedition in New Granada had also a much 
more powerful influence than that of Peru in 
educating youth and in promoting intellectual 
activity, particularly among the Creoles. 

The period of Mutis' effective work closed 
with the visit of Humboldt in 1801 ; after this event 
Francisco Caldas became the leader of scientific 
inquiry in New Granada. 13 

is The awakening interest in the scientific study of nature in 
all the Spanish Colonies was observed by Humboldt, and he affirms 
that "no European government has spent more considerable sums 
to increase knowledge of plants than the Spanish government." 
"All the researches made during twenty years in the most fertile 
regions of the new continent have not only enriched the domain 
of science with more than four thousand new species, but they 
have also contributed much to spread the taste for natural history 
among the inhabitants of the country." — Essai politique sur le 
royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne, Paris, 1811, 1, 120. 

On Caldas and his work, see Memoria historica soore la vida, 
cardcter, traoajos cientificos y literarios y servicios patrioticos de 
Francisco Jose de Caldas, in La Siesta, Bogota, 1852 ; also Vergara 
y Vergara, Historia de la literatura en Nueva Granada, Bogota, 
1905, cap. XIV; Groot, cap. XLI; Schumacher, Sudamerikanische 
Studien, Berlin, 1884. 



282 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



XI 

Other evidence of the intellectual awakening in 
Spanish South America is found in the new inter- 
est manifested by the Creoles in questions of gov- 
ernment. The transformation of the British 
colonies into the United States of America and the 
social explosion of France in the French Revo- 
lution filled the atmosphere of Europe and Amer- 
ica with a storm of new political ideas that swept 
over the carrier of Spain's protective system. 
Many Spanish traditions were thrown down, and 
the loyalty of the colonists, particularly the loy- 
alty of the Creoles, was everywhere thoroughly 
shaken. The effects were observed in all of the 
dependencies, but most distinctly in New Granada, 
where they were conspicuously illustrated by the 
career of Antonio Narino. In the last decade of 
the century Narino voiced the protest of an 
awakening people against Spain's unreasonable 
rule. He belonged to the same generation as the 
younger scientists who had grown up under the 
influence of Mutis ' investigations, but his thought 
was directed chiefly to the realm of social affairs. 
He was born at Bogota in 1760. 14 He studied at 
the Colegio de San Bartolome; and at the time of 
the reception of Gil y Lemus as viceroy of New 
Granada he was alcalde of his native city. Among 

i* El Precursor: Documentos sobre la vida publico, y privada del 
General Antonio Narino, Bogota, 1803 (Bibl. de hist, nacional, 
II). 2. 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 283 

his contemporaries he passed for a man of learn- 
ing. 15 The viceroy maintained especially friendly 
relations with him, and appointed him treasurer 
of the tithes. The canons of the ecclesiastical 
cabildo opposed this appointment on the ground 
that they alone had the right to appoint to this 
office. They appealed to the king who supported 
their contention. When their power had thus 
been recognized, they exercised it in appointing 
Narino, who had been appointed by the viceroy. 16 
Among his other enterprises, Narino had 
acquired a printing press. Having received a 
copy of a history of the constituent assembly of 
France from Captain Ramirez, an officer of the 
viceroy's guard, he copied Les Droits de V 'Homme 
from it. He translated this document into Span- 
ish and printed it on his press in the beginning of 
1794. He at first held the copies in reserve, but 
a few of them were distributed among Narino 's 
friends. One of these was discovered by a Span- 
iard, Francisco Carrasco, through whom knowl- 
edge of it became public, and by whom Narino 
was denounced to the viceroy. The viceroy was 
at Guaduas when he learned of this publication. 
On his arrival in Bogota he commissioned Joaquin 
Mosquera to institute proceedings against Narino. 

!5 One of the most enlightening documents of the collection 
called El Precursor (164^191), is the list of books contained in 
Narino 's library, and confiscated with the rest of his property by 
the government. 

16 Documents relating to this controversy are printed in El 
Precursor, 3-15. 



284 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

At the same time he authorized Juan Fernandez 
de Alva to prosecute a number of persons charged 
with conspiracy; and Joaquin Inclan to bring 
to trial certain persons for issuing pasquinades 
against the government. By the trials for sedi- 
tion and issuing the pasquinades a number of the 
accused were sentenced to imprisonment, and 
later were sent to Spain. When Narino was 
brought to trial, he affirmed that no other person 
had had any part in the publication of the docu- 
ment in question ; and he excused his act by saying 
that he had not published it to provoke a revolu- 
tion against the government, but merely as an 
economic speculation. When asked to deliver the 
copies, he replied that as soon as he learned that 
the subject was to be investigated he had burned 
them. The destruction of them appears to have 
been complete. 

The defense presented by Narino and his 
attorney Eicuarte maintained that publishing The 
Rights of Man was not a crime; that it was not 
pernicious, since the same principles were current, 
having been already printed in Spanish books, 
and consequently its further circulation should 
not be regarded as criminal; and that viewed in 
the light of reason and giving to the document 
its proper meaning, it could not be considered as 
prejudicial to the public interest. 17 

17 The document containing the defense offered by Narino in 
the case brought against him for publishing Los Derechos de 
Sombre and for other alleged offenses is found in El Precursor, 
51-110. 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 285 

The evidence presented by Narifio was not 
accepted as exculpating him, and he was sentenced 
to imprisonment in Africa for a period of ten 
years. He was sent to Spain with a number of 
other persons who had been convicted on charges 
relating to conspiracy and the issuing of pas- 
quinades. On arriving at Cadiz, Narino took 
advantage of the confusion at the port, escaped, 
and went to Madrid. The other persons whose 
cases were referred to the Council of the Indies, 
and who were conducted to Madrid, were Louis 
Bieux, Manuel Froes, Jose Ayala, Sinf oroso Mutis, 
Francisco Zea, Ignacio Sandino, Pedro Pradilla, 
Bernardo Cifuentes, Jose Maria Cabal, and 
Enrique Umana. Besides the ten persons sent by 
the audiencia under grave charges, five others 
were brought to the attention of the Council of 
the Indies as minor offenders. The decision of 
the Council respecting all of these was that they 
should be set free and placed in full possession 
of all their rights, and be permitted to continue 
their studies and professions as if no proceedings 
against them had been taken. Their property, 
which had been confiscated, should be restored to 
them without cost ; and those having a legal domi- 
cile in New Granada should be returned to Bogota, 
or to the towns of their previous residence. Bieux 
having no legal residence in that dependency, 
might not return to it without permission granted 
by the king, who, however, found it just that Bieux 
should be allowed to return and recover his prop- 



286 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

erty. Twelve of these persons were young men 
under thirty years of age. Of the others, the 
Frenchman Bieux was the oldest, forty-four, while 
Ayala and Cifuentes were thirty-three and thirty- 
four respectively. Narino was thirty-four, and 
thus the whole group was composed of men who 
were about to assume, or who had already assumed 
recently, the duties and the obligation of the new 
generation. 18 

XII 

From Madrid Narino fled to France, where he 
remained until he considered himself in danger. 
At Paris he fell in with Jose Caro, a Cuban, who 
was urging the French revolutionary government 
to support an insurrection that he had projected 
in Peru. At Paris he also interviewed Tallien, 
and presented to him a project for bringing about 
a revolt in New Granada, and for transforming 
the viceroyalty into a republic. To this propo- 
sition Tallien replied that although he could not 
support the project publicly, because of the peace 
existing between France and Spain, in secret he 
would furnish such assistance as might be pos- 
sible, so arranging affairs that the Spaniards 
would not send a fleet of sufficient force to prevent 
the contemplated movement. At the same time he 
affirmed that in England more effective action 
might be taken. 19 

is This decision is printed in El Percursor, 121-143. 
is El Percursor, 217. 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 287 

Encouraged by this statement, Narino went to 
London, where he endeavored to form a plan to 
promote an insurrection in New Granada, and to 
make an agreement under which Great Britain 
would furnish arms, munitions, and a squadron 
that would attack Cartagena and by making use 
of the Orinoco take advantage of the resources 
of the interior of the country. Narino 's note to 
Pitt on this subject remained unanswered; he, 
however, obtained an interview with Lord Liver- 
pool. From London Narino returned to Paris. 
Then he went to St. Bartholomew by way of Bor- 
deaux. Afterwards he passed over to St. Thomas, 
and later to Curazao. From the islands he went 
to New Granada, and proceeded to the capital in 
disguise. 20 

Espeleta's administration ended January 2, 
1797, and on the same day his successor, Pedro 
Mendinueta (1797-1803), assumed the duties of 
the viceregal office. Complete tranquility pre- 
vailed at this time throughout the country ; but the 
report that Narino had escaped and had returned 
to New Granada caused a certain popular agita- 
tion. This news was satisfactory to the radicals, 
but it alarmed the conservatives. 

In his Relacion to his successor, Mendinueta 
affirmed that "one of the greatest tasks of the 
government was that of maintaining good order 
in internal affairs, public peace, and submission 
to the magistrates, a task which in more fortunate 

20 El Precursor, Preface. 



288 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

times cost little anxiety. Communication with 
foreigners by means of contraband ; the introduc- 
tion of books and public papers prohibited as 
prejudicial to religion and the state ; certain flat- 
tering maxims imperfectly understood; a philo- 
sophical fanaticism, and more than all a spirit 
demanding always something new, succeeded in 
turning some few heads and making them adopt 
various notions which they announce as their own 
ideas. In these circumstances is found the origin 
of the changes and the radical doctrines manifest 
in the capital in 1794. ' m 

Narino was, in fact, already in Bogota, under 
the protection of the archbishop, by whom ad- 
vances in his behalf were made to the viceroy. 
On the 30th of July, 1797, Narino addressed a 
communication to Mendinueta, giving an account 
of his sojourn in France and England, and of his 
interviews with Lord Liverpool, with whom he 
had discussed the question of subjecting his coun- 
try to foreign domination, and the proposition 
that England should offer assistance with arms, 
munitions, and a squadron that would cruise off 
New Granada and prevent the entrance of succor 
from Spain. It was agreed that, in consideration 
of this assistance, certain advantages respecting 
commerce with New Granada would be accorded 
to the British. This document closed with the fol- 

2i Belaciones re Mando (Bibl. de hist. National, III), 584. 
"La capital del virreinato era un foco de ardoroso patriotismo, 
unido al deseo mas violento de aprender y de estudiar todas la3 
eieneias. " — Buletin de historic y antigiiedades, II, 676. 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 289 

lowing remarkable profession of conversion by 
Narino : 

"I hope that, reestablished in the sovereign con- 
fidence of the king by your Excellency, I shall be able 
to employ the rest of my days in repairing the past and 
giving authentic and unequivocal proof of my repent- 
ance, occupying all the moments of my life in the service 
of both their Majesties. And if resentment led me to the 
borders of the precipice, I assure your Excellency that 
from today onward my obligation and the recognition 
of his great goodness will lead me even to shedding the 
last drop of my blood in the service of the king, at whose 
royal feet, humbly prostrated and with the most pro- 
found respect, I implore his sovereign piety, in order 
that in his personal goodness he may deign not only to 
grant me pardon for my past errors, but that, restoring 
me to his royal confidence, which is what my heart 
earnestly desires, I may remain in such a state that by 
my works I may be able to give evidence of my repent- 
ance and of being able to come to the support of my 
disgraced country. ' ' 

On the 4th of August, 1797, the viceroy asked 
for an elucidation of certain passages of this com- 
munication, concluding with the statement that if 
in good faith Narino wished to render this service 
to the sovereign, in accordance with his protesta- 
tions, he could not do less than to reply categori- 
cally to the government. 22 

In responding to this request Narino made an 
elaborate and detailed comment on his narrative, 
and on the 11th of September, 1797, Mendinueta 
granted him amnesty, and sent a report of this 

22 El Precursor, 238-246. 



290 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

action to the king for confirmation. The king, 
however, ordered that Narino should not be lib- 
erated until after the conclusion of peace. 

It is not probable that any concession by the 
king at this time would have prevented Narino 
from ultimately becoming a factor in the struggle 
for independence; but by accepting his promised 
loyalty, the most forceful early advocate of 
emancipation would have been withheld from the 
movement, at least in its preliminary stages. 

During the period of these events the govern- 
ment of the United States had become more 
thoroughly organized, and the officers and people 
of New Granada were receiving abundant infor- 
mation of the hopeful prospects of the young 
republic. From France, moreover, came reports 
of the overthrow of feudalism and absolute govern- 
ment and the abolition of political privileges; the 
announcement of the sovereignty of the people; 
that the essential basis of government was equal- 
ity before the law, the liberty of the individual, 
freedom of conscience, of speech, and of the press ; 
the right of all citizens to be elected or appointed 
to public office; the just distribution of the bur- 
dens of taxation; the responsibility of public 
officials; and the security and inviolability of 
property. It was not merely the doctrines of lib- 
erty that reached the governors and the people 
of the dependencies. They learned of the spread 
of these doctrines in Europe, the transformation 
of governments, and the rise of new republics, in 



INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 291 

France, in the Netherlands, in Italy, and the 
popular revolt of the Poles against their oppres- 
sors. The forces that caused the disappearance 
of colonial isolation and ignorance overturned the 
cornerstone of Spanish rule. In New Granada 
the rest of the foundation was wrecked by the 
indolence, the corruption, the political blindness, 
and stupidity of Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbon, 
who succeeded Mendinueta in 1803. 



CHAPTEE XI 

LIMA AND SANTIAGO AT THE END OF THE 
CENTURY 

I. The position and external form of Lima. II. The 
earthquake of 1746. III. The court of the viceroy 
and the institutions of Lima. IV. Social char- 
acteristics. V. Santiago de Chile. VI. The classes. 



The city of Lima presented the most advanced 
phase of social development in Spanish South 
America at the end of the eighteenth century. It 
was the residence of the highest officers of the 
government and of the most important dignitaries 
of the church. Here resided, moreover, a consid- 
erable body of titled nobles, and here the differ- 
entiation of the social classes was carried to the 
extreme, giving to the city many of the features 
of an Old-World capital. 

In Mexico the Spaniards had established their 
capital at the center of the dominant Indian com- 
munity. To have followed this example in Peru 
would have placed the new city at an inconvenient 
elevation, and in a position difficult of access from 
the sea. In Mexico the Spaniards wished to live 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 293 

away from the unsanitary coast. In Peru the 
valley of the Eimac near the coast offered an 
agreeable and healthful climate and an abundance 
of pure water for the use of a city and for irri- 
gation in a rainless region. The population of 
Lima at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
was 57,250. It had increased to 60,000 in 1746. 
The earthquake of that year caused a loss of be- 
tween 6000 and 8000 persons; and, therefore, in 
1755 the number of the inhabitants was only 
54,000. In 1781 the number had again reached 
60,000, and during the next nine years there was 
a loss of 7373. It may be presumed that by the 
end of the century there was a certain increase 
over the 52,627 given as the population in 1790, 
but the amount of this increase has not been 
accurately determined. 1 

When Tadeo Haenke wrote his description of 
Lima, the city was still surrounded by walls. 
These walls were between eighteen and twenty - 
five feet high, without moat or outworks. They 
enclosed an area that was about a mile in extent 
from north to south, and about the same extent 
from east to west. It was divided into two parts 
by the river Eimac. Communication between 
these two parts passed over the stone bridge built 
during the administration of Montesclaros. At 
first there was a wooden bridge, and later the 
Marquis of Canete, while viceroy, caused a bridge 

i Mercurio Peruano, February 3, 1791 (I, 97) ; Present State 
of Peru, 139-141. 



294 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

to be constructed of brick near the site of the 
present stone bridge. This was subsequently de- 
stroyed by the force of the water. Then, several 
years after its destruction, the present structure 
was begun, in 1608, and two years later it was 
completed. The plans were made by Friar Gero- 
nimo Villegas, a native of Lima, and the work 
was carried on under the direction of Juan de 
Corral. The expenses of the construction were 
met in part by a tax of two reals on every sheep 
consumed in the city, and by certain contributions 
required of other cities in the viceroyalty. Some 
of these cities were unable to see any justice in 
being required to pay for work that lay entirely 
beyond the limits of their jurisdiction ; and Quito, 
in particular, complained at being compelled to 
furnish this assistance. The total cost of the 
structure, including the replacing the arch that 
was thrown down by the earthquake of 1746, was 
seven hundred thousand pesos. 

The principal plaza, now only a breathing 
place for the citizens, a place of rest and recre- 
ation, appears to have been used as a market at 
the end of the eighteenth century. It was sup- 
plied abundantly with products of Europe and 
America. Negresses generally conducted the 
sales, "and judging from their good clothing and 
the manner in which they conduct themselves one 
may conclude that many of them pass a life of 
comfort and the most of them acquire wealth." 2 

2 Haenke, Tades, Description del Peru, Lima, 1901, 3. 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 295 

The principal streets were broad and straight, 
dividing the city into blocks one hundred and fifty 
yards square, and were paved and kept notably 
clean. Many of the houses were large, built about 
one or more patios, or courts, and were con- 
structed of adobes and of studs interwoven with 
cane or bamboo, and covered with plaster or 
stucco. The roofs, in the absence of rain, were 
of little importance, except to keep out the sun, 
and were in many cases formed of a framework 
of timber and reeds covered with earth. This 
form of construction, particularly the basketwork 
walls covered with plaster, were thought to be 
well adapted, by their lack of rigidity, to with- 
stand the shocks of the frequent earthquakes. 
There were, in the last decade of the eighteenth 
century, 3641 houses in the city, which was divided 
into thirty-five wards, in each of which there was 
an alcalde de barrio elected to watch over the par- 
ticular interests of his ward, and who was subject 
to the central authority. 

II 

The inhabitants of Lima entered upon the 
second half of the eighteenth century with the 
task of reconstructing the city only partially 
accomplished. The earthquake of 1746 had trans- 
formed a large part of the buildings into masses 
of ruins, and those persons who had occupied the 
houses destroyed had sought safety in the public 



296 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEE 

squares and in the suburbs. At the time of the 
earthquake, after the first stupefying effect of the 
shock had passed, and the inhabitants had learned 
that a tidal wave had completely destroyed Callao, 
and even carried ships from the harbor directly 
over the town, they were seized by an unreason- 
able fear that the same calamity might overtake 
them. A rumor was spread through all the city 
that the sea was rising and advancing towards 
Lima. Apparently forgetting that the city was 
six miles from Callao and five hundred feet above 
the level of the sea, they were seized by a panic 
that prevented all sober reflection, and sent them 
in wild confusion towards the neighboring moun- 
tains. 

The number of victims of the earthquake and 
the flood in Lima and Callao is set down at some- 
what more than sixteen thousand. Some of the 
members of the clergy added to the terror of the 
event by noisily proclaiming that the catastrophe 
was a Divine punishment for the sins of the 
people. The provincial of the San Franciscans 
preached against those persons who had affirmed 
that the earthquake was the effect of natural 
causes. The destruction of the shops and the 
bakeries caused an immediate scarcity of pro- 
visions ; but the embarrassment was soon removed 
by the influx of food from the country, and by the 
arrival of ships from Chile with cargoes of wheat. 
A greater source of danger appeared in the pos- 
sible infection from the large number of unburied 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 297 

bodies of men and animals. And to these evils 
was added the plundering of the dead and the 
ruins by bands of outlaws. 

Ill 

Somewhat of the social character of Lima was 
due to the fact that the city was the residence of 
the viceroy of Peru. Representing the king, he 
maintained much of the style of royalty. He was 
attended by two companies of guards, one of 
cavalry and one of halberdiers. Before 1784 the 
cavalry company contained one hundred and 
forty-seven men, but in that year it was reduced 
to a captain and thirty-four men. The halberdiers 
were reduced to a captain and twenty-four men. 
When the viceroy drove through or about the city, 
four of the cavalrymen preceded him and four 
followed. His court was made to resemble that of 
a European monarch. The presence in Lima of 
a group of families distinguished by their wealth 
or titles contributed to the imitation. The highest 
title in this society was that of duke, held by 
Formin de Carvajal y Vargas, who was born in 
Chile in 1722. His father, Luis de Carvajal, was 
a regidor of Concepcion. Formin de Carvajal 
was later an alcalde of Lima, a familiar of the 
inquisition, and an incumbent of other important 
offices. As holder of the office of correo mayor, 
he received the revenues of the post-office, and 
when these were resumed by the crown, in 1768. 



298 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Charles III granted him as compension an annual 
income of fourteen thousand dollars. Eleven 
years later, in 1779, he was made Duke of San 
Carlos, a grandee of Spain of the first class, and 
a field marshal. 

Among the institutions established at Lima, 
the most conspicuous was the royal audiencia, 
created in 1546. At the end of the eighteenth 
century, it was composed of a regent, eight judges, 
four alcaldes de corte, and two prosecuting attor- 
neys. The viceroy was the president. For the 
administration of justice, the audiencia was 
organized in three divisions. Two divisions, com- 
posed of oidores, or judges, considered civil cases, 
while the third division, composed of the alcaldes 
de corte, dealt with criminal cases. 

The superior council of the royal treasury was 
composed of the viceroy as president, and five 
members including the regent of the audiencia. 
Created in 1784, the principal object of this body 
was to supervise the affairs of the treasury and 
the economical affairs of the department of war. 
A court of accounts, properly a bureau of audit- 
ing; a bureau charged with making a census of 
Indians ; a commercial tribunal known as the con- 
sulado ; a court of mines ; and the royal mint were 
some of the other institutions established at Lima. 3 
There were various other organizations or offices 
that helped to give the city the appearance and 
character of a capital. Among these were the 

s On the institutions of Lima, see Memorias de los vireyes, 
VI, 79-86. 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 299 

University of San Marcos, the central post-office, 
the commission for managing the royal monopo- 
lies, the custom-house, and the commission for 
managing the royal monte de piedad, or pawn- 
shop. There were established here also a large 
number of religious orders, that had acquired a 
large amount of property and were receiving 
extensive annual revenues. 4 

4 The following tabular statement presents the religious houses 

in Lima at the period in question, together with the numbers of 

the members and the amounts of their annual revenues stated in 

dollars : 

No. of 
Dominicans : members Revenues 

Convento grande del Eosario 146 $35,389 

Santa Eosa 9 2,519 

Magdalena 19 8,869 

Santo Tomas _ 30 6,802 

Franciscans, three monasteries: 

Convento grande de Jesus 161 

College of San Buenaventura de Guade- 

lupe 20 

Eecoleceion 33 

Augustinians, three houses: 

Casa grande 129 34,150 

Eecoleceion de Guia 9 1,928 

University of San Ildefonso 30 4,104 

Mercedarios, three houses: 

Casa grande 140 19,922 

Eecoleceion de Bethlem 16 2,945 

College of San Pedro Nolasco 34 3,900 

Order of San Francisco de Paula. 42 7,139 

Hospitalarios de San Juan de Dios 43 4,561 

Agonizantes, two houses: 

Convento de Nuestra Senora de la 

Buena Muerte 53 19,724 

Santa Liberata 5 2,500 

Oratorio de San Felipe Neri 41 3,283 

Hospitium of St. Benedict 2 1,630 



No. of 




lembers 


Revenues 


22 


3,640 


2 


1,630 


572 


119,504 


210 


5,300 


12 




12 


1,141 


11 




5 





300 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Beletmitas, two houses: 

Casa grande 

Casa de Incurables 

Fourteen Convents of Nuns 

Beaterios, or houses inhabited by pious 

women : 
Beal Casa de Amparados de la 

Purisima Concepeion 210 

Nuestra Sefiora de Copacabana 

Santa Bosa de Viterbo 

Patroeinio 

Camilas „ 

Beal Casa de Ejercieios, retreat for 

religious women 1,200 

A less detailed statement is found in the Belacion by Viceroy 
Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, made on the basis of the 
enumeration of 1791; it gives the number of monks as 1100, nuns 
as 572, and beatas as 84. — Memorias de los vireyes, VI, 28. 

Besides these houses devoted exclusively to 
the life of the religious, there were also many 
hospitals and other institutions having charitable 
or public purposes, that were directed and con- 
trolled by the church. But the large amount of 
wealth held by the religious orders may not be 
taken as conclusive evidence* that the king of 
Spain and the Council of the Indies favored the 
accumulation of real property in the hands of the 
church. The following statement in the Laws of 
the Indies points to an opposite view: "Let the 
lands be distributed reasonably among the dis- 
coverers and pobladores antiguos and their de- 
scendants, who may remain in the country, and let 
them not be able to sell them either to a church or 
to a monastery or to any other ecclesiastical per- 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 301 

son, under pain of the lands reverting to the king 
and being conferred upon other persons." 5 

This law, however, like many others made 
for the Indies with excellent intentions, was not 
effective; for real property was brought into the 
hands of ecclesiastics to such an extent that, as it 
has been said, "secular persons came to be 
mere administrators of estates possessed by the 
church." 6 In Lima and some of the other cities, 
the monasteries owned a large part of all the real 
estate ; and in the middle of the eighteenth century 
it was said ' ' there are but few who do not pay rent 
to the church, either for their houses or their 
farms. ' " 

IV 

From contemporary records we are able to 
derive a sufficiently clear idea of the personal 
qualities of the inhabitants of Lima as well as of 
their general activity, during the last years of 
Spanish rule. They were generous, and spent 
their money lavishly, often going beyond reason- 
able limits even to their ruin. This was particu- 
larly true of the Creoles, who, perhaps recognizing 
their social inferiority, sought to overcome this 
prejudice by extravagant display. There was lit- 
tle crime among them, but, when a crime had been 

s Leyes de Indias, lib. 4, tit. 12, ley 10. 
e Oliveira, 27, 28. 

7 A True and Particular Relation of the Dreadful Earthquake, 
London, 1748, 279, 280. 



302 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

committed, their inclination to mercy led them to 
seek to protect the culprit. This humanity was 
manifested also in their treatment of their slaves. 
It was very rare that slaves complained of severe 
treatment by their masters. Living in a society 
dominated by the viceroy, the inhabitants of Lima 
acquired somewhat of the refinements and formal- 
ity of manners characteristic of dwellers near a 
royal court. Their desire for wealth and its uses 
led even members of illustrious houses to oppose 
the prejudices that existed in Spain, and engage 
openly in trade. They possessed a peculiar pride, 
or vanity, which tended to manifest itself in ex- 
travagant sentiments and statements concerning 
their surroundings. In their language every 
white man was a caballero; every instrumental 
concert was an opera; every man with the ele- 
ments of education was a savant; and any one 
showing any evidence of devotion was a saint or 
an angel. They were given to pleasure and 
gambling, and in general to a life of entertain- 
ment and idleness. Idolizers of women, they 
almost always held their own wives in little 
esteem. The youth were easily corrupted, and 
the luxury of the demi-monde indicated that a 
large number of contributions were made to their 
wealth. 

"Lima," says Haenke, "like the cities of 
Spain, has its bull-ring where bull-fights are held 
at appointed times. The bull-fighters, the most 
active and daring, have the custom of hamstring- 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 303 

ing the bull if he will not attack. The people of 
Lima count among their public amusements the 
drama, for the representation of which they have 
a sufficiently capacious theatre. Good order and 
neatness are maintained in the treatre in spite of 
the fact that the spectators smoke during the 
play. The decorations are mediocre, and the 
actors are ordinary. Generally no other plays are 
given than those which we call magic or religious 
plays. The public applauds them heartily, and 
the time appears still very remote when these 
coarser productions will be driven from the 
stage, which, far from instructing, vitiate the 
understanding and confirm bad taste." 8 

Among the popular amusements of the city, 
pelota and cock-fighting were especially conspicu- 
ous, and furnished occasions for extensive betting. 
The cock-fights were at first held in the streets, 
public squares, and vacant lots. In 1762 Viceroy 
Amat, acting on a proposition by Juan Garial, 
ordered the construction of a cockpit, Garial bind- 

s Haenke, Tadeo, Description del Peru, Lima, 1901, 29. 

Before the year 1771 cafes were not known in Lima. This year 
Francisco Serio proposed to establish a cafe, and his project was 
supported by Viceroy Manuel de Amat. This was a new institu- 
tion and was much frequented. Its extensive patronage induced 
a person called Salazar to open another the next year. This 
second cafe was known as Francisquin ; later it became an inn, 
the Leon de Oro. Serio 's venture proved so profitable that in 1775 
he opened a larger place called Cafe de las Animas. A third cafe 
was established near the bridge, called the Cafe de Puente. Others 
were established later, but the first three or four were extensively 
patronized, and through their influence the cafe became a favorite 
place of resort. — Mendiburu, Apuntes historicos, 79, 82; Mercurio 
Peruano, I, 108-111. 



304 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ing himself to pay annually five hundred pesos to 
the hospital of San Andres, and one thousand 
pesos into the treasury of the city. This pit was 
constructed in the plaza of Santa Catalina. The 
fights were held on holidays and two other days 
of the week. 

The basis of the life and prosperity of Lima 
was commerce. The precious metals from the 
mines and the wares from Europe were received 
and forwarded or distributed by the inhabitants of 
the city. But in 1794 Arica had begun to receive 
European goods, and this took away from Lima, 
the trade of the rich provinces of Cuzco and 
Arequipa. 9 The increase of direct shipments be- 
tween Spain and Buenos Aires helped, moreover, 
to detract from Lima 's trade ; and the disappear- 
ance of the corregidor as the sole trader in his 
district diminished materially the demand for 
wares at Lima. In connection with these facts, 
and perhaps as their consequence, there was ob- 
served a marked increase in the number of the 
unemployed. 10 

The inquisition continued throughout the cen- 
tury to maintain its principal colonial office at 
Lima, and here it continued its nefarious inquiries 
and its fiendish punishments. 

9 Memorias de los vireyes, VI, 121. 

10 ' ' Discurso sobre el destino que debe darse a la gente vaga 
que tiene Lima," by Joseph Ignacio de Legunada, in Mercurio 
Peruano for February 16, 1794 (X, 115). The author of the 
Discurso called attention to the fact that the son of an artisan 
•was not willing to follow the career of his father, preferring, in 
case no other occupation was at hand, to join the ranks of the 
unemployed. 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 305 



In Peru the sandy lowlands near the coast and 
the mountains of the interior made life in towns 
or cities the preferred form of existence ; but the 
physical characteristics of Chile, the fertile lands 
and the agreeable climate, rendered rural life 
there to such an extent attractive that the inhab- 
itants had in a large measure resisted the efforts 
that had been made to cause them to live in cities. 
At the end of the century two-thirds of the 
population were still living scattered about the 
country, on the estates or at the mines. Except 
Santiago, no city had more than six thousand 
inhabitants. Conception had about five thousand. 
The cities next in size were Valparaiso and 
Serena. After these came Chilian and Talca. 
Each of the last two had about four thousand 
inhabitants. In general the dwellers in the cities 
had few opportunities for getting information of 
events in other countries, and at the same time 
they had very little interest in such events. But, 
as the majority of the cities were small, they were 
intensely interested in local feuds and factions. 
These arose naturally where the towns were 
isolated, and where large numbers of persons were 
idle and without incentives to higher aspirations. 
There were no amusements but card-playing, 
bowling, cock-fighting, and horse-racing. 

Santiago, the capital of the colony, the resi- 
dence of the governor, or the captain-general, the 



306 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

seat of the audiencia, was the center of the most 
pretentious society of Chile. It had about thirty 
thousand inhabitants. With respect to its public 
buildings it was not below the standard of Lima 
or Mexico. But the private houses were generally 
simple, one-story structures, and the interior fur- 
nishings were necessarily plain, on account of the 
expensiveness of European wares and the rude- 
ness of nearly all colonial products. The streets 
were usually dirty, but this feature of the city's 
affairs was greatly improved under the republic. 
The practice of burying larged numbers of bodies 
in the churches led to "the propagation of epi- 
demics that made great ravages among the 
inhabitants. The churches in which the soil was 
constantly removed for new burials emitted an 
unhealthy and pestiferous odor, which made it 
necessary to open and ventilate them every morn- 
ing before the faithful assembled." 11 

I In Santi ago, as in the other important Span- 
ish-American capitals, there was a limited class 

( of men who had acquired titles of nobility, and 
whose wealth enabled them to live in luxury as 

^compared with the bulk of the inhabitants. Cor- 
vallo, describing them, said: "They use costly 

^ carriages and fine liveries, and show themselves 
on the public drives, and visiting and at balls with 

j rich costumes and valuable jewels." 12 The city 
had no public market, but the plaza in front of 

11 Barros Arana, Hist, de Chile, VII, 459. 

12 Bescripcidn historico-geogrdfioa, Part II, Chap. 4. 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 307 

the cathedral was used for this purpose. The 
streets were not lighted, except as those who went 

. out at night or their servants carried lanterns. 
The state of the city in this respect was an in- 
centive to vice and disorder. But the character 
of many of the lower class made any incentive 
of this kind superfluous, for "drunkenness was a 
vice much more common than in our day, as were 
also robbery, brawls^ and assassinations. ' m Beg- 
ging had attained such alarming proportions that 
many persons were inclined to seek a remedy, and 
hoped to find it in the development of industries ; 
and to this end they sought to suppress the 
obstacles that had stood in the way of industrial 
progress. 
f The filth, the vice, the ignorance, and the lack 

I of sanitary measures and of proper medicinal 

.remedies, both in the country and in the cities, in 
spite of the general healthfulness of the climate, 

\ made it possible for diseases to become epidemic. 
In the records of the municipal council of Santi- 
ago, the existence of the epidemics was carefully 
noted, as was also the action taken to provide 
prayers, offerings, and processions to allay the 
evil. But the records give no pathological indi- 
cations sufficient to inform us of the character of 
the diseases in question. From other sources, 
however, it is known that syphilis and smallpox 
were two of the diseases that spread their ravages 
through the colony. Smallpox was first intro- 
duced into Chile in 1561, and from time to time 

is Barros Arana, Hist, de Chile, VII, 463. 



308 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

throughout the colonial period it appeared and 
carried off its victims by thousands. In 1765, the 
municipal council of Santiago recorded the fact 
that, in the few preceding months, smallpox had 
caused the death of more than five thousand per- 
sons. In 1788-1789 the city of Conception, having 
a population of not more than six thousand, lost 
fifteen hundred by smallpox. The ravages of the 
disease, as it swept through the cities and over 
the country, left horror and desolation in its path. 
Those persons who escaped death were often 
greatly disfigured, and many of them were left 
blind. Its appearance in one province, Santiago 
or Conception, led the other province to establish 
a quarantine line along the river Maule, but the 
precautions were always ineffective. In the last 
half of the century successful vaccination was 
introduced, but it could not be made general. 
Except among the cultivated classes, it met with 
insurmountable opposition. 

VI 

In the society of Chile where a small minority 
of the inhabitants — the Spaniards and the Cre- 
oles — sought to preserve the lines of class separa- 
tion, the mestizos constituted a large lower class, 
the members of which found it difficult to keep 
above the line of positive misery. They inherited 
vices as well as virtues from both of the races 
from which they were descended. The mestizos, 
like their ancestors on the side of the Indians, 



LIMA AND SANTIAGO 309 

were both physically and mentally strong; yet 
they were rough, malicious, superstitious, given 
to gambling, intoxicating drinks, and robbery, and 
they were easily drawn into bloody quarrels. 
They might have become a powerful factor in the 
material progress of the country, if the political 
authorities and the upper class had known how 
to provide the conditions in which their labor 
would have been demanded. But in the isolation 
imposed by nature and under the restrictive legis- 
lation imposed by Spain, there was only a limited 
market for the wares which the country might 
most readily produce, and as a consequence those 
persons who might have become most effective 
laborers were wasted, without employment, in 
recklessness and poverty. There was no lack of 
laborers to complete promptly the wheat harvest 
in spite of its abundance, or to perform the work 
of the vintage. The market was inadequate to 
receive the wares that were produced, or, espe- 
cially, that would have been produced if all the 
laborers had been employed. These circum- 
stances made the increase of vagrancy inevitable. 
Negroes formed only a small part of the 
colonial population of Chile. The first colonists, 
instead of buying negroes, availed themselves of 
the labor of the Indians, with little or no cost. 
There were, however, three or four thousand 
African slaves in Chile before the middle of the 
seventeenth century, but a later rise in their 
price caused many to be transported to Peru and 



310 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

there sold; and, but for the prohibition of the 
governor, all of them would probably have been 
taken away. Valparaiso was the port from which 
the slaves were shipped ; and with this beginning, 
it became a somewhat important market for slaves 
brought from Africa by way of Buenos Aires. 
Many negroes and mulattoes born in Chile were 
also sold there for transportation to Peru. The 
low wages of free laborers in Chile made it un- 
profitable to keep slaves, particularly since the 
price had risen from 250 to 600 dollars. Yet at 
the close of the eighteenth century, there were in 
Chile ten or twelve thousand negroes and mulat- 
toes, including both sexes. Of this number only 

f four or five thousand were slaves, and these were 
almost all in domestic service. They were kept by 

[ the wealthy families largely for ostentation. 
They were generally dressed well, sometimes in 
showy livery, and were treated with kindness. 

! Some of them who appeared to be sufficiently 
intelligent and trustworthy, were made superin- 
tendents on estates in the country, while others 
[were taught trades. They became tailors and 
shoemakers, and made the clothing and shoes for 
the family of their masters. Among the negroes 
and mulattoes who were free, there were tailors, 
shoemakers, carpenters, silversmiths, and some 
who followed other trades. Those living in Santi- 
ago formed a small battalion, under officers of 
the white race; and in the struggle for indepen- 
dence they rendered important service in the 
battle of Maipo. 



CHAPTEB XII 

THE STATE OF VENEZUELA AND MIRANDA'S 
EXPEDITION 

I. External attempts to overthrow Spanish rule. II. 
The captaincy-general at Venezuela. III. The 
revolt led by Espana and Gual in 1797. IV. 
Manners and sentiments of the inhabitants of 
Venezuela. V. The unemployed and the remedy. 
VI. The economic confusion in the province. VII. 
Miranda's project. VIII. Plans of Great Britain 
and the United States. IX. The expedition from 
the United States. 



The internal rebellions and conspiracies against 
the government of Spain's dependencies in South 
America were followed by assaults relying on 
external support. The primary aim of the inter- 
nal revolts was relief from burdensome taxes. 
The objects of the external attacks were commer- 
cial and political advantages. If the revolting 
colonies had plans for the overthrow of the gov- 
ernment, such plans were developed only after 
reform had appeared to be impossible. For many 
years Great Britain and France had coveted the 



312 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

opportunities for wealth and political power 
offered by Spain's American possessions. The 
inhabitants had, therefore, reason to suppose that 
their appeals to foreign governments for assist- 
ance would be successful, since they were ad- 
dressed to the cupidity and political ambition of 
those governments. Negotiations concerning 
those appeals were a part of the elaborate web 
of European diplomacy in the century's later 
decades. 

Two conspicuous late attempts from without 
to overthrow the Spanish authority before the 
beginning of the campaign for independence 
were the invasion of Venezuela by Francisco de 
Miranda, with men enlisted in the United States, 
and the taking of Buenos Aires by the British. 1 
Miranda was a native of Caracas, and much of his 
remarkable activity was directed to obtaining for- 
eign support for his revolutionary project. His 
first conference with Pitt concerning the emanci- 
pation of the colonies was held in February, 1790. 
At this time the plans of the revolutionists had 
become definite. The free and independent state 

i The expeditions of Admiral Vernon and Commodore Anson 
were undertaken, if not with a conscious determination to over- 
throw completely the rule of Spain in South America, at least to 
open the colonial ports to British trade. Vernon expected to 
establish the power of Britain in the Gulf of Mexico and on the 
northern coast of South America, while Anson was to penetrate 
the southern seas, sack the open ports of Peru, and effect com- 
munication with Vernon across the Isthmus of Panama. These 
expeditions occupy a place midway between the raids of the 
earlier freebooters and the later more elaborately prepared attempts 
to supplant Spanish power in America. 



THE STATE OF VENEZUELA 313 

to be created was designed to supercede the Span- 
ish colonies, and to embrace all of their territory, 
but the initial effort was intended to supplant 
the rule of Spain in Venezuela. 



II 

This province, formerly a part of the vice- 
royalty of New Granada, had been finally organ- 
ized as a captaincy-general in 1777. At this time 
an intendant was appointed, who, assisted by 
the governors of the subordinate districts, was 
charged with the financial affairs of the depen- 
dency. The local governors, or delegates, directed 
all ordinary expenses in their districts, but for 
all extraordinary expenses they required the 
approval of the intendant. From their decisions 
relating to affairs within their jurisdiction, there 
was an appeal to the intendant, but if no appeal 
was taken the delegate might submit his decision 
to the intendant for approval. The intendant was 
president of the general assembly of the con- 
sulado, and was the judge of appeals from that 
court. 2 

The audiencia established in 1786 included 
within its jurisdiction all the territory subject to 
the captain-general: the provinces of Venezuela, 
Maracaibo, Cumana, Varinas, Guayana, and the 

2 Depons, F., A Voyage to the eastern part of Terra Firma, or 
the Spanish Main in South America, New York, 1806, 11, 105, 106. 



314 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

island of Margarita. The captain-general was its 
president, and it served as his advisory council in 
affairs of administration ; it was also the supreme 
court of the captaincy-general. Appeals might be 
taken to it from the decisions of the municipal 
court of the alcaldes. The consulado of Caracas, 
created in 1798 for the purpose of settling com- 
mercial controversies, performed its functions not 
only at the capital, but also through deputies at 
the important ports. This tribunal was composed 
of the intendant as its president, a prior, two 
consuls, nine counsellors, and a syndic, with a 
secretary, an assessor, and deputies. The process 
in its trials was simple and direct, the judges mak- 
ing an effort to effect an amicable settlement. If 
the case was especially complicated, the parties 
were permitted to make written statements, but 
they were obliged to swear that no lawyer had 
been concerned in preparing the papers. The 
consulado was expressly charged by the king to 
report measures for the encouragement of agri- 
culture, industry, and commerce; to further the 
construction of roads ; to improve the port of La 
Guayra; and to facilitate the use of such rivers 
as might serve for the transportation of produce. 
But the practical achievements of this body re- 
sponded only indifferently to the expectations 
entertained concerning it. The trade it was 
created to stimulate declined during the years 
following its establishment. The exports from 
the captaincy-general between 1793 and 1796 



THE STATE OF VENEZUELA 315 

amounted to $12,252,415; between 1796 and 1800, 
to only $6,442,318. 3 

Somewhat of the inefficiency of the consulado 
was due to the election of persons who sought 
membership more for the honor conferred upon 
them than for the opportunity for service. The 
diminution of exports was in large measure owing 
to the failure of the harvests in 1798 and 1799. 
In the latter year there was such a scarcity of 
food that the cabildo of Caracas passed a resolu- 
tion to encourage the merchants to import grain 
from the Antilles. The execution of this measure 
was, however, suspended by the opposition of the 
commandant of La Guayra. The inhabitants 
appeared to be facing a famine ; and this state of 
affairs was aggravated by the conspiracy of 1797. 

Ill 

The Creoles in Venezuela, as well as elsewhere, 
had adopted the principles of the French Revolu- 
tion. They recognized the inability of Spain to 
send adequate forces to America, and in their dis- 
satisfaction they began to expect support from 
England. Three state prisoners, condemned in 
Spain, arrived in La Guayra, and, under the lib- 
erty allowed them in their prison, they became 
propagandists of revolutionary doctrines. They 
escaped and joined the conspirators who were led 
by Jose Maria Espana and Manuel Gual. In July, 

3Depons, 11, 346. 



316 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

1797, the conspiracy was discovered. The leaders 
fled to Trinidad, but many of their adherents were 
arrested. Espafia, interpreting the dilatoriness 
of the courts to indicate the possibility of an armi- 
stice, returned to Venezuela. He went to join his 
wife at La Guayra. Although he had entered the 
town disguised and lived in hiding, he was dis- 
covered April 29, 1799, and a few days later was 
hanged in the plaza of Caracas. His head was 
placed in an iron cage at La Guayra, and his limbs 
were distributed among several towns. 4 

On July 12, 1799, Manuel Gual wrote to 
Miranda from Trinidad: "Our enterprise failed 
only from this circumstance, that of my being 
absent from Caracas : the government discovered 
the plan through the imprudence of a simpleton; 
they arrested many persons, and took the most 
active measures, both at La Guayra and Caracas ; 
so that our combinations being defeated, I was 
obliged to make my escape, with the view of seek- 
ing succor in the English colonies, as the hopes of 
my countrymen are still alive. This, in a few 
words, is an account of the miscarriage of our 
attempt ; since which, the desire of independency 
has but increased." 5 

When Charles IV learned of the revolt, he sent 
to the audiencia a secret order recommending the 

4 Baralt and Diaz, Besumen de la historia de Venezuela, Cura- 
zao, 1887, 11, 19. 

s Antepara, Jose Maria, South American Emancipation ; Docu- 
ments, London, 1810, 185; Bobertson, Francisco de Miranda, Am. 
Hist. Assn., 1907, 1, 225 ; Depons, 1, 150. 



THE STATE OF VENEZUELA 317 

court "to refrain from sanguinary measures, to 
exercise towards those who were concerned in that 
affair all the leniency which their fidelity deserved, 
and not to punish as a crime what might be only 
the effect of seduction and ignorance." 6 This 
recommendation may have caused fewer to suffer 
capital punishment than otherwise might have 
been executed ; still ninety were sentenced in May 
and June, 1799; some to be hanged and some to 
be imprisoned in irons, and some condemned to 
deportation. 7 

IV 

There appears to be no authoritative state- 
ment of the number of Venezula's inhabitants at 
the end of the century. The guesses range from 
728,000 upwards. This is Depons' estimate, 
whose distribution recognizes two-tenths as 
whites, three-tenths as slaves, four-tenths as the 
descendants of freedmen, and one-tenth as In- 
dians. Somewhat more than two-thirds of the 
whole population, or 500,000, lived in the province 
of Venezuela, while 100,000 of the remainder 
occupied the territory of Maracaibo. From this 
estimate it appears that the majority of the whole 
was composed of members of the colored races. 
The bulk of the real property in both the towns 
and the country was in the hands of the Creoles, 

6 Depons, 1, 150. 

7 Gonzalez Guinan, Francisco, Historia contemporanea de Vene- 
zuela, Caracas, 1909, 1, 13. 



318 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

while the Spaniards controlled the commerce and 
held the political power. The possession of the 
public wealth by one of two antagonistic classes, 
and the public power by the other, furnished the 
conditions of an inevitable conflict, a conflict 
involving not merely political but also economical 
questions. 8 

f The Creoles by reason of their wealth had 
become influential in all matters except the affairs 
I of the actual government. Many of them had 
I devoted much time to the cultivation of their 
! minds, and, "by reason of their travels, had be- 
come informed of the most rcent ideas and events 
of Europe. ' ' Their wealth moreover made it pos- 
sible for them to gratify their desire for display. 9 
Dauxion observed that "the luxury of European 
capitals is found in the town of Caracas, and a 
refinement or exaggeration of their politeness, 
which partakes of the Spanish gravity, and the 
voluptious manner of the Creoles. It may be said 
that their manners are a mixture of those of Paris 
and those of the large towns of Italy; the same 
taste for dress, sumptuous furniture, ceremonious 
visits, balls, shows, music, and even for painting, 
which is in its infancy. ' no 

In spite of the habit of the Spanish govern- 
ment to discriminate against the Creoles with 

s Level, L. D., Eistoria patria, Caracas, 1911, 247, 248. 

9 Eivas, Angel Cesar, Origines de la independencia de Vene- 
zuela, Caracas, 1909, 70. 

io Dauxion, Jean Frangois, Description of Venezuela, Trinidad, 
Margarita, and Tobago, London, 1820, 189. 



THE STATE OF VENEZUELA 319 

respect to offices in the colonies, there was devel- 
oped among them, in the later decades of the cen- 
tury, a strong sentiment of patriotism. They felt 
"a kind of pride in being born on the soil of the 
New World." 11 Their interest in Spain as the 
mother country declined, and they fell under the 
influence of the French. They imitated French 
fashions, and were ambitious "to assimilate their 
manners to those of the French." 12 When the 
restrictions on the importation of European books 
was relaxed, there was a demand for the political 
writings of revolutionary or pre-revolutionary 
France. The Count of Segur, after his sojourn 
in the United States, visited Venezuela. At Vic- 
toria he met a physician, who took him to his 
house and showed him with great pleasure the 
works of Rousseau and Eaynal. 13 



V 

Restrictions on immigration were also relaxed. 
The Council of the Indies by an edict issued in 
1783 removed most of the barriers: any for- 
eigner of the Roman Catholic faith might estab- 
lish himself in the colony. It protected, for a 
period of five years, immigrants from debts con- 
tracted in the countries they had left. 14 But from 

uDepons, 112. 

i2Depcms, 122. 

13 Memories ou souvenirs et anecdotes, 1, 140. 

nDauxion, 326. 



320 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

such immigrants it was later (1801) proposed to 
raise a revenue by imposing a tax of four hun- 
dred dollars, and an equal amount as a fee for 
naturalization. The emigration from Spain to 
Venezuela during this period did not exceed one 
hundred persons annually. Fewer returned to 
Spain, thus indicating a weakening connection 
between the colony and the mother country. 

Following the subjection of Trinidad to Great 
Britain, in 1797, a strong tide of emigration set 
from the lower classes of that island towards 
Venezuela. These immigrants were not only with- 
out resources, but also lacked the will to work. 
At the same time Caracas became the goal of the 
unemployed from the country. They came either 
in search of work or to get food without work. 
The embarrassment produced by the large num- 
ber of vagabonds and beggars was so great that 
a special committee of the consulado was formed 
to investigate the subject. After due considera- 
tion, the prior reported that the first evil to be 
remedied was that concerning the agricultural 
laborers and the elaboration of their products; 
"for even in the actual limited state of the har- 
vests not enough persons are found to gather 
them, not even for an exorbitant wage, in spite of 
the existing abundance of idle men. ' n5 Accustomed 
to the conditions of poverty, they preferred them 
and independence to the mildest form of labor and 
its attendant restraints. There were ten thou- 

15 Level, Historic patria, 238. 



THE STATE OF VENEZUELA 321 

sand persons in the capital without productive 
employment adequate for their maintenance. 
They gathered in great numbers in front of the 
episcopal palace Saturday, twelve hundred ap- 
pearing as public beggars. All but a few of them 
were able to work. But they preferred the life 
of vagabonds to engaging in any continuous and 
laborious occupation. 

The consulado formed a plan for setting aside 
the evil. It was to collect all the beggars at the 
door of the bishop 's palace on a specified day, and 
at all other places where they were accustomed 
to resort for alms ; to have them examined before 
a judge as to what hindered them from working 
in the fields. Unemployed persons, found com- 
petent to work, were sent to pueblos in charge of 
local officers, who assigned them to estates where 
laborers were needed, but with the special recom- 
mendation that they should be treated with 
humanity, and induced to become willing to work. 
The committee considered also the wages that 
should be given to persons forced to labor, and 
concluded that they should be adjusted to the cost 
of subsistence, varying with the changes in the 
price of important articles of food. 

The captain-general accepted this project; the 
beggars were rounded up; and the vagabonds, 
who knew what awaited them, left Caracas to 
work according to their pleasure, rather than 
under compulsion. Freed from the useless con- 
sumers, the authorities undertook to supply the 



322 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

city with needed provisions. One of the measures 
taken was to prohibit the exportation of food from 
La Guayra. 16 



VI 

The regulation of the trade with colonial ports 
had passed in large measure to the local authori- 
ties. The laws providing for the exportation of 
products to the colonies near the Gulf of Mexico 
made permission for such exportation to depend 
on the assent of the intendant. 17 It was in the 
exercise of this power that Captain-General Vas- 
concelos, supported by the intendant, undertook 
to relieve the distress of Caracas by opening the 
port of La Guayra for the importation of food 
from neutral nations. But their effort was not 
hopefully successful. The price of corn was eight 
times as high as the normal price ; still few ships 
came to the port. The British fleet did not permit 
ships to depart from Spain ; not even those carry- 

16 Level, Historia patria, 239. 

To these economic disturbances there were added serious social 
embarrassments, violations of local traditions, and interference 
with the long-standing prerogatives of the white element of the 
population. Under the royal decree of August 3, 1801, one might 
legitimate a son for a small payment of money; he might become 
an hidalgo or obtain a Castilian title (titulo de Castilla) without 
the applicant being obliged to make known the services he had 
rendered. He might acquire the distinction involved in the right 
to prefix Don to his name; and for one hundred and twenty-five 
dollars a negro might whiten himself, or become legally a white 
man. — Level, Historia Patria, 236. 

17 Depons, 1, XXVII. 



THE STATE OF VENEZUELA 323 

ing the mails. The mail that arrived on the 20th 
of February, 1799, was the first to arrive for four- 
teen months. 18 

Barcelona and Cumana, however, continued 
an advantageous trade with the colonies, and were 
supplied with food, while Caracas suffered want. 
Trinidad, moreover, after it fell into the hands 
of the British, became a depot of large stores of 
British wares. At the same time it became a 
market for a large contraband trade, rendered 
especially flouishing by the practice of selling on 
credit. 19 British smugglers, principally residents 
of the island of Trinidad, purchased three-fifths of 
what Venezuela had to sell, and paid in wares of 
British manufacture. 20 

During this period of economic disturbance 
the political affairs fell into confusion. There was 
a strong drift towards decentralization. The 
cabildos in the provinces enlarged their powers 
to an unprecedented degree, extending their 
authority over all departments of social control 
except the military. 21 The captain-general re- 
garded the future with evil foreboding. Address- 
ing a council of war at Caracas on the 21st of 
November, 1798, he said: "Our situation, gentle- 
men, is truly deplorable ! An expedition threatens 
the whole coast, and all the coast is without de- 
fense; and the king's fleets, blockaded in his ports, 

is Level, Kistoria patria, 236. 
is Level, Historic, patria, 235. 
aoDauxion, 131. 
aiDepons, 11, 36. 



324 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

cannot come to our support. And the people, 
already wearied with our government, look up to 
the English as their protectors and friends." 22 

The central figure in the negotiations relating 
to the threatened expedition was Francisco de 
Miranda, who had been trained in Spain. After 
he left the Spanish service, much of his activity 
was directed to a project to supplant Spanish rule 
with a government having a revolutionary origin. 
His persuasion was effective; even Catharine of 
Eussia became interested in his undertaking, and 
expressed her determination to support the inde- 
pendence of South America. She, moreover, by a 
circular letter to her ambassadors in Europe, 
ordered them to accord to him their assistance 
and protection whenever he might need it. 23 

VII 

At a conference at Hollwood, on the 14th of 
February, 1790, Miranda presented his project to 
Mr. Pitt, who approved of it, but expressed his 
inability to assist in its execution except in case 
of war with Spain. While the Nootka sound con- 
troversy threatened to lead to war, Miranda urged 
his plan for the emancipation of Spanish America. 
In September, 1791, he presented to the British 
minister the outline of a government he ' ' thought 
proper to be introduced into South America 

22Antepara, 189. 
23 Antepara, 15, 41. 



MIRANDA'S EXPEDITION 325 

according to the principles of Freedom and Inde- 
pendency. ' ' 2 * 

L It was proposed to enlist the sympathy of the 
' Indians, who had not ceased to regret the destruc- 
tion of their ancient state, by reviving the title of 
Inca for the person holding the executive power 
I and serving as the hereditary head of the federal 
empire. The senate was to be composed of 
caciques or senators, appointed by the inca for 
\ life. The members of the lower house were to be 
chosen by popular election. The inca was to ap- 
point distinguished jurists to be judges, who would 
hold office for life, unless removed by impeach- 
ment. Among other officers with titles borrowed 
| from ancient Rome, two censors were to be nom- 
inated by the citizens and confirmed by the inca. 
They were to watch over the morals of thejsen- 
•ators, of the youth, and of teachers. The doctrine 
of the relation of statute law to the constitution 
was evidently borrowed from the United States. 
No law contrary to the spirit of the constitution 
would be valid. The plan for amending the pro- 
posed constitution was also clearly drawn from 
the United States. Although the proposed state 
was to be a federation, no mention was made in 
the constitution of the subordinate political organ- 
izations or their relation to the supreme govern- 
ment. But elaborate provision was made for the 
period of transition until the establishment of the 
permanent government. 

24 Miranda to Pitt, September 8, 1791. Am. Hist. Bev., VII, 
F. 13. 



326 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Miranda 's design was to obtain the support of 
the United States in order to supplement that 
expected from Great Britain; but his letters to 
General Knox and Alexander Hamilton brought 
no satisfactory results. Great Britain continued 
to be moved by the ambition to extend her power 
in America at the expense of Spain, and Spain's 
declaration of war in 1796 appeared to offer a 
favorable occasion for attaining the desired end. 
The intrigues of Blount supported for a short 
time the hope of acquiring Florida and Louisiana, 
but the expulsion of Blount from the senate of the 
United States nullified all expectations of advan- 
tage in that direction. It was known in Spain 
that Miranda was interested in the British enter- 
prises, and the king admonished the viceroy of 
New Spain, the captain-general of Yucutan, and 
the captain-general of Caracas to be on their 
guard against the machinations of the conspirator 
and the undertakings of the British. 
| After the capture of Trinidad, the British sec- 
j retary of war directed Thomas Picton, the gover- 
nor and commander of the island, to keep the 
' : inhabitants of the neighboring part of the conti- 
I nent under careful observation, and to assure 
them of succor from his Britannic Majesty, when- 
ever they were disposed to renounce the rule of 
Spain. The course pursued by Picton constituted 
a distinct propaganda of revolution; and by his 
presentation of the advantages of holding Caracas 
and Santa Thome, he sought to induce the British 



MIRANDA'S EXPEDITION 327 

government to adopt an aggressive policy. He 
declared "it would be no difficult matter to sub- 
vert the Spanish government in the provinces of 
Cumana and Caracas, the example and effects of 
which would shake their empire over the whole 
continent, and would open immediate as well 
as immense commercial advantages to Great 
Britain. ' ,25 

Miranda continued his negotiations with Great 
Britain in December, 1797, announcing himself as 
the representative of a junta said to be composed 
of deputies from the principal provinces of Span- 

I ish America. He requested that Great Britain 

1 would support the movement for emancipation 
with twenty-seven ships of the line, 8000 infantry, 

land 2000 cavalry, and suggested, as a means for 
preserving liberty, an alliance of Great Britain, 

(the United States, and Spanish America. At the 
same time it was proposed that inter-oceanic 
navigation should be provided for both at the 
Isthmus of Panama and by way of Lake Nica- 
ragua. The next month Miranda attempted to 
enter into relations with the United States. He 
visited Rufus King, and through him he hoped 
to approach Hamilton. Later he unfolded to 
King his plans, and emphasized the advantages 
England and the United States would enjoy in the 
trade of Spanish America. 

25 Picton to Dundas, September 18, 1797, quoted by Eobertson 
in Anrmal Report of the Am. Hist. Assn., 1907, 1, 315. 



328 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



VIII 

The policy of the British government was com- 
municated to King by Granville : "If Spain should 
be able to preserve her independence and prevent 
a revolution of her government, they should not 
enter into the project respecting South America; 
but if it was really to be apprehended that Spain 
should fall beneath the control of France, then it 
was their intention to endeavor to prevent France 
from gaining to their cause the resources of South 
America. In this event they should immediately 
open their views and commence a negotiation upon 
the subject with the United States. At present 
they deemed it impolitic to engage in the plan of 
Miranda." 26 

The British government, however, continued 
to keep in mind the possibility of an expedition to 
South America, and to make preparations for it. 
Miranda was solicitous to learn the decision 
reached in England, and at the same time sought 
to enlist the interest of the administration in 
America. Hamilton was not enthusiastic over 
either the plan of the proposed undertaking or its 
chief advocate; he did not hesitate to call him 
"an intriguing adventurer." 27 King endeavored 
to persuade the United States to action by affirm- 
ing that South America was on the eve of revo- 

26 King, Charles R., Life and correspondence of Bufus Kmg. 
New York, 1896, 111, 561. 

27 Beport of Am. Hist. Assn., 1907, 1, 327. 



MIRANDA'S EXPEDITION 329 

lution, and that if England did not assist at the 
movement the work would be done by France to 
the great disadvantage of the United States. 
Four months after this, Hamilton appears to have 
changed his view. 28 He at least wrote favorably 
of ' ' the enterprise in question. I wish it much to 
be undertaken, but I should be glad that the prin- 
cipal agency was in the United States — they to 
furnish the whole land force necessary." 29 

The project that was forming involved the 
cooperation of Great Britain and the United 
States in revolutionizing South America. But it 
failed to ripen with sufficient rapidity to satisfy 
Miranda's extravagant imagination. In his dis- 
appointment, he entertained for a brief period the 
idea of going to Trinidad, where Governor Picton 
had formed a plan to begin the revolution by an 
attack on the town of Cumana. The British- 
American cooperative plan to emancipate South 
America was wrecked. Adams and Pinckney 
opposed it ; Great Britain was withheld from it by 
her engagements on the continent, and by her fear 
of causing the scenes of the French Revolution to 
be repeated in America. The ministers, however, 
thought of this failure to act as only a postpone- 
ment of the project. This was again taken up in 
1799. In the subsequent negotiations, Manual 
Gual, the exiled leader of the conspiracy of 1797, 

28 King to Piekney, Marshall, and Gerry, London, April 2, 
1798. Life and Correspondence, 11, 300. 

29 Hamilton to King, Aug. 22, 1798, King, Life and Corre- 
spondence, 11, 659. 



330 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

appears in correspondence with Miranda and the 
British commander of the Windward Islands. 

Later projects for British participation were 
defeated by the opposition of Granville, yet 
Miranda was retained in England against his will 
when he wished to go to France, where he hoped 
his plans might receive more favorable consider- 
ation. The treaty of Amiens, March 27, 1802, 
halted all revolutionary negotiations; but the 
prospect of renewed hostilities with France and 
Spain in 1803 caused Miranda's schemes to be 
revived. And soon after this the plans for attack- 
ing South America took a wider range. Sir Home 
Popham urged the government to send an expe- 
dition against Buenos Aires. Preparations for 
such an expedition were made in 1804, but the 
project was suddenly abandoned; England and 
Spain were still nominally at peace. Again dis- 
appointed, Miranda determined to go to Trinidad, 
taking with him such arms and munitions as 
would be needed in beginning a revolution. But 
this project also failed. 

In 1804 Spain declared war on Great Britain.; 
Pitt returned to power, and plans for an attack 
on South America found new advocates. Sir 
Home Popham was chosen to command an 
expedition against Buenos Aires, while Miranda 
continued to urge his plan for a revolution in 
Venezuela. The Spanish minister in London 
communicated to his government information 
concerning the designs of the British and the 



MIRANDA'S EXPEDITION 331 

preparations for an attack on Buenos Aires were 
set aside as well as the proposition to assist 
Miranda. Thus after negotiating with the British 
government for fifteen years, Miranda was 
doomed to see all his schemes come to naught. He 
made his will, and prepared to go to the United 
States. 30 

IX 

Miranda arrived in New York in November, 
1805. For several months he was engaged in 
efforts to induce the government of the United 
States to lend its assistance to his revolutionary- 
undertaking. After his unsuccessful attempts in 
this quarter, he entered into relations with Smith 
and Ogden in New York. Mr. Ogden offered the 
ship Leander, that had been engaged in the trade 
between New York and Santo Domingo. He also 
promised to place at his service another ship, then 
at Santo Domingo, called the Emperor. The 
Leander put to sea on the 2nd of February, 1806. 31 

In his charge to the jury in the trial of William 
S. Smith, Judge Talmadge said that the Leander 
"had a very crowded cargo, and was laden almost 

so Miranda 's negotiations with the British government are 
presented at length in Francisco de Miranda and the revolution- 
ising of Spanish America, by William Spence Eobertson, in 
Annual Beport of the Am. Hist. Assn., 1907, 1, 191-528. 

31 Miranda and the British Admiralty, 1804-1806, containing 
"Memorandum by Captain Sir Home Popham" and correspon- 
dence concerning Miranda's Expedition of 1806, in Am. Hist. Bev., 
VI, 508-530. 



332 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

entirely with articles of warlike preparation. 
From 180 to 200 men were engaged in the enter- 
prise, several of them immediately after took 
military title and rank, and all were submitting 
to subordination and discipline; eleven or twelve 
hundred suits of soldiers' uniforms, about six 
hundred swords and cuttlasses, and a great num- 
ber of belts, pouches, and cartridge boxes, about 
four thousand five hundred pikes, a number of 
muskets, horsemen's pistols and blunderbuses, 
all of which were principally in boxes or sacks. 
Exclusive of her complement of seventeen guns, 
the Leander had on board about thirty-four can- 
non, with several field carriages, one hundred and 
fifty casks of gunpowder, and a quantity of 
balls suited to cannon and muskets of different 
caliber. ' ' 32 

Knowledge of Miranda's departure provoked 
unwonted activity on the part of the Spanish 
minister to the United States. He dispatched 
accounts of this event to the captain-general of 
Caracas, to the viceroy of New Spain, and to the 
governors of Cuba and the Floridas. By giving 
the number of men in the expedition as 1200 in- 
stead of 180 or 200, he alarmed the inhabitants of 
the provinces that appeared to be open to invasion. 
He also protested against the attitude of the 
United States government in regard to the expe- 
dition. The French also found the action or 

32 Lloyd, Thomas, The trials of William S. Smith and Samuel 
G. Ogden, New York, 1807, 238. 



MIRANDA'S EXPEDITION 333 

inaction of the government blameworthy ; and the 
protests of these two nations had doubtless much 
influence in bringing Smith and Ogden to trial; 
but public sentiment was in favor of the accused, 
and their acquittal was sometimes interpreted as 
a verdict against the government. 
f The Leander was halted by the Br itish ship 
Cleopatra on the 12th of February, and was 

/ obligecTto surrender to Ca ptain Wight^ about a 

' score of her crew. Miranda visited the British 
vessel and presented to the captain his papers 

! showing the relations he had sustained to the Brit- 
ish government. He also caused a number of 
Americans recently captured by the British to be 
released and added to the forces of the expedition. 
Having been permitted to proceed, Miranda now 
organized his one hundred and eighty men as the 
' ' Columbian Army. ' ' He caused the arms and 
equipment on board to be repaired and made fit 
for service. Finding at Jacquemel that the 
Emperor would not join the expedition, Miranda 

(■ secured two schooners, the Bacchus and the Bee, 
and transferred to them a number of his men, in 

, spite of their mutinous protest. The three vessels 

! reached the island of Aruba onjji© 11th of April. 
The troops were landed and drilled, and five days 

. later they continued their voyage. Guevara Vas- 

I concelos, the captain-general of Caracas, warned 
by Yrujo, had taken measures for defense, and 

/ sent abroad information of the proposed invasion. 

\ On the 2nd of May, Lieutenant Brierly, who had 



334 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

been at Cumana on the 20th and the 21st of 
April wrote to Rear- Admiral Cochrane : 

"The country is in a dreadful state, and embargo 
on every vessel on this coast, no person suffered to quit 
his dwelling on pain of death, every person under arms, 
that is able to bear them, the prisons full of Miranda's 
friends, and in short everything in the greatest confusion 
imaginable. In the meantime no person has any knowl- 
edge of the present situation of Miranda, nor is it even 
conjectured in which part of the West Indies he is ; this 
I am certain, he has a multitude of friends who will 
join him the moment he appears." 33 

On the 28th of April the vessels of the expedi- 
tion fell in with two armed Spanish ships, a brig 
of twenty-two guns, and a schooner of eighteen 
guns. After a few shots had been exchanged, the 
Leander ran away, and the persons on the other 
vessels were taken prisoners and landed at Puerto 
Cavallo. That night they were "cramed into a 
small dungeon shackeled two and two." 34 

After the loss of the schooners, the Leander 
went to the island of Granada, and then to Barba- 
dos, arriving at the latter island in the first week 
in June. Cochrane, who was stationed there, 
replied to Miranda's petition for assistance, that 
I he would furnish a number of small vessels and 

33 Am. Hist. Bev., VI, 522. 

s* Diary and Letters of Henry Ingersoll, in Am. Hist. Bev., Ill, 
681; (Sherman, John A.) A general account of Miranda's Expe- 
dition, including the trial and execution of ten of his officers, New 
York, 1808, giving also some account of the fate of the other 
prisoners; Smith, Moses, History and adventures and sufferings of 
Moses Smith, Albany, 1814. 



MIRANDA'S EXPEDITION 335 

such additional support as he might be able to give. 
^He also extended to him permission to enlist re- 
cruits in Barbados and Trinidad. Miranda's 
petition to General Bowyer, of the British land 
forces of the Leeward Islands, called forth a more 
cautious reply. The general proposed, before 
making a decision, to receive instructions from 
Great Britain. Miranda was, however, not dis- 
j posed to wait for such instructions, and left Bar- 
bados, accompanied by three small British vessels. 
At Trinidad the little squadron was increased by 
(the addition of six or seven other ships. The 
vessels of "the expedition attached to General 
(Miranda" were by order of Admiral Cochrane, 
under the command of Captain Campbell. They 
arrived in the bay of La Vela de Coro on the 1st 
of August. The troops landed on the 3rd, and 
took the forts and the town of Coro. Instead of 
the popular uprising in favor of emancipation, the 
greater part of the inhabitants fled, carrying with 
them whatever property they could take away. 

Miranda's proclamation, setting forth his de- 
sign with respect to the form of the government 
to be established, and a "letter to the Spanish 
Americans" produced no assuring effect. More- 
over, his letters to Admiral Cochrane, Admiral 
Dacres, of the Jamaica naval station, and Sir 
Eyre Costo, the governor of Jamaica, brought no 
favorable reply, except that Admiral Cochrane 
proposed to continue such assistance as the small 
squadron under Captain Campbell could furnish. 



336 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

In the meantime the officers of the province 
had sent forth a call for troops. The merchants 
exaggerated reports concerning Miranda's forces 
and the designs of the leader; and in the face of 
| the increasing numbers of the enemy the invaders 
.found it advisable to withdraw to the island of 
Aruba. In September Captain Dundas, of the 
British ship Elephant, warned Miranda that the 
[protection of the British naval force would be 
\ withdrawn unless he retired from Aruba. On the 
I 21st of October, Miranda, with some of his officers, 
arrived at Granada. Meanwhile Vasconcelos, 
ignorant of the extent of Great Britain's partici- 
pation in the revolutionizing projects, continued 
to maintain the captaincy-general in a state of 
tense anxiety with respect to the next move of the 
champions of emancipation. But at Granada, the 
military uniforms and the flag of the expedition 
disappeared; the Leander was sold; the insig- 
nificant remnant of the troops received a partial 
payment; and how to meet or avoid his other 
obligations constituted for Miranda one of the 
residuary cares of the campaign. 35 

35 An intimate and unsympathetic account of the expedition is 
presented in Biggs' letters: The History of Don Francisco de 
Miranda's attempt to effect a Revolution in South America, 
Boston, 1811. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE BRITISH CAPTURE AND LOSS OF 
BUENOS AIRES 

The trade of Buenos Aires. II. Plans of Great 
Britain respecting South America. III. The Brit- 
ish advance and capture of the city. IV. Liniers 
and the overthrow of Beresford. V. The cabildo 
and Liniers in power. VI. British reinforcements 
and the recall of Popham. VII. The final British 
attack and failure. 



The second attempt to overthrow from without 
the rule of Spain in South America was directed 
against the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. After r 
the extension of commercial freedom in 1778, l 
there was a noteworthy increase of shipping at j 
Buenos Aires. In the three years from 1792 to , 
1795 forty-seven vessels left that port, and fifty- 
three vessels arrived from Spain. The value of 
the exportations and the importations for this 
period amounted to somewhat more than $8,- 
000,000. There was also a great increase in the 
internal trade. Mendoza and San Juan sold 
annually large quantities of wine and brandy; 
and Tucuman had an extensive trade in hides and 
textile fabrics. Paraguay's trade was chiefly in 



338 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

mate, tobacco, and lumber. Of the mate exported, 
Chile consumed about 4,000,000 pounds, and paid 
for it with exported gold and silver. 

The mules sent to Peru from the eastern prov- 
inces of the viceroyalty were driven by easy stages 
to Salta, where they were kept over the winter; 
and in the spring they were taken to Potosi. In 
the province of Buenos Aires they cost at that 
time between three and four dollars a head, but 
at Potosi they brought eight or nine dollars a 
head. In case they were taken farther into the 
country, they brought a larger price, amounting 
in some places to forty or fifty dollars apiece. 
They were required in Peru for use in the mines, 
but the hard conditions under which they worked 
caused many of' them to be short-lived, thus mak- 
ing the demand for them greater than it would 
have been if they had been employed under more 
favorable circumstances. 

Cordova, Salta, and Jujui lay on the main 
route from Buenos Aires to Peru, and the inhab- 
itants of these towns, by furnishing means of 
transportation, derived important advantages 
from this overland trade. The goods were gen- 
erally carried in carts drawn by four or more 
oxen; and the freight rate from Buenos Aires to 
Jujui was four dollars a quintal, or approximately 
four cents a pound. For transportation beyond 
Jujui mules were substituted for oxen and carts, 
and the rates varied according to the season and 
the abundance or scarcity of mules. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 339 

The early policy to make Buenos Aires de- 
pendent on Lima for European wares was checked, 
as has been indicated already, by the rise of 
contraband trade with the Portuguese ; and the 
commercial emancipation of the eastern provinces 
from Peru was finally completed by the increase 
of importations at Buenos Aires directly from 
European ports. In this later trade with Peru, 
therefore, Buenos Aires, having a cheaper source 
from which to obtain European wares, received in 
return for her exportations large quantities of 
gold and silver, products of the Peruvian mines. 

The trade between Buenos Aires and the 
western coast by sea was inconsiderable. Now 
and then a vessel arrived at Montevideo from 
Callao with wares intended for shipment to Spain. 
Ships were also occasionally sent from Monte- 
video to Arica with quicksilver for the mines, and 
they carried at the same time small quantities of 
mate and tallow. 

The principal trade of Buenos Aires with Chile 
was through the province of Cuyo, on the eastern 
side of the Andes. The exports from Chile and 
Cuyo to the eastern provinces were woollen goods, 
particularly ponchos, wines, brandy, and oil; 
raisins and dried peaches; apples, snuff, and 
sugar ; and copper, gold, and cordage. 

The enlarged freedom of commerce gave an 
increased value to the products of the herds of 
Rio de la Plata. Hides and salted beef could now 
be profitably exported in the numerous vessels 



340 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

that brought European wares to Buenos Aires. 
The wealth of the inhabitants increased rapidly, 
and justified the expenditure of large sums on 
private houses; and the viceroy took advantage 
of this prosperity to embellish the city with 
important public buildings. The city hall and 
the .mint were begun in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century. 

Buenos Aires had previously grown very slowly 
under the severe restriction which Spain had 
placed upon her trade. In 1608 the town con- 
tained 2000 inhabitants. During the following 
one hundred and seventy years its population 
increased from 2000 to 24,205, an average addition 
of only about 130 persons a year. The progress 
was more rapid after the organization of the 
viceroy alty and the establishment of commercial 
freedom. The last quarter of the eighteenth 
century added somewhat more than 15,000 per- 
sons to the city's population, so that at the begin- 
ning of the nineteenth century Buenos Aires 
contained 40,000 inhabitants, and 46,000 in 1810. 1 

II 

The British government had contemplated for 
a long time the conquest of some part of South 
America. It was solicitous to obtain a New World 
market as compensation for the loss of the North 
American colonies. The projects of Miranda 

1 Lopez, V. F., Eistoria de la Bepublica Argentina, Buenos 
Aires, 1883, I, cap. XXVI. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 341 

seemed to offer an opportunity for gaining control 
of Venezuela. It was not less solicitous to prevent 
any diminution of British power and prestige in 
the East Indies, menaced chiefly by the Dutch in 
possession of Cape Colony. 

Preparations for a campaign against South 
America had already been undertaken, as already 
suggested, in 1804. In that year Sir Home Pop- 
ham was appointed to the ship Diadem, "with a 
view of cooperating with General Miranda, to the 
extent of taking advantage of any of his proceed- 
ings, which might lead to our obtaining a position 
on the continent of South America, favorable to 
the trade of this country. ' ,2 

The point to be aimed at in the projected 
attack was revealed by the testimony of Lord 
Melville at the trial of Popham. 

"At all times," he said, "and in every conversation 
that I had with Mr. Pitt on the subject, I make no doubt 
Buenos Aires was often the subject of discussion. My 
reason for being confident in that opinion is, that in all 
the considerations I ever gave to the subject of South 
America, whether the attack was to be made on a smaller 
or larger scale, I always considered the Rio de la Plata 
as the most important position for the interest of Great 
Britain upon that side of South America. ' ' 3 

The proposed attack was not made directly 
from Great Britain. In August, 1805, an expedi- 
tion to the Cape sailed from Cork. The naval 

2 Lord Melville, head of the Board of Admiralty ; see Minutes 
of a court-martial for the Trial of Sir Home Popham, London, 
1807, 139. 

s Ibid., 140. 



342 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

forces were under the command of Sir Home 
Popham ; General David Baird commanded a land 
force of 6600 men. This expedition arrived at its 
destination on the 4th of January, 1806. 

The Cape fell into the hands of the British 
without great cost, and soon afterwards it was 
determined to make an attempt on Buenos Aires. 
Sir Home Popham and Brigadier-General Beres- 
ford commanded the expedition to the Bio de la 
Plata, which consisted of three frigates, three 
corvettes, and five transports, carrying in all one 
hundred and seventy-eight guns. The Board of 
Admiralty took the view that this expedition to 
Buenos Aires was undertaken by the officers at 
the Cape without any superior ''direction or 
authority whatever," leaving the Cape, " which 
it was Sir Home Popham 's duty to guard, not 
only exposed to attack and insult, but even with- 
out the means of affording protection to the trade 
of his Majesty's subjects, or of taking possession 
of any ships of the enemy, which might have put 
into any of the bays or harbors of the Cape or 
ports adjacent." 4 

Sir Home Popham had been directed, however, 
by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to 
send a frigate to cruise on the east coast of South 
America between Rio de Janeiro and Rio de la 
Plata, as soon as he should have accomplished the 
object of the expedition on which he was about 
to proceed, for the purpose of procuring intelli- 

* Admiralty Order in. Trial of Sir Home Popham, 4. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 343 

gence of the enemy's motions, in order that he 
might be prepared against any attack they might 
be disposed to make on the settlement. 5 And in 
September he was directed from the Admiralty 
office to retain all the transports under his com- 
mand at the Cape of Good Hope, after the reduc- 
tion of that settlement, until he should receive 
further orders. 6 

"While at Portsmouth in 1805, Sir Home Pop- 
ham had received information of the weak state 
of the garrison at the Cape of Good Hope. ' ' This 
intelligence, ' ' he said, ' ' appeared to me so impor- 
tant, not only from the advantage to be derived 
from the capture of the Cape of Good Hope itself, 
but from the facility which the possession of that 
settlement would afford to the projected conquest 
of the dependencies on the east coast of South 
America, that I lost no time in coming up to 
town and communicating it to Mr. Pitt." The 
communication was made through Mr. Sturges 
Bourne, then one of the secretaries of the Treas- 
ury, whom Mr. Pitt immediately authorized to 
make further inquiries on the subject "in the 
quarter from which the communication was stated 
to be derived." The result of the information 
obtained by this means "was a complete confirma- 
tion of the statement made by Sir Home Popham ; 
and Mr. Pitt instantly determined to -take the 
necessary measures for the execution of an expe- 

s John Barrow to Sir Home Popham, August 2, 1805 ; see 
Trial, 17. 
e Ibid., 18. 



344 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

dition against the Cape." The suggestion of Sir 
Home Popham appears thus to have been the 
origin of Pitt's plan; for Sturges Bourne said 
before the court-martial: "I am quite sure that 
Mr. Pitt had no such expedition in his contem- 
plation at the time Sir Home Popham made his 
proposal, and I have no reason to believe that any 
other of the king's ministers had such an object 
in view." But whatever their origin, Mr. Pitt's 
views with respect to South America were not 
confined to introducing British manufactures, 
but took a wider range/ 

The origin of the plan to take Buenos Aires 

which was carried out at this time may be seen in 

the correspondence produced at the trial of Pop- 

j ham. In a letter written by Popham to William 

I Marsden, of the Admiralty Office, and dated 

I April 9, 1806, he announced that, on account of 

I the unsettled weather, he proposed to remove his 

! squadron from its position in Table Bay, and that 

1 he considered the coming of Admiral Willeaumez 

* very improbable. As it was expected that the 

I F rench fle et woul d be obliged to resort to Rio de 

la Plata or the coast of Brazil for supplies, he 

thought "employing the squadron in cruising a 

short time off that coast, instead of remaining 

idle, will be a disposition fraught with some 

advantages, and which I hope will appear so 

evident to their Lordships as to induce them to 

approve the measure. ' ' Starting on the 10th, the 

7 Trial of Sir Home Popham, 142, 146. 






THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 345 

lack of the requisite breeze led him to anchor in 
the outer bay, and here he received "intelligence 
respecting the weak state of defence which Monte- 
video and Buenos Aires were in." With this 
information, confirming what he had already 
learned from other sources, he "suggested the 
expediency of sparing a few troops for a short 
time, to enable us to bring a question of such 
importance to an immediate issue." 8 Popham 
urged this undertaking, "from a conviction of 
the great and splendid benefit which the country 
would derive by a conquest of such a nature at 
this moment." Sir David Baird after consider- 
ing the subject seriously and consulting with Gen- 
eral Beresford acceded to the proposition, and 
ordered that the 71st regiment should be em- 
barked under the direction of General Beresford. 
The main advantage of the conquest suggested at 
this time was the opportunity "to supply several 
millions of inhabitants with the manufactures of 
the United Kingdom. ' ' 9 

The conquest, moreover, was not expected to 
be difficult, for Popham was convinced as the 
result of his examinations that there were "not 
above five hundred regular troops at the two 
places, some provincial cavalry and militia; that 
the walls of Montevideo are in a very ruinous 
state ; and the inhabitants disaffected beyond any 
calculation." In his letter of April 13, 1806. 

s Popham to William Marsden, April 13, 1806. 
9 Popham to William Marsden, April 30, 1806. 



346 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Popham expressed the hope that His superiors in 
London would consider the undertaking "as far 
preferable to the alternative of allowing the 
squadron to moulder away its native energy, by 
wintering in False Bay, and eventually become 
paralyzed. ' ' 

III 

While on the voyage Popham had a plan to 
take Montevideo as soon as he neared the coast, 
and then to pass on to Buenos Aires. But infor- 
mation received from a British pilot who fell 
into his hands as he entered the river persuaded 
him that it would be expedient to move immedi- 
ately against the latter city. 

Major-General Baird in his instructions to 
Brigadier-General Beresford directed him to 
assume the office of lieutenant-governor, "and to 
draw whatever salary and allowances may have 
been enjoyed by the Spanish Governor, his imme- 
diate predecessor, until His Majesty shall be 
graciously pleased to make known his pleasure. ' no 

During the advance of the British the city 
was in confusion, and the authorities displayed 
only weakness and indecision. After the vessels 
had been observed entering the river, Jose de la 
Pena, the chief pilot of the royal fleet, went along 
the coast in search of definite information con- 
cerning these vessels. On the night of the 23d 

10 Major-General Baird to Eight Hon. Lord Castlereagh, April 
14, 1806, Trial of Sir Home Popham, 59. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 347 

of June, 1806, in accordance with Viceroy Sobre- 
monte's orders, he reported to that officer at 
Buenos Aires. But the viceroy refused to adopt 
Pena 's advice, and held that the vessels were only 
cruising, and had not come to attack the colony. 
On the 24th, Pena returned to Ensenada to await 
the viceroy's orders. At daybreak, on the 25th, 
British vessels appeared off Buenos Aires. The 
viceroy now caused a call to arms to be sounded, 
and between seven and nine o'clock the inhabi- 
tants gathered at the fort. "But in spite of all 
this, still no preparations were made ; on the con- 
trary, the viceroy remained inactive, notwith- 
standing the fact that the ships of the enemy were 
seen approaching Quilmes, three or four leagues 
from the city, and disembarking in boats and 
launches." 11 Finally as a result of persistent 
urging the viceroy caused arms to be distributed 
to the militia of Buenos Aires. This force, having 
been joined by 800 lancers under the command of 
Nicolas de la Quintana, was sent to Quilmes to 
attack the enemy, and was to be under the com- 
mand of Sub-Inspector Pedro de Arce. In the 
meantime 1000 citizens had been given arms at the 
fort, but they had no cartidges and their guns 
had no flints. These things they were to get from 
their respective captains in the afternoon. On the 
26th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, 600 of the 
provincial militia with their officers marched to 
Barracas, with the viceroy as their rear-guard. 12 

ii Calvo, Tratados, IV, 387. 
12 Ibid., IV, 388. 



348 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

In the meantime the British had landed; the 
Argentinos after firing from a distance fled, leav- 
ing three cannon and a howitzer which were 
immediately taken possession of by their enemy. 

During this skirmish a second call to arms was 
sounded in the city, announcing to the rest of the 
inhabitants who remained in the town that their 
compatriots found themselves in great need of 
assistance. 

During these operations the alarm had spread 
through all parts of the city. The inhabitants 
were terrified by the news of the arrival of the 
British forces. The panic was, moreover, intensi- 
fied by the ringing of the bells; and the viceroy, 
abandoning all hope of effective resistance, was 
fully occupied in preparing for flight. But before 
his departure for the interior of the country, he 
published, June 26, 1806, a manifesto to the 
inhabitants he was cowardly deserting. 

There were in the city no disciplined troops, 
and no competent leaders. In the companies that 
were formed to ward off the impending invasion, 
the officers were as ignorant as the rank and file. 
On the 27th of June the British troops, numbering 
fifteen hundred and sixty men, entered Buenos 
Aires. The population of the city at this time 
was about 45,000 and the more spirited of the 
inhabitants felt deeply the humiliation of their 
subjugation, particularly when they saw how 
small was the body of the conquerors who took 
possession of the streets and squares, and pro- 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 349 

ceeded to make their power effective in the 
government. 13 

Having taken possession of the city, and raised 
the British flag, with much firing of cannon both 
by the fleet and the artillery on shore, Beresford 
ordered the public treasure to be put into his 
hands. Under the circumstances compliance with 
this demand was inevitable. The money was sur- 
rendered and transferred to London. A large 
amount of merchandise also fell into the hands of 
the British. It consisted principally of chinchona 
and quicksilver, and was estimated to be worth 
between one million and two million dollars, 
namely, $1,438,514. The arrival of the spoils in 
London aroused general joy, and filled the British 
nation with extravagant expectations of commer- 
cial gains. The government of Great Britain had 
not authorized this conquest, but now it approved 
and confirmed it. 

The effect of the fall of Buenos Aires and of 
the plan of the British to invade Chile was to 
stimulate the government in Peru to undertake 

is In his Autobiography, Belgrano makes the following state- 
ment respecting the taking of the city by the British: 

"Confieso que me indigne, y que nunea senti mas haber 
ignorado, como ya dije anteriormente, hasta los rudimentos de la 
milicia; todavia fue mayor mi incomodidad cuando vf entrar las 
tropas enemigas, y su despreciable numero para una problacion 
como la de Buenos Aires ; esta idea no se aparto de mi imaginacion, 
y poco falto para que me hubiese hecho perder la cabeza: me era 
muy doloroso ver a mi patria bajo otra dominacion, y sobre todo 
en tal estado de degradacion que hubiese sido subyugada por una 
empresa aventurera, cual era la del bravo y honrado Beresford, 
cuyo valor admiro y admirare siempre en esta peligrosa empresa." 



350 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

preparations for the defense of the western coast 
of South America. The viceroy Abascal sent 
forces and supplies to Chiloe, aroused the Peru- 
vians to enlist in the militia, and proposed to lead 
a body of troops to Chile, and, if necessary, to 
Buenos Aires. The struggle of the inhabitants 
of Buenos Aires to drive out the British and 
regain the city moved the Peruvians under the 
leadership of Abascal to lend assistance. They 
sent 100,000 pesos by way of Cuzco, and 200,000 
from the treasuries of Arequipa and Puno. From 
Chile were sent 1800 quintals of powder, 200,000 
cartridges and 200 quintals of balls, and other 
munitions and supplies. 

After the surrender of the funds, the inten- 
tions of the British government were made known 
to the inhabitants through proclamations, dated 
June 28 and June 30, and issued by the command- 
ing officers. These proclamations affirmed, among 
other things, that a free trade should be opened 
and permitted to South America, similar to that 
enjoyed by all others of His Majesty's colonies, 
particularly the island of Trinidad, the inhab- 
itants of which had derived peculiar benefits from 
being under the government of a sovereign power- 
ful enough to protect them from any insult, and 
generous enough to give them such commercial 
advantages as they could not enjoy under the 
administration of any other country. 
t The terms granted to the inhabitants of 
\ Buenos Aires by Popham and Beresford were 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 351 

published on the second of July. They provided 

\ that the troops belonging to the king of Spain, 
who were in the town at the time of the entry of 
the British troops, should be allowed to meet in 
'the fortress of Buenos Aires, to march out of the 
fort with all the honors of war, and should then 

* lay down their arms and become prisoners of war ; 
but such officers as were natives of the country, or 
Regally domiciled, should be at liberty to continue 
in the province as long as they behaved themselves 
properly, taking the oath of allegiance to His 
Britannic Majesty ; or they might proceed to Great 
Britain with regular passports, having previously 
passed their parole of honor not to serve until 
.they should be regularly exchanged. Moreover, 
'all bona fide private property, whether belonging 
to individual persons, the churches, or public 
institutions, should be unmolested; all the inhab- 

I itants should receive protection ; the different 
taxes should be collected by the magistrates, as 
usual, until His Majesty's pleasure should be 
known ; every protection should be afforded to the 

j exercise of the Eoman Catholic religion ; the coast- 
ing vessels in the river should be delivered to their 
owners; and all public property should be sur- 

I rendered to the captors. 14 

By proclamation, dated August 4, 1806, Major- 
General Beresford made known the conditions 

14 The document setting forth these terms, dated July 2, 1806, 
is printed in Wilcocke, S. H., History of Buenos Aires (London, 
1807), 352; see Annual Register, 1806, 599; the original, printed 
in Spanish and English, is found in Colee. Carranza: Invasiones 
Inglesas, 1806-1807, i. 



352 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

under which trade with Buenos Aires and its 
dependencies might be carried on. He informed 
the people 

' ' that the system of monopoly, restriction and oppression 
has already come to an end ; that the people will be able 
to enjoy the products of other countries at a moderate 
price; that the manufactures and productions of their 
country are free from the hindrance and oppression that 
has burdened them, and prevented the country from 
becoming what it is capable of being, the most flourishing 
in the world ; and that the object of Great Britain is the 
happiness and prosperity of these countries." 

The regulations announced by this procla- 
mation 15 provided that a lawful trade in all 
merchandise, fruits, manufactured articles, and 
products from Great Britain, Ireland, and her 
colonies might be carried on with Buenos Aires 
and its dependencies, in British ships owned by 
His Majesty's subjects, or by inhabitants of that 
country, upon paying, in general, a duty of twelve 
and one-half per cent ad valorem, on entering any 
port of Rio de la Plata ; and that all commodities 
produced in that country should be permitted to 
be imported into the United Kingdom, in the ships 
already mentioned, under the same terms as from 
the West India islands. 

is The original proclamation is found in Colec. Carransa : Inva- 
siones Inglesas, 1806-1807. The order of the king in council 
affirming possession of the conquered city and territory and con- 
firming the terms of Beresford's proclamation made it clear that 
the British government had adopted the results of the conquest, 
and held the city and the territory as a part of the dominions of 
the British sovereign. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 353 



IV 

Beresford was not ignorant of the prepara- 
tions a part of the inhabitants were making to 
resist the invaders and to drive them ont of the 
city. Through his spies he was kept informed of 
the steps taken to organize a patriotic force at 
Perdriel, a place about fifteen miles from the city. 
Against these patriots, who had raised their 
standard of blue and red, Beresford led a body of 
five hundred men with six pieces of artillery. In 
spite of the brave resistance of Pueyrredon and 
his followers Beresford was victorious. The 
killed and wounded on both sides, however, did 
not amount to more than a dozen persons. 
Although those who had determined on the re- 
conquest of the city were temporarily scattered, 
they were not discouraged nor were their plans 
changed. They were almost immediately united 
with certain forces under Liniers, that had been 
collected at Colonia, and had left that town for the 
southern shore on the 3d of August. 

On the eve of his departure from Colonia, 
Liniers issued a proclamation to his troops, in 
which he expressed his confidence in their zeal 
and patriotism, but affirmed 

"that if, contrary to his expectations, some forgetting 
their principles should turn their face from the enemy, 
they should know that there will be a cannon in the rear 
charged with grape-shot, with orders to fire on fugitive 
cowards. ' ' 



354 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEK 

"Valor without discipline," this proclamation con- 
tinues, ' ' only leads to immediate ruin ; forces united and 
subordinate to the voice of those who direct them furnish 
the most secure means of attaining victory; therefore I 
order and command that the most scrupulous obedience 
be observed, under the most severe penalties of the 
ordinances for such cases." 16 

In crossing from Colonia the Spanish, forces 
took advantage of a gale that swelled the waters 
on the bank of Palmas permitting their ships to 
pass over in safety. They were favored, more- 
over, by the violent rains that set in, making the 
roads practically impassable by any force but 
cavalry ; and they were abundantly supplied with 
horses, while the British had only a few they were 
able to obtain in the city. Recognizing his dis- 
advantageous position, Beresford deemed it ad- 
visable to withdraw from the center of the town 
to the right bank of the Riachuelo. He sent over 
the wounded and the treasure, but here the Span- 
iards intervened and prevented his retreat. 

General Beresford had expected to be able to 
keep Liniers' forces at a distance from the town, 
but his inadequate means of communication and 
the condition of the roads prevented the execution 
of his plan. On the 10th of August the Spaniards 
had closed in upon the town, and occupied the 
principal avenues, while the inhabitants had 

is This proclamation was dated August 1, and the forces left 
Colonia on the 3d (Liniers to the Prince of Peace, August 16, 
1806) ; for this and other documents relating to the English 
invasion, see Cairo, Tratados de la America Latina, V, 1-118. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 355 

armed themselves and taken possession of the 
housetops and the churches, prepared to carry on 
guerilla warfare from their posts of advantage. 
Only a part of the force that had been collected 
under Liniers was armed; and as it entered the 
city it continued to be attended by a large number 
of persons who had neither the arms nor the disci- 
pline of soldiers. The people were aroused to do 
what they might, whether with or without arms, 
to further the cause of their emancipation; and 
the unarmed were especially helpful in assisting 
to bring up the artillery. 

Liniers' success in life had hitherto been lim- 
ited by his personal character. He was a man, 
according to General Mitre's description, of "high 
spirit, sensitive imagination, reckless tempera- 
ment, with more good-nature than energy, and 
with more zeal in taking up projects than perse- 
verence in carrying them out ; he was intelligent, 
active, and brave, uniting to an heroic yet vacil- 
lating ambition the frivolous passions of a super- 
ficial man ; although he was not wanting in moral 
elevation and had the characteristics of a gentle- 
man, he was guided rather by his emotions than 
his judgment." 17 

On the 10th of August Liniers demanded 
from Beresf ord the surrender of the city. To 
his request the British general replied that he 
would defend it as long as it might be done with- 

17 Mitre, Historic, de Belgrano, I, 128 ; Groussac, Paul, Santiago 
de Liniers, Conde de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1907. 



356 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWEE 

out overwhelming the inhabitants in calamity. 
\Liniejs received this answer at eleven o'clock at 
night, and three hours later his forces began the 
' march; at five o'clock in the morning they occu- 
, pied the square, Retiro, and here the contest for 
' (the possession-of the city_began. The regult odL 
the fighting which followed in the streets and 
(from the housetops was the unconditional sur- 
render of Beresford and his troops, on the 12th 
of August. The lost in killed and wounded was 
three hundred; twelve hundred laid down their 
/arms and became prisoners of war. The victors 
lost two hundred in killed and wounded. 18 



After the overthrow of the British the fate 
of Buenos Aires was in the hands of the popular 
army. The viceroy, the representative of the 
sovereign, had fled before the invaders, and was 
hopelessly discredited. Under the circumstances 
it devolved upon the municipality to initiate a 
movement to effect an organization. This was 
done by calling a congress of one hundred persons 
known as notables. This congress was opened, 
according to Mitre, ' ' in the presence of more than 
four thousand spectators resolved to intervene in 
the discussion if it was necessary." 19 

is Liniers to the Prince of Peace, August 16, 1806 ; Sir Home 
Popham to W. Marsden, August 25, 1806. 
is Ristoria de Belgrano, I, 141. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 357 

Under the strong pressure of a clamorous 
public, the chief military command was formally 
conferred upon Liniers, and a committee carrying 
a notification of this appointment was sent to 
Sobremonte. The viceroy was found about forty 
leagues from Buenos Aires at the head of a force 
of three thousand men, and he professed to be 
advancing to reconquer the city which had already 
been reconquered by the citizens themselves. At 
first he refused to assent to the appointment of 
Liniers, but was soon convinced by the attitude of 
the municipality that opposition was useless. He 
was also convinced that the period of his service 
as viceroy was ended. 

This change left the civil and military power 
distributed among the audiencia, the cabildo, or 
municipal corporation, and Liniers, as the mili- 
trry chief. Under this new order, two of the 
authorities, the cabildo and the military chief, had 
a popular basis for their power. It was the voice 
of the populace which had insisted that Liniers 
should be formally recognized as the leader of 
the armed force; and the cabildo was the repre- 
sentative body of the municipal republic. In the 
process of colonial emancipation the audiencia, 
whose members were appointed by the king, and 
represented absolute power, appeared destined to 
diminish relatively in influence as the people grew 
in power. 



358 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



VI 

After the surrender of the troops in the city 
under Beresford, the fleet remained in the river 
blockading the ports of both shores. The first 
reinforcements to arrive were 1400 men from 
Cape Colony; the next were 4300 men sent from 
England under the command of General Samuel 
Auchmuty. Admiral Stirling, who was in com- 
mand of the convoying fleet from England, was 
ordered to relieve Sir Home Popham. Both of 
these expeditions were dispatched before it was 
known in London that Beresford had been de- 
feated; and they were originally designed to 
assist him in holding the position he had won. 
Another expedition of 4400 men had been pre- 
pared to invade Chile, but was ordered to the Rio 
de la Plata when the result of the popular uprising 
in Buenos Aires had become known to the British 
government. A little later still another body of 
1630 men was sent, under the immediate command 
of Major-General Levison Gower. In the begin- 
ning of the year 1807, the British had assembled 
near Buenos Aires an army of about 12,000 men, 
a fleet of eighteen war vessels, and more than 
eighty transports. The chief command over all 
the land forces serving in this region was con- 
ferred upon Lieutenant-General Whitelocke. 20 
General Whitelocke was commanded, in case the 

20 Whitelocke 's military commission was dated February 24, 
1807; see Trial of Lieut. -Gen. Whitelocke, London, 1808, I, 5. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 359 

British succeeded in establishing their authority 
in the southern provinces of South America, to 
assume and exercise the civil government of the 
conquered territory, and to pay himself a salary 
of four thousand pounds sterling per annum out 
of any revenues that might be collected in these 
provinces. 

Before the news of the disaster reached Lon- 
don an order was issued for the recall of Sir 
Home Popham. The Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty had before them Popham 's letter of 
July 6, containing information that the city of 
Buenos Aires and its dependencies had surren- 
dered to His Majesty's arms: and they found it 
advisable to take note of the irregularity of the 
conquest. On September 25 their secretary, Wil- 
liam Marsden, wrote to Popham : 

"I have received their Lordship's commands to 
acquaint you, that although they have judged it neces- 
sary to mark their disapproval of a measure of such 
importance being undertaken without the sanction of his 
Majesty's government, and of your having left the 
station it was your duty to guard without any naval 
defence, they are nevertheless pleased to express their 
entire approbation of the judicious, able, and spirited 
conduct manifested by yourself, the officers, seamen, and 
mariners employed under your orders on the above occa- 
sion. ' ' 

Eear admiral Stirling, appointed to succeed 
Popham, was authorized to determine in which 
ship Popham should return to England and, in 
performing this duty, he indicated the Sampson, 



360 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

which had a convoy in charge for the Cape of 
Good Hope, and was then to proceed to Saint 
Helena on the way to Europe. In protesting 
against this order Sir Home Pophom wrote: 

" It is natural, Sir, for me to feel mortified at the idea 
of having, by any act of mine, given their Lordships 
cause to supersede me in this country; but when, in 
addition to this, I learn that it is proposed that I should 
be subject to all the aggravation of a voyage lengthened 
by proceeding from South America to South Africa, 
thence to Saint Helena for convoy, on my way to Eng- 
land, I cannot but say it is the severest punishment that 
could be inflicted on me. To a mind sensible, as I trust 
mine is, to every reproach — to any man of proper feeling 
— it is that sort of punishment which I consider second- 
ary to scarcely any but death: it is carrying me in a 
situation humbled in the extreme to the place which, in 
conjunction with Sir David Baird, I had the honor to 
capture. There are also reasons, too evident to need 
any explanation, which would make a visit to Saint 
Helena, situated as I am, equally galling to my feel- 
ings. ' ' 21 

The subsequent correspondence on this subject 
showed Stirling's meanness of spirit under cir- 
cumstances where he could have afforded to be 
generous. 

After his arrival in England Sir Home Pop- 
ham was tried by a court-martial, held on the 
Gladiator; and at the conclusion of the trial the 
following verdict was rendered : 

"The Court is of the opinion, that the charges have 
been proved against the said Captain Sir Home Popham. 

21 Sir Home Popham to Rear- Admiral Stirling, December 7, 
1806. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 361 

That the withdrawing, without orders so to do, the whole 
of any naval force from the place where it is directed 
to be employed, and the employing it in distant opera- 
tions against the enemy; more especially if the success 
of such operations should be likely to prevent its speedy 
return, may be attended with the most serious incon- 
venience to the public service, as the success of any plan 
formed by his Majesty's Ministers for operations against 
the enemy, in which such naval force might be included, 
may by such removal entirely be prevented. And the 
Court is further of opinion, that the conduct of the said 
Captain Sir Home Popham, in the withdrawing the 
whole of the naval force under his command from the 
Cape of Good Hope, and the proceeding with it to the 
Rio de la Plata, was highly censurable, but in consider- 
ation of circumstances doth adjudge him to be only 
severely reprimanded; and the said Captain Sir Home 
Popham is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly." 22 

VII 

The British forces took possession of Monte- 
video, Maldonado, and Colonia, and appeared to 
have established their authority firmly on the left 
bank of the river. 

"Merchant vessels had followed in the wake of the 
ships of war, and the river, lately so deserted, was encum- 
bered with vessels having on board more merchandise 
than the country would be able to consume in five years. 
Montevideo had all the appearance of an English city; 
English placards covered the walls; in all the streets 
English shops were opened, where English cloth was sold 
at half the price which had hitherto been paid for it, on 
account of the thousand hindrances of the Spanish cus- 

22 Trial of Sir Home Popham, 179, 180. 



362 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

toms, and the unreasonable demands of the smugglers. 
Finally a Spanish-English journal, The Star of the 
South, was established under the patronage and with the 
assistance of the English administration, with the pur- 
pose of undermining the authority of Spain, whose 
decadence and weakness it was pleased to expose. ' ' 23 

About three months after the taking of Monte- 
video, Whitelocke and Crawford arrived. In view 
of the firm footing that had been gained on the 
left bank of the river, and the fact that 1600 men 
had previously taken the city, the task of the 
commander-in-chief, at the head of an army of 
twelve thousand men, did not appear difficult. On 
the 28th of June, 1807, the British forces landed 
at Ensenada, a little port about sixteen leagues 
southeast of Buenos Aires. Since Beresford's 
easy victory the spirit of the inhabitants of 
Buenos Aires had undergone a great change, 
which was in a measure manifest in their expul- 
sion of the invaders, and they now found them- 
selves directed by leaders of energy and foresight. 
Alzaga stood at the head of the municipality, 
and the national battalions were commanded by 
Saavedra, Belgrano, Esteban Romero, Balcarce, 
Viamont, and Martin Rodriguez. The bulk of the 
inhabitants, in view of the force and skill that 
were brought against them, appreciated the diffi- 
culties of the situation ; but at the same time they 
felt confident of success. 

The British, advancing towards the city, 
crossed the Riachuelo, and inflicted upon the 

23 Arcos, La Plata, Paris, 1865, 214. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 363 

Spaniards a partial defeat. This defeat de- 
stroyed the hopeful expectations of the people 
and spread a pall of evil foreboding over the city. 
In the night which followed, Alzaga caused the 
city to be placed in a condition of defense. The 
streets around the plaza were cut by deep 
trenches ; the troops were distributed on the roofs 
of the churches and other buildings; and the 
artillery was placed behind street barricades, and 
where it might command the trenches. Confidence 
returned to the defenders of the city. The leaders 
of the attacking party appeared also to be con- 
fident of victory, for in summoning the city to 
surrender he offered the following conditions : 

"1. All British subjects detained in South America 
' must be delivered up, and sufficient hostages placed in 
the power of the British commander till their arrival 
f at Buenos Aires. 

"2. That all persons holding civil offices dependent 
on the government of Buenos Aires, and all military 
j officers and soldiers become prisoners of war. 

"3. That all cannon, stores, arms, and ammunition 
be delivered up uninjured. 

"4. That all public property of every description be 
j delivered up to the British commanders. 

"5. That free and unrestrained exercise of the 
Roman Catholic religion be granted to the inhabitants 
| of Buenos Aires. 

"6. That all private property on shore shall be re- 
spected and secured to its owners. ' ' 

In replying to this proposition, the Spaniards 
refused to consider any terms which involved the 
laying down of their arms. The day following the 



364 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

date of this reply, namely, the 4th of July, Gen- 
eral Whitelocke wrote to Liniers, stating that he 
had another column of troops awaiting his orders 
within little more than a league of the capital; 
that he had considerable reinforcements on board 
ship ; and that the navy was ready to support such 
military operations as might be adopted. But 
Liniers appears not to have been profoundly 
impressed by the assurance of the invader, and 
replied, on the same day, that whilst he had am- 
munition and whilst the spirit which animated the 
garrison and the people continued to exist, he 
would not think of delivering up the post which 
had been confided to him, convinced that he had 
more than sufficient means to resist all the forces 
that were ready to be brought against him. 
Active hostilities began in the city on the 5th of 
July ; and as the result of this day for the British 
there were 1130 killed and wounded, including 70 
officers, and 120 officers and 1500 private soldiers 
made prisoners. It was now the Spaniards ' turn 
to assume a tone of confidence. At five o 'clock on 
the evening of the conflict, Liniers wrote the fol- 
lowing letter to General Whitelocke: 

"The same sentiments of humanity which induced 
your Excellency to propose to me to capitulate, lead me, 
now that I am fully acquainted with your force, that I 
have taken 80 officers and upwards of 1000 men, and 
killed more than double that number, without your hav- 
ing reached the centre of my position; the same senti- 
ments I say, lead me in order to avoid a greater effusion 
of blood, and to give your Excellency a fresh proof of 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 365 

Spanish generosity, to offer to your Excellency, that if 
you choose to reembark with the remainder of your 
army, to evacuate Montevideo, and the whole of the 
River Plate, leaving me hostages for the execution of 
the treaty, I will not only return all the prisoners which 
I have now made, but also all those which were taken 
from General Beresford : at the same time I think it 
necessary to state, that if your Excellency does not admit 
this offer, I cannot answer for the safety of the prisoners, 
as my troops are so infinitely exasperated against them, 
and the more so, as three of my Aids-de-Camp have been 
wounded bearing flags of truce; and for this reason I 
send your Excellency this letter by an English officer, 
and shall wait your answer one hour. ' ' 24 

Whitelocke 's reply was dated July 6, and in it 
he affirmed that the idea of surrendering the 
advantage which the army had gained was quite 
inadmissible; but the tone of this communication 
did not suggest a boasting spirit on the part of 
the writer, and in the treaty which was signed on 
the following day, he acceded to virtually all of 
the demands made by Liniers. What the con- 
ditions of the final agreement were, can hardly 
be more succinctly stated than in the language of 
the treaty itself : 

"I. There shall be from this time a cessation of hos- 
tilities on both sides of the River Plata. 

"II. The troops of his Britannic Majesty shall retain 
for the period of two months the fortress and place of 
Montevideo, and as a neutral country there shall be con- 
sidered a line drawn from San Carlos on the west to 
Parido on the east, and there shall not be on any part 
of that line hostilities committed on any side, the neu- 

24 Trial of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke, Appendix, vol. I, p. xxxviii. 



366 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

trality being understood, only that the individuals of 
both nations may live freely under their respective laws, 
the Spanish subjects being judged by theirs, as the 
English by those of their nation. 

"ILL There shall be on both sides a mutual restitu- 
tion of prisoners, including not only those which have 
been taken since the arrival of the troops under Lieu- 
tenant-General Whitelocke, but also all those his Britan- 
nic Majesty's subjects captured in South America since 
the commencement of the war. 

"IV. That for the promptest dispatch of the vessels 
and troops of his Britannic Majesty, there shall be no 
impediment thrown in the way of the supplies of pro- 
visions which may be requested for Montevideo. 

" V. A period of ten days from this time is given for 
the reembarkation of his Britannic Majesty's troops to 
pass to the north side of the River La Plata, with the 
arms which may be actually in their power, stores, equip- 
age, at the most convenient points which may be selected, 
and during this time provisions may be sold to them. 

"VI. That at the time of the delivery of the place 
and fortress of Montevideo, which shall take place at the 
end of the two months fixed in the second article, the 
delivery will be made in the terms it was found, and 
with the artillery it had when it was taken." 

"VII. Three officers of rank shall be delivered 
for and until the fulfillment of the above articles by 
both parties, being well understood that his Britannic 
Majesty's officers who have been on their parole cannot 
serve against South America until their arrival in 
Europe." 25 

This treaty was signed by Lieutenant-General 
Whitelocke and Bear- Admiral George Murray, on 
the part of the British, and by Santiago Liniers, 

25 Trial of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke, Appendix, vol. I, p. xxv. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 367 

Cesar Balbiani, and Bernardo Velasco for Spain. 
The British were required to evacuate Buenos 
Aires within forty-eight hours, and Montevideo 
within two months, and they complied strictly 
with these requirements. At the expiration of the 
term fixed, the posts which they had held on the 
Plata were abandoned. 

The complete victory won by the inhabitants 
of Buenos Aires had come after brief periods 
during the conflict when it was feared that all was 
lost; and the announcement of peace, with these 
extraordinary and unexpected conditions, was 
received with many signs of public joy. The 
patriots owed their deliverance not merely to 
their own bravery, but also, in large part, to the 
stupidity of the British leader. Their loss dur- 
ing the days of fighting was 302 killed and 514 
wounded, of whom 37 were officers. 

Concerning the attitude of the Spanish to- 
wards the English in Montevideo, an English 
resident of that city made the following statement 
in a volume published in 1808 : 

"The intercourse which subsisted between the Span- 
iards and English in Montevideo, gave them an idea of 
our character, conduct, and liberal intentions, so different 
from what they had been taught to expect, that could they 
have followed their own wishes, and what they knew to 
be their own interest, by far the greater part of them 
would have rejoyced at our continuance among them. 
They confessed that they had never before seen such 
commerce, that they had never enjoyed under their 
former government such security and happiness, or 



368 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

known such strict impartiality in the administration of 
justice. 

"It indeed seemed, without exaggeration, that the 
inhabitants of Montevideo, on the news of our repulse 
at Buenos Aires, felt even more severely than ourselves, 
and lamented, instead of rejoicing, at the successes of 
their countrymen. As the period of our departure 
approached, and when they found by our preparations 
that the place was really to be abandoned, which was a 
circumstance that they for a long time thought incred- 
ible, a gloom seemed to pervade every countenance. Not 
the most distant appearance of exultation could any- 
where be discovered. They took leave of us with regret, 
and seemed by the tears that were shed, to be parting 
from their friends and relations, rather than from 
enemies. ' ' 26 

Whitelocke returned to England, and was 
there tried by a court-martial on four distinct 
charges. The essential points of these charges 
were as follows : 

' ' 1. That Whitelocke had sent a message to the Span- 
ish commander, demanding, among other things, 'the 
surrender of all persons holding civil offices in the gov- 
ernment of Buenos Aires as prisoners of war.' 

"2. That during the march from Ensenada to Buenos 
Aires he 'did not make the military arrangements best 
calculated to ensure the success of his operations against 
the town,' and ordered the forces to enter the city with 
arms unloaded, and on no account to fire, thus unneces- 
sarily exposing the troops to destruction, without the 
possibility of making effectual opposition. 

"3. That he 'did not make, although it was in his 

26 Notes on the Viceroyalty of La Plata in South America, 
London, 1808, 104-106. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 369 

power, any effectual attempt, by his own personal exer- 
tion or otherwise, to co-operate with or support the 
different divisions of the army under his command, when 
engaged with the enemy in the streets of Buenos Aires, 
on the 5th of July.' 

"4. That he, subsequently to the attack on the town 
of Buenos Aires, and at a time when the troops under 
his command were in possession of posts on each flank 
of the town, and of the principal arsenal, with a com- 
munication open to the fleet, and having an effective 
force of about five thousand men, did enter into, and 
finally conclude a treaty with the enemy, whereby he 
acknowledged in the public dispatch the 10th of July, 
1807, that he resolved to forego the advantages which the 
bravery of his troops had obtained, and which advantages 
had cost him about two thousand five hundred men in 
killed, wounded, and prisoners, and by such treaty he 
unnecessarily and shamefully surrendered all such ad- 
vantages, totally evacuated the town of Buenos Aires 
and consented to deliver, and did shamefully abandon 
and deliver up to the enemy the strong fortress of Monte- 
video, which had been committed to his charge, and 
which, at the period of the treaty and abandonment, was 
well and sufficiently garrisoned and provided against 
attack, and which was not, at such period, in a state of 
blockade or siege." 27 

General Whitelocke was found guilty of these 
charges, with the exception of that part of the 
second charge which relates to the order pro- 
hibiting firing on entering the city. He was in 
consequence " cashiered and declared totally unfit 
and unworthy to serve His Majesty in any mili- 
tary capacity whatsoever. ' ' 

27 Trial of Lieut.-Gen. WMtelocTce, Appendix, vol. I, pp. i-iv. 



370 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

The city of Buenos Aires, by its heroic achieve- 
ments in expelling Beresford and resisting the 
assault of Whitelocke, won marked distinction. 
By the king it was ennobled and permitted to 
employ the title of Excellency; and all the other 
cities of the viceroyalty sent deputations con- 
gratulating it on its heroism. 28 

Although this episode cost Buenos Aires many 
lives and not a little destruction of property, by 
it the inhabitants acquired a valuable experience. 
It showed that the authority of Spain in this part 
of America might be easily overthrown; at the 
same time it made manifest the fact that the new 
society already stood prepared to assert itself. 
By this struggle the inhabitants of these provinces 
had moved forward to a new position. They had 
been deserted by their official ruler, and in the 
presence of a powerful enemy, they had been 
obliged to take up the reins of public power which 
he had cowardly thrown down in his flight. By 
their experience, gained in successfully defending 
themselves, they had been politically transformed. 
They had acquired the spirit of an independent 
commonwealth. They had the power to be free, 
and wanted only the will to be free. The revolt 
against Spain was, therefore destined to appear 

28 See Trial of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke; also Watson, Eobert 
Grant, Spanish and Portuguese South America, London, 1884, II, 
chap. XVIII, and Appendix; an account of the taking and the 
reeonquest by a contemporary resident of Buenos Aires is con- 
tained in Ignacio Nunez, Noticias historicas de la Bepublica Argen- 
tina, Buenos Aires, 1857, 3-50. 



THE BRITISH IN BUENOS AIRES 371 

whenever the community arrived at a conscious- 
ness of its real position. The events of these two 
years had tended to arouse their self-conscious- 
ness. The British carried off the spoils of the 
colony, but they contributed to the development 
of a nation. 



CHAPTER XIV 

PERU AND CHILE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 

I. The viceroys. II. El Mercurio Peruano. III. Am- 
brosio O'Higgins. IV. The Araucanian question. 

V. Agriculture and the system of encomiendas. 

VI. Fear of foreign trade and foreign ideas. VII. 
The last viceroy of the eighteenth century. VIII. 
The population. IX. Commerce and industry. 
X. Titles of nobility and entailed estates. XL 
Life in the country. XII. Hindrances to produc- 
tion. XIII. Royal drafts on the resources. 



Aftee the filial establishment of the viceroyalty 
of New Granada in 1739, and the creation of the 
viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, in 1776, the juris- 
diction of the viceroy of Peru, including the par- 
tially dependent captaincy-general of Chile, was 
limited to a region embracing approximately the 
territory at present claimed by the republics of 
Peru, Bolivia, and Chile. From 1776 to the end 
of the colonial period, the viceregal power within 
this territory was exercised by a series of seven 
viceroys. These were Manuel de Guirior (1776- 
1780), Agustin de Jauregui (1780-1784), Theo- 



PERU AND CHILE 373 

doro de Croix (1784-1790), Francisco Gil de 
Taboada y Lemos (1790-1796), Ambrosio O'Hig- 
gins (1796-1801), Gabriel Aviles, the Marquis of 
Aviles (1801-1806), and Jose Fernando Abascal 
(1806-1816). Under the political organization of 
this region during this period, Chile was depen- 
dent on Peru with respect to military affairs and 
matters relating to the royal treasury, but the 
local affairs of the province were controlled by the 
captain-general of Chile. There was a modifica- 
tion of the boundary of the viceroyalty, in 1796, 
when certain districts northwest of Lake Titica 
were withdrawn from the viceroyalty of Rio de la 
Plata, and added to the viceroyalty of Peru. 

The four years of Guirior 's reign were marked 
by the local disturbances preliminary to the great 
Indian revolt, and by the military preparations 
that absorbed much of the attention of both Amat, 
who preceded him, and Jauregui who followed 
him. Although it was now fifteen years after the 
expulsion of the Jesuits, the government was still 
engaged with measures relating to the disposition 
of the confiscated property. 1 

In the upturning between 1780 and 1782, the 
system of the forceful distribution of goods 
among the Indians disappeared together with the 
corregidores, but other abuses hardly less grave 
subsisted. Not the least of these was the treat- 
ment of the Indians in the mines. This was an 

i Guirior 's Relation to his successor is printed in Eelaciones de 
los vireyes y audiencias que han gooemado el Peru, Madrid, 1872, 
III, 1-113. 



374 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ancient field of cruelty. For two hundred years 
the employers had held their laborers as slaves, 
not nominally slaves; but it was maintained that 
they could not leave the works while they were in 
debt, and they were kept in debt by the proprie- 
tors selling them goods at exorbitant prices. This 
form of bondage was not an invention of the 
Spaniards. It is an inheritance from the Orient. 
The viceroy Guirior uttered a severe prohibition 
of the practice, but whatever may have been the 
immediate effect of his injunction, the abuse still 
lingers in many parts of the world, and doubtless 
in many obscure corners of America. 

At this time there was communication by post 
between Lima and Buenos Aires once a month 
for correspondence, and a special post once every 
two months for packages. There was also a 
monthly post between Lima and Cerro de Pasco 
and Huanuco by way of Jauja. In some of the 
civil institutions of the country, hospitals, for 
example, there was observed a marked decadence 
due at least in part to a decline in their resources. 
This decline was often owing to maladministra- 
tion. In the earlier decades the prodigality of the 
mines permitted lavish expenditure and encour- 
aged no emphasis on the need of careful and 
economical management. It was not strange that 
public foundations later suffered from careless or 
unwise control. Somewhat of the weakness of the 
civil administration was doubtless attributable 
also to the fact that most of the chief officials sent 



PERU AND CHILE 375 

from Spain to govern the colonies were men of 
military training and experience, and conse- 
quently fitted to take a wise initiative only in 
military affairs, only in expenditure and destruc- 
tion, not in the creative work on which the well- 
being and the progress of civil life depends. 

The loosening of the joints of the social struc- 
ture was illustrated by the affairs of the Univer- 
sity of San Marcos. The academic community 
was divided into hostile parties. It was a con- 
flict between the old and the new, and between 
ecclesiastical and secular control. In a project 
to elect a new rector, the inhabitants of the city 
became partisans for one or an other candidate. 
As in the election of the head of a monastery or 
convent, persons having no connection with the 
institution became intense partisans. It was the 
case of a community having few opportunities to 
express its contentious spirit, seizing upon and 
becoming partisans in matters that did not vitally 
concern it. Respect for the traditional seemed to 
triumph, when the viceroy suppressed the pro- 
fessorship of Indain languages and used its foun- 
dation in establishing a chair for instruction in 
the ethics, politics, and economics of Aristotle. 

Among the royal decrees arriving at Lima in 
the reign of Jauregui, relating to details of admin- 
istration, significant and insignificant, one pro- 
vided that the squadron in the Pacific should be 
under orders of the viceroy and of no other chief. 
Another provided that troops sent from Spain to 



376 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Peru or Eio de la Plata should return after four 
years including the time of the outward and 
home voyage. Jauregui was succeeded in the 
viceregal office by Teodoro de Croix on the 3d of 
April, 1784. Twenty-four days later he died as 
the result of a violent accident. 

Teodoro de Croix gave his chief attention to 
internal reforms and material improvements. He 
caused an audiencia to be installed at Cuzco. The 
oidores on their arrival in the city were greeted 
with great manifestations of rejoicing, and the 
coming of the royal seal a little later was made 
the occasion of the usual elaborate ceremony that 
attended its reception. The viceroy caused a 
cabildo to be created in Tarma and also in Huaraz. 
He applied the ordinance of intendants to Peru; 
made certain long-discussed improvements of the 
harbor at Callao; formed a project for construct- 
ing a system of sewers for Lima, but in under- 
taking to carry out his plan he encountered insur- 
mountable difficulties. He had to deal with the 
irrepressible question of monopolies and taxes, 
arising here as it had arisen elsewhere, and 
always exciting a hostile controversy. He had to 
execute the royal order of January 20, 1784, which 
provided that no foreign ship would be permitted 
to enter the ports of the Spanish dominions of the 
Indies under any pretext whatsoever. It was 
under this order that Bias Gonzalez, the governor 
of the island of Juan Fernandez, was condemned 
for harboring the disabled Columbia while it was 



PERU AND CHILE 377 

undergoing repairs. By a royal decree of the 
following year, May 10, 1785, the organization of 
the Philippine Company was announced. The 
first ship of this company to enter Callao from 
Manila was called the Hercules; it was assigned 
to the Count of San Isidro. 2 

Vicero y Croi x-jentered with excessive zeal upon 
the execution of the order of August 10, 1785, 

'^concerning printing and the possessioiuof tjooks. 
In obedience to the terms of this decree he caused 

Yto be collected and burned alL.copies that could 
be found of the works of Montesquieu, K-aynal, 
|vlachiavelli, and other works, like the Encyclo- 
pedic, that seemed to contain doctrines endanger- 
ing the stability of the state. Some of the owners 
of these works were accustomed to keep them in 
secret receptacles, in hollow beams or in hidden 
places in the walls of their houses. This decree 
required, moreover, that no printed paper or 
document of any kind should be issued without 
permission given by the government. The vice- 
roy entered into an agreement with the Inquisi- 
tion for the purpose of uniting the forces of these 
two agencies in the attempt to prohibit the impor- 
tation of prohibited books. A joint committee 
was organized and commissioned to examine all 
public libraries and withdraw such works as in 
the opinion of this committee ought not to be 
circulated. These measures appearing when the 
intellectual revolt of the late eighteenth century 

2Mendiburu, II, 443. 



l/ 



378 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

was in full swing tended rather to widen than to 
close the breach between the colonies and the 
mother country. 

The production of the mines had declined to 
such an extent in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century, that Charles III saw the need of making 
a special effort to revive the industry. For this 
purpose he called Baron von Nordenflicht from 
Curland to Madrid in 1788 and senTEim to"~Peru 
as chief of a metallurgical commission. Norden- 
flicht was born in Prussia. On this Peruvian 
expedition he was accompanied by a number of 
chemists and metallurgists, who, in 1791, estab- 
lished a chemical laboratory at Lima for the 
instruction of youth. At the mines of Potosi the 
commission undertook to put in practice a system 
of exploitation that would produce more satisfac- 
tory results than those hitherto followed. But 
the expected results, neither in instruction nor in 
the practical business of mining, were realized, 
and Nordenflicht withdrew from America after a 
number of years, with a greatly diminished repu- 
tation. 

Viceroy Gil de Taboada y Lemus, of the royal 
navy, arrived at Cartagena January 1, 1789. 
While there he received the extensive Memoria 
prepared by his predecessor, Gongora, who had 
held the two offices of archbishop and viceroy of 
New Granada. After an uneventful career of 
seven months as the head of the government of 
New Granada, he relinquished his authority, and 
assumed the duties of viceroy of Peru. 



PERU AND CHILE 379 

II 

The awakening interest in literary cultivation 
was encouraged by Viceroy Francisco Gil de 
Taboada y Lemus. He approved the project to 
establish a periodical publication designed to pre- 
sent articles relating to the state and progress of 
the kingdom. He, moreover, offered from the 
archives and from the various offices and vice- 
regal institutions such information as might be 
desired for publication. Through the efforts of 
an interested company of persons under the 
patronage of the viceroy the Mercurio Peruano 
came into existence. A few months before it 
appeared there had been issued a periodical called 
the Diario erudito, that began to be published 
October 1, 1790. It was issued by a society known 
as ' i Filopolita. " Its existence was limited to 
about two years. The obstacles to its continuing 
were lack of funds and the rigorous official censor- 
ship exercised over all articles submitted for pub- 
lication. This censorship was so firmly fixed in 
the order of affairs that not even the viceroy was 
competent to set it aside. 3 

The first number of the Mercurio Peruano was 
issued on the 2nd of January, 1791. An associa- 
tion known as the Sociedad de Amantes del Pais 
was formed to guarantee the permanency of the 
publication. The number of members was limited 
to thirty. Twenty-one of them were required to 

sMendiburu, IV, 70. 



380 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

be residents of Lima, and persons of literary- 
attainments. After the completion of twelve 
volumes, the publication was suspended in 1796. 4 
Another publication of the period in question 
was El Seminario critico, undertaken by Padre 
Antonio Olavarrieta. It was announced as de- 
signed to discuss questions relating to education, 
public customs, and in general the social affairs 
of the community. From 1793 to 1798 Dr. Unanue 
edited and caused to be published an annual 
official guide. In 1793 the viceroy made arrange- 
ment for the publication of the Gaceta de Lima. 
It was said that the " alarming events of the 
French nation" made this periodical necessary, 
"in order that the capital and the viceroyalty 
might have an accredited journal through which 
the inhabitants might inform themselves concern- 
ing the excesses that are now reported to their 
ears in an informal manner." 5 The Gaceta was 
continued until 1821, publishing only such matters 
as were found to be agreeable to the government, 
and not hesitating to present information in a 
garbled form. In 1791 there was also formed an 
association of writers called "Tertulia poetica." 
The viceroy extended to it his patronage and 
support. It held frequent meetings, where the 
members submitted their compositions for exam- 
ination. Some of these were found worthy of 

4 Mercurio Peruano, February 27, and March. 20, 1794. The 
names of the members of the society are given by Mendiburu, 
IV, 70. 

s Memorias de los vireyes, VI, 97. 



PERU AND CHILE 381 

publication in the Mercurio Peruano but the asso- 
ciation itself had only a brief existence. 

The establishment of the Gaceta was not the 
only act the viceroy was induced to take by the 
events of the French Revolution; he was moved 
also to create a secret police in Lima, whose func- 
tion was to find out the subjects of public and 
private communications among the inhabitants, 
and to keep a careful watch over the books and 
other writings that were brought into the coun- 
try. The members of this force were enjoined 
especially to prevent the circulation of The Rights 
of Man, that Narino had printed and made known 
in New Granada. It was also made the business 
of the secret police to take account of all persons 
who had entered the kingdom after 1790, and to 
inquire into their manner of life. The viceroy 
issued an order prohibiting the game of pelota, 
in order to prevent the assembling of discontented 
persons at the courts. 

In his Memoria to his successor, Viceroy Gil 
set forth the advantages for Peru and the royal 
treasury of direct trade with Spain by way of 
Cape Horn. Through statements published in the 
Mercurio, the inhabitants of Peru had their first 
opportunity to learn the relation of their imports 
to their exports. According to this source, during 
the lustrum from 1785 to 1789 the imports from 
Spain amounted to 42,099,313 pesos, while the 
exports to the Peninsula were valeud at 35,979,339 
pesos. These exports were in money and products 



382 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

of the country. During the lustrum from 1790 
to 1794, the imports amounted to 29,091,220 pesos, 
and the exports to 31,889,500 pesos. The greater 
part of the exports in both cases consisted in gold 
and silver both coined and in other forms. 6 



Ill 

Viceroy Gil turned over the affairs of the vice- 
regal office, on the 6th of June, 1796, to Lieutenant- 
General Ambrosio O'Higgins, the Marquis of 
Osorno. O'Higgins came to Peru from Chile, 
where he had held the office of governor and 
captain-general. It is noteworthy that the most 
distinguished of the Chilean captains-general, the 
person who made the most profound impression 
on the affairs of Chile, entered upon the duties of 
his office at an age when public officials are often 
supposed to have outlived the period of their 
greatest usefulness. This man was Ambrosio 
O'Higgins, who was born in Ireland in 1720. The 
agitation against the Catholics in Ireland, their 
exclusion from public offices, and other limitation 
of their civil and political rights persuaded him, 
as many others had been persuaded, to emigrate, 
and seek to establish himself in a foreign country. 
Spain received him hospitably and assigned him 

e Statistics relating to the reign of Viceroy Gil de Taboada y 
Lemus may be referred to in the Mercurio Peruano, in the vice- 
roy's Memoria to his successor {Memories de los vireyes, VI), and 
in Mendiburu's monograph on the viceroy in Die. Biog., IV, 
69-103. 



PERU AND CHILE 383 

a position in the army. A few years later he went 
to Peru, interested in a mercantile venture. This 
resulted disastrously, and in 1761 he sought occu- 
pation in Chile where Governor Barroeta gave 
him a subordinate position as engineer. After 
twenty-seven years of efficient service, he was 
appointed captain-general of Chile and after a 
vigorous administration of eight years he was 
promoted, in 1796, at the age of seventy-six, to 
the office of viceroy of Peru. This office he held 
nearly five years, until his death in 1801. 

In the later years of the colonies the king of 
Spain sought to promote to the highest offices per- 
sons who had experience in either the civil or 
military service of the Indies. At the time of 
his appointment to the office of captain-general, 
O'Higgins had served many years as an engineer, 
a military officer, and an intendant, and had be- 
come familiar with the character and needs of the 
different parts of the Chilean territory. 

This policy doubtless helped to make the gov- 
ernment of the colonies more efficient, at the same 
time the colonists, in so far as they could think of 
the government as embracing many officials long 
familiar with their affairs, were disposed to think 
of it as their government. Under this view they 
would assume that a viceroy, a captain-general, or 
a judge sent from Spain without American experi- 
ence, was not in sympathy with it. Thus the 
carrying out of this very reasonable policy could 
not but emphasize the distinction between the 



384 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

Spanish rule and a local or domestic administra- 
tion. 

The northern part of Chile had not been 
visited by any of the previous governors or cap- 
tains-general, while the southern districts, lying 
between the Araucanian frontier and the capital, 
had been constantly within the range of the 
captain-general's observation. The expeditions 
against the Araucanians had crossed these dis- 
tricts, and, through the numerous conferences 
with the Indians, this region had been kept in 
mind by both parties. But the northern end of 
the territory had remained in isolation, and both 
the economical affairs and the affairs of the ad- 
ministration needed the supervision and stimulus 
of the central government. The fact that the 
captain-general made this northern journey of 
hundreds of leagues over a region with few roads, 
studying the needs of the inhabitants and seeking 
to promote their material interests in all possible 
ways, is a sufficient indication of the zeal and force 
which he brought to the task of government. 

IV 

In the long course of the Araucanian war 
treaties had been made from time to time, but 
they were rarely more than temporary inter- 
ruptions of hostilities. These interruptions per- 
mitted the belligerents to recover from their 
losses and make ready for a new attack with re- 



PERU AND CHILE 385 

newed force. In the conflict the rules of warfare 
that prevail among civilized nations were dis- 
regarded. Both parties kept forces on the fron- 
tier, made raids at every opportunity into the 
enemy's territory, and committed all kinds of 
depredations. Neither party trusted the promises 
of the other, and time seemed only to increase 
the bitterness of their hostility. In this state 
of affairs the southern districts might not be 
neglected. Moreover, the almost continouus war- 
fare had a very marked influence on the military 
arm of the colony. It made the militia a vital 
and active force. Imminent war made military 
discipline possible. 

. As a means of establishing peace between the 
.two races, Jauregui, when he became captain- 
' general in 1773, caused four Araucanian chiefs_£o 
\ be brought to Santiago as ambassadors represent- 
ing the various Indian tribes. It was intended 
that these chiefs should be witnesses to the dis- 
position of the Spaniards to deal fairly with their 
neighbors ; that they should be employed as medi- 
ators or interpreters in future negotiations; and 
that through them the complaints of the Indians 
might be carried to the Spanish authorities. They 
should be clothed and supported at the expense of 
the government. They arrived at Santiago in 
April, 1774, and were placed under the protection 
of the local authorities; and the public was 
solemnly ordered, under severe penalties, not to 
show them any disrespect. This plan received the 



386 • SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

endorsement of the viceroy of Peru, but there 
were not wanting persons who saw that it in- 
volved an overestimate of the civilization of the 
Indians and was consequently visionary. It was, 
nevertheless, confirmed by an agreement between 
the Indians and the Spaniards made at the con- 
ference in 1774. In this agreement it was stipu- 
lated that peace should be maintained among the 
various Indian tribes, and that the Indians should 
send their sons to be educated in a school to be 
opened in Santiago for this purpose. The Arau- 
canians, however, hesitated to comply with the 
provision respecting the education of their sons. 
The few who were sent to Santiago acquired a 
certain amount of elementary knowledge; but 
difficulties arose when attempts were made to give 
them more advanced instruction. It was found 
that the barbarian was only a good beginner in 
learning. In 1780 the Santiago. school for Indians 
was transferred to Chilian. 

V 

With respect to agricultural reform, O'Hig- 
gins entertained certain ideas and plans that, 
under the prevailing natural conditions, could not 
be fully carried out. He seems to have exagger- 
ated the possibilities of governmental influence in 
economic affairs. His efforts to foster the pro- 
duction of sugar was a case in point. In some of 
the northern valleys where it was planted on a 



PERU AND CHILE 387 

small scale, the enterprise was in a measure 
successful ; but the attempt to create larger plan- 
tations in other districts encountered difficulties, 
and the cultivation was abandoned after three or 
four years of experiment. The efforts to extend 
the production of rice had no better result, and 
the attempt to introduce the cultivation of tobacco 
met with an insurmountable obstacle in a royal 
decree of prohibition issued in the interest of the 
existing monopoly. The motive in these and other 
proposed agricultural reforms was the betterment 
of the condition of the people ; and, although some 
of the specific undertakings were unsuccessful, 
attention was called to the need of more careful 
cultivation. 

But more important for the social well-being 
of Chile was the effort of the captain-general to 
set aside the abuses of the encomiendas, and even 
to abolish the system itself. In the beginning this 
system was thought to be necessary in order to 
provide laborers for the fields and the mines ; for 
it was understood that the Indians, like all sav- 
ages, lacked the habit of consecutive work, and 
that compulsion would be necessary to make them 
persistent laborers. The power to compel the 
Indians to work having been granted to the 
encomenderos, there remained no practical 
obstacle to making them slaves, and to this posi- 
tion they were reduced with all the attendant 
miseries that have become historic. But after 
two hundred years and more, a class of persons 



388 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

had come into existence who were accustomed to 
obtain their livelihood by more or less regular 
work. The reason for compulsory labor origin- 
ally advanced was no longer valid, and it is to the 
credit of the captain-general as an administrator 
that he gave a powerful impulse to the movement 
for abolishing this system. 

The encomenderos carried to the King their 
protests against the action of the governor, but 
O'Higgins by frequent reports kept the king in- 
formed of his motives in this reform, and of the 
advisability of causing it to be adopted through- 
out Spain's American possessions. 

The fact that the initiative in a reform as 
important as this was taken by a governor of a 
dependency in America indicates that the Spanish 
rule was declining, and that local authority in 
local affairs was leading the rule of the king. By 
a decree of April 3, 1791, Charles IV approved the 
action taken by the governor of Chile, and by a 
later decree, June 10, of the same year he ordered 
that the encomiendas of private persons should be 
definitely suppressed. 

VI 

While the captain-general was engaged in 
these and other internal reforms, the coming of 
foreign vessels to participate in the trade of the 
colony provoked the opposition of the officials both 
in Chile and Peru. Even the presence of foreign 



PERU AND CHILE 389 

vessels excited alarm, whether they came to trade 
or merely halted at a Spanish-American port 
on their way to another destination. In 1788 
an American vessel named Columbia, battered 
by storms, put into the port of the island of 
Juan Fernandez. The governor of the island, 
Bias Gonzalez, permitted repairs to be made. 
Although the vessel was bound for Alaska, and 
had no design to trade at the ports of South 
America, Governor Gonzalez was deposed and 
tried for having furnished succor to the distressed 
vessel. The viceroy had no warships with which 
to pursue strange vessels, but a ship furnished by 
a merchant of Lima was armed and sent to Juan 
Fernandez; it failed to find any offenders. The 
coming of foreign vessels from the United States 
was opposed by the authorities not merely because 
they would tend to overthrow the ancient trade 
regime, but also because they would help to propa- 
gate the political ideas of the young republic, and 
thus contribute to the destruction of the Spanish 
colonial system. 

During the last decades of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, the radical philosophy of the time, as 
already indicated, was gradually modifying the 
ideas of the Spanish colonists, while the kings of 
Spain continued to think as their ancestors of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thought. 
They held that the cession of Alexander VI and 
their conquests made them absolute masters of 
their American possessions and the exclusive 



390 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

lords of the adjacent oceans. But the colonists 
had already begun to regard this view as a fiction ; 
for they saw that foreigners did navigate these 
seas and trade at colonial ports in spite of the 
royal prohibition. They saw also that the demand 
of the increased population could not be satisfied 
by Spanish traders dealing solely in Spanish 
wares. But, although unable to meet the require- 
ment of the colonists, Spain still persisted in her 
attempt to exclude foreign trade and foreign 
ideas, with the inevitable result of alienating her 
transatlantic subjects, and weakening her control 
over them. 

After the Columbia other ships appeared off 
the coast, and when these were reported to the 
king, he again ordered the colonial authorities to 
prevent foreign vessels from navigating Ameri- 
can waters or from approaching the ports. But 
the efforts of the colonial government were in- 
effective, the contraband trade was continued ; and 
the colonists, finding the supply of desired wares 
increased by it, were not in sympathy with the 
order of prohibition. On the etiquette of certain 
packages introduced from the United States 
appeared the figure of a woman holding a flag, 
with the motto, "American Liberty." This fact, 
brought to the attention of the king, induced him 
once more to issue his futile injunction against 
contraband trade. 

"While the inhabitants of the viceroyalty were 
contemplating the results that might proceed from 



PERU AND CHILE 391 

the encroachments of foreigners it was announced 
that Charles III was dead. He had died in Decem- 
ber, 1788, but information of the fact did not reach 
Chile and Peru until April of the following year. 
After elaborate funeral ceremonies had been had 
in the capital cities, preperations were made to 
celebrate the accession of Charles IV. The 
enthusiastic chronicler of these ceremonies in 
Chile affirmed that persons familiar with the 
grandeur of the most important courts and cities 
of both worlds maintained that nowhere else had 
they seen such magnificence as was here displayed. 
This was the last occasion of this kind on which 
public enthusiasm was especially manifest; for 
when Ferdinand VII, the son and successor of 
Charles IV, ascended the throne in 1808, the 
Spanish monarchy was already falling under the 
shadow of Napoleon's expanding empire, and the 
loyalty of the people was undermined by the 
spread of revolutionary doctrines. 

The fear of foreign encroachment had already 
led the authorities of the viceroyalty to petition 
the king to send them arms and ammunition. 
O'Higgins repeated this request, and acting on 
orders from the king the viceregal government 
proceeded to put the coast in a state of defense; 
for active hostilities appeared to be imminent in 
1789 as a result of the controversy between Eng- 
land and Spain concerning the possession of a 
part of the island of Vancouver. The Spanish 
government, in withdrawing its pretensions, con- 



392 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

ceded to the English the right to fish in the Pacific 
and at the same time to make use temporarily of 
certain points on the coast that were not occupied 
by the Spaniards. In order to prevent this con- 
cession from serving as a pretext for unlawful 
trade with the Spanish colonies, it was expressly 
stipulated that English subjects should not navi- 
gate the Pacific within ten maritime leagues of 
any point of the coast occupied by the Spanish. 
This concession gave English vessels recognized 
rights on the Spanish- American coast, but the 
Spanish authorities found it difficult to confine 
them within the limits of these rights ; for vessels 
that came ostensibly to fish were naturally led to 
engage in the much more profitable business of 
smuggling, and the government was not in a 
position to prevent them. 

VII 

On the 16th of May, 1796, O'Higgins surren- 
dered his functions as head of the government of 
Chile into the hands of the regent of the audiencia, 
who exercised them until the arrival of O'Hig- 
gins' successor, the Marquis of Aviles. He 
entered Lima as the viceroy of Peru on the 24th 
of July, and thus, clothed with the highest official 
dignity in the New World, he came back to the city 
where in poverty he had attempted unsuccessfully 
to enter upon a very humble mercantile career. 
It was in the first year of his administration that 



PERU AND CHILE 393 

the intendency of Puno was withdrawn from the 
viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, and added to the 
territory of Peru. Although he was seventy-six 
years of age on his arrival in Lima, the activity 
he had displayed in Chile appears to have suffered 
no abatement. He caused a fort to be constructed 
at Pisco, and manned it with a force of artillery ; 
he strengthened the fortress of Callao, armed cer- 
tain vessels of war, established a camp for the 
instruction and discipline of troops, and con- 
structed barracks for soldiers at Lima. His sup- 
port of mills for spinning cotton, flax, and hemp, 
that had been established by a company, indicates 
a certain emancipation from the restraints im- 
posed by the government in Spain. He saw more 
clearly than most of his predecessors the economic 
advantage of good roads. In Chile he had found 
the country almost wholly without roads; they 
existed only in and immediately around the cities. 
The Spanish colonists everywhere were generally 
content to travel or to transport their goods on 
beasts of burden. Even between Valparaiso and 
Santiago there was no wagon road before the last 
decade of the century. O'Higgins had to make 
this journey three times during the first two 
years of his rule as captain-general, and these 
journeys were sufficient to make him appreciate 
the need of a road suited to vehicles on wheels. 
The inhabitants of the capital of Chile, as the 
foreign trade of the country increased, recognized 
the advantage that would accrue to them from 



394 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

better means of transportation; but when it was 
proposed to begin the construction, the captain- 
general encountered two obstacles; the lack of 
funds and the unwillingness of many proprietors 
to have the road traverse their lands. Finally, 
however, certain funds were obtained by imposing 
a slight additional tax on goods imported and 
exported at Valparaiso, and some of the proprie- 
tors were made to see that their prejudices were 
groundless, and that the road would be a benefit 
rather than an injury. The work of construction 
was begun in 1792. 

Two years later Captain Vancouver passed 
over this road going form Valparaiso to Santiago. 

"The making of the new road," he wrote, 
"had doubtless been a work of great labor, and 
to a people who are not very industriously in- 
clined, and who are all bigoted to former practices 
and original habits, it is no wonder that the 
manifest advantages that must result to the in- 
habitants of the country from his Excellency's 
wise undertaking, should be overlooked, or rather 
not be seen by them ; and that the execution of his 
judicious plan should have deprived him, amongst 
the lower orders of the people, of much of his 
popularity." 7 

In Peru itself O'Higgins found the roads in a 
lamentable state, and undertook to improve them. 
He built a new road from Lima to Callao, the 
most elaborate of all of his constructions of this 

7 A Voyage of Discovery, VI, 258. 



PERU AND CHILE 395 

kind. The end at the entrance of the city was 
adorned with an architectural gate bearing the 
royal arms and the arms of Lima and the con- 
sulado. 

VIII 

The population of Peru at the end of the 
century, according to Humboldt's estimate, was 
1,200,000. 8 Negroes and mestizos, particularly at 
Lima, formed a considerable part of the inhab- 
itants ; and there were about 400,000 Indians. The 
population of Chile is set down in the returns of 
the first census as 259,646 in 1778. The estimate 
for the end of the century is approximately 
400,000, counting the Spaniards, the Creoles and 
the mestizos. The presence of the alien and mixed 
races, in this viceroyalty as elsewhere in Spanish 
America, made the Spaniards especially solicitous 
to maintain lines of social distinction. The 
coexistence of these classes created a prejudice in 
the Spanish mind against many kinds of work, 
thus giving to the society of the viceroyalty the 
spirit characteristic of communities composed of 
slave-holders and slaves. The Spaniards refused 
to engage in certain occupations that were honor- 
able in themselves, because they were accepted 
by persons of color, suffering any degree of pov- 
erty rather than do violence to their prejudices. 

8 Humboldt to Viceroy Mendinueta, November 7, 1802, printed 
by Groot, II, Appendix No. 47; Memorias de los vireyes, Lima, 
1859, VI, 4. 



396 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

The persons who constituted a subject class 
were Indians, mulattos, and negroes. They were 
required to pay tribute. The mestizo was no 
farther removed from the Spaniard than the 
mulatto, yet he was not under this obligation. The 
basis of this difference was the Spaniard's differ- 
ent estimates of the Indians and the negroes. The 
Spanish-Indian union might produce a child des- 
tined to freedom. The Spanish-negro union might 
produce only a member of a subject class. The 
mestizos formed the bulk of the free laboring 
class, the artisans, and the subalterns in the offices 
of administration. 9 

The long discussion concerning the relation of 
the Indians to the Europeans, particularly in the 
southern part of the viceroyalty, finally culmin- 
ated in 1791 in the abolition of personal service 
and the incorporation of the encomiendas in the 
crown. This last act was, in fact, a revocation of 
the privilege enjoyed by the encomenderos of 
holding Indians for service on their lands. The 
decree making these changes provided also for 
alloting to the Indians such lands as might be 
necessary, when cultivated, for their support. 10 

One of the beneficient effects of this measure 
was the pacification of the Araucanians, who had 
been stimulated by the cruelties inflicted on their 
compatriots to maintain themselves in a state of 
hostility towards the Spaniards. An equally pro- 

9 See Amunategui, Los Precursores de la independencia de 
Chile, Santiago de Chile, 1910, III, 15. 

io This edict is printed in Amunategui, Los Precursores, II, 493. 



PERU AND CHILE 397 

voking cause of this hostility was the reluctance 
of the Indians to depart from their ancient man- 
ner of living, a change destined inevitably to 
follow the encroachment of their northern neigh- 
bors. Having been brought by this measure into 
a friendly attitude with respect to the power they 
had known for many decades, they might be 
expected to adhere to it rather than to go over 
to a party that seemed to be opposed to it. Thus 
the Araucanians appear in sympathy with the 
royalists rather than with those who were hostile 
to the legitimate government. Although the . 
revolutionary party as developed later drew noj 
physical support from the Araucanians, the heroic 
struggle of that people to preserve its indepen- ' 
dence encouraged the revolutionists to persist in, 
their cause. Ercilla, in Araucana, wrote to mag- 
nify the power and glory of Spain, but the 
characters and the deeds that stand out conspicu- 
ously in the poem, and that furnished an inspira- 
tion to Chilean patriotism are the characters and! 
deeds of Araucanians. In the early years of the 
revolutionary movement, there were many evi- 
dences of this influence. Parents caused their 
children to be baptized with the names of Caupo- 
lican, Lautaro, Tucapel, and of other Indians 
who had achieved fame in the long conflict. The 
examples of these heroes as set forth by Ercilla 
and Chilean historians were cited in proclama- 
tions to awaken the zeal of Chilean soldiers in the 
cause of independence. 



398 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



IX 

A large part of the trade between Peru and 
other dependencies was carried on by sea, chiefly 
from the port of Callao. The merchandise ex- 
ported consisted of textile fabrics, sugar, and rice. 
The articles imported were wheat, tallow, hides, 
copper, cordage, mate, and tobacco. The mate 
and tobacco came to Peru from Paraguay by way 
of Chile. The trade between Lima and Bogota 
passed in part overland through the province of 
Quito, and in part through the ports of Guayaquil 
and Panama. The viceroyalty of New Granada 
sent to Lima, among other things, cacao and 
coffee. The effect of the liberal policy respecting 
trade, established in 1778, and carried into gen- 
eral execution in 1783, may be seen in the great 
increase in shipping at Callao. In 1785 sixteen 
vessels arrived at that port with cargoes esti- 
mated at twenty-four million dollars. At that 
time the value of the annual production of gold 
and silver in the country was only about four 
million dollars, and these were the principal com- 

I modities produced that might be exported to pay 
for imports. Thus the zeal to embrace the new 

' opportunities for trade brought to Peru goods to 
the value of twenty-four million dollars in a 

' period when four million dollars represented the 
normal consumption of imports. The result of 
this oversupply was to glut the market completely 

'land to cause a temporary interruption of trade. 



PERU AND CHILE 399 

In some cases the wares could not find a market 
at any price, and were committed to the flames. 
This was a warning to shippers, and caused them 
to withhold their goods. By this means the im- 
ports were reduced to the quantity and the kinds 
of commodities needed. 11 

The Spanish colonists, like the Spaniards in 
Spain, did not look with favor on commercial or 
industrial corporations. They raised a great out- 
cry against the Philippine Company 12 and other 
corporations on the ground that they were 
destructive of the commercial undertakings of 
private persons; that they absorbed all the trade 
the viceroyalty could maintain; and that by their 

11 The Present State of Peru, London, 1805, 108-110 ; at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century a large part of the wares in 
use in Lima were English. Writing from his observations made 
at the time, Stevenson says "the windows were glazed with Eng- 
lish glass — the brass furniture and ornaments on the commodes, 
tables, and chairs were English — the chintz or dimity hangings, 
the linen and cotton dresses of the females, and the cloth coats 
and cloaks of the men were all English; the tables were covered 
either with plate or English earthenware, and English glass, 
knives, and forks; and even the kitchen utensils, if of iron, were 
English; in fine, with very few exceptions, all was either of 
English or South American manufacture. Coarse cotton, nankeens, 
and a few other articles were supplied by the Philippine company. 
Spain sent some iron, broadcloth, Barcelona prints, linen, writing 
paper, silks, and ordinary earthenware. From the Italians they 
had silks and velvets; from the French, linens, lace, silks, and 
broadcloth; from Germany linens, common cutlery, and glass; 
everything else was either English or of home manufacture." — 
Twenty Years in South America, I, 349. 

12 The Compania Filipinas was established in 1785 for a period 
of twenty years. It was designed to carry on trade directly with 
the East Indies. It gave a powerful impulse to Spanish commerce. 
— Palacio, Edward de, Espana desde el primer Boroon hasta la 
revolu-cion de Setiembre, Madrid, 1868, I, 487. 



400 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

extensive capital they were enabled to sell at a 
reduced price. It was affirmed that by these 
means they drove the private trader to the wall. 13 
The association of capitalists in industrial and 
commecrial corporations was unknown in Chile in 
the colonial period. ' ' There was no other commer- 
cial association than that of certain brothers, who, 
after the death of their fathers, continued together 
for a certain number of years in the business 
which their fathers had established." 14 There 
were, moreover, no companies for insuring against 
the risks of transportation by sea, or against 
losses by fire. In view of this fact and the great 
risks attending the route around the southern end 
of the continent, in the course of time more and 
more of the wares imported from Europe were 
carried by way of Buenos Aires and the Andes, 
while the sea route was almost entirely neglected. 
The conduct of business was further impeded 
by the absence of a system of credit and exchange, 
necessitating the actual transfer of coin for the 
payment of debts, whether within or without the 
limits of a province or dependency. The expor- 
tation of money required by this method of mak- 
ing payments sometimes threatened to exhaust the 
supply of currency. This difficulty was in a meas- 
ure set aside by the circulation of clipped coins 
that passed for their nominal value but could not 
be exported without loss. The coins of circulation 
were of the same system as those used in Spain, 

is Present State of Peru, 117. 

i* Barros Arana, Hist, de Chile, VII, 401. 



PERU AND CHILE 401 

but the copper coins that circulated in Spain were 
not employed. The attempt made in 1781 to intro- 
duce them met with vigorous opposition; and it 
was not until after the establishment of the repub- 
lic that the project to circulate copper coins was 
resumed with success. 

Among all the obstacles to industrial and com- - 
mercial progress, the chief was the deadening grip 
of Spain's restrictions. With natural conditions 
that might have been turned to good account in 
the production of sugar, the Spanish government 
prohibited the introduction of material for the 
equipment of sugar mills, and prohibited also the 
construction of sugar refineries in Peru. The pro- 
hibition of making brandy from cane was de- 
signed as a direct discouragement to the cultiva- 
tion of cane. This order not proving effective, 
a tax of twelve per cent was imposed upon brandy, 
and later it was definitely decreed that Indians 
might not work in sugar mills, and they might not 
be employed in cutting and carting cane without 
express governmental authorization. 15 

By a series of decrees extending over many 
decades, the cultivation of the grape and the 
making of wine were prohibited, and all these acts 
of prohibition had one general purpose, namely, 
to leave the markets of America open to Spanish 
wine. It was, however, seen in the course of time 
that these restrictions were disadvantageous to 
Spain as well as to the colonies, and they were 

15 Leyes de Indias, lib. 6, tit. 13, ley 11. 



402 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

relaxed; yet even while the laws existed without 
modification they were not completely effective; 
frequently they were not obeyed. But as long as 
they stood unrepealed the production of wine was 
necessarily a precarious business; for it could 
not with entire safety be presumed that the policy 
of one viceroy to allow planters to ignore the law 
would be followed by his successor. 16 

Although an act of prohibition might be 
directed to the authorities of a specified captaincy- 
general or viceroyalty to cure a specific evil in the 
district in question, yet it was often the purpose 
of the decree that its application should be gen- 
eral, and affect all regions where the conditions 
to be remedied might exist. By Philip IV, the 
prohibition concerning the cultivation of the 
grape had already been made to apply generally, 
when it was " prohibited to plant vines in the 
Indias Occidentales, and ordered that the viceroys 
should give no license for new planting or for 
cultivating the vines already planted." 17 An in- 
( dication of the declining force of Spanish law in 
\ America is seen in the fact that the vineyards had 
i greatly increased in the later decades of the cen- 
tury, in spite of the general and specific decrees 
of prohibition. 

The acts of prohibition by the government, 

provoked by the complaints of Spaniards, ran 

. directly counter to the purposes of the Spaniards 

is Leyes de Indias, lib. 4, tit. 18, ley 15. 

17 Leyes de Indias, lib. 4, tit. 17, ley 18 ; Amunategui, La 
cronioa de 1810, I, 89. 



PERU AND CHILE 403 

settled in America, whose attention in the begin- 
ning was directed to the cultivation of the various 
grains and other food products they had used in 
Spain. The lack of frequent communication with 
any civilized country made such cultivation neces- 
sary to their existence and thus as early as 1501 
" there were cultivated on this continent wheat, 
rice, and all the nutrious grains of Spain; there 
had been introduced the Spanish domestic fowls, 
sheep, hogs, goats; the ox and the ass and the 
horse aided man in the cultivation of the fields, 
where before he had worked alone. ' ,18 

It is noteworthy that the government early 
assumed an attitude of opposition to the cultiva- 
tion and use of the coca plant. This was the 
sacred tree of the incas, and it was employed in 
their religious ceremonies. It was conceived to 
have power to placate the anger of their gods. 
The curling smoke of coca burning on the altar 
brought divine favor ; and only the priest chewing 
the sacred leaf could hear the voice of the oracles. 
The right to cultivate the coca plant belonged only 
to the inca, son of the sun, the Supreme King, and 
the Supreme Priest. The public action at first 
taken by the Spanish authorities was in some 
sense prompted by ideas of religion and charity. 19 

is Benzoni, History of the New World, 91. 

is ' ' The plant grew in unhealthy regions, and experience had 
taught that the Indians who went to the coca plantations, if they 
did not lose their lives, came back to their homes with weakened 
bodies. To seek to abolish the coca plantations was, therefore, in 
a certain way, to spare the sufferings of the oppressed race." — 
Oliveira, La politico, econormca de la metropoli, 34. 



404 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

f By an ordinance issued by Viceroy Toledo 
.under royal authority, it was provided that no per- 
' son might plant coca. As a penalty for violation 
of this ordinance, it was ordered that the plants 
should be pulled up and burned, the culprit should 
pay a fine of two thousand dollars, and he should 
be banished for four years. But while the Indians 
were prevented from working on the coca planta- 
tions, they were permitted to work under the much 
more destructive conditions of the mines. The 
reason of this discrimination may perhaps be 
found in the fact that the mines contributed one- 
fifth of their product to the king, while, in the 
view of the authorities, "coca was the diabolical 
instrument of superstition." 20 "Working in the 
mines might kill the body, but the use of coca 
tended to demoralize the spirit. The absurdity 
of this legislation appears to have been perceived 
at last by the viceroy himself, for he subsequently 
\ issued an ordinance permitting the establishment 
\ of new coca plantations. 21 

While the government of the viceroyalty of 
Peru sought to discourage the cultivation of wine 
and coca, it was active in promoting the cultiva- 
tion of wheat; but the fields had been rendered 
unproductive by the earthquake of 1687, and re- 
mained sterile for nearly forty years. After 1722 
the production of wheat was revived, and with 
this arose the policy of protecting the Peruvian 

20 Oliveira, 45. 
alOliveira, 47-49. 



PERU AND CHILE 405 

wheat market from the more abundant and 
cheaper production of Chile. The first step 
towards this end was to reduce the tax burden on 
Peruvian farmers who raised wheat. Then it was 
ordered that dealers should sell Chilean and 
Peruvian wheat in equal quantities, and, later, 
that Chilean wheat should be sold only after the 
Peruvian wheat had been exhausted. In order 
to render the protection still more effective, still 
later a tax of a dollar per fanega was imposed on 
wheat from Chile. Finally, under Viceroy 'Hig- 
gins, action was taken that suggests one phase of 
the culture system of Java. The farmers of cen- 
tral and western Peru were required to devote a 
part of their estates to the cultivation of wheat, 
the amount in individual cases to vary with the 
size of the estate in question. 

Yet in spite of these protective measures, Peru 
had not great expectations regarding her agricul- 
ture. A large part of her territory was composed 
of mountains, and another large part was made 
up of deserts. More might have been done if sys- 
tematic and persistent efforts had been devoted to 
irrigation. But with profitable mines at hand and 
with an energetic part of the population in eager 
search for others, it was not to be expected that 
large sums would be invested in carrying out 
elaborate plans for irrigation, when the profits of 
such undertakings would be realized only after 
some years. There was wanting both an adequate 
local demand for the products and also the 



406 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

requisite labor to stimulate and develop agricul- 
tural production. The devastating scourge of 
smallpox, the violent and unaccustomed efforts of 
the Indians taken to work in the mines under the 
oppressive system of the mita, and the introduc- 
tion and immoderate use of spirituous liquors 
destroyed a large part of the original inhabitants, 
and the immigration was not sufficient to com- 
pensate for the loss. A savage people unused to 
the regular tasks which civilized man imposes 
upon himself appears to be unable to maintain 
itself when subjected to the conditions of civilized 
life. The mere fact, therefore, that savages dis- 
appear when brought into contact with civilized 
society does not necessarily involve a condemna- 
tion of thers'uperioPy-ace. Unnecessary hardships 
imposed upon^he inferior may hasten the in- 
evitable decline. For imposing such hardships a 
nation may be justly blamed, and on this point the 
verdict has been rendered against the Spaniards. 
Agricultural production was embarrassed not 
only by lack of internal consumption but also by 
the difficulties of transportation. Sugar shipped 
from Havana to Spain brought the owner a clear 
profit of fifty cents a quintal. The white sugar 
of Martinique sold in France brought a profit of 
sixty-two and a half cents a quintal. On account 
of the larger freight charges, sugar from Peru 
sold in Europe in competition with that from 
Havana caused the owner a very considerable 
loss. In the same way cotton from Peru could not 



PERU AND CHILE 407 

successfully compete in Holland with that from 
other parts of the world. In view of these facts, 
Peru had to rely on gold and silver as exports. 

Other causes leading to the decline of agri- 
culture were the diminution of the number of 
inhabitants, the lack of an organized and effective 
system of cultivation especially needed in a coun- 
try where much depended on irrigation, and the 
general aversion of the natives to work on being 
released from the authority of their traditional 
rulers. Under these conditions the support of the 
population became increasingly difficult. 

The importation of the African negro, as an 
agricultural laborer, did not greatly improve the 
condition of affairs. As a slave laborer, he had 
all the economic defects of his class. But the 
defects of colonial agriculture were not all due to 
the laborers. The Creole proprietors were only 
interested in spending their income in ease. They 
brought to their undertakings a minimum of that 
practical intelligence which should manifest itself 
in new appliances and improved methods of culti- 
vation. With respect to those who tilled the soil 
independently on a small scale, the circumstances 
were hardly more favorable. Under the commun- 
ism of the inca period, the work of the Indian was 
prescribed by a superior authority. When, there- 
fore, this authority was removed the Indian was 
deprived of his accustomed direction, and he did 
not possess sufficient power of initiative to make 
his efforts extend much beyond the satisfaction of 



408 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

his immediate wants. The early gains in gold and 
silver and the hope of finding rich mines made the 
Spanish and Creole population impatient of the 
meagre returns from cultivating the soil, and the 
presence of slave laborers brought the work of the 
agriculturist into disrepute. Furthermore, the 
arid lands of the rainless coast and the broken 
region of the Sierra offered few attractions to 
agricultural undertakings, and the Spanish gov- 
ernment took no steps toward storing the waters 
of the mountain streams, or systematically utiliz- 
ing them in irrigation, a work clearly transcend- 
ing individual effort. 

X 

In Chile the fitness of the soil and climate for 
agriculture made this branch of production pros- 
perous; its chief obstacle to expansion was the 
limited demand for the products. The early dis- 
tribution of the lands among many proprietors 
was later counteracted by the accumulation of 
many estates in the hands of the Jesuits. Some 
of those that remained in private hands passed 
from one generation to another in the same 
family. This direct descent was furthered by the 
law upholding primogeniture. There were, how- 
ever, no estates to which this procedure had been 
applied prior to the middle of the seventeenth cen- 
tury. The number of them increased in the early 
part of the eighteenth century, but declined 
towards the end. At the end of the colonial period 



PERU AND CHILE 409 

there were only eighteen important estates taking 
advantage of this law. There were others subject 
to certain restriction as to transmission, although 
they were not properly under the law of primo- 
geniture. The heads of some of the families hold- 
ing estates under this law bore titles of nobility. 
The system of inheritance under the law of 
primogeniture contributed to maintain the pres- 
tige of certain families, but it came to be regarded 
as a cause of the backwardness of Chilean agri- 
culture. It was, therefore, decreed in 1789 that 
no more foundations of this kind should be made 
without the express permission of the king. The 
titles of nobility were eagerly sought, particularly 
by the Creoles ; they were conferred by the crown 
on the presentation of a nobiliary, a statement of 
services rendered, and the payment of a certain 
amount of money, ordinarily not less than twenty 
thousand dollars. As might have been expected, 
many persons not worthy to be made prominent 
in their communities received titles of nobility; 
and this abuse led the king, in 1790, to undertake 
to make such regulations as would set it aside. 
Whether owing to any measures formed by the 
king or to the increasing influence of the new 
society, in the last years of the colonial period no 
new titles were granted to Chile. Persons seeking 
some mark of distinction limited their aspirations 
to the possession of a decoration in the order of 
Santiago, of Calatrava, of Alcantara, of Montera, 
or, later, to the order of Charles III. 



410 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

XI 

While life in the cities lacked many attractions, 
the country presented much less favorable condi- 
tions. On the estates of even the more wealthy 
families, there were few Conveniences for com- 
fortable living. The houses of the proprietors 
were in some cases large, but they contained only 
a few rooms. They had very little furniture, and 
this was usually in the last stages of its useful- 
ness. The windows were without glass. A few 
plates and other dishes, often presenting evidence 
of rough usage, made up the table service, and 
everywhere there was a lack of cleanliness. The 
food was only such as was produced on the estate. 
Fresh meat was available usually only at the 
annual period of slaughtering; for it was found 
to be too expensive to kill an ox or other animal 
in order to provide fresh meat for a family for 
four or five days. In the last years of the century 
a few of the more wealthy owners of land, par- 
ticularly those in the neighborhood of Santiago 
and Lima, showed a disposition to increase the 
conveniences of living in the country. The pro- 
prietors who lived on their estates for only a few 
months in the year constituted a very small part 
of the country population. The large majority 
was composed of tenants who were nominally free, 
but whose condition was not greatly different 
from the vassals of the medieval landlord. Each 
of them received a small farm, or piece of ground, 
for cultivation. In return for the use of this he 



PERU AND CHILE 411 

was required to work for the owner. ' ' There were 
without doubt," as Barros Arana says, "kind and 
charitable proprietors who treated their tenants 
humanely, who helped them in their times of need, 
and who were interested in their well-being; but 
the greater number maintained with respect to 
their dependents a regimen that was very little 
different from that to which the Indians of the 
encomienda were subjected." 22 The great pro- 
prietors frequently exercised the power of public 
officials, either as agents of the subdelegates or 
as merely owners of the soil, and their orders had 
practically the authority of law. They arrogated 
to themselves the right to administer justice and 
even to impose punishments. Although the tenant 
might legitimately leave the estate on which he 
lived, few of them did it voluntarily, for they 
either acquired a sentimental attachment to the 
places where they had spent many years, or they 
saw nothing to be gained in going from one estate 
to another. Like the very poor everywhere, who 
have some permanent abiding-place, they hesi- 
tated to move lest they should lose the very small 
advantage of their actual state, and fall into the 
more miserable condition of the floating popula- 
tion that wandered over the country seeking work 
wherever they fancied it might be found. The 
feudal relations that thus came into existence 
were generally characteristic of the later colonial 
society, especially of that portion of it outside of 
the cities, in the southern part of the continent. 

22 Hist, tie Chile, VII, 466. 



412 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

XII 

Although the mines were one of Peru's most 
important sources of wealth, this industry was 
subject to certain inconveniences. It could not be 
carried on advantageously without the mita, but 
the continuance of the enforced labor of the mita 
caused the rapid destruction of the Indians. It 
was, moreover, carried on without adequate scien- 
tific knowledge. It was burdened with the pay- 
ment of a fifth of the product to the king. It 
suffered from lack of credit, or from credit 
obtained under onerous conditions. Banks for 
assisting mining enterprises either did not exist, 
or when created were opposed and discredited. 
Stock companies that might have brought together 
the requisite capital were, if formed at all, of little 
importance. The bank proposed in Arequipa in 
1792, with a capital stock of fifty thousand dollars 
divided into five hundred shares, found that the 
country was not accustomed to such projects and 
failed for lack of support. Progress in mining 
was, moreover, hindered by the Spaniard's lack 
of initiative ; also by the desire of the Creole, who 
had a fortune, to consume it in ease instead of 
increasing it by means of work ; or, if he invested 
it, by his search for such investments as would 
cause him the least trouble. The ill-success that 
attended the quicksilver mine of Huancavelica at 
certain periods was due to maladministration and 
the neglect or hostility of the government favor- 
ing the Spanish mine of Almaden. 



PERU AND CHILE 413 

A striking feature of Spain's policy respecting 
industry in the dependencies was its vacillation. 
The views of one king were sometimes not the 
views of his successor, and the Council of the 
Indies did not always render the same interpreta- 
tion of facts. The viceroys and captains-geenral, 
moreover, sometimes had policies of their own, 
inconsistent with the orders set forth in royal 
decrees. An instance of the misinterpretation of 
facts is shown by the action of the government 
in Spain, when prices were rising there as a con- 
sequence of the importation of gold and silver 
from America. It was assumed that the rise was 
due to a strong demand for Spanish wares by the 
colonists. The rise in the price of textile fabrics 
offered a specific case. To provide the remedy 
desired by the consumers in Spain, the govern- 
ment prohibited the inhabitants of the depen- 
dencies from purchasing cloth in Spain. This 
action taken by the Cortes in Valladolid, in 1548, 
furnished protection for the manufacturer of the 
articles in question in America. Whatever advan- 
tage was derived by the American manufacturer 
was not designed by the Spanish authorities, but 
accrued as a consequence of an act taken in ignor- 
ance of the influences affecting their trade. This 
hallucination later caused the issuance of ordi- 
nances to further manufactures in different parts 
of America. 

This direct reversal of the original policy 
was not consistently maintained subsequently. 
Philip II undertook to encourage the purchase of 



414 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

American wool by Spaniards, "hoping that the 
textile industry of the colonies would be destroyed 
by being deprived of one of its most essential 
materials." 23 The great distance from Europe 
and the difficulties of transportation furnished, 
however, sufficient protection to keep the industry 
alive. Yet a little later it was dealt a severe blow 
by an ordinance issued by Philip II, in 1595, pro- 
viding that "in no province or part of the Indies 
may the Indians work in the mills for making 
woollen, silk, or cotton cloth." 24 But this ordi- 
nance did not apply to those manufacturing estab- 
lishments belonging to communities of Indians 
and carried on by them exclusively ; it also did not 
apply to those belonging to the king. It affected 
only those owned by private persons and those in 
which Indians and Spaniards were engaged to 
work together. The motive of these acts of pro- 
hibition was revealed in the instructions to Vice- 
roy Velasco, when it was required "that he should 
prohibit the manufacture in order that the trade 
and commerce in cloth might not be weakened." 
But the viceroy was unwilling to carry out this 
policy, and affirmed "that the manufactories are 
so necessary and the cloth made in them of so 
great importance and service for the poor people, 
and that which comes from Spain is so dear, that 
the Indians, the negroes, and even the Spaniards 
would go naked if the manufactories were closed ; 

23 Oliveira, 92, 93. 

24 Solorzano, Politico Indiana, lib. 11, cap. 12. 



PERU AND CHILE 415 

and this could not be done without great resent- 
ment from many private persons in this kingdom, 
who have them and who are supported by them." 25 

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 
textile industry in Peru suffered an apparently 
fatal shock. The viceroy and the audiencia re- 
ceived orders to destroy all the factories and mills 
which had not been established by the express 
permission of the king ; to give an account of those 
demolished and of those that remained. 26 

It might have been possible to avert the de- 
structive effect of royal orders, but the abundant 
importations to the viceroyalty by the French in 
the early decades of the eighteenth century was 
fatal to the undertakings of American manufac- 
turers. The wares thrown on the American 
market were of a superior quality and cheap ; and 
American production could not resist this compe- 
tition. The cessation of the French trade later in 
the century, after the collapse of colonial produc- 
tion, left the colonists in want of many articles 
important for their well-being. Imports from 
Spain were interrupted by the fear of hostile 
ships. The arrival of Spanish ships at American 
ports was to such an extent prevented by the 
watchfulness of the British that there was not 
only a great scarcity of European goods at very 
high prices, but also a corresponding fall in the 

25 Mendiburu, VIII, 288; Oliveira, 95. 

26 The royal order was received by Viceroy Ladron de Guevara 
on the 4th of November, 1711; for the terms, see Mendiburu, IV, 
372. 



416 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

price of American products. In order to remedy 
this evil, officials in America exercised functions 
that legally belonged to the king and the Council 
of the Indies. They assumed towards foreign 
traders essentially the same attitude that the 
Peruvian and Chilean officials held towards the 
French in the first and second decades of the cen- 
tury. In the first decade of the nineteenth century 
they were even more open and specific in their 
action. In November, 1808, Juan de Casas, the 
president of Venezuela, declared commerce with 
the British colonies and neutral nations to be law- 
ful, and reduced by one-fifth the duties that had 
been established. 27 This action was recognized as 
temporary, but it indicates to what extent the 
local authorities in the colonies were usurping the 
legitimate powers of the government in Spain. 
The merchants of Cadiz were indignant; they 
preferred, quoting Amunategui, "to see the col- 
onists given over to nakedness and hunger rather 
than to run the most remote risk of losing their 
monopoly." 28 

The independent action of the authorities in 
America, when not reversed by the king or the 
Council of the Indies, encouraged further action 
of a similar character ; but sometimes such action 
was annulled, and thereby a sentiment of hostility 
was provoked. From this it would appear that 

27 Amunategui, Lo eronica de 1810, Santiago de Chile, 1876, 
I, 77. 

28 La eronica de 1810, I, 72. 



PERU AND CHILE 417 

after the colonists had begun to think of acting 
on their own initiative, the results would be essen- 
tially the same, whatever course might be pursued 
by the government in Spain. The viceroy's or 
captain-general's superior knowledge of the local 
circumstances often enabled him to see that a 
strict execution of the king's orders would cause 
an unjust hardship, and, in his growing indepen- 
dence, he not infrequently assumed the responsi- 
bility of adapting the execution of the orders to 
the known circumstances of the persons subject 
to them. 

Part of the weakness of Spain's hold on the 
dependencies lay in the fact that the connection 
was a personal union. Whatever common senti- 
ments the colonies and the parent nation may 
have entertained in the beginning were enfeebled 
as the American possessions became conscious 
of their individuality and distinct interests. The 
growth of this consciousness was inevitably 
attended by a decline of loyalty to the government 
in Spain; it produced an impulse to rejecting 
Spain's domination. 

XIII 

Perhaps the most effective hindrance to pro- 
duction and to the advance of the colonies in 
material prosperity was the draft made on their 
resources by Spain. The colonies were conceived 
as existing for the advantage of the mother coun- 



418 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

try, and whether their resources were insignificant 
or abundant little remained, after the exorbitant 
demands of the crown had been satisfied, to 
promote the general welfare of the colonies. 
There was in each of the principal cities an office, 
or agency, of the royal treasury. This office 
received the funds designed to be transported to 
Europe to the credit of the government in Spain, 
and to meet in the colonies such expenses as were 
borne by the royal government. These funds 
were derived from many sources, among which 
the tax known as the alcabala was one of the more 
productive. This tax had been long known in 
Spain, and was originally imposed to provide 
means for carrying on the war against the Moors. 
In the course of time its imposition and collection 
came to be regarded almost as a prerogative of 
the crown ; and when the question arose as to the 
propriety of introducing it into America, it was 
assumed that without any new grant it might be 
extended by the king to all possessions annexed 
to the Spanish empire. It was thus established in 
Mexico in 1574, and in Peru in 1591. It was a per- 
centage tax on the price of every article sold, and 
was due at every sale of the article in question, 
whether this article was a bundle of faggots or a 
great estate. The rate fixed for the colonies was 
two per cent, and this rate was maintained for a 
number of years, but about the middle of the 
eighteenth century it was raised to five per cent. 
In the case of a retail dealer it would have been 



PERU AND CHILE 419 

evidently inconvenient to collect the tax on the 
occasion of each sale. An account of such a 
trader 's stock was, therefore, taken annually, and 
the annual sales estimated. The tax was then 
collected on the estimated sales for the year. On 
land or other property that was seldom sold this 
tax was not burdensome, but it tended to absorb 
the value of wares that passed from hand to hand 
many times during the year. Under this system, 
if trade was dull and few exchanges were made, 
the annual profits were naturally small; if trade 
was brisk, the profits were absorbed by the royal 
treasury. The universal effect was to discourage 
exchanges. 

The import and export duties varied with the 
articles involved and with the ports where they 
were landed, the larger ports having a higher rate 
than the smaller. The impost known as the 
armada was a tax collected for the purpose of 
maintaining government vessels designed to pro- 
tect the coast from pirates. In the course of time 
it was found that smaller vessels than those at 
first employed were better adapted to this pur- 
pose, and an additional impost was established for 
maintaining them. This tax was called armadilla. 
Later the pirates ceased to infest the coast, but 
the tax to provide means for warding them off 
continued to be collected. 

A small special import and export tax was 
levied to pay the salaries and other expenses con- 
nected with the consulate. It amounted to an 



420 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

average duty of one per cent on all articles im- 
ported from Spain and from different parts of 
Spanish America, or shipped to those regions. 
The import and export taxes levied for this pur- 
pose on such trade as was permitted with foreign 
countries were much higher, averaging about 
three per cent. There were some exceptions to 
these rates : horses and mules paid a specific duty 
of one dollar a head. 

In the larger cities there was a license for the 
sale of intoxicating liquors. The amount of this 
license for saloons, or shops, for this traffic, was 
fixed in proportion to estimated sales, but this 
payment did not release the dealers from the 
alcabala; this they were obliged to pay, in addi- 
tion, as retail traders. 

The practice of selling titles had been resorted 

| to in Spain as a means of increasing the royal 
J j revenues, and this was extended to the colonies. 

I A resident of Spanish America who wished the 
distinction of a title of nobility paid the king a 
prescribed sum; or he might even enter into an 
agreement to pay annually interest on the sum 
prescribed. These payments and the interest on 
the sums promised constituted a source of revenue 
for the king. Back of this practice lay, as already 
indicated, the desire and purpose of the king to 
maintain in America social conditions similar to 
those of Spain. 

There was a long list of other sources from 
which revenues flowed more or less abundantly 



PERU AND CHILE 421 

into the royal treasury. The following were the 
, most important: 

1. The media anata was half of the salary, or 
{ yearly product, of places or offices under the gov- 
ernment to which appointments were made. It 
was paid into the treasury for the first year. In 
case of an increase of salary by promotion or 
otherwise, the half of the increase was paid for 
the first year after it was granted. 

2. The royal ninths comprised the parts of the 
tithes not allotted to ecclesiastical or other insti- 
tutions. The tithes established in America by an 
edict of Charles V, October 5, 1501, were at first 
applied solely to the support of the church. Forty 
years later, it was provided that they should be 
divided into four parts. One part, or one-quarter 
of the whole amount, was given to the bishop of 
the diocese, and one part to the chapter. Of the 
remaining half of the whole amount collected, two- 
ninths (one-ninth of the whole) went to the crown; 
three-ninths were set apart for the foundation of 
churches and hospitals ; and the remainder, four- 
ninths, was devoted to the support of curates or 
other officiating ecclesiastics. Later this last 
amount was increased to seven-ninths of the half 
of the whole amount, absorbing the three-ninths 
previously devoted to founding churches and hos- 
pitals. 

3. The tribute paid by the civilized Indians 
constituted an important contribution to the royal 
revenue. This was the annual personal tax im- 



422 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

posed upon every male Indian between the ages 
of eighteen and fifty, over whom the Spaniards 
had acquired jurisdiction. The amount of the 
tribute varied both with respect to persons and 
with respect to provinces. It was collected by the 
corregidores, or governors of districts, who were 
allowed six per cent of the sums collected, in 
accordance with the assessment placed in their 
hands. In the colonial system established by 
Spain, every Indian was regarded as a vassal 
either immediately subject to the king or depen- 
dent on an encomendero. During the years in 
which the Indians were being brought into sub- 
jection to Spanish authority, the king made 
numerous grants of lands, and large numbers of 
Indians were assigned to the various holders of 
these lands. Making these grants was a part of 
the process of conquest ; for a Spaniard on whom 
had been bestowed an extensive territory, together 
with a large number of Indians, would necessarily 
be disposed to dominate his possessions and main- 
tain peace among his dependents. In the course 
of time these grants that were made for only one 
or two lives, reverted to the crown, and the tribute 
that had been paid previously to the encomendero 
was, after this reversion, paid into the king's 
treasury. The effect of this change was to in- 
crease the king's revenue, and to make a larger 
part of the Indian population dependent imme- 
diately on him. This tax gradually came to be 
regarded with dissatisfaction ; for those who paid 



PERU AND CHILE 423 

it looked upon it as a sign of personal subordina- 
tion or bondage. 

4. The royal treasury received also a large 
sum from the sale of offices, particularly municipal 
offices. Appointments to these offices were made 
frequently after a considerable payment to the 
crown by the candidate. 

5. The income derived from the sale of 
stamped paper increased with the increase of the 
population and the growth of official business. 

6. The royal treasury received, moreover, a 
certain increment from lost property and strays, 
which, having been found and held unclaimed for 
a year, belonged to the king. 

7. The fifth part of the product of the mines 
was the most noteworthy element of the royal 
income. A large part of the income from the 
mines was the net product of the quicksilver mine 
of Huancavelica owned by the government. Dur- 
ing the two hundred and nineteen years from 1570, 
when the mine was purchased by the crown, to 
1789, the mine of Huancavelica produced 1,040,469 
quintals of mercury, an average annual product 
of 4751 quintals. The price of the metal extracted 
was sixty dollars per quintal in 1786 and seventy- 
three dollars in 1791. At the average price of the 
whole period in question, the value of the product 
was 67,629,396 dollars. After deducting the ex- 
penses of the mine there remained a profit for the 
crown of about 65,000,000 dollars. 

It is impossible to make an accurate statement 



424 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

of the output of the other mines of South America, 
from which the king drew the allotted twenty per 
cent. It is estimated that the mines of Potosi 
alone, in their first ninety years, produced 395,- 
619,000 dollars; and that between 1545 and 1800 
the king's fifth from the product of these mines 
amounted to 163,000,000 dollars. On the basis of 
this estimate the total output of the mines of 
Potosi for these years would appear to have been 
815,000,000 dollars. It has been estimated, more- 
over, that Spain received from America, during 
two hundred and forty-eight years ending in 1740, 
the sum of 9,000,000,000 dollars. These figures 
are, however, only estimates, as the condition of 
the accounts of the mines has always made it im- 
possible to derive from them an accurate and 
trustworthy statement. 

8. The proceeds of the salt tax belonged to the 
crown, but it was one of the less productive 
sources of income. 

9. The king also received the fees paid by 
ships on entering and clearing at the ports. 

10. The proceeds from the sale of the bull of 
Crusada, although this was apparently an insti- 
tution of the church, were gathered into the royal 
treasury. The Crusada mentioned here as a 
source of revenue was a bull published every two 
years, carrying absolution from past offences and 
containing certain privileges with respect to the 
future. The prices paid for the bull ranged from 
a few cents to several dollars. 

11. The crown received an important addition 



PERU AND CHILE 425 

to its revenues from various kinds of concessions 
and monopolies, but these created great dissatis- 
faction, and, as has already been pointed out, 
provoked revolts that endangered the stability of 
the royal government. There was also a tax on 
titles of nobility. This was, however, of very little 
importance except in Lima and the city of Mexico. 
In Lima at the beginning of the nineteenth cen- 
tury there were sixty-three persons who were 
expected to pay this tax. 

The viceroys and captains-general, recogniz- 
ing their loyalty and obligations to the crown, 
sometimes sent special contributions to the king, 
from any available funds, thus depriving the 
dependencies of means that might have been used 
for public improvements, or to facilitate social 
progress. 

In the last years of the eighteenth century and 
in the beginning of the nineteenth, the drift of 
affairs clearly indicated that the great colonial 
enterprise had failed. The viceroy found evi- 
dence of it in the decreasing population, and 
proposed remedies that would have had some 
chance of success if they had been applied two 
hundred years earlier: To guard with care the 
treatment of the Indians by the priests and the 
corregidores ; to prohibit the sale of alcoholic 
beverages; to transfer to the decadent provinces 
a sufficient number of families from the more 
densely populated provinces; to prevent the cre- 
ation of too great a number of convents and 
monasteries; to rehabilitate the arts and trades; 



426 SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 

and to oppose the increase of luxury. 29 But the 
only remedy that involved a promise of success, 
the complete overthrow of Spain's traditional 
policy, did not enter the mind of the king. There 
were, moreover, almost insurmountable difficulties 
that opposed the application of the only remedy 
destined to work a cure. The inhabitants of the 
dependencies had been subject to an autocratic 
rule from the beginning. The viceroys, the 
captains-general, the judges, the corregidores, and 
all the higher ecclesiastical functionaries were the 
appointees of an absolute authority in the other 
half of the world. Neither the colonists nor their 
ancestors had had an opportunity to learn the 
difficult business of self-government. Unlike the 
British colonists of North America, they lacked 
both the political instinct and experience in organ- 
ization and administration; and during these last 
decades of the century their reaction under gov- 
ernmental abuses hardly went beyond protests. 
Their plans for constructive political efforts were 
visionary or impractical. In this state of affairs 
ends the colonial enterprise. The growth of a 
new spirit, the development of a will to be free, 
the rise in the creole-mestizo society of the power 
and the determination to organize itself for eman- 
cipation, and the long struggle to overthrow the 
ancient regime fill a new period in the history of 
Spanish South America. 

29 Memorias de los vireyes, III, 133. 
THE END 



INDEX 



Abascal sends aid to Buenos 
Aires, 350, 373. 

Abipones, account of, 88. 

Aeevedo advocates viceroyalty 
of Buenos Aires, 158; real 
head of Chilean government, 
237. 

Acosta, Jose (the historian), 
provincial, 128. 

Acosta, Friar, opposes Ver- 
tiz's theatre, 250. 

Admiralty's view, 342; orders 
as to Cape, 343; on Pop- 
ham's irregularity, 359. 

Agriculture, in Chile, xv, 408; 
in Argentina, xvii; hind- 
rances to, in Peru, 406-408. 

Alcabala, increased, 177; not 
imposed on Indians, 178, 
418. 

Alcohol, monopoly of, 99; de- 
stroyed in Quito, 100. 

Alcoholic liquors, consumed by 
Indians, 37. 

Alcedo, president, 53. 

Aleedo's Diccionario, 54. 

Aldunate in Buenos Aires, 15. 

Alexander VI, 74. 

Aliaga, corregidor, 183, 184. 

Altamirano, Jesuit, 80. 

Alvarez, J. F., state secretary 
of Comun, 212. 

Alzaga at head of Buenos 
Aires, 362; organizes de- 
fense, 363. 

Amantes del Pais, 379. 

Amar y Borbon, viceroy, 291. 

Amaru, Tupac, 180. 

Amat y Junient, governor and 
viceroy, 97; his military 
regime, 98, 177; in Chile, 
228. 

Amnesty to rioters in Quito, 
101. 



Amunategui on Rojas, 234. 

Ana de Ricuarte, held mint 
pension, 58. 

Andean route, 42; passes 
guarded, 136. 

Andes, slopes of, xiv. 

Andonaegui, Governor of Uru- 
guay, 34; to attack reduc- 
tions, 81; moves on mis- 
sions, 1754, 82; to priests, 
91; returns to Spain, 93. 

Angostura, 63. 

Angulo y Olarte, alcalde, ad- 
dresses insurgents, 207. 

Anson, 14; his plan, 312, n. 

Antequera, in Paraguay, 14; 
executed in Lima, 20; his 
rebellion, 157. 

Aponte, Governor of Chile, 
35; Chile under, 38; death, 
1733, 40. 

Aperger, Padre, remained in 
Misiones, 126. 

Aranda, Count of, receives de- 
cree expelling Jesuits, 106; 
instructions, 106; his cir- 
cular letter, 107, 129; ob- 
jects to leaving Jesuits in 
Quito, 142 ; instructions, 
151. 

Araucanians, resistance by, 
xvi; drafted into service, 
35; would expel Spaniards, 
36, 46; chiefs in Santiago, 
385; pacified, 396; sympa- 
thized with royalists, but 
inspired patriots, 397. 

Archbishop of Bogota and the 
Comun, 217; his hypocrisy, 
218; pastoral visit to rebels, 
220; becomes viceroy, 225, 
266. 

Architects among Jesuits, 133. 



428 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



Areche, 177; increased taxes, 
178; charges against Gui- 
rior, 179; his forces at 
Cuzco, 186; with Del Valle 
at Cuzco, 186, 191; his re- 
ply to Tupac, 192 ; attitude, 
193; sentences Tupac, 195. 

Arequipa, 179, 246; trade 
with Arica, 304. 

Arevalo, commander at Isth- 
mus, 270-272. 

Argentina, x. 

Arica becomes a port, 304. 

Armada, tax, 419. 

Armadilla, 419. 

"Armiena," frigate, 32. 

Arms and munitions distrib- 
uted by Amat, 98. 

Armistice of 1737, 32, 73. 

Army, Superintendent of, 168. 

Arregui, Bishop, at Asuncion, 
21; as mediator, 22; elected 
Governor, 23 ; his false posi- 
tion, 23; retires to Buenos 
Aires, 24. 

Articles furnished by corregi- 
dor, 175. 

Aruba, Miranda at, 333, 336. 

Asesor general, 156. 

Asuncion, stagnant, xvii ; 
without authority, 23; Jes- 
uits removed from, 114, 243. 

Astete, Pablo, commands at 
Cuzco, 191. 

Atrato river, xii; route to Pa- 
cific, 272. 

Auchmuty, General, 358. 

Audiencia, Quito and Pana- 
ma, 50, 55 ; of Buenos Aires, 
243; in Venezuela, 1786, 
313. 

Auditor's office, 172. 

Aviles, 373; O'Higgins' suc- 
cessor in Chile, 392. 

Aymaras, 7. 

Aziia, agent of eabildo on 
university, 47. 

Aziia, Archbishop, on priests' 
traffic in alcohol, 59. 

Azores, Portuguese from, 163. 

{l Bacchus" and "Bee" join 

Miranda, 333. 
Baird, General, 342; to Beres- 

ford, 346. 



Balmaseda, agent to expel 
Jesuits from Chile, 136, 137. 

Bank at Arequipa, 412. 

Barcelona, province of, 61, 68. 

Barquisimeto, xi, 68. 

Barreiro, president of comu- 
neros, 19. 

Barreda, Jose, provincial of 
Paraguay, 80. 

Barreda y Vera, succeeds 
Aponte, 40. 

Barrera, Captain, 211, 212. 

Barros Arana, on Jesuit am- 
bitions, 133. 

Bastides, Miguel, campaign 
east of Titicaca, 197. 

Battle, reduction Indians de- 
feated, 89; of Cuzco, 191; 
at Checacupe, 194; of 
Puente Eeal, 211. 

Barua, in Paraguay, 15, 17, 
18. 

Bauza on war against mis- 
sions, 94. 

Belgrano on loss of Buenos 
Aires, 349, n. 

Benavides, Governor of Chile, 
237; intendant of Santiago, 
246. 

Berbeo, chief of Comun, 210; 
commanding general, 212 ; 
commisioners ' note to, 213 ; 
his vacilation, 215; pro- 
poses peace conference, 216 ; 
corregidor of Socorro, 219. 

Beresford, General, to Bio de 
la Plata, 342; salary, 346; 
victorious at Perdriel, 353. 

Berlanga, Juan de, and arrest 
of Jesuits, 109. 

Berney, his conspiracy, 232 ; 
forms constitution, 235 ; 
sentenced, 238. 

Berrio, Antonio de, 62. 

Bishops, authority of, 244. 

Bishoprics and intendencies, 
242. 

Blanco and royal revenues, 
230; transferred to Potosi, 
231. 

Blount, intrigues of, 324. 

Bogota, position of, xiv, 4; 
Comun advance upon, 213; 
population of, 260, 261 ; be- 
comes fashionable, 275. 



INDEX 



429 



Bolivia, x. 

Books, importation prohibited, 
8; on politics in Venezuela, 
319; hunted by Viceroy 
Croix, 377. 

Borja, authorized Jesuits in 
Peru, 127. 

Botanical Expedition, ap- 
proved by the King, 269; 
change in purpose, 272-274 ; 
transferred to Bogota, 275 ; 
in Peru, 277-281. 

Bougainville on Nanguiru, 88, 
n. 

Bourne, Sturges, to Pitt, 343. 

Boundary controversy, 26 ; 
commisioners, 79 ; commis- 
sioners for Portugal, 80; 
question, 93. 

Bridge over the Eimac, 293. 

Brierly on Cumana, 334. 

British policy communicated 
to King, 328. 

British designs on South 
America, 340. 

British vessels at Buenos 
Aires, 347, 348. 

British proclamation as to 
trade at Buenos Aires, 350- 
352. 

British in Montevideo, 361 ; 
reinforcements at Buenos 
Aires, 358 ; advance on 
Buenos Aires, 362; de- 
mands, 363. 

Brunete, Joseph, 278; died in 
Pasco, 1787, 280. 

Bucareli, Governor of Rio de 
la Plata, 104; receives order 
to be sent to Chile and Peru, 
108; his edict at Buenos 
Aires, 109; on Cordova Jes- 
uits, 112; on latest Jesuit 
arrivals, 114; goes to Mis- 
iones, 125; enters Yapeyu, 
126; sends papers to Chile, 
135. 

Buenos Aires, lost and rewon, 
Chap. XIII; British at, 
x, xvii; lack of privileges, 
6; new shipping orders, 42; 
state of, 155, 249; and 
trade, 167; shipping point 
for interior, 168; audiencia 
of, 243, 244; provinces of, 



244 ; intendency of, 245 ; re- 
lation to other cities, 251 ; 
agriculture and commerce, 
252 ; trade with Spain, 304 ; 
later trade, 339; increased 
wealth, 340 ; population, 
340; project against, dis- 
cussed, 345; offers resist- 
ance, 347; prepares for de- 
fense, 353; commanders of 
battalions, 362 ; victory, 
370. 
Bull fights at Lima, 303. 

Caballero, his toleration, 266 ; 
Relation de mando, 268, 
273. 

Cadiz, in Spain's commerce, 
167; merchants of, 416. 

Caesares, Orejuela 's expedi- 
tion to, 235. 

Cafes in Lima, 303, n. 

Callao, destroyed, 1746, 13; 
fortress of, 98; under vice- 
roy, 157. 

Canary Islands, 167. 

Cannon cast at> Lima, 98. 

Cape captured, 342. 

Capuchin missions, 64. 

Cartagena, xii; defended by 
Eslaba, 57; defenses of, 
261. 

Carabobo, 68. 

Carvajal, Duke, 297. 

Casa de Contratacion, 42. 

Casas, Juan de, on British 
commerce, 416. 

Casanare, 64. 

Caracas, xi, 4, 68. 

Cauca Valley, xii. 

Cauquenes, 44. 

Castel-Fuerte, 13, 14; ap- 
points Salamanca governor, 
40. 

Ceballos, his fleet and army, 
162; lands at Montevideo, 
162; received at San Borja, 
93 ; his commission, 159 ; 
his orders, 159; his power, 
161; promoted, 163; suc- 
ceeded by Vertiz, 168 ; and 
reform, 172 ; repatriation 
of Portuguese, 170-172. 

Celebrations, 55. 

Cession of reductions, 76. 



430 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



Chaeo, Jesuits of, 118. 

Charcas, audiencia of, 157, 
244; advises the King, 158, 
170. 

Charles II, Spain under, 27. 

Charles III, xx; King of 
Naples, 57; accession, 95, 
103; appoints Bucareli, 104; 
reply to Clement XIII, 107 ; 
his reforms, 153; economic 
legislation, 166, 172, 229; 
death, 391. 

Charles IV, accession, 391; re- 
volt in Venezuela, 316. 

Charlevoix, quoted, 14, 15. 

Checacupe, battle of, 194. 

Chibchas, xii, 7. 

Chiloe, province of, 247. 

Chinchona monopoly, 265. 

Chiquitos, 170. 

Chile, x; middle part of, xv; 
mining in, xv; southern, 
xvi; monotony of life in, 
34; trade with Peru, 42; 
rural life in, 305, 384. See 
Agriculture, Aponte, etc. 

Chome, Padre, died going into 
exile, 122. 

Chucuito, 170. 

Chuquisaca, xiv, 251. 

Church, attitude towards the 
Indians, 2; and riot in 
Quito, 180; extent of prop- 
erty, 301. 

Cities, of Chile, 305; life in, 
410. 

Clement XIII, on expulsion of 
Jesuits, 107. 

Clergy, their irregular living, 
14; against Tupae, 188. 

Coast, sandy, xiv. 

Cochrane, furnishes ships to 
Miranda, 334. 

Cock-fights, 303. 

Code of 1778, 167, 172, 173, 
398. 

Coining in Chile, 43. 

Colegio del Eosario, Mutis at, 
263. 

Colombia, x, xi. 

"Columbia" at Juan Fernan- 
dez, 389. 

Colonia, contraband trade, 
xvi ; held by Portuguese, 26, 
27; taken by Eoss, 28; 



ceded to Portugal, 28; 
under Vasconcellos, 31; be- 
sieged by Salcedo, 32, 33; 
fort strengthened, 72 ; ceded, 
by Portugal, 74; Ceballos 
advances on, 162; prisoners 
sent to Mendoza, 163 ; ceded 
to Spain, 1777, 164; re- 
ceives English goods, 166; 
Portuguese inhabitants, 171. 

Colonial history, xviii. 

Colonial system, failure of, 
171. 

Colonists of Buenos Aires 
after 1778, 167. 

Commercial code, 166-173. 

Comuneros, Chap. VII; of 
Paraguay, 15-43; of New 
Granada, 209-219. 

Comun, 221-224. 

Communism of missions, 147. 

Concepcion, Bishop of, 36 ; 
earthquake, 39; intendency 
of, 246, 305; smallpox in, 
308. 

Condorcanqui, Tupae 's name, 
180. 

Conspiracies, secret, 232, 241. 

Conspiracy of Gramuset and 
Berney, Chap. VIII. 

Consulado for Santiago, 43; 
Caracas, 314; on unemploy- 
ment, 321; tax for, 419. 

Contensiosa, court of, 247. 

Contraband trade, 27, 31, 41, 
165, 339. 

Copiapo, 44. 

Cordova, 4; Gorro retained at, 
27; capital, 34, 251. 

Coro, xi, 68. 

Corral, Juan de, built Lima 
bridge, 294. 

Corregidores, as sole traders, 
14; purpose of office, 174; 
and Indians, 241; sup- 
pressed, 243, 373. 

Correo mayor, resumed by 
crown, 297. 

Corporations in South Amer- 
ica, 399. 

Corsica, Jesuits in, 117. 

Corvallo on Santiago, 306. 

Council of the Indies, xx, 15, 
47, 156. 

Country, life in, 410. 



INDEX 



431 



Court of junta superior de 
gobierno, 248. 

Crawford at Buenos Aires, 
362. 

Credit, absence, 8, 400. 

Creoles, ix, 4; excluded from 
office, 4, 9 ; and mestizo op- 
position, 5-11 ; party at 
Quito, 102; acquire Jesuit 
property, 103 ; intellectual 
awakening, 275, 301, 315, 
318; attachment to New 
World, 319. 

Crime, increase of, 53. 

Croix, viceroy, 373. 

Crusada, proceeds from, 424. 

Cumana, xi, 61, 68, 313, 334. 

Cundinamarca, plateau of, xii. 

Curieo, 44. 

Cuyo, province of, 244. 

Cuzco, xiv; college of, 128, 
158; on corregidores, 176, 
179 ; panic in, 186 ; pre- 
pared for war, 188; abol- 
ishes repartimientos, 189 ; 
battle of, 191, 246; trade 
with Arica, 304. 

Dangers met by Euiz and 
Pavon, 280. 

Darien, Indian war ended, 272. 

Dauxion on luxury at Caracas, 
318. 

Dead hand, King opposed, 
300. 

Decline of Spain's power, xix. 

Decree expelling Jesuits, 104. 

Defeat at Puente Eeal, 212. 

Del Valle, against insurgents, 
192-194; brutality, 194. 

Diario erudito, 379. 

Diary of Segurola, 192, n. 
198. 

Diego and Inca at Pauear- 
tambo, 191 ; after Inca, 197. 

Diguja, Governor, 66; suc- 
ceeds Zelaya at Quito, 102; 
prepared to expel Jesuits, 
141. 

Disaster at Sangarara church, 
187. 

Divine right of Kings, 237. 

Dobrizhoffer, 76, 88. 

Dombey, of Botanical Expe- 
dition, 278. 



Dominance of creole-mestizo 

class, 10. 
Dominicans, their instruction, 

46. 
Donations to church, 51. 
Draft on colonies by Spain, 

417. 
Dual government, 173. 
Duke of San Carlos, 298. 
Dundas warns Miranda, 336. 
Dutch, in Java, 3 ; West India 

Company, 62 ; view of Santo 

Thome. 

Earthquake, 1730, in Chile, 
39; 1687, 42; 1746, 295; 
"divine punishment," 296. 

Ecclesiastics, Spanish, 8. 

Echaurri, Captain, 25; ap- 
pointed governor, 26. 

Economic facts, misinterpre- 
ted, 413. 

Ecuador, x, xiii; under New 
Granada, 99. 

Education, lack of interest in, 
49. 

Election in Paraguay, 25. 

Elhuyar, reforms mining, 267, 
274. 

Emeralds in New Granada, 51. 

' ' Emperor ' ' offered to Miran- 
da by Ogden, 331; refused 
to join Miranda, 333. 

Encomenderos, 2; and Jesuits ; 
103. 

Encomiendas, abuses of, 
O'Higgins on, 387; incor- 
porated in crown, 396. 

Endeiza, house plundered, 185. 

England protects Portugal, 27. 

English, the, in the Orinoco, 
1740, 69. 

English colonies, 8; goods at 
Colonia, 166; protection of 
Venezuela, 324; right to 
fish, 392; wares in Lima, 
399. 

Equality on fate of Indians, 2. 

Ercilla's Araucana, 397. 

Escuela de la Concordia, 258. 

Eslaba, viceroy of New Gra- 
nada, 55, 260. 

Espafia, revolutionist, 315. 

Espeleta, viceroy, 258, 275. 



432 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



Espinosa, commandant of 

Trinidad, 70. 
Essequibo, slaves of, 63. 
Estevez, Comun council, 210. 
Estudios de Quito, 1791, 258. 
Europeans vs. Americans, 101. 
Execution of Aliaga, 184. 
Export duties, 419. 
Expulsion of Jesuits, Chap. 

IV; decree in Chile, 137; 

as an event in history, 149; 

general effect of, 152. 



Fabro, to arrest Cordova Jes- 
uits, 112. 

Failure of colonial system, 
425. 

Falkland Islands, 170. 

Ferdinand VI, influenced by 
Jesuit rumors, 84; succeed- 
ed by Charles III, 103. 

Ferdinand VII, 391. 

Fernandez, general intendant, 
173, 245. 

Feudal subjection of Indians, 
7. 

Feuvillee, 278. 

Fiesta on eve of Jesuit expul- 
sion, 143. 

Flora Bogotana, 276. 

Florez, viceroy, 204; resigned, 
224, 266. 

Florida Blanca, 164. 

Flores assists La Paz, 192, 
200. 

Food problem in Venezuela, 
322. 

Forces of reductions, 85. 

Foreign vessels in Pacific, 389. 

Foreign invasion, fear of, 391. 

Foreigners expelled from 
Montevideo, 33, 34. 

Founder, title of, 131. 

France, as market, 41; sup- 
ports Portugal, 27; influ- 
ence of, in New Granada, 
290. 

Frazier, 278. 

Free trade, effect of, 339. 

French academicians, 54; in 
Ecuador, 56. 

French importations, 36 ; 
merchants, 12. 



French Eevolution, influence 
in New Granada, 277, 282; 
in Lima, 381. 

French trade, 1700-1715, 415. 

Funds withdrawn, 38, 52, 178. 

Gaceta de Lima, 380. 

Galan, Bartolome, 19. 

Galan, Jose Antonio, at 
Guaduas, 214; fight at 
Facatativa, 214; ordered to 
Honda, 214; renews the 
rebellion, 219; chief, 222; 
executed, 223. 

Galvez, Jose de, 179. 

Garay, Miguel de, 19. 

Garcia, P. A., Mutis' assist- 
ant, 270. 

Genoa, Jesuits would settle at, 
118. 

German Jesuits sent to Ger- 
many, 120. 

Gil de Toboada, 373, 378. 

Giron, opposes Comun, 215. 

Gonzalvez Manrique, Antonio 
and Francisco, 50. 

Gorro, Governor of Chile, 27. 

Government, civil, of Para- 
guay, 19; policy towards 
Comun, 221; weakness of, 
101, 242. 

Governors, provincial, 172. 

Gower, General, 358. 

Gramuset and Berney, 232, 
235; denounced, 237; their 
fate, 239. 

Gran Chaco, missions of, 171. 

Great Britain, ambition of, 
326 ; cooperating with U. S., 
329. 

Gruesso, J. M., 257. 

Gual, revolutionist, 315, 316 ; 
with Miranda, 329. 

Guamanga, 246. 

Guaranis, detained in Buenos 
Aires, 124. 

Guayana, 61; first governor, 
62, 68, 313. 

Guill y Gonzaga, 135; in 
Chile, 228. 

Guirior, viceroy, 177, 178; 
goes to Peru, 266, 372; ar- 
rives, 1773, 264; liberal, 
265. 



INDEX 



433 



Gumilla, Padre, on crop fail- 
ure, 68. 
Guayaquil, port for Quito, 



Haciendas of Jesuits, 131. 

Haenke, Tadeo, 293 ; on Lima, 
302. 

Hamilton, Miranda to, 326, 
327; changed view of 
Miranda, 328. 

Herds in Argentina and Uru- 
guay, xvii; of Misiones, 65. 

Herrera, Juan Diaz, in Quito, 
99, 100. 

Hides and beef, trade in, 339. 

Honda, xii. 

Hooper intervenes in favor of 
Spanish on Isthmus, 281. 

Hospitals, 300. 

Huarochiri in revolt, 13. 

Huancavelica,. 179, 246, 412; 
product, 423. 

Huidobro, held mint monop- 
oly, 59. 

Humboldt on Spain's sup- 
porting research, 281, n. 

Ideals, new, 11. 

Ideas, imported, 10. 

Ignorance of lower classes, 49. 

Immigration, 319. 

Import duties, 419. 

Imprenta de los Ninos exposi- 
tos, 253. 

Inca's titles, 193; Inea and 
followers prisoners at Cuzco, 
195; in new state, 325. 

Indian raids on Buenos Aires, 
249. 

Indians, in Spanish society, 
2; adoption by Spaniards, 
7 ; with creole-mestizo party, 
8; revolt in Peru, 13; under 
mita, 14; in Uruguay, 31; 
uprising, 1723, 37; oppose 
treaty of 1750, 76; and re- 
moval of Jesuits, 119; op- 
pressed by corregidores, 171, 
175; after Tupac, 202; as 
laborers, 406-408. 

Independence, spirit of, x. 

Industry, Spain's policy on, 
413; textile, 414. 



Intellectual awakening, 257, 
282. 

Inhabitants, differing groups 
of, 6; of Lima, their char- 
acter, 301. 

Inquisition, 304. 

Institutions of Lima, 298. 

Insurance companies, 400. 

Insurgents, in Quito, 98-102; 
in Trinidad, 320. 

Insurrection, 196, 202. 

Intendant, 168; in Chile, 240; 
territory, 242 ; in Peru, 246, 
248. 

Intendaneies, 169; and bish- 
oprics, 242; their capitals, 
243; in Chile, 246. 

Invasion, 312. 

Irrigation, 405. 

Isolation, effect of, 8. 

Jauregui, Guirior's successor, 
179; in Chile, 229, 372. 

Janszoon Pater, Adriaen, 
burns Santo Thome, 62. 

Juan and Ulloa, 13, 174, 176. 

Jesuits, expulsion of, Chap. 
IV; xi, xx, 15, 16, 17; 
driven from college, 20; 
hostility to, 23, 24, 26; re- 
instated in Asuncion, 26; 
saw Araucanian danger, 36; 
their instruction, 46; land- 
owners in Ecuador, 52; in 
New Granada, 57; work in 
education, 58; hostility to, 
66; protest to audiencia, 
78; oppose treaty, 78; in 
Quito, 100; property con- 
fiscated, 102; and eneomen- 
deros, 103; charges against, 
104; arrested in Buenos 
Aires, 108, 115; church 
closed, 110; arrested at 
Santa Fe, 110; at Cordova, 
112; journey, Cordova to 
Ensenada, 113; from Spain, 
1766, 115; drowned in Bio 
de la Plata, 116 ; at Buenos 
Aires, 117; of Chaco, 118; 
from Chiquitos, 120; Ger- 
man sent to Germany, 120; 
from Paraguay, 123; num- 
ber in Misiones, 126; in 
Peru, 127; their wealth, 



434 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



128, 129, 130; devotion to 
Indians, 129; their slaves, 
130; their libraries in Peru, 
130 ; property in Chile, 131 ; 
industries, 132 ; houses, 133 ; 
relation to government, 
134; at Chilian, 134; of 
Cuyo, 137; from Chile, 137- 
139; their pension, 140; 
from Chile to Lima, 140 ; at 
Quito, 141; from Quito to 
Guayaquil, 142; from New 
Granada, 142-144 ; routes, 
145; llanos, 145; isolation, 
147; communism, 147; resi- 
dence in Europe, 149; 
novices, 151; effect of ex- 
pulsion, 263. 

Keymis quoted on Santo 
Thome, 62. 

King's C. E., aim, 328; King, 
Miranda visits, 327. 

Knox, Miranda to, 326. 

Labor and market in Chile, 

309. 
La Condamine in Ecuador, 56. 
Le Guayra, xi, 314. 
Land tax, 30. 
Landa, and Tupac, 187; 

Landa killed, 187. 
La Plata, 243 ; archbishop of, 

251. 
La Paz, besieged, 192, 197; 

position of, 197 n., 243, 253. 
La Serena, 246. 
Laws on Indians after Tupac, 

202. 
"Leander" offered by Ogden, 

331 ; its cargo, 331 ; halted 

by British, 333 ; at Granada. 

334; sold, 336. 
Leo, Francisco de, revolt, 240; 

Bights of Man, 283. 
Liberalism, opposed, 10. 
Libraries of Jesuits, 130. 
Library, public, with Jesuits' 

books, 263. 
Life in cities, 410; in country, 

410. 
Lima at end of century, Chap. 

XI; position of, xiv, 4, 6; 

in 1746, 13, 168, 178, 246; 

position of, 292; popula- 
tion, 293; walls, 293; 



streets, 295; houses, 295; 
after earthquake of 1746, 
296; social character, 297; 
institutions, 298. 

Linnaeus and Mutis, 262. 

Liniers, orders on desertion, 
353; crosses Eio, 354; Mitre 
on, 355; demands Beres- 
ford's surrender, 356; mili- 
tary chief, 357; reply to 
Beresford, 364. 

Liquors, tax on sale, 420. 

Lisbon, destroyed, 93. 

Literature, periodical, 276. 

Llanos, x. 

Loayza, archbishop, 127. 

Local government, 153, 154. 

Lobo, captured at Colonia, 27. 

Looting in Oruro, 186. 

Lopez, Tupac 's instructor, 
181. 

Lopez, S. J., attacks Mutis, 
277. 

Lorrain, president of Quito, 
50. 

Lost property, 423. 

Louis I succeeds Philip V, 54. 

Loyalty in New Granada, 282 ; 
loyalty to Spain declines, 
417. 

Lozano quoted, 19, n. 

Madariaga, rector of Jesuit 
College, 137. 

Magdalena, x, xii. 

Mails to Venezuela, 323. 

Malouine, 170. 

Mandagure, campaign east of 
Titicaea, 197. 

Manso de Velasco, Governor 
of Chile, 41; sells titles, 
44; founds towns, 44; vice- 
roy of Peru, 45. 

Manso Maldonado, President 
of New Granada, 50. 

Mantiel to Ruiloba, 22. 

Maracaibo, population of, 317. 

Margarita Island, 314. 

Markets for Chile and Peru, 
41. 

Markham on the Inca, 189. 

Martinez, B., pursues comu- 
neros, 25. 

Marsden, Popham's letter to, 
344. 



INDEX 



435 



Martin Garcia, treaty of 1750, 
81. 

Mat6 from Paraguay, 338, 
398. 

Matiz, Mutis ' draughtsman, 
270. 

Media anata, 421. 

Melipilla, founded by Manso, 
44. 

Melville at trial of Popham, 
341. 

Mendoza receives Portuguese 
soldiers, 163. 

Mercurio peruano, 38, 258, 
259, 379. 

Mena, Juan de, executed at 
Lima, 20; daughter in 
Paraguay, 20. 

Mendieta commands force of 
clergy, 188. 

Mendinueta, viceroy, 287. 

Mesia de la Zerda, 143. 

Messner, Padre, 122. 

Mestizos, 5; in Chile, 308. 

Middle Class, absence of, 8. 

Military affairs in Peru, 98; 
escort at missions, 146, 162. 

Mines, Charles III would re- 
vive, 378; output, 424; low 
state of, 262; and the mita, 
412; fifth, 423. 

Minoa, expedition to, 62. 

Mint for Santiago, 43; 
monopoly, 58; at Popayan, 
59. 

Miranda 's expedition, Chap. 
XII, 312, 324; requests of 
Great Britain, 327; on U. S. 
support, 326; retained in 
England, 330; with Smith 
and Ogden, 331 ; support 
from Cochrane, 335; ships 
attacked, 334; takes Coro, 
335. 

Missions in Orinoco region, 
63-65; support from royal 
treasury, 65; of the plains, 
65; Jesuits expelled, 119, 
146; of Guaranis, 170, 243, 
266. 

Mitre on Liniers, 355. 

Mompo in Asuncion, 16-19. 

Monasteries, conflicts in, 14; 
at Santo Thom6, 62; in 
Chile, 231, 375. 



Mojos, 170. 

Molina, Jesuit, sent from 
Chile, 140. 

Molina, Antonio de, officer of 
Comun, 210. 

Money, lack of, 53, 400. 

Mofiino, to treat with Portu- 
gal, 164. 

Monks, 4. 

Monopoly of alcohol, 99; of 
food by Jesuits, 132. 

Monopolies, 42, 98, 265, 276, 
425. 

Monsalve, Comun council, 210. 

Montesclaros, viceroy, 178, 
293. 

Montevideo, xvii, 29, 30, 32, 
33, 110, 167, 170, 361. 

Morales, Juan Bautista, sent 
to England, 215; impris- 
oned, 226. 

Morales, F. J., in Chile, 228. 

Moreno, his school system, 263. 

Mules, trade in, prices, 338; 
duty on, 420. 

Mutis, x, 260-276; life and 
writings, 277, n. 

Nanguiru, Nicholas, 84; suc- 
ceeds, Sepee, 87. 

Narifio, x, 282; prints De- 
rectios de Hombre, 283 ; 
tried, 283-284 ; defense, 
284; escaped at Cadiz, 285; 
in France, 286; in England, 
287; conversion, 289; im- 
prisoned by King's order, 
291. 

Nationalism revived in Spain, 
9. 

Natural sciences in Colegio 
del Eosario, 276. 

Negroes in Chile, 309. 

Neiva, riot in, 220. 

Nemocon, Indians of, 221; 
fight at, 222. 

New Andalucia, 68. 

New Granada, xi, 50; condi- 
tion of people, 51; viceroy, 
99, 154, 261. 

Newton, doctrines of. 262. 

Nicholas I, 87. 

Nieto, Pedro, 207. 

Ninths, royal, 421. 

Nitrate deposits, xv. 



436 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



Nobility in New World, 1; 

titles of, 409. 
Nobles at Lima, 297. 
Nootka Sound, 324. 
Nordenflicht in Peru, 378. 
Noticias secretas, 14, 56, 172, 

174. 
Nueva Guayana, 63. 

Obando, interim governor of 
Chile, 45. 

Obelar, succeeds Arregui, 24. 

Oorajes, oppression in, 180, 
185. 

Observationists, 64. 

Ocean for Indians and Span- 
iards, xiv. 

Official delinquency, 12; inde- 
pendence in America, 416. 

Officials in America, 179; 
sent from Spain, 9. 

Offices in America, 1; given 
to Spaniards, 4; sale of, 
423. 

O 'Higgins, intendant, 246, 
273; in Peru, 282; agricul- 
tural experiments, 386 ; goes 
to Peru from Chile, 392; 
work in Peru, 393. 

Olano, Garcia, 207. 

Olavarrieta, editor, 380. 

Olivares sent from Chile, 140. 

Oppression by corregidores, 
175. 

Orders instead of nobility, 
409. 

Ordinance of intendants, 173, 
242, 243, 245; of 1802, 247. 

Orejuela, Chilean conspirator, 
235. 

Organization under inten- 
dants, 242. 

Orinoco, x; missions of, 266. 

Oropesa, Marquis of, 181. 

Ortiz, Secretary of Comun, 
210. 

Oruro, xiv; revolt in, 185; 
looted, 186; troops from, at 
La Paz, 201. 

Osorio and crown of Comun, 
212. 

Paleozzi, Padre, died at Porto 

Bello, 123. 
Palos, Bishop, 14, 24, 24. 



Polpaico, Bojas' estate, 235; 

Panama, audiencia, 50; in 
New Granada, 58; univer- 
sity, 58. 

Papel Periodico, 258, 259. 

Paraguay, x, 21, 24, 170; 
province of, 244; Indian 
population, 252. 

Paraguayans and reductions, 
15. 

Parlamento with Indians, 41. 

Patriotic unions, 256. 

Pastoral life in Venezuela, xi. 

Patagonia, sovereignty over, 
169. 

Paula Sanz, general intendant, 
245. 

Pavon, Jose, 278. 

Peace after 1723, 41. 

Pelota at Lima, 303. 

Pena's inquiry, 346. 

Perdriel, fight at, 353. 

Peru, xii, xiv, 13; internal 
state, 14; viceroy of, 15; 
and Tupac's forces, 191; 
intendencies, 246 ; Botan- 
ical Expedition to, 277. 

Peruvian market glutted, 398. 

Personal service abolished, 
396. 

Philip II, 181. 

Philip V, ignorance of Amer- 
ica, 28; appoints Aponte 
governor, 35; and univer- 
sity, 47; abdication, 54; 
death, 57; sells coining 
right, 58. 

Philippine Islands, 105-107. 

Philippine Company, 397, 399. 

Pieton, governor of Trinidad, 
326; propaganda, 326; plan 
329. 

Pimiento, viceroy, 224. 

Pineres, visitador in New 
Granada, 204, 207; pre- 
pares for flight, 212; mal- 
administration, 266. 

Pisco, Ambrosio, honored as 
Zipa, 216; supports Indians, 
222; fate, 224; returned to 
Chia, 225. 

Pitt, Miranda with, 312, 324; 
returned to power, 1804, 
330 ; plan as to South Amer- 
ica, 344. 



INDEX 



437 



Pizarro, viceroy, 57, 59, 260. 

Plains of Argentina, xvi, 253- 
255. 

Plata, Comun council, 210. 

Plaza, quoted on property of 
Jesuits, 448. 

Plaza of Lima, 294. 

Police, secret, of Lima, 381. 

Politics, interest in, Chap. X. 

Popayan, destroyed, 56. 

Popham, on expedition to 
South America, 330; chosen 
to command, 330; "Dia- 
dem, ' ' 341, 342 ; weakness 
of Cape, 343; letter to 
Marsden, 344; to take Mon- 
tevideo, 346; recalled, 359; 
to Sterling, 360; trial, 360; 
sentence, 360. 

Population, in Peru, xv; dif- 
ferences in, 5; of Chile, 39, 
46; of reductions, 79; of 

. Lima, 293 ; decreasing, 425. 

Port of Spain, capital of 
Trinidad, 72. 

Port charges, 424. 

Ports, under code of 1778, 
168; large and small, 419. 

Portillo, provincial, 127. 

Porto Bello and trade, 167. 

Portugal supported by Eng- 
land, 74. 

Portugese after armistice, 33; 
at Colonia, 26; advance on 
Uruguay, 31; defend Colo- 
nia, 72; at Mendoza, 171. 

Patagonia, settlements on 
coast, 170. 

Paraguayan missions after 
Jesuits, 171. 

Post, Lima to Buenos Aires, 
374. 

Potosi, xiv, 170, 243, 253; 
mules taken to, 338. 

Poverty in New Granada, 51; 
in Quito, 52. 

Prieto Salazar, mint monop- 
oly, 58. 

Priest, arrested by Viana, 91 ; 
on alcohol, 59; exactions of, 
180. 

Primogeniture in Chile, 408. 

Prince of Bogota, 216. 

Printing office in Buenos 
Aires, 252. 



Property in Paraguay, con- 
fiscated, 24; of Jesuits in 
Chile, 131. 

Protection, Peru vs. Chile, 42. 

Protestant miners, 267, 275. 

Provinces of Rio de la Plata, 
170. 

Provincial 's instructions to 
Jesuits, 79. 

Public works planned by Solis, 
60. 

Pueyrredon 's resistance, 353. 

Puente Eeal, battle of, 211. 

Puno, siege of, 197, 246; 
added to Peru, 393. 

Quesada, advances to Bogota, 
xii. 

Quichua, Kingdom, xiii, lan- 
guage, and dramas forbid- 
den, 190. 

Quina, from New Granada, 
273. 

Quiroz, Canon, killed, 53. 

Quispicanchi, Tupac against, 
184. 

Quito, seat of audiencia, xiii; 
position of, xiv; audiencia 
of, 50; poverty in, 52; re- 
volt in, 98. 

Radical philosophy, 389. 

Ealeigh, 62. 

Rancagua, 44. 

Eaynal, 319. 

Eeal Decreto de Ejecucion, 

104. 
Real estate in church hands, 

301. 
Reductions, the seven, 23 ; 

ceded, 75, 85; submit, 91; 

Indians in military service, 

94; of Chiquitos, 120. 
Reform needed, 172 ; by Cuzco, 

189; internal, 376; difficul- 
ties of, 426. 
Religious houses in Lima, 299, 

n. 
Reseguin, commands Oruro 

troops, 201. 
Restrictions by Spain, 401- 

405. 
Residencia inefficient, 41. 
Revenues royal, 420-425. 



438 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



Revolt, of Tupae, extent of, 
192; local, 179; in Bogota, 
leaders, 207; internal, 311. 

Revolution in Paraguay, 104. 

Revolutionists sent to Spain, 
285. 

Reyes, Diego de los, 16. 

Rimae at Lima, xiv; valley of, 
298. 

Rio de la Plata, x; viceroy - 
alty of, xiv; takes Colonia, 
27. 

Rio Negro, 169. 

Bights of Man, 381. 

Riot in Quito, 100. 

River systems, x; of the south- 
east, 154. 

Road, Santiago to Valparaiso, 
394. 

Rodriguez, Tupac's instructor, 
181, 183. 

Rodriguez, M. S., chief of Bo- 
gota library, 275. 

Rodriguez, Socorro, Manuel 
de, 257. 

Rojas, J. A., with Berney, 
233, 240. 

Rosas, succeeds Salcedo, 33. 

Rozas, Ortiz de, Governor of 
Chile, 45, 46. 

Rousseau, works of, 319. 

Royal exactions in Chile, 229. 

Royal orders on Colonia, 179. 

Ruiloba, Governor of Para- 
guay, 17, 21, 22 ; death, 23 ; 
his murderers executed, 25. 

Ruiz de Berecedo, on Univer- 
sity of Chile, 47. 

Ruiz, Jose, studied under Wal- 
lerius, 267. 

Ruiz, H., botanist, 278. 

Rumors in Europe as to Jes- 
uits, 84. 

Salamanca, Aponte's nephew, 
35; governor of Chile, 40; 
resideneia, 41; not con- 
firmed by king, 41. 

Salcedo succeeds Zabala, 31; 
Governor, 32; lays siege to 
Colonia, 33; deposed, 33. 

Sales by corregidor, 175. 

Salt tax, 424. 

Salta, 251; mules at, 338. 



Salinas of Nemocon, 221. 
Sangarara, Landa at, 187. 
St. Bartholomew, visited by 

Narino, 287. 
San Bernardo, College of, 128. 
"San Esteban," frigate, 32. 
"San Felipe," 44. 
San Fernando, 44. 
San Gabriel, island added to 

Spain, 164. 
San Gil, 208. 
San Ildefonso, treaty of 1777, 

164. 
San Juan River, xiii. 
San Jose de Oruna, in ruins, 

69. 
San Miguel, ceded pueblo, 90. 
Santa Catalina Island, 165. 
Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Jes- 
uits of, 121, 170, 243. 
Santa Fe, Jesuits arrested, 

110. 
Santa Marta, xii. 
Santa Rosa de los Andes, 44. 
Santiago, valley of, xv, 4; at 

end of eighteenth century, 

Chap. XI; intendency of, 

246, 305-308. 
Santo Thome, 61; different 

sites, 63. 
Sorata destroyed, 197. 
Saravia denounced Berney, 

237. 
Savages disappear, 406. 
Science and politics, x. 
Secretary of viceroyalty, 172. 
Segurola at La Paz, 192; 

diary, 192-198, 202. 
Segur in Venezuela, 319. 
Seminario critico, 380. 
Sentence of Tupac, 195. 
Sepee, Guarani chief, 87. 
Serena, 305. 

Settlers at Montevideo, 29, 30. 
Seville in Spain's commerce, 

167; monopoly broken, 168. 
Shipping at Buenos Aires, 

337. 
Ships, of register, 42 ; used by 

Botanical Expedition, 279. 
Siege of La Paz, 198-202. 
Slaves, 165; in Chile, 309; 

trade in, 74. 
Smallpox, in Chile, 39, 307; at 

Trinidad, 69. 



INDEX 



439 



Smuggling, effect on Peru, 
166. 

Sobremonte, viceroy, x, 357. 

Social movements in Quito, 
177; character of Lima, 
297; classes in Peru, 395. 

Society, designed by Spain, 1 ; 
Spanish and Creole, 7, 9, 11 ; 
in Chile, 306. 

Socorro, revolutionary center, 
206; revolt at, 207; sus- 
pends taxes, 208; document 
in verse, 209; insurgents, 
210. 

Solis Folch, viceroy, 59; char- 
ity, 142; enters monastery, 
143, 260. 

Soroeta, Governor of Para- 
guay, 16-19. 

Southeastern districts, 154. 

Southey, quoted, 79. 

Souza Coutinho, of treaty 
commission, 164. 

Spain's control of Indians, 1; 
declining power, 6; declares 
war on Great Britain, 330. 

Spanish-creole separation, 4 ; 
merchants, 12; succession, 
war of, 28; defeat at San- 
garara, 187 ; minister 's 
activity, 332; on English at 
Montevideo, 367; on ap- 
pointments, 383; and Brit- 
ish colonies, 426. 

Spaniards on new ideas, 10; 
reinforced at Cuzco, 190. 

Squadron, Pacific, 45. 

Stamped paper, 423. 

State designed by Miranda, 
325. 

Statistics by Solis, 61. 

Stevenson, quoted, 156 n. 

Sterling, Admiral, 358; on 
Popham's return, 359. 

Stock companies, 412. 

Strays, 423. 

Suffering of Indians, 180. 

Superintendent of treasury, 
168, 173. 

Superunda (Velasco), 13. 

Table Bay, British squadron 

at, 344. 
Tafalla, professor of botany 

at Lima, 289. 



Talca, 44. 

Tallien to Narifio, 286. 

Talmadge, Judge, on "Le- 

ander's" cargo, 331. 
Tarija, Jesuits at, 114. 
Tarma, 246. 

Taxes, 205; in Chile, 229-231. 
Tea of Bogota, 273. 
Tebicuary Biver, 17-24. 
Temple, quoted, 200, n. 
Temperature in Venezuela, xi. 
Tenants on estates, 410. 
Terms granted Buenos Aires 

by British, 351; of White- 

locke's surrender, 365. 
"Tertulia eutropelica, " 257; 

"poetica," 38. 
Tesorero blanquecedor, 58. 
Textiles, of Quito, 53; indus- 
try, 414. 
Theatre at Lima, 303. 
Tinta, province of, 181. 
Titles, sold in Chile, 44, 420; 

taxed, 425. 
Toledo, viceroy, 181. 
Tordesillas, treaty of, 74. 
Trade, 34; Chile-Peru, 42; 

Bio de la Plata, 166; tea 

in Bogota, 273, 323, 381, 

398. 
Traffic, Buenos Aires to Lima, 

338. 
Treachery with Tupac, 194. 
Treasury, royal, 168, 173, 418. 
Treaty, Spanish -Portuguese, 

28, 74, 75, 78, 95, 164. 
Tribute, by Indians, 16, 396, 

421. 
Trinidad, revolt, 68-72, 323. 
Troops, unpaid, 38, 84, 200, n. 
Truce with reductions, 84. 
Tueuman, 34, 170, 243, 244, 

251. 
Turbaco, residence of viceroy, 

272. 
Tupac Amaru, revolt, Chap. 

VI, 177-217. 

Ulloa and Araujo, 54. 
Unanue, Dr., 380. 
Unemployed in Venezuela, 

320, 321. 
United States, influence of, 

282; in New Granada, 290; 

constitutions, 325, 390. 



440 



SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER 



Unions, patriotic, 256. 

University of San Felipe, 46- 
49; of San Marcos, 258, 
299, 375; at Panama, 58. 

Upper Peru, xiv, xv; province 
of, 244. 

Uprising in Quito, 1765, 98; 
1782, 373. 

Uraba, Gulf of, xii. 

Uriarte, on fort at Monte- 
video, 33. 

Uruguay, x; scene of contest, 
26. 

Utrecht, treaty of, 28. 

Valdelerios, boundary commis- 
sioner, 79. 

Valencia, xi. 

Valenzuelas, Elroy de, under 
Mutis, 269. 

Valparaiso, 305 ; slave market, 
310. 

Vancouver, quoted, 394. 

Varinas, province of Vene- 
zuela, 313. 

Vasconcellos, Pedro Antonio 
de, commands Colonia, 31. 

Vasconcelos, Manuel de Gue- 
vara, captain-general of 
Venezuela, 322, 336. 

Vargas, Francisco, 207. 

Venezuela, geography of, x; 
Chap. XII; provinces of, 
313 ; trade, 315 ; population, 
317; bad state of, 320-323. 

"Venus, La," sails with Jes- 
uits, 113. 

Vera Cruz, and trade, 167. 

Veraguas, province of New 
Granada, 58. 

Vergara, Francisco, regent of 
tribunal of accounts, 61. 

Vergara, Padre Manuel, dies 
going into exile, 126. 

Vernon, 14; his plan, 312, n. 

Vertiz, as governor, 161; in 
command after Ceballos, 
163; viceroy, 168; settle- 
ments under, 169, 245, 250; 
establishes a theatre, 250 ; 
founds printing office, 252. 

Viana, campaign against re- 
ductions, 85 ; message to In- 
dians, 86. 

Viceroy, of Peru, 13; repudi- 
ates treaty, 28 ; Villa Garcia 



on Chilean consulado, 44; 
Bucareli, letter, 129; power 
and duties, 153; of Mexico 
and Peru, 155; relation to 
audiencia, 156; restrictions 
on, 156; Stevenson on, 156, 
n. ; relation to Callao, 157 ; 
in Buenos Aires permanent, 
168; power limited, 168; re- 
port to successor, 170; 
under law of Indies, 172; 
powers of, 243; and inten- 
dants, 244, 272; in Peru, 
1776-1816, 372-373. 

Vieeroyalty of Eio, Chap. VI; 
of New Granada, 55; of 
Peru, 153; of Buenos Aires, 
155, 158; of Buenos Aires 
province, 159; independence 
of Peru, 161; organization, 
170, 244. 

Viceregal office suspended, 50. 

Vieja Guayana, 64. 

Vilcamayu, troops at, 194. 

Villegas, J. A. de, on mines, 
262. 

Villegas, Geronimo, plans 
Lima bridge, 294. 

Vine culture near Mendoza, 
163. 

Voyage to South America, 56. 

War, England and Spain, 169. 

"Warships equipped by Amat, 
98. 

Wheat in Chile, xv; growing 
in Peru, 42; price fixed in 
Peru, 43, 405. 

Whitelocke arrives at Buenos 
Aires, 362; reply and sur- 
render, 365; trial and sen- 
tence, 368. 

Women, unmarried, refused 
emigration, 5; education of, 
49. 

Yrujo, Spanish minister, 
war on Caracas, 333. 

Yturriaga boundary commis- 
sioner for the north, 79, 261. 

Zabala in Paraguay, 14, 21, 
24; attacks communeros, 25 ; 
leaves Paraguay, 26, 30-40. 

Zelaya at Quito, 101. 

Zapata, leader at Nieva, 220. 

Zerda, viceroy, 260, 264. 



